Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 5
ARTICULUS I.
De aversione luciferi.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum lucifer peccaverit peccato superbiae.
Quod autem peccaverit peccato superbiae, videtur sic.
1. Super illud Lucae decimo1: Videbam satanam etc., Glossa: «Qui singulariter elatus erat, ut in eius casu ceteri de elatione timerent».
2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo2: Initium omnis peccati superbia; sed primum inter omnia peccata fuit peccatum diaboli: ergo etc.
3. Item, Augustinus undecimo super Genesim ad litteram3: «Factus continuo se a luce veritatis avertit, superbia tumidus et propriae potestatis delectatione corruptus».
4. Item, Isidorus de Summo Bono, libro primo, capitulo decimo4: «Mox ut factus est, in superbiam erupit et praecipitatus de caelo est».
5. Item, ratione videtur, quia non contingit peccare nisi tripliciter, videlicet aut ex concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia vitae5. Sed primum peccatum non potuit esse carnis concupiscentia, nec potuit esse appetitus divitiarum, quia spiritus istis non indiget: ergo necesse est, quod fuerit superbia vitae.
6. Item, peccatorum spiritualium non sunt nisi quatuor genera praeter avaritiam, quae tenet quasi medium inter carnalia et spiritualia, scilicet superbia, ira, accidia, invidia; sed in omnibus tribus generibus est odium: ergo cum omne odium causetur ab amore, odium inordinatum causatur ab amore inordinato6: ergo ante ista tria genera oportet aliquod peccatum spirituale praecedere in diabolo. Sed hoc non potuit esse nisi superbia: ergo etc.
7. Item, nunquam pervertitur affectus, nisi prius pervertatur iudicium; nunquam pervertitur iudicium in his quae sunt de necessitate salutis, nisi aliqua excaecatio sit in ratione: ergo excaecatio rationis praecedit omnem appetitum. Sed excaecatio non potest esse, quin praecesserit peccatum; et non potuit praecedere peccatum appetitus: ergo praecessit peccatum praesumtionis; sed hoc est peccatum superbiae: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Quod fuerit primum peccatum omissio, videtur, quia, si ipse deliberasset, utrum illud esset appetendum, nunquam peccasset, nec aliter vitare poterat: ergo tenebatur deliberare; et ante omisit deliberare, quam illud appeteret: ergo ante omisit, quam superbiret. Si forte dicas, quod per intellectum deiformem poterat sine deliberatione videre, quid faciendum; contra: ad hoc, quod ipse hoc inspiceret, oportuit ipsum considerare circumstantias appetiti et consequentia, et ista sunt multa; sed simplex virtutis finitae, quod cognoscit multa per multa, impossibile est simul multa cognoscere, cum se totaliter convertat ad cognitum7: ergo necesse habuit deliberare. Praeterea, hoc non solvit, quia quidquid esset, tenebatur vitare peccatum, tenebatur reprimere cogitationem suam, ne procederet ad consensum, et hoc, antequam consentiret: ergo ante omisit: ergo etc.
2. Item, videtur, quod peccato ingratitudinis. Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis8: «Quia gratuitae bonitati Dei, a qua conditus es, ingratus existis, iustitiam, quam expertus non es, non metuis; ideo audacter culpam committis»: ergo ante fuit ingratus, quam committeret culpam illam superbiae.
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia tenetur quis gratias agere de beneficiis, quando illa considerat; sed diabolus consideravit beneficia Dei, cum respexit9 suam pulcritudinem et excellentiam, et non egit gratias, immo oppositum fecit, quia voluit sibi attribuere quod Dei erat: ergo etc.
4. Item, videtur, quod peccato infidelitatis, quia Anselmus de Peccato diaboli et Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis10 dicunt, quod diabolus non credidit, se esse puniendum, sive credidit, se non debere puniri; sed qui credit, peccatum a Deo impunitum relinqui, est infidelis: ergo diabolus, antequam peccaret appetendo, peccavit per infidelitatem.
5. Item, ratione videtur: diabolus nunquam appetivisset, nisi credidisset, sibi esse bonum vel p. 146possibile; sed omnis qui credit, creaturam posse aequari ipsi Creatori, est infidelis: ergo diabolus, antequam superbiret, infidelis fuit.
6. Item, videtur, quod peccatum curiositatis fuerit primum. Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis, capitulo decimo11: «Per curiositatem a veritate cecidit, quia quod prius spectavit curiose, affectavit illicite et speravit praesumtuose».
7. Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia curiositatis vitium est diligenter respicere, quod non licet appetere, secundum illud: «Non licet intueri quod non licet concupisci12»; sed diabolus diligenter aspexit quod supra se erat, quando dixit: In caelum ascendam: ergo manifestum etc.
8. Item, quod invidia fuerit, videtur. Augustinus de Sancta Virginitate13, loquens de superbia et invidia: «His duobus diabolus diabolus est»; sed in primo peccato factus est diabolus: ergo fuit simul invidia ut superbia: ergo qua ratione superbia primum, et invidia.
9. Item, ratione Magistri14 videtur: «Sicut converti est caritate adhaerere, ita ab oppositis averti est odio habere vel invidere»: cum ergo primo peccato diabolus fuerit aversus, invidia fuit eius primum peccatum.
Conclusio.
Primum Angeli peccatum fuit superbia; quod initiatum est in praesumtione, consummatum in ambitione, confirmatum in invidiae et odii aversione.
Respondeo: Ad hoc notandum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere ad praedictas rationes et auctoritates, quod diabolus simul tempore peccavit pluribus generibus peccatorum; naturaliter tamen et principaliter prae aliis peccatis fuit peccatum superbiae. Et sic respondent unica et brevi responsione ad omnia obiecta, quod verum concludunt. — Sed haec responsio nec verum dicit, nec solvit. Non dicit verum, quia, cum affectus diaboli simplex sit, sicut et intellectus, et intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere vel plures cogitationes habere, similiter nec affectus simul et in eodem instanti plura peccata committere, maxime quae spectant omnino ad diversas actiones, sicut infidelitas, superbia et invidia. Praeterea, esto quod vera esset15, non solvit, quia praedictae rationes non tantum probant, quod praedicta peccata concomitentur superbiam, sed quod antecedant.
Et ideo aliter est dicendum, quod est loqui de peccato quantum ad triplicem statum, scilicet quantum ad inchoationem, consummationem et confirmationem. Peccatum diaboli initiatum est in praesumtione, statim enim, ut suam vidit pulcritudinem, praesumsit; consummatum est in ambitione, quia praesumens de se appetiit quod omnino supra se fuit et ad quod pervenire non potuit; sed confirmatum est invidiae et odii aversione, quia ex quo obtinere non potuit quod appetiit, ideo invidere coepit et affectu odii contraire. Et in hoc firmatus est, quia hoc16 omnino ipsum a Deo separavit et perfectum obstaculum posuit, sicut perfecta caritas perfecte Deo iungit.
Concedendae ergo sunt rationes primae, quod superbia fuerit primum peccatum; nam superbia praesumtionis et tumoris primum fuit generatione, superbia ambitionis primum fuit consummatione.
Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de omissione, notandum, quod omissio nec fuit nec potuit esse principale peccatum sive primum, quia dimissio boni venit ex timore male humiliante, et omnis talis timor venit ex amore male inflammante17. Unde nullus dimittit aliquid facere quod debet, nisi aliquid amet, quod non debet; sicut aliquis omittit ire ad matutinum, quia amat somnum et quietem in lectulo. — Hac eadem ratione non potuit primum18 esse ingratitudo, nec etiam invidia. — Dicendum est igitur, quod non quaecumque dimissio inducit peccatum omissionis. Contingit enim omittere circumstantiam, et tunc non est peccatum omissionis, sed negligentia quaedam. Contingit omittere actum, et hoc dupliciter: vel generaliter, vel specialiter; generaliter, secundum quod comprehendit praeceptum affirmativum et negativum; specialiter19 contra affirmativum, sicut transgressio contra negativum. Unde non omittit qui non vitat fornicationem, sed qui non honorat parentes. Et secundum quod est actus specialis, potest esse actus principalis, vel non principalis. Et non est omissio peccatum principale, nisi pro actu principali, sicut patet de eo qui tep. 147netur ire ad matutinas, tenetur se induere et surgere de lecto, et sic de aliis; et quamvis sint multi actus, una est omissio. Ad hoc autem, quod sit peccatum aliquod censendum esse peccatum omissionis, oportet, quod sit omissio actus, non circumstantiae; affirmativi20, non negativi; principalis, non annexi. — Sic autem patet, quod non est in proposito, quia diabolus actum principalem aliquem, ad quem teneretur, non dimisit, sed id appetiit, quod non debuit. Et sic patet breviter de omissione.
Ad 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ingratitudine, dicendum, quod ingratitudo potest dici dupliciter, scilicet negative, vel privative21. Negative, quando quis non est gratus Deo, ut debet, et sic est circumstantia omnium peccatorum. Privative, quando non tantum non est gratus, immo contrarie movetur, ut puta quando cogitat de beneficio, ut est beneficium, et parvipendit beneficium vel benefactorem; et sic est speciale peccatum. Sic autem non peccavit diabolus, quia non cogitavit de beneficiis Dei, in quantum erant Dei, sed in quantum erant bona propria, et ideo elatus est.
Ad 4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infidelitate, dicendum, quod nec peccatum infidelitatis nec curiositatis fuit primum, quia oculus sanus et clarus ipsius intellectus non pervertitur in iudicando vel inquirendo, nisi prius aliqua elatione inquinetur22.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non credidit etc.; dicendum, quod ad infidelitatis peccatum duo concurrunt. Oportet enim, quod sit consensus rationis cum iudicio universali. Si enim aliquis cogitat, quod fornicari est sibi bonum; vel cogitat in universali, quod est bonum, et non consentit iudicio rationis23, non est infidelis, ut patet. Et de diabolo dico, quod non consensit iudicio rationis, sed aestimavit sibi bonum.
Ad 6. 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de curiositate, dicendum, quod duo faciunt considerationem dici curiosam, scilicet curae attentio et utilitatis privatio24. Unde si diabolus ex omnibus quae respexit, suum bonum elicuisset, referendo illa in gloriam Dei; illa consideratio nec esset culpanda nec curiosa dicenda. Quod ergo fuit curiosa, ex hoc fuit, quod non suum25 bonum inde elicuit, sed malum ambitionis et praesumtionis incurrit; et ita est primo ratio peccati in praesumtione et in consideratione. Et sic patet, quod quamvis in diabolo fuerit curiositas, non fuit culpa antecedens praesumtionem, nec alia, sed conditio illi annexa.
Ad 8. 9. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de invidia, patet responsio per verbum Augustini, quod non fuit primum peccatum. Nam Augustinus dicit, quod est proles superbiae, in libro de Virginitate26, et ita eam consequitur, etsi non in eodem instanti, tamen in eodem tempore sine morae intermissione. Unde in huius prolis generatione confirmata est superbia, et diabolus dictus est diabolus, quia deorsum fluxit27 et ex hoc in malitia sua firmatus fuit. Et ideo Magister describens perfectam aversionem, qualis est in diabolo, non qualis est in hominibus peccatoribus, dicit, quod «averti est odio habere vel invidere». Diabolus enim superbus non valens conscendere, sed compulsus descendere, odit Deum iustum et invidet excellentiae eius.
I. Fide constat, aliquos Angelos peccasse; theologi in hoc etiam consentiunt, quod nulla creatura ex natura sua esse possit omnino impeccabilis in ordine ad finem tum naturalem tum supernaturalem. Respectu autem finis et legis naturalis S. Thom. (S. q. 63. a. 1. ad 3; de Malo, q. 16. a. 3, et a. 5. ad 10.) censet, Angelos directe et immediate non contra hunc finem et legem, sed tantum contra finem et legem supernaturalem potuisse peccare. S. Bonav. autem, Scot. aliique multi omnem creaturam peccabilem esse sine restrictione dicunt (cfr. infra d. 24. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.).
II. Primum peccatum luciferi in superbia ponendum esse, communiter tenetur. Quod etiam Alex. Hal. docet, sed addit: «Et radix eius avaritia vel cupiditas», scil. in sensu largiore. Scotus autem putat, illud non esse superbiam proprie dictam, quam intelligit esse appetitum immoderatum excellentiae per respectum ad alios; sed potius reducendam esse ad quandam luxuriam spiritualem. Porro doctores in hoc convenire videntur, quod initium huius peccati non consistat in appetendo aliquod bonum non habitum, sed in amando inordinate bonum, quod Angelus habuit; sive quod ipse peccare incepit ab inordinato amore non cuiuscumque, sed sui ipsius. Et cum inordinatus amor recurvetur in se ipsum, hinc ille sibi complacuit, et motus complacentia excellentiae in se ipso considerata, prorupit in appetitum inordinatum alicuius obiecti, vel per se ipsi non concessi, vel saltem inordinato modo desiderati. Sed de hoc progressu in peccando, et praecipue de p. 148obiecto ab ipso appetito (de quo agitur seq. quaest.), diversae sunt sententiae, vel saltem modi loquendi. Hunc progressum in peccando S. Bonav. egregie hic et clarius in Breviloquio (p. II. c. 7.) adumbrat, ubi dicit: «Lucifer, suae pulcritudinis et altitudinis consideratione excitatus ad se diligendum et suum privatum bonum, praesumsit de altitudine habita et ambivit excellentiam propriam, non tamen obtentam; ac per hoc praesumendo constituit se sibi principium summum, in se ipso gloriando; et ambiendo constituit se sibi summum bonum, in se ipso quiescendo». Ex his verbis, ni fallimur, apparet, verba (in corp.) in praesumtione sensu largiore accipienda esse pro actu, quo voluit esse bonus et magnus secundum se et non per aliud; totam autem sententiam Seraphici congruere cum iis quae de peccato Adami dicit S. Augustinus (XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 1.): «Quid est autem superbia nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Perversa enim celsitudo est, deserto eo cui debet animus inhaerere principio, sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, dum sibi nimis placet. Sibi vero ita placet, qui ab illo bono incommutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit, quam ipse sibi». Cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 1.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 2. — Scotus, in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 63. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 103. 110. — C. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 6. q. unica.
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ARTICLE I.
On the aversion of Lucifer.
QUESTION I.
Whether Lucifer sinned by the sin of pride.
That he sinned by the sin of pride, it seems thus.
1. On that text of Luke, chapter ten1: I saw Satan etc., the Gloss: «Who was so singularly elated that, at his fall, the rest might fear elation».
2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter ten2: The beginning of every sin is pride; but the first among all sins was the sin of the devil: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, Augustine, on the eleventh [book] On Genesis according to the letter3: «Made [good], he straightway turned himself away from the light of truth, swollen with pride and corrupted by the delight of his own power».
4. Likewise, Isidore, On the Highest Good, book one, chapter ten4: «As soon as he was made, he burst into pride and was hurled down from heaven».
5. Likewise, it seems by reason, because one does not happen to sin except in three ways, namely either from concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the eyes, or pride of life5. But the first sin could not be concupiscence of the flesh, nor could it be the appetite for riches, since a spirit does not need these things: therefore it must be that it was pride of life.
6. Likewise, of spiritual sins there are only four kinds besides avarice, which holds as it were the middle between the carnal and the spiritual, namely pride, anger, sloth, envy; but in all three kinds there is hatred: therefore, since all hatred is caused by love, inordinate hatred is caused by inordinate love6: therefore before these three kinds some spiritual sin must precede in the devil. But this could not be except pride: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, the affection is never perverted unless the judgment is first perverted; the judgment is never perverted in those things which are of the necessity of salvation unless there is some blinding in the reason: therefore a blinding of reason precedes every appetite. But a blinding cannot be unless a sin preceded; and a sin of appetite could not precede: therefore a sin of presumption preceded; but this is the sin of pride: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. That the first sin was omission, it seems, because, if he had deliberated whether that thing was to be desired, he would never have sinned, nor could he avoid it otherwise: therefore he was bound to deliberate; and he omitted to deliberate before he desired that thing: therefore he omitted before he was proud. If perhaps you say that through a deiform intellect he could see without deliberation what was to be done; on the contrary: for him to inspect this, it was necessary for him to consider the circumstances of the thing desired and the consequences, and these are many; but for a simple [power] of finite virtue, which knows many things through many, it is impossible to know many things at once, since it turns itself wholly to the thing known7: therefore he had to deliberate. Moreover, this does not solve [it], because, whatever it might be, he was bound to avoid sin, he was bound to repress his thought lest it proceed to consent, and this before he consented: therefore he omitted beforehand: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, it seems [that he sinned] by the sin of ingratitude. Bernard, On the Steps of Humility8: «Because to the gratuitous goodness of God, by which you were made, you show yourself ungrateful; the justice which you have not experienced you do not fear; therefore you boldly commit the fault»: therefore he was ungrateful before he committed that fault of pride.
3. Likewise, it seems by reason, because one is bound to give thanks for benefits when he considers them; but the devil considered the benefits of God, when he beheld9 his own beauty and excellence, and did not give thanks, nay did the opposite, because he wished to attribute to himself what was God's: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, it seems [that he sinned] by the sin of infidelity, because Anselm, On the Sin of the Devil, and Bernard, On the Steps of Humility10, say that the devil did not believe that he was to be punished, or believed that he ought not to be punished; but whoever believes that a sin is left unpunished by God is unfaithful: therefore the devil, before he sinned by desiring, sinned through infidelity.
5. Likewise, it seems by reason: the devil would never have desired unless he had believed it to be good or p. 146possible for himself; but everyone who believes that a creature can be made equal to the Creator himself is unfaithful: therefore the devil, before he was proud, was unfaithful.
6. Likewise, it seems that the sin of curiosity was the first. Bernard, On the Steps of Humility, chapter ten11: «Through curiosity he fell from the truth, because what he first beheld curiously, he affected illicitly and hoped for presumptuously».
7. Likewise, this seems by reason: because the vice of curiosity is to look diligently at what it is not licit to desire, according to that [saying]: «It is not licit to gaze upon what it is not licit to covet12»; but the devil diligently looked at what was above himself, when he said: I will ascend into heaven: therefore [it is] manifest etc.
8. Likewise, that there was envy, it seems. Augustine, On Holy Virginity13, speaking of pride and envy: «By these two the devil is a devil»; but in the first sin he was made a devil: therefore there was envy together with pride: therefore by the same reasoning as pride was first, so also envy.
9. Likewise, it seems by the reasoning of the Master14: «As to be converted is to adhere by charity, so to be averted from the opposites is to hold in hatred or to envy»: since therefore in the first sin the devil was averted, envy was his first sin.
Conclusion.
The first sin of the Angel was pride; which was initiated in presumption, consummated in ambition, confirmed in the aversion of envy and hatred.
I respond: It must be noted on this point that some wished to say, to the aforesaid arguments and authorities, that the devil sinned at the same time by several kinds of sins; yet naturally and principally, before the other sins, it was the sin of pride. And thus they answer with a single brief response to all the objections, that they conclude what is true. — But this response neither says what is true nor solves [it]. It does not say what is true, because, since the devil's affection is simple, as also his intellect, and the intellect cannot understand many things at once or have several thoughts, similarly neither can the affection commit several sins at once and in the same instant, especially those which pertain wholly to diverse actions, such as infidelity, pride, and envy. Moreover, granted that it were true15, it does not solve [it], because the aforesaid arguments prove not only that the aforesaid sins accompany pride, but that they precede [it].
And therefore it must be said otherwise, that one may speak of the sin with respect to a threefold state, namely with respect to inception, consummation, and confirmation. The devil's sin was initiated in presumption, for at once, as he saw his own beauty, he presumed; it was consummated in ambition, because, presuming about himself, he desired what was wholly above himself and to which he could not attain; but it was confirmed by the aversion of envy and hatred, because, since he could not obtain what he desired, he therefore began to envy and to go against [God] with the affection of hatred. And in this he was made firm, because this16 wholly separated him from God and set up a perfect obstacle, just as perfect charity perfectly joins to God.
The first arguments are therefore to be conceded, that pride was the first sin; for the pride of presumption and swelling was first in generation, the pride of ambition was first in consummation.
To 1. To that which is objected concerning omission, it must be noted that omission neither was nor could be a principal or first sin, because the relinquishing of a good comes from fear that badly humbles, and every such fear comes from love that badly inflames17. Hence no one relinquishes doing something he ought to do unless he loves something he ought not [to love]; just as someone omits to go to matins because he loves sleep and rest in his little bed. — By this same reasoning ingratitude could not be the first18, nor even envy. — It must therefore be said that not every relinquishing induces the sin of omission. For it happens that one omits a circumstance, and then there is not a sin of omission, but a certain negligence. It happens that one omits an act, and this in two ways: either generally or specially; generally, according as it comprehends an affirmative and negative precept; specially19 against the affirmative, as a transgression [is] against the negative. Hence he does not omit who does not avoid fornication, but he who does not honor [his] parents. And according as it is a special act, it can be a principal act or a non-principal one. And omission is not a principal sin except for a principal act, as is clear of him who is p. 147bound to go to matins, [and] is bound to dress himself and rise from bed, and so of the rest; and although there are many acts, there is one omission. But for some sin to be reckoned a sin of omission, it is required that it be an omission of an act, not of a circumstance; of an affirmative20, not a negative; of a principal, not an annexed [one]. — Thus it is clear that it is not so in the case at issue, because the devil did not relinquish some principal act to which he was bound, but desired what he ought not. And so it is briefly clear concerning omission.
To 2. 3. To that which is objected concerning ingratitude, it must be said that ingratitude can be spoken of in two ways, namely negatively or privatively21. Negatively, when someone is not grateful to God as he ought, and thus it is a circumstance of all sins. Privatively, when not only is he not grateful, but nay is moved contrariwise, as for instance when he thinks of a benefit, as it is a benefit, and makes little of the benefit or the benefactor; and thus it is a special sin. But the devil did not sin in this way, because he did not think of the benefits of God insofar as they were God's, but insofar as they were goods proper [to himself], and therefore he was elated.
To 4. 5. To that which is objected concerning infidelity, it must be said that neither the sin of infidelity nor of curiosity was the first, because the sound and clear eye of his intellect is not perverted in judging or inquiring unless first stained by some elation22.
To that, then, which is objected, that he did not believe etc.; it must be said that to the sin of infidelity two things concur. For it is required that there be a consent of reason with a universal judgment. For if someone thinks that to fornicate is good for himself; or thinks in the universal what is good, and does not consent to the judgment of reason23, he is not unfaithful, as is clear. And of the devil I say that he did not consent to the judgment of reason, but estimated [it] good for himself.
To 6. 7. To that which is objected concerning curiosity, it must be said that two things make a consideration to be called curious, namely attention of care and privation of usefulness24. Hence if the devil, from all the things he beheld, had elicited his own good, referring them to the glory of God; that consideration would be neither blameworthy nor to be called curious. That it was curious, then, came from this, that he did not elicit his own25 good from it, but incurred the evil of ambition and presumption; and so the ground of the sin is first in presumption and in consideration. And thus it is clear that, although there was curiosity in the devil, it was not a fault antecedent to presumption, nor any other, but a condition annexed to it.
To 8. 9. To that which is objected last concerning envy, the response is clear through the word of Augustine, that it was not the first sin. For Augustine says that it is the offspring of pride, in the book On Virginity26, and so it follows it, even if not in the same instant, yet in the same time without an interval of delay. Hence in the generation of this offspring pride was confirmed, and the devil was called a devil, because he flowed downward27 and from this was made firm in his malice. And therefore the Master, describing the perfect aversion, such as is in the devil, not such as is in sinful men, says that «to be averted is to hold in hatred or to envy». For the devil, proud, not able to ascend, but compelled to descend, hates the just God and envies his excellence.
I. By faith it is established that some Angels sinned; theologians also agree in this, that no creature can by its own nature be wholly impeccable in relation to the end, whether natural or supernatural. But with respect to the natural end and law, St. Thomas (S. q. 63. a. 1. ad 3; de Malo, q. 16. a. 3, and a. 5. ad 10.) holds that the Angels could sin not directly and immediately against this end and law, but only against the supernatural end and law. But St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and many others say without restriction that every creature is peccable (cf. below, d. 24, p. I, a. 1, q. 1).
II. That the first sin of Lucifer is to be placed in pride is commonly held. Alexander of Hales also teaches this, but adds: «And its root [is] avarice or cupidity», namely in the broader sense. But Scotus thinks that it was not pride properly so called, which he understands to be an immoderate appetite of excellence by respect to others; but rather is to be reduced to a certain spiritual luxury. Further, the doctors seem to agree in this, that the beginning of this sin consists not in desiring some good not possessed, but in loving inordinately a good which the Angel had; or that he began to sin from an inordinate love not of just anything, but of his very self. And since inordinate love is curved back into itself, hence he was pleased with himself, and, moved by complacency in the excellence considered in himself, burst forth into an inordinate appetite of some object, either not granted to him of itself, or at least desired in an inordinate manner. But concerning this progress in sinning, and especially concerning p. 148the object desired by him (which is treated in the following question), there are diverse opinions, or at least manners of speaking. This progress in sinning St. Bonaventure sketches excellently here and more clearly in the Breviloquium (p. II, c. 7), where he says: «Lucifer, excited by the consideration of his own beauty and height to loving himself and his private good, presumed concerning the height he had and sought after an excellence of his own, not yet obtained; and through this, by presuming, he constituted himself for himself a highest principle, glorying in himself; and by seeking he constituted himself for himself a highest good, resting in himself». From these words, unless we are mistaken, it appears that the words (in the body) in presumption are to be taken in the broader sense for the act by which he wished to be good and great according to himself and not through another; and that the whole opinion of the Seraphic [Doctor] agrees with what St. Augustine says concerning the sin of Adam (XIV de Civ. Dei, c. 13, n. 1): «What is pride but an appetite for a perverse loftiness? For a perverse loftiness is, having forsaken the principle to which the soul ought to adhere, to become and be in a certain manner a principle to oneself. This happens when one is too pleased with oneself. And he is thus pleased with himself who falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to have pleased him more than he himself». Cf. also below, a. 2, q. 1.
III. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 98, m. 2. — Scotus, in each Scriptum, II Sent., d. 6, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; S. I, q. 63, a. 2; S. c. Gent. III, c. 103, 110. — Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q., here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q., here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following q., II Sent., d. 6, q. unica.
- Vers. 18. — Glossa sumta est ex Gregor., XXIII. Moral. c. 6. n. 13: Ipse quippe singulariter elatus dixerat: Supra astra caeli... (Isai. 14, 13.), et mire Dominus, ut in discipulorum cordibus elationem premeret, mox iudicium ruinae retulit, quod ipse magister elationis accepit, ut in auctore superbiae discerent, quid de elationis vitio formidarent.Verse 18. — The Gloss is taken from Gregory, XXIII Moralia, c. 6, n. 13: He indeed, singularly elated, had said: Above the stars of heaven... (Isa. 14:13), and wondrously the Lord, to press down elation in the hearts of the disciples, at once brought back the judgment of ruin which the very master of elation received, that in the author of pride they might learn what they should dread of the vice of elation.
- Vers. 15.Verse 15.
- Cap. 23. n. 30.Chapter 23, n. 30.
- Num. 7.Number 7.
- Epist. I. Ioan. 2, 16.First Epistle of John 2:16.
- Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 6. seq. — Cod. 1 causetur pro causatur.Cf. Augustine, XIV de Civ. Dei, c. 6 ff. — Codex 1 [reads] causetur for causatur.
- Cfr. supra pag. 67, nota 8. et pag. 79, nota 2. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 quia cognoscit pro quod cognoscit.Cf. above, p. 67, note 8, and p. 79, note 2. — A little above, codex cc and edition 1 [read] quia cognoscit for quod cognoscit.
- Cap. 10. n. 33, ubi agit de lucifero ipsumque his verbis alloquitur.Chapter 10, n. 33, where he treats of Lucifer and addresses him with these words.
- Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 respexerit.Some codices, with edition 1, [read] respexerit.
- Anselm., de Casu diab. c. 23; Bernard., loc. cit. c. 10. n. 33. et 36.Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 23; Bernard, loc. cit., c. 10, n. 33 and 36.
- Num. 38; in qua sententia textus originalis, verbis transpositis: quia prius spectavit curiose, quod affectavit illicite, speravit praesumtuose.Number 38; in which sentence the original text, with the words transposed: because what he first beheld curiously, he affected illicitly, hoped presumptuously.
- Gregor., XXI. Moral. c. 2. n. 4. — Sequens textus est Isai. 14, 13.Gregory, XXI Moralia, c. 2, n. 4. — The following text is Isa. 14:13.
- Cap. 31. n. 31: Quibus duobus malis, hoc est superbia et invidentia, diabolus est. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum pluribus mss. et superbia, cod. cc et ed. 1 cum superbia pro ut superbia.Chapter 31, n. 31: By which two evils, that is, pride and envy, [one] is a devil. — A little below, the Vatican edition with several manuscripts [reads] et superbia, codex cc and edition 1 cum superbia for ut superbia.
- Hic c. 1.Here, chapter 1.
- Subaudi: haec responsio. — Nonnulli codd. quod ita esset.Understand: this response. — Some codices [read] quod ita esset.
- Scil. odium. — Vat. firmatum est, quia haec.Namely, hatred. — The Vatican edition [reads] firmatum est, quia haec.
- August., Enarrat. in Ps. 79, n. 3: Succensa igni et effossa etc. Omnia peccata duae res faciunt in homine, cupiditas et timor... Ad omne recte factum amor et timor ducit, ad omne peccatum amor et timor ducit... Quae sunt peccata succensa igni et effossa? Quid fecerat amor malus? Tanquam ignem succenderat. Quid fecerat timor malus? Tanquam effoderat. Amor quippe inflammat, timor humiliat. — In hac prop. sicut et aliquanto inferius nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 omissio pro dimissio.Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 79, n. 3: Kindled with fire and dug up etc. Two things make all sins in man, cupidity and fear... To every rightly done deed love and fear lead, to every sin love and fear lead... What are the sins kindled with fire and dug up? What had the bad love done? It had as it were kindled the fire. What had the bad fear done? It had as it were dug up. For love inflames, fear humbles. — In this proposition, as also a little below, some codices, with edition 1, [read] omissio for dimissio.
- Supple cum Vat. peccatum.Supply, with the Vatican edition, peccatum.
- Cod. U specialiter vero ita est omissio. Cod. cc et ed. 1 specialiter contra affirmativum. Sic enim omissio est contra praeceptum affirmativum, sicut etc. Non pauci codd. cum Vat. incongrue apprehendit pro comprehendit.Codex U [reads] specialiter vero ita est omissio. Codex cc and edition 1 [read] specialiter contra affirmativum. For thus omission is against an affirmative precept, as etc. Not a few codices, with the Vatican edition, incongruously [read] apprehendit for comprehendit.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 praecepti affirmativi.Codex cc and edition 1 [read] praecepti affirmativi.
- Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 contrarie, quod non convenit subnexis. Eadem distinctio insinuatur hoc modo: materialiter et formaliter.Many codices, with editions 1, 2, [read] contrarie, which does not agree with what follows. The same distinction is suggested in this way: materially and formally.
- Vat. inclinetur.The Vatican edition [reads] inclinetur.
- Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. iudicium rationis; perperam, ut claret ex contextu. — Cfr. Aristot., de Motu animalium, c. 4. (c. 7.), ubi electionem et appetitum exponit per modum syllogismi, qui habet tres propositiones.Very many codices, with the first editions, [read] iudicium rationis; wrongly, as is clear from the context. — Cf. Aristotle, On the Motion of Animals, c. 4 (c. 7), where he expounds choice and appetite by the manner of a syllogism, which has three propositions.
- Eadmerus (✝ 1121), de S. Anselmi similitudinibus (inter opera Anselmi), c. 26. definit curiositatem ita: Curiositas est studium perscrutandi ea quae scire nulla est utilitas. — Quoad primam curiositatis notam, scil. quod sit curae attentio, codd. inter se dissentiunt; plures enim cum edd. 1, 2 pro attentio substituunt accusatio, nonnulli accuratio, aliqui actio; melius codd. N P Q W applicatio et cod. 1 accumulatio.Eadmer (✝ 1121), On the Similitudes of St. Anselm (among the works of Anselm), c. 26, defines curiosity thus: Curiosity is the zeal of scrutinizing those things which there is no usefulness in knowing. — As to the first mark of curiosity, namely that it is attention of care, the codices disagree among themselves; for several, with editions 1, 2, substitute accusatio for attentio, some accuratio, others actio; better, codices N P Q W [read] applicatio and codex 1 accumulatio.
- In pluribus mss. et ed. 1 desideratur suum.In several manuscripts and edition 1 the word suum is lacking.
- Cap. 31. n. 31: Hanc (superbiam) sequitur invidentia, tanquam filia pedissequa; eam quippe superbia continuo parit, nec unquam est sine tali prole atque comite. Cfr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 filia superbiae pro proles superbiae.Chapter 31, n. 31: Envy follows this (pride), as a handmaid daughter; for pride continually begets it, nor is it ever without such offspring and companion. Cf. XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 14, n. 18. — Codex cc and edition 1 [read] filia superbiae for proles superbiae.
- Isidor., VIII. Etymolog. c. 11. n. 18: Diabolus Hebraice dicitur deorsum fluens, quia quietus in caeli culmine stare contempsit, sed superbiae pondere deorsum corruens cecidit; Graece vero diabolus criminator vocatur etc.Isidore, VIII Etymologies, c. 11, n. 18: In Hebrew the devil is called «flowing downward», because, having scorned to stand quiet in the summit of heaven, he fell, rushing downward by the weight of pride; but in Greek the devil is called «accuser» etc.