Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus

p. 554

Articulus I. De adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere.

Quaestio I. Utrum homini dari potuerit liberum arbitrium inflexibile per naturam.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod homini dari potuerit adiutorium sive liberum arbitrium inflexibile per naturam, hoc est absque gratia superaddita:

1. Primo a simili. Contingit enim reperire lucem corporalem, quam impossibile est per naturam in se obnubilari, sicut lucem empyrei, vel lucem solis. Si ergo lux spiritualis multo permanentior est quam corporalis, videtur, quod anima humana potuit fieri in perfectione tanti luminis per naturam, quod nullo modo posset obscurari, nec per ignorantiam nec per culpam.

2. Item, contingit reperire aliquam substantiam corporalem intransmutabilem quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad proprietates, sicut est corpus ultimum, scilicet empyreum; et hoc non habet solum per gratiam, sed etiam per naturam¹. Ergo pari ratione possibile est, substantiam spiritualem per naturam in tanta stabilitate fieri, quod nullo modo valeat permutari a rectitudine naturali; si enim hoc reperitur in substantia corporali, multo fortius reperiri potest in substantia digniori.

3. Item, gratia est perfectio naturae, et perfectio conformatur suo perfectibili: si ergo gratia confirmationis omnino reddit naturam impossibilem ad peccandum, videtur, quod anima humana naturaliter capax sit talis stabilitatis et invertibilitatis.

Si tu dicas, quod non est capax talis invertibilitatis, nisi mediante gratia; obiicitur contra hoc, quod talis vertibilitas ad malum aut est essentialis ipsi naturae, aut non. Si est essentialis: ergo videtur, quod per gratiam non possit auferri. Si non est essentialis: ergo videtur, quod sine tali vertibilitate ad malum possit natura rationalis fieri, salva sua natura et nulla superaddita gratia. — Propter hoc est quaestio, cum tam liberum arbitrium hominis quam gratia sit quid creatum, sicut patebit infra²: utquid dari potest gratiae inflexibilitas ad malum, et non potest dari creaturae rationali? Videtur enim ratione consimili, quodsi potest dari uni, quod possit dari alteri.

4. Item, licet omnis creatura per se vertibilis sit in natura, aliquae tamen tales creantur a sua origine, quod impossibile est eas corrumpi: et hoc habent sine aliquo addito naturalibus, sicut patet in substantiis simplicibus. Unde Angeli et animae per naturam sunt immortales: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod aliquae animae possint creari per naturam ad malum inflexibiles: videtur ergo fuisse possibile, tale adiutorium a Deo conferri, per quod naturaliter ad malum non posset inflecti³.

Sed contra: 1. Ista duo sunt convertibilia, sicut vult Damascenus⁴ et etiam Augustinus, videlicet esse creabile et esse vertibile. Sic ergo in omni creatura necesse est, esse aliquam vertibilitatem; sed in substantia spirituali non est vertibilitas secundum substantiam: ergo necesse est, quod sit secundum electionem: ergo impossibile est, substantiam creatam habere liberum arbitrium per naturam inflexibile.

2. Item, non est per naturam magis arctatus affectus quam intellectus; sed intellectus, eo ipso quod intellectus est, per naturam suam est natus omnia intelligere⁵: ergo pari ratione affectus per naturam suam est potens hoc vel illud appetere, ergo ab uno oppositorum in alterum transire: ergo omnis affectus creatus, quantum est de natura sua, non solum bonum simpliciter, sed etiam apparens, non solum bonum concessum, sed etiam prohibitum potest velle et praeeligere: ergo etc.

p. 555 3. Item, liberum arbitrium creatum, hoc ipso quod liberum est, dominatur actui suo⁶; hoc ipso quod creatum est, factum est debens aliquid suo Creatori, videlicet honorem: ergo si dominatur suo actui, potest non reddere quod debet; sed hoc est peccatum: ergo necessarium est, liberum arbitrium, quantum est de sua natura, fieri flexibile ad peccatum.

4. Item, si liberum arbitrium per naturam suam esset inflexibile ad malum, ergo stare in bono et facere bonum esset ei naturale: ergo omne opus egrediens a libero arbitrio esset in genere operis naturalis, et nullum esset in genere moris: ergo, si hoc verum est⁷, nullum esset meritorium, nullum etiam esset laudabile, per nullum etiam opus, quod faceret, esset liberum arbitrium ad gloriam ordinabile. Sed hoc est contra naturalem liberi arbitrii institutionem: ergo impossibile est, alicui creaturae dari liberum arbitrium per naturam inflexibile.

Conclusio.

Et ex parte initialis principii et ex parte finalis termini repugnat, ullam rationalem creaturam per naturam habere liberum arbitrium inflexibile ad malum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod impossibile fuit, hominem vel aliquam creaturam rationalem per naturam habere liberum arbitrium inflexibile ad malum. Hoc enim repugnat naturae ipsius creaturae rationalis et a parte principii initialis et a parte termini finalis; et hoc patet sic.

Si enim liberum arbitrium creaturae rationalis fieret naturaliter ad malum inflexibile, aut hoc esset propter ipsius arctationem ad bonum, aut propter ipsius determinationem. Si propter arctationem, ut sic faceret bonum, sicut lapis tendit deorsum; iam certe liberum arbitrium nec esset liberum, nec opus eius esset laude dignum; et ita ineptum esset ad finem, propter quem est factum, videlicet ad laudis et gloriae praemium assequendum. — Si autem inflexibile esset ad malum propter determinationem, quia sic potens esset per propriam naturam in bonum, ut non posset deficere in malo, sicut est de libero arbitrio divino, quod ad sola bona determinatum est; iam tale liberum arbitrium careret vanitate per naturam suam: ergo iam non esset creatura nec productum ex nihilo, cum omnis creatura vanitati subiecta sit⁸; et ita hoc esset contra naturam principii initialis, quantum ad hoc quod dicimus, creaturam rationalem ex nihilo esse productam. — Repugnante igitur natura rationalis creaturae et ex parte initialis principii et ex parte finalis termini, impossibile fuit, hominem, vel aliam quamcumque creaturam rationalem liberum arbitrium habere per naturam ad malum inflexibile. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de luce corporali, dicendum, quod non est simile, tum propter hoc, quod fons lucis corporalis reperiri potest in genere creaturae, fons autem lucis spiritualis non reperitur in genere creaturae, sed est ipse Creator, iuxta illud, Ecclesiastici primo⁹: Fons sapientiae Verbum Dei in excelsis; tum etiam, quia lux corporalis respectu actus lucendi habet arctationem, adeo ut lucere eius non sit laudabile, sed pure naturale. Non sic est de rectitudine et operatione rationalis creaturae, sive voluntatis deliberativae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliqua substantia corporalis per naturam est immutabilis etc.; iam patet responsio per hoc, quod non valet sive non decet, creaturam spiritualem sic esse arctatam ad opus suum, sicut corporalem; sive etiam, quia non tenet summum in genere spiritus, sicut aliqua creatura corporalis tenet summum in genere corporum. — Verumtamen dici posset, quod omne corpus mutabile est aliquo genere mutationis, sicut vult Augustinus¹⁰, sive quia ipsum mutatur in se, sive quia aliqua mutantur in ipso; et hoc ultimo modo mutatio posset esse in empyreo.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de gratia confirmante, dicendum, quod gratia dicitur esse perfectio naturae non solum, quia adiuvat, sed etiam, quia defectum eius excludit. Unde in omni natura creaturae rationalis est aliquis defectus naturalis, qui per gratiam habet excludi, quantumcumque illa natura sit in genere creaturae perfecta¹¹. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi aliquid convenit alicui per gratiam, quod conveniat per naturam. Et si obiiciatur, quod Deus potuit dare naturae, quod dedit gratiae; dicendum, quod natura non fuit nata suscipere. Sicut enim alia est natura operis moralis, alia operis naturalis, nec proprietas operis moralis potest convenire operi naturali, nisi naturale desineret esse naturale — non enim potest laus et vituperium, quae est proprietas operis moralis, secundum quod huiusmodi, competere operi naturali, in quantum tale — sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de immortalitate, iam patet responsio per praedicta. Quod enim naturaliter est immortale ex hoc non est laudabile, vel vituperabile; et ita, si liberum arbitrium inflexibile creatum esset, nec laudis nec vituperii capax esset.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio, utrum possibile sit, quod creatura secundum conditionem naturae sit impeccabilis, connexa est cum ea quae quoad impeccabilitatem supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. agit de congruentia facti. Utraque quaestio, praesertim autem haec, convenit cum iis quae leguntur in Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 2. § 2. et (de hac) § 3. (cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. schol.). — Conclusio communiter tenetur; sed Durand. (II. Sent. d. 23. q. 1.) respondet cum distinctione sic: « Nulla creatura intellectualis potest esse impeccabilis per naturam quoad eligibilia, quae deducuntur ex principiis legis supernaturalis fidei, vel disciplinae, licet possit esse impeccabilis quoad solum dictamen rationis naturalis, nisi haec deducerentur ex altiore principio, ut dictum est ». — Scot. (in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 23. q. unica) in conclusione quidem convenit, sed quia ipse, si agitur de possibilitate, Deo plus tribuere solet quam alii doctores, etiam hic argumenta rationis non sufficere putat, et de rationibus Alexandri et S. Bonaventurae dicit (ibid. n. 5.), quod non concludunt, quibus adiicit duas alias tanquam probabiles. Tamen affirmat (ibid. n. 7.), se tenere dictam conclusionem magis propter auctoritates.

II. Commentatores Lombardi de hac quaest. tractant II. Sent. d. 23, et quidem quaest. 1. Quibus adde S. Thom., S. 1. q. 63. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 108. seq.

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English Translation

Article I. On the help conferred upon man, by which he might be able to resist.

Question I. Whether free choice unbendable by nature could be given to man.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that there could be given to man a help, that is, a free choice unbendable by nature, that is, apart from superadded grace:

1. First, from a similitude. For it happens that one finds a corporeal light which it is impossible by nature to be darkened in itself, such as the light of the empyrean, or the light of the sun. If therefore spiritual light is far more permanent than corporeal, it seems that the human soul could have been made in the perfection of so great a light by nature, such that it could in no way be obscured, neither through ignorance nor through fault.

2. Likewise, it happens that one finds some corporeal substance unchangeable as to its substance and as to its properties, such as the outermost body, namely the empyrean; and this it has not only through grace, but also through nature¹. Therefore by parity of reasoning it is possible that a spiritual substance be made by nature in such great stability that it can in no way be turned away from natural rectitude; for if this is found in a corporeal substance, much more strongly can it be found in a more dignified substance.

3. Likewise, grace is the perfection of nature, and a perfection is conformed to its perfectible subject: if therefore the grace of confirmation renders nature wholly incapable of sinning, it seems that the human soul is naturally capable of such stability and unbendableness.

If you say that it is not capable of such unbendableness except by the mediation of grace; it is objected against this that such bendability toward evil is either essential to the nature itself, or not. If it is essential: then it seems that it cannot be removed through grace. If it is not essential: then it seems that without such bendability toward evil the rational nature could be made, its own nature preserved and with no superadded grace. — On this account there is a question, since both the free choice of man and grace are something created, as will be made clear below²: why can unbendableness toward evil be given to grace, and yet cannot be given to the rational creature? For it seems by a like reasoning that if it can be given to one, it can be given to the other.

4. Likewise, although every creature is in itself bendable in its nature, yet some are so created from their origin that it is impossible for them to be corrupted: and this they have without anything added to their natural endowments, as is clear in the case of simple substances. Hence the Angels and souls are by nature immortal: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that some souls can be created by nature unbendable toward evil: it seems therefore to have been possible for such a help to be conferred by God, by which one could not be bent toward evil by nature³.

On the contrary: 1. These two are convertible, as Damascene⁴ and also Augustine hold, namely to be creatable and to be bendable. So therefore in every creature there must be some bendability; but in a spiritual substance there is no bendability according to substance: therefore there must be bendability according to choice: therefore it is impossible for a created substance to have free choice unbendable by nature.

2. Likewise, the affective power is not by nature more constrained than the intellect; but the intellect, by the very fact that it is intellect, is by its own nature born to understand all things⁵: therefore by parity of reasoning the affective power is by its own nature able to desire this or that, and therefore to pass from one of two opposites into the other: therefore every created affective power, as far as concerns its own nature, can will and prefer not only the good simply, but also the apparent good, not only the good that is permitted, but also that which is forbidden: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, created free choice, by the very fact that it is free, is master of its own act⁶; by the very fact that it is created, it has been made to owe something to its Creator, namely honor: therefore if it is master of its own act, it can fail to render what it owes; but this is sin: therefore it is necessary that free choice, as far as concerns its own nature, be made bendable toward sin.

4. Likewise, if free choice were by its own nature unbendable toward evil, then to stand in the good and to do good would be natural to it: therefore every work proceeding from free choice would be in the genus of a natural work, and none would be in the genus of moral conduct: therefore, if this is true⁷, none would be meritorious, none would be praiseworthy, and free choice would be ordainable to glory through no work that it might do. But this is contrary to the natural institution of free choice: therefore it is impossible for free choice unbendable by nature to be given to any creature.

Conclusio.

Both on the side of the initial principle and on the side of the final term it is repugnant that any rational creature should have, by nature, free choice unbendable toward evil.

I respond: It must be said that it was impossible for man or any rational creature to have, by nature, free choice unbendable toward evil. For this is repugnant to the nature of the rational creature itself both on the side of the initial principle and on the side of the final term; and this is clear thus.

For if the free choice of the rational creature were to become naturally unbendable toward evil, this would be either on account of its constraint toward the good, or on account of its determination. If on account of constraint, so that it would do good as a stone tends downward; then surely free choice would neither be free, nor would its work be worthy of praise; and thus it would be unsuited to the end for which it was made, namely to the attaining of the reward of praise and glory. — But if it were unbendable toward evil on account of determination, because it would be so capable through its own nature with regard to the good that it could not fall into evil, as is the case with the divine free choice, which is determined to goods alone; then such free choice would lack mutability by its own nature: therefore it would no longer be a creature nor produced from nothing, since every creature is subject to vanity⁸; and thus this would be contrary to the nature of the initial principle, as to that which we say, that the rational creature was produced from nothing. — Since therefore the nature of the rational creature is repugnant both on the side of the initial principle and on the side of the final term, it was impossible for man, or any other rational creature, to have free choice unbendable toward evil by nature. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first concerning corporeal light, it must be said that it is not similar, both on account of the fact that the source of corporeal light can be found within the genus of creature, whereas the source of spiritual light is not found within the genus of creature, but is the Creator himself, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter one⁹: The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high; and also because corporeal light has a constraint with respect to the act of shining, so much so that its shining is not praiseworthy, but purely natural. It is not so with the rectitude and operation of the rational creature, that is, of the deliberative will.

2. To that which is objected, that some corporeal substance is by nature unchangeable, etc.; the response is now clear from this, that it is not fitting or proper that a spiritual creature be so constrained to its work as a corporeal one; or also because it does not hold the highest place in the genus of spirit, as some corporeal creature holds the highest place in the genus of bodies. — Nevertheless it could be said that every body is changeable by some kind of change, as Augustine holds¹⁰, either because it is changed in itself, or because some things are changed within it; and in this last way change could be in the empyrean.

3. To that which is objected concerning confirming grace, it must be said that grace is said to be the perfection of nature not only because it aids, but also because it excludes a defect of it. Hence in every nature of a rational creature there is some natural defect which is to be excluded through grace, however perfect that nature may be within the genus of creature¹¹. And therefore it does not follow that, if something belongs to a thing through grace, it belongs to it through nature. And if it is objected that God could have given to nature what he gave to grace; it must be said that nature was not born to receive it. For just as the nature of a moral work is one thing, and that of a natural work another, nor can a property of a moral work belong to a natural work unless the natural ceased to be natural — for praise and blame, which is a property of a moral work as such, cannot belong to a natural work as such — so too in the matter at hand it is to be understood to be the case.

4. To that which is objected concerning immortality, the response is now clear from what has been said. For that which is naturally immortal is on that account neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy; and thus, if free choice unbendable were created, it would be capable neither of praise nor of blame.

Scholion

I. This question, whether it is possible that a creature according to the condition of its nature be impeccable, is connected with that which, regarding impeccability, above in d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, treats of the fittingness of the fact. Each question, but especially this one, agrees with what is read in Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 2, § 2, and (concerning this) § 3 (cf. above d. 23, a. 2, q. 1, scholion). — The conclusion is commonly held; but Durandus (II Sent., d. 23, q. 1) responds with a distinction thus: « No intellectual creature can be impeccable by nature as to the eligible things which are deduced from the principles of the supernatural law of faith, or of discipline, although it can be impeccable as to the mere dictate of natural reason, unless these were deduced from a higher principle, as has been said ». — Scotus (in both his works on II Sent., d. 23, q. unica) does indeed agree in the conclusion, but because he, when it is a matter of possibility, is wont to attribute more to God than do other doctors, here too he thinks the arguments of reason insufficient, and concerning the reasons of Alexander and St. Bonaventure he says (ibid. n. 5) that they are not conclusive, to which he adds two others as probable. Yet he affirms (ibid. n. 7) that he holds the said conclusion rather on account of the authorities.

II. The commentators on Lombard treat of this question in II Sent., d. 23, and indeed in question 1. To these add St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 63, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 108 seq.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — In principio arg. Vat. reperiri pro reperire.
Cf. above d. 2, p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — At the beginning of the argument the Vatican edition reads reperiri for reperire.
Dist. 26. q. 2. — Paulo post edd. 3, 4 et Vat. voci gratiae praefigunt ipsi.
Dist. 26, q. 2. — A little later editions 3 and 4 and the Vatican edition prefix ipsi to the word gratiae.
Vat. in naturam, codd. F Y in nihil. Circa finem arg. pro a Deo codd. W Z substituunt Adam.
The Vatican edition reads in naturam, codices F Y in nihil. Near the end of the argument, for a Deo codices W Z substitute Adam.
Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27. — August., de Natura boni, c. 1; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. n. 3.
Book I, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3, and Book II, c. 27. — Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, c. 1; Book XII, On the City of God, c. 1, n. 3.
Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 4. seqq. (c. 4.). De seq. prop. vide supra pag. 183, nota 7. — Paulo inferius desunt in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 verba non solum bonum simpliciter, sed etiam apparens.
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 4 ff. (c. 4). On the following proposition see above page 183, note 7. — A little below, the words non solum bonum simpliciter, sed etiam apparens are lacking in the Vatican edition and in editions 3, 4.
Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 5. — Mox plures codd. omittunt factum, alii debens; Vat. etiam omittit factum et dein pro est debens substituit debet.
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 5. — Soon after, several codices omit factum, others debens; the Vatican edition also omits factum and then for est debens substitutes debet.
Codd. F Y esset. In ultima huius arg. conclus. auctoritate codd. cc et ed. 1 commutavimus dare, quod Vat. cum aliis codd. exhibet, in dari. — Cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 8.
Codices F Y read esset. In the final conclusion of this argument, on the authority of codices cc and edition 1, we have changed dare, which the Vatican edition with the other codices exhibits, into dari. — Cf. above page 113, note 8.
Rom. 8, 20: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est. — Paulo inferius multi codd. cum primis edd. post quantum ad omittunt hoc, pro quo Vat. id contra codd. H Y (T W a sec. manu).
Rom. 8:20: For the creature was made subject to vanity. — A little below, many codices with the first editions omit hoc after quantum ad, for which the Vatican edition reads id against codices H Y (T W by a second hand).
Eccli. 1, 5: Fons sapientiae Verbum Dei in excelsis. — Vers. B. In fine solut. pro deliberativae plures codd., inter quos C L M R S T aa, deliberatione.
Ecclus. 1:5: The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high. — Version B. At the end of the solution, for deliberativae several codices, among them C L M R S T aa, read deliberatione.
Libr. III. de Trin. c. 10. n. 21; VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 19. et VIII. c. 20. n. 39. seqq. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 31, nota 9. — Edd. 1, 4 cum Vat. sicut universaliter vult Augustinus. Paulo inferius pro sive quia aliqua mutantur in ipso (i. e. extrinsece) aliqui codd., ut C H R T ee, sive quia aliqua mutatio est in ipso.
Book III, On the Trinity, c. 10, n. 21; Book VII, On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 12, n. 19, and Book VIII, c. 20, n. 39 ff. Cf. also above page 31, note 9. — Editions 1, 4 with the Vatican edition read sicut universaliter vult Augustinus. A little below, for sive quia aliqua mutantur in ipso (i.e. extrinsically) some codices, such as C H R T ee, read sive quia aliqua mutatio est in ipso.
Cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
Cf. below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 seq. ---

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