Bonaventure

Articulus I. De duratione caritatis per comparationem ad peccatum sibi oppositum.

Quaestio I. Utrum caritas semel habita possit amitti.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum caritas semel habita possit amitti. Et quod non, adducit Magister multas auctoritates in littera¹; et hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione.

1. Haec enim est per se vera: amor unit², ergo maior amor magis unit: sed amor caritatis est excellentior amor, quam sit amor naturalis: ergo excellentius unit. Sed naturalis amor unit indissolubi-

liter, quia nullus unquam odit quod naturaliter amat: ergo multo fortius amor caritatis indissolubiliter unit: ergo qui caritatem habet non potest vinculo caritatis privari.

2. Item, fortior est caritas in bono, quam sit aliquod peccatum in malo³: sed magis forte non potest destrui per minus forte: ergo caritas non potest expelli per peccatum; nec per aliud habet expelli: ergo semel habita non potest amitti.

3. Item, omne peccatum ortum habet vel ex timore male humiliante, vel ex amore male incendente; sed in eo, in quo est caritas, nec est timor male humilians nec amor male incendens, quia dicit Bernardus⁴: « Nunquam est caritas sine timore, sed casto; nunquam sine cupiditate, sed ordinata »: ergo videtur, quod in eo, in quo est caritas, nulla possit esse culpa: videtur ergo, quod caritas, ex quo semel habetur, nunquam amittatur.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium in eligendo semper sequitur affectionem praedominantem⁵; sed in omni homine habente caritatem affectio caritatis praedominatur, cum faciat eum diligere Deum propter se et super omnia: ergo liberum arbitrium, ex quo semel habet caritatem, nunquam movetur contra caritatem. Sed nunquam amittit caritatem, nisi moveatur contra ipsam: ergo ex quo caritas semel inest homini, videtur, quod non possit ab eo perdi nec separari.

5. Item, omnis qui habet caritatem, habet Christum pro fundamento et Spiritum sanctum pro adiutorio; sed nihil potest firmitatem fundamenti infringere nec virtutem divini adiutorii superare: ergo videtur, quod nihil possit caritatem ab homine expellere⁶.

Sed contra hoc ostenditur: 1. Primo per exempla veteris Testamenti. Constat enim, quod Saul caritatem habuit, cum de eo scribatur⁷, quod non erat vir in Israel melior eo; similiter et David caritatem habuit, cum de eo dicat Dominus: Inveni virum secundum cor meum; et constans est, quod uterque caritatem perdidit, quia uterque mortaliter peccavit: Saul in persequendo David, David vero in committendo adulterium et homicidium: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per exempla novi Testamenti: quia discipuli Domini caritatem habuerunt, tam Apostoli quam alii discipuli electi; sed multi de discipulis abierunt retro, secundum quod dicitur Ioannis sexto⁸; multi etiam de Apostolis dubitaverunt in fide, secundum quod habetur Matthaei ultimo, et similiter ultimo Marci, et similiter ultimo Lucae: ergo caritatem habitam perdiderunt: ergo caritas semel habita potest perdi.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per auctoritates: quia scribitur primae ad Corinthios decimo⁹: Qui stat videat, ne cadat; et Apocalypsis secundo: Habeo adversum te pauca, quod caritatem primam reliquisti: ergo caritas semel habita potest perdi et deleri.

4. Item, hoc ipsum probatur manifesto experimento: quia parvuli, qui baptizantur, habent gratiam, et ita caritatem et virtutes ceteras¹⁰; et tamen, quando veniunt ad adultam aetatem, caritatem perdunt peccando, sicut planum est: ergo caritas, postquam habetur, amittitur.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationali argumento. Facilius est deficere quam proficere, et cadere quam resurgere; facilius est etiam perdere caritatem quam fidem, quia, perdita fide, perditur caritas, sed non convertitur¹¹; sed possibile est, hominem, qui non habet caritatem, caritatem acquirere, possibile etiam est, hominem habentem fidem a fide recedere: ergo multo fortius possibile est, hominem habentem caritatem a caritate cadere.

Conclusio.

Error est et insania dicere, quod caritas semel habita non possit amitti.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera¹², quorundam opinio et sententia fuit, quod caritas semel habita nunquam amittatur; et hoc posuerunt propter perfectionem illius vin-

culi et ardorem sive fervorem illius amoris. Crediderunt enim, illud vinculum esse tantae perfectionis, quod nullo agente posset dissolvi; et illum amorem esse tanti fervoris, quod nullo modo posset exstingui propter dignitatem et excellentiam ipsius caritatis. Et hoc affirmare nixi sunt auctoritate multiplici, sicut in ipso textu Magister satis aperte dicit. — Sed haec positio non¹³ opinio nec rationalis sententia, immo error et insania potius est dicenda, quia repugnat sacrae Scripturae, repugnat experimento nostrae fidei, repugnat nihilominus rationi rectae. Sacrae Scripturae et etiam experientiae repugnat, sicut in opponendo¹⁴ monstratum est. A ratione autem recta dissonat, si quis attendat, pro eo quod recta ratio dictat, quod caritas viae non tollit a libero arbitrio vertibilitatem ad malum, sicut nec cupiditas tollit habilitatem ad bonum. Simul ergo stat vertibilitas et caritas; sed ubi est vertibilitas, ibi potest esse culpa; et ubi potest esse culpa, ibi tam caritas quam gratia potest abesse: restat igitur, quod secundum dictamen rationis rectae caritas perdi potest in statu viae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod excellentius unit amor caritatis quam amor naturalis: dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod indissolubilius uniat, quia excellentia unionis non tantum attenditur secundum unionis inseparabilitatem, quantum attenditur secundum habitus unientis¹⁵ et obiecti sive termini dignitatem. Unde ratio illa non valet. Sed si tu quaeras, unde hoc est, quod amor naturalis unit inseparabiliter, et amor caritatis non; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia caritas est habitus regulativus et directivus voluntatis deliberativae, quae est ad opposita secundum statum viae. Amor vero naturalis respicit ipsam inclinationem naturae, quae est ad unum determinata¹⁶. Ideo dilectum ex caritate potest esse odiosum propter voluntatis vertibilitatem, quamvis quod naturaliter diligitur semper sit amabile propter ipsius naturae determinationem. Unde non est simile hinc inde.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est fortior peccato; dicendum, quod amissio caritatis non est propter hoc, quod peccatum agat in ipsam, eam expellendo, sicut una forma naturalis expellit aliam: sed hoc est, quia, cum esse caritatis dependeat a duobus, videlicet a Deo influente et a libero arbitrio suscipiente; cum liberum arbitrium se a Deo avertit, caritas in semetipsa deficit. Et quia liberum arbitrium non se avertit nisi peccando, hinc est, quod caritas dicitur per peccatum expelli, non propter fortitudinem ipsius peccati agentis, sed propter defectionem ipsius liberi arbitrii suscipientis¹⁷.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne peccatum est ex amore male inflammante, vel timore male humiliante; dicendum, quod illud dupliciter potest intelligi: aut quod illae duae radices praecedant omne peccatum perpetratum exterius tempore, aut quia praecedant origine¹⁸. Si quia praecedant tempore, sic non oportet esse generaliter verum, quia ante primum peccatum nullum istorum fuit in primo homine. Si quia praecedant origine ipsam perpetrationem peccati, sic habet veritatem, quia nemo peccatum perpetrat nisi malo affectu amoris, vel malo affectu timoris. Quamvis autem huiusmodi affectus non sint in homine habente caritatem in actu, possunt tamen inesse, quia liberum arbitrium, quod est rectum per caritatem, incurvari potest per cupiditatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium in eligendo sequitur affectionem praedominantem; dicendum, quod est affectio praedominans in habitu, et est affectio praedominans in actu. Cum ergo dicitur, quod liberum arbitrium sequitur affectionem praedominantem; hoc non intelligitur de affectione praedominante in habitu, sed de praedominante in actu. Quamvis autem in homine habente caritatem affectio caritatis praedominetur in habitu; contingit tamen, affectionem carnalem praedominari actu; quia frequenter homo, qui est in gratia, eorum quae Dei sunt, oblitus, omnino cogitat quae sunt mundi¹⁹; et sic afficitur, quasi non esset civis illius supernae Ierusalem; et dum istam affectionem sequitur, cadit in praecipitium perditque gratiae donum et caritatis habitum.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod habenti caritatem Christus est fundamentum, et Spiritus sanctus est in adiutorium; dicendum, quod verum est; sed sic Christus est fundamentum, quod non sustentat nisi volentem sibi inniti, et Spiritus sanctus non gubernat in esse gratuito nisi volentem sibi cooperari. Et ideo, quamvis illud fundamentum sit immobile, et adiutorium illud sit invincibile, tamen, quia liberum arbitrium ex sua defectibilitate recusat inniti illi fundamento et cooperari illi adiutorio, peccando deficit in se ipso, ac per hoc privatur caritatis dono propter defectum a parte sui, non propter defectum a parte fundamenti, vel adiutorii.

Article I. On the duration of charity in relation to the sin opposed to it.

Question I. Whether charity once had can be lost.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether charity once had can be lost. And that it cannot, the Master adduces many authorities in the text¹; and this same thing is shown by reason.

1. For this is true of itself: love unites², therefore the greater love unites the more: but the love of charity is a more excellent love than natural love is: therefore it unites more excellently. But natural love unites indissolu-

bly, because no one ever hates what he naturally loves: therefore much more strongly does the love of charity unite indissolubly: therefore he who has charity cannot be deprived of the bond of charity.

2. Likewise, charity in the good is stronger than any sin is in evil³: but the more strong cannot be destroyed by the less strong: therefore charity cannot be expelled by sin; nor has it anything else by which to be expelled: therefore once had it cannot be lost.

3. Likewise, every sin has its origin either from fear wrongly abasing, or from love wrongly inflaming; but in him in whom charity is, there is neither fear wrongly abasing nor love wrongly inflaming, because Bernard says⁴: « Charity is never without fear, but a chaste one; never without desire, but an ordered one »: therefore it seems that in him in whom charity is, there can be no fault: it seems therefore that charity, once it is had, is never lost.

4. Likewise, free choice in choosing always follows the predominant affection⁵; but in every man having charity the affection of charity predominates, since it makes him love God for his own sake and above all things: therefore free choice, once it has charity, is never moved against charity. But it never loses charity unless it be moved against it: therefore once charity is in a man, it seems that it cannot be lost or separated from him.

5. Likewise, everyone who has charity has Christ for a foundation and the Holy Spirit for a help; but nothing can shatter the firmness of the foundation nor overcome the power of the divine help: therefore it seems that nothing can expel charity from a man⁶.

But against this it is shown: 1. First, by examples of the Old Testament. For it is established that Saul had charity, since it is written of him⁷ that there was not a better man in Israel than he; likewise David too had charity, since the Lord says of him: I have found a man according to my own heart; and it is constant that each lost charity, because each sinned mortally: Saul in persecuting David, but David in committing adultery and homicide: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by examples of the New Testament: because the disciples of the Lord had charity, both the Apostles and the other chosen disciples; but many of the disciples went back, according to what is said in John the sixth⁸; many also of the Apostles doubted in the faith, according to what is held in the last chapter of Matthew, and likewise in the last of Mark, and likewise in the last of Luke: therefore they lost the charity they had had: therefore charity once had can be lost.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by authorities: because it is written in the first to the Corinthians, the tenth chapter⁹: Let him who stands see that he fall not; and Apocalypse the second: I have a few things against thee, that thou hast left thy first charity: therefore charity once had can be lost and destroyed.

4. Likewise, this same thing is proved by manifest experience: because little ones who are baptized have grace, and so charity and the other virtues¹⁰; and yet, when they come to adult age, they lose charity by sinning, as is plain: therefore charity, after it is had, is lost.

5. Likewise, this same thing is shown by a rational argument. It is easier to fail than to advance, and to fall than to rise again; it is also easier to lose charity than faith, because, when faith is lost, charity is lost, but not conversely¹¹; but it is possible that a man who does not have charity acquire charity, it is also possible that a man having faith withdraw from faith: therefore much more strongly is it possible that a man having charity fall from charity.

Conclusion.

It is error and madness to say that charity once had cannot be lost.

Respondeo: It must be said that, as the Master says in the text¹², the opinion and judgment of certain men was that charity once had is never lost; and this they held on account of the perfection of that bond and the ardor or fervor of that love. For they believed that that bond was of such perfection that by no agent could it be dissolved; and that that love was of such fervor that in no way could it be extinguished, on account of the dignity and excellence of charity itself. And this they strove to affirm by manifold authority, as the Master says clearly enough in the text itself. — But this position is not¹³ an opinion nor a rational judgment, but rather is to be called error and madness, because it is repugnant to sacred Scripture, repugnant to the experience of our faith, repugnant nonetheless to right reason. It is repugnant to sacred Scripture and also to experience, as has been shown in the objecting¹⁴. And it is dissonant from right reason, if one attends, for the reason that right reason dictates that the charity of the wayfarer does not take away from free choice the changeableness toward evil, just as desire does not take away the aptitude for good. Therefore changeableness and charity stand together; but where there is changeableness, there can be fault; and where there can be fault, there both charity and grace can be absent: it remains, therefore, that according to the dictate of right reason charity can be lost in the state of the wayfarer. — Hence the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that the love of charity unites more excellently than natural love: it must be said that it is true; but yet from this it does not follow that it unites more indissolubly, because the excellence of union is not weighed so much according to the inseparability of union as it is weighed according to the dignity of the uniting habit¹⁵ and of the object or term. Hence that reason is not valid. But if you ask whence this is, that natural love unites inseparably, and the love of charity does not; it must be said that this is because charity is a habit regulative and directive of the deliberative will, which is toward opposites according to the state of the wayfarer. But natural love regards the very inclination of nature, which is determined toward one thing¹⁶. Therefore what is loved out of charity can become hateful on account of the changeableness of the will, although what is naturally loved is always lovable on account of the determination of nature itself. Hence the case is not the same on the one side and the other.

2. To that which is objected, that charity is stronger than sin; it must be said that the loss of charity is not because sin acts upon it, expelling it, as one natural form expels another: but this is because, since the being of charity depends on two things, namely on God infusing it and on free choice receiving it; when free choice turns itself away from God, charity fails in itself. And because free choice does not turn itself away except by sinning, hence it is that charity is said to be expelled by sin, not on account of the strength of the sin itself acting, but on account of the failing of free choice itself receiving¹⁷.

3. To that which is objected, that every sin is from love wrongly inflaming, or fear wrongly abasing; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: either that those two roots precede in time every sin perpetrated outwardly, or that they precede in origin¹⁸. If they precede in time, so it need not be generally true, because before the first sin none of these was in the first man. If they precede in origin the very perpetration of sin, so it has truth, because no one perpetrates sin except by the evil affection of love, or by the evil affection of fear. But although affections of this kind are not in a man having charity in act, they can nevertheless be present, because free choice, which is right through charity, can be bent through desire.

4. To that which is objected, that free choice in choosing follows the predominant affection; it must be said that there is an affection predominant in habit, and there is an affection predominant in act. When, therefore, it is said that free choice follows the predominant affection; this is not understood of the affection predominant in habit, but of the one predominant in act. But although in a man having charity the affection of charity predominates in habit; it nevertheless happens that a carnal affection predominates in act; because frequently a man who is in grace, forgetful of the things that are God's, thinks wholly the things that are of the world¹⁹; and so is affected as though he were not a citizen of that supernal Jerusalem; and while he follows that affection, he falls into the precipice and loses the gift of grace and the habit of charity.

5. To that which is objected last, that to him who has charity Christ is a foundation, and the Holy Spirit is for a help; it must be said that it is true; but Christ is a foundation in such a way that he sustains only one willing to lean upon him, and the Holy Spirit does not govern in gratuitous being except one willing to cooperate with him. And therefore, although that foundation be immovable, and that help be invincible, nevertheless, because free choice out of its own defectibility refuses to lean upon that foundation and to cooperate with that help, by sinning it fails in itself, and through this is deprived of the gift of charity on account of a defect on its own part, not on account of a defect on the part of the foundation, or of the help.