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Dist. 14, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus
p. 331

Articulus I. De iteratione poenitentiae.

Quaestio I. Utrum contingat cadere a vera poenitentia.

Circa primum proceditur sic et ostenditur, quod contingat a vera poenitentia cadere:

1. Exemplo David, qui de peccato mortis Uriae poenitens, quod Dominus eius poenitentiam acceptavit, peccavit in enumerando populum, secundi Regum ultimo1. —

2. Item, auctoritate Domini: Ioannis quinto2 dixit paralytico: Vade et amplius noli peccare, ne deterius tibi aliquid contingat; sed non fuisset comminatus malum propter recidivum, nisi posset cadere: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia poenitentia habet esse in libero arbitrio secundum statum viae, et hoc non coacto3; sed tale est vertibile, et per vertibilitatem potest cadere a statu gratiae et iustitiae: ergo et poenitentiae.

4. Item, gratia baptismalis est maior quam poenitentiae, et confirmationis similiter4; sed post veram gratiam baptismatis et confirmationis contingit cadere: ergo et post gratiam poenitentiae.

Contra: 1. Ambrosius et Augustinus5 sic definiunt poenitentiam: «Poenitentia est perpetrata plangere et plangenda non committere»: ergo si admittit vel committit post plangenda, prius non poenituit: si ergo poenituit, patet, quod ultra non committet. Si dicas, quod refertur ad idem tempus, hoc superfluit, quia nemo in eodem tempore, in quo plangit, peccata admittit.

2. Item, Isidorus6: «Inanis est poenitentia, quam sequens culpa inquinat»: ergo si post peccat, prima poenitentia fuit inanis: ergo ab oppositis, si fuit vera, postea non peccavit.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia offensa est infinita, ergo et satisfactio, si vera est, debet esse infinita: ergo cum non sit infinita intensione, saltem est infinita duratione: ergo si non semper durat, non est vera poenitentia nec satisfactio.

4. Item, vere poenitentis est semper dolere7, ergo semper peccatum detestari; sed semper detestanti gratiam impossibile est resurgere: ergo vere poenitentem, cum semper detestetur culpam, impossibile est cadere.

Conclusio. Homo potest cadere a poenitentia vera, quatenus vera importat essentiam poenitentiae, non vero, quatenus includit perseverantiam finalem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sic erraverunt aliqui circa poenitentiam, sicut circa caritatem8. Dixerunt enim, quod habens semel veram caritatem nunquam perdit eam: similiter et habens veram poenitentiam nunquam eam perdit. — Sed hoc est p. 332 manifestus error, et contra Scripturam.

Ratio autem, quae istos decepit, fuit, quia non consideraverunt, quid dicatur vel importetur per hoc nomen verum, cum dicitur vera poenitentia, vel vera caritas. Quamvis enim unum dicat indivisionem principiorum entis, et verum indivisionem entis ab esse sive actu absoluto, prout tamen natum est fieri apud intellectum9, et bonum indivisionem ab actu ut in finem relato; tamen quando verum reflectitur supra bonum, ut dicatur vera virtus, utrumque potest importare et utroque modo accipi potest.

Et ideo intelligendum, quod veritas poenitentiae dupliciter accipitur, sicut et cuiuslibet virtutis. Uno enim modo dicitur virtus vera, quae habet verum virtutis opus, vel nata est habere, quantum est de se; et haec veritas est de essentia virtutis. Alio modo dicitur virtus vera, quae perducit in finem; et haec veritas non est essentialis virtuti, sed tamen dicit virtutis statum sive continuationem10.

— Secundum hoc dicendum, quod si primo modo dicatur poenitentia vera, quae verum virtutis habet actum; sic de veritate poenitentiae est detestari malum commissum et pro illo tempore nullum committere et de futuro proponere non committere et ab omnibus his potest homo cadere, et ita a poenitentia vera, veritate primo modo dicta. Si autem dicatur vera, quia perducit in finem, ut finalis et continuata; ab hac non est cadere; sed hanc non est dicere11 hominem habere nisi in fine, et post non contingit cadere.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod ad veritatem eius spectat plangenda non committere; dicendum, quod si loquamur de veritate primo modo, ad veritatem spectat non committere tunc, nec actu nec proposito, sed non post; et sic accipitur in illis definitionibus12. — Vel si accipiatur pro futuro simpliciter, tunc erit poenitentiae dictae verae veritate perseverantiae sive ducente in finem. — Et per hoc patet illud Isidori: quia dicitur inanis propter frustrationem finis.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod offensa est infinita; dicendum, quod Deus remittit offensam per gratiam et pro delectatione exigit poenam per poenitentiam; et ideo non oportet, quod sit infinita.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper dolere debet; dicendum, quod semper dolere debet habitu; sed qui habitu dolet de peccato praeterito, nihil impedit, quin actu committat futurum. — Vel aliter: referendum est ad poenitentiam finalem, sicut dictum est.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio connexa est cum alia, utrum gratia et caritas possint amitti; de qua actum est III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1, quaeque definita est a Concilio Trident. Sess. VI. in can. 23, qui refertur ibi in scholio nec non Sess. VII. de bapt. can. 6, cfr. prop. 43. Paschasii Quesnelli a Clemente XI. damnata.

De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 14. m. 5. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. I; II. q. a. 11; cfr. III. q. 84. a. 10. — B. Albert, hic a. 13. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 7. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. — De hac et 2 seqq. qq. Durand., hic q. 6; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

II. Circa seq. (2.) quaestionem iam erraverunt Novatiani pluresque posteriores. Quaestio praecipue intelligenda est de Sacramento poenitentiae; conclusio autem confirmatur verbis Concilii Trid. (Sess. XIV. c. 2.), quod, dum baptismus nulla ratione possit iterari, in Sacramento poenitentiae «per sacerdotum sententiam non semel, sed quoties ab admissis peccatis ad ipsum poenitentes confugerint, possent liberari». Item Sess. VI. c. 14. dicitur: «Qui vero ab accepta iustificationis gratia per peccatum exciderunt rursus iustificari poterunt, cum, excitante Deo, per poenitentiae Sacramentum merito Christi amissam gratiam recuperare procuraverint»; simul contraria assertio reprobatur can. 29. — Notatu digna est triplex interpretatio loci Apostoli in solut. ad 1. 2.

De 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 2. 3. 4. — Scot. rem tangit hic q. 1. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. 3; S. III. q. 84. a. 10. — B. Albert. — , hic a. 13. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 9. q. 2.

III. De 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 4. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. I. n. 17. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. I; S. III. q. 80. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 29. — Petr. a Tar. rem tangit in cit. a. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit. et q. 6.

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English Translation

Article I. On the repetition of penance.

Question I. Whether it can happen that one falls from true penance.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that it can happen that one falls from true penance:

1. By the example of David, who, being penitent for the sin of Uriah's death — a penance which the Lord accepted — yet sinned in numbering the people, in the last chapter of Second Kings1. —

2. Likewise, by the authority of the Lord: in the fifth chapter of John2 He said to the paralytic: Go and sin no more, lest something worse befall you; but He would not have threatened an evil on account of relapse, unless one could fall: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because penance has its being in free choice according to the state of the wayfarer, and this not by compulsion3; but such a thing is changeable, and through its changeableness it can fall from the state of grace and justice: therefore also from penance.

4. Likewise, baptismal grace is greater than that of penance, and that of confirmation likewise4; but after true grace of baptism and of confirmation it happens that one falls: therefore also after the grace of penance.

On the contrary: 1. Ambrose and Augustine5 thus define penance: «Penance is to bewail things done and not to commit things to be bewailed»: therefore if one admits or commits after the things to be bewailed, he did not previously repent: if therefore he repented, it is clear that he will commit no further. If you say that this refers to the same time, this is superfluous, because no one in the same time in which he bewails admits sins.

2. Likewise, Isidore6: «Vain is the penance which a following fault defiles»: therefore if one sins afterward, the first penance was vain: therefore conversely, if it was true, he did not afterward sin.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because the offense is infinite, therefore also the satisfaction, if it is true, ought to be infinite: therefore since it is not infinite in intensity, at least it is infinite in duration: therefore if it does not last forever, it is not true penance nor satisfaction.

4. Likewise, it belongs to one truly penitent always to grieve7, therefore always to detest sin; but for one always detesting it is impossible to rise again from grace: therefore one truly penitent, since he always detests the fault, it is impossible that he should fall.

Conclusion. A man can fall from true penance, insofar as "true" implies the essence of penance, but not insofar as it includes final perseverance.

I respond: It must be said that some have erred concerning penance just as concerning charity8. For they said that one who once has true charity never loses it: likewise also one who has true penance never loses it. — But this is p. 332 a manifest error, and against Scripture.

Now the reason which deceived these men was that they did not consider what is said or implied by this word true, when one says true penance, or true charity. For although one expresses the indivision of the principles of a being, and true the indivision of the being from its being or absolute act, insofar as it is apt to come to be in the intellect9, and good the indivision from the act as referred to an end; nevertheless when true is reflected upon good, so that one says true virtue, it can imply both and be taken in both ways.

And therefore it must be understood that the truth of penance is taken in two ways, just as that of any virtue. For in one way that virtue is called true which has the true work of virtue, or is apt to have it, so far as in it lies; and this truth belongs to the essence of the virtue. In another way that virtue is called true which leads to the end; and this truth is not essential to the virtue, but nevertheless expresses the virtue's state or continuation10.

— According to this it must be said that if penance be called true in the first way, as having the true act of virtue; thus it belongs to the truth of penance to detest the evil committed and for that time to commit none and to propose for the future not to commit — and from all these a man can fall, and thus from true penance, by truth said in the first way. But if it be called true because it leads to the end, as final and continued; from this one does not fall; but this it is not to be said11 that a man has except at the end, and after that it does not happen that he falls.

To the arguments:

To 1 and 2. To that which is objected first, that it belongs to its truth not to commit things to be bewailed; it must be said that if we speak of truth in the first way, it belongs to truth not to commit then, neither in act nor in intention, but not afterward; and so it is taken in those definitions12. — Or if it be taken for the future absolutely, then it will belong to penance called true by the truth of perseverance or leading to the end. — And by this is clear that saying of Isidore: because it is called vain on account of the frustration of the end.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the offense is infinite; it must be said that God remits the offense through grace and for the delight exacts the penalty through penance; and therefore it is not necessary that it be infinite.

To 4. To that which is objected, that one ought always to grieve; it must be said that one ought always to grieve by habit; but one who grieves by habit over a past sin, nothing prevents him from committing a future one in act. — Or otherwise: it is to be referred to final penance, as has been said.

Scholion

I. This question is connected with another, whether grace and charity can be lost; concerning which it was treated in III Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, and which was defined by the Council of Trent, Session VI, in canon 23, which is cited there in the scholion, as also Session VII, on baptism, canon 6; cf. proposition 43 of Paschasius Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI.

On this first question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 14, m. 5, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4, sub-question I; II, q. a. 11; cf. III, q. 84, a. 10. — Blessed Albert, here a. 13. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 7, sub-question 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, III Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 1. — On this and the 2 following questions: Durandus, here q. 6; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

II. Concerning the following (2nd) question the Novatians and many later men have already erred. The question is principally to be understood of the Sacrament of penance; the conclusion, moreover, is confirmed by the words of the Council of Trent (Session XIV, c. 2), that, whereas baptism can in no way be repeated, in the Sacrament of penance «through the sentence of priests they may be freed not once, but as often as, after sins committed, the penitent have recourse to it». Likewise in Session VI, c. 14, it is said: «But those who by sin have fallen away from the received grace of justification will be able to be justified again, when, God exciting them, they have endeavored, through the Sacrament of penance, by the merit of Christ, to recover the lost grace»; and at the same time the contrary assertion is reproved in canon 29. — Worthy of note is the threefold interpretation of the passage of the Apostle in the solution to 1 and 2.

On the 2nd question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 2, 3, 4. — Scotus touches the matter here q. 1, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4, sub-question 3; S. III, q. 84, a. 10. — Blessed Albert, here a. 13. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. sub-question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 9, q. 2.

III. On the 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 12, m. 4, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. I, n. 17, seqq. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, sub-question I; S. III, q. 80, a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 29. — Peter of Tarentaise touches the matter in the cited a. 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 7, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit. and q. 6.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Vers. 1. seqq. (Cfr. infra dub. 13.). — De priori peccato David vide II. Reg. 12. 13. — quod [i. e. ita Vat., pro poenitens, quod] posito poenituit, et, post acceptavit addit qui tamen post.
    Verses 1 and following (cf. below, dub. 13). — On David's earlier sin see II Kings 12. 13. — quod [i.e. so the Vatican edition reads, in place of poenitens, quod] having put poenituit, et, after acceptavit it adds qui tamen post.
  2. 2
    Vers. 14: Ecce sanus factus es, iam noli peccare etc.
    Verse 14: Behold, you are made whole, now sin no more, etc.
  3. 3
    Cod. M et in hoc non est coactio; Vat. non est coactum. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. seq.
    Codex M reads et in hoc non est coactio ("and in this there is no compulsion"); the Vatican edition non est coactum. Cf. II Sent., d. 25, p. II, q. 4, and following.
  4. 4
    Vide supra d. 4. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et d. 7. a. 2. q. 2.
    See above, d. 4, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and following, and d. 7, a. 2, q. 2.
  5. 5
    Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et Comment. p. 1. dub. 4, in quo etiam obiectio subnexa (refertur ad idem tempus) expenditur.
    Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2, and the Commentary, p. 1, dub. 4, in which also the appended objection (it refers to the same time) is weighed out.
  6. 6
    Libr. I. Synonym. n. 77. — Cod. P (F a secunda manu) cum textu originali coinquinat. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    Book I of the Synonyms, n. 77. — Codex P (F by a second hand), with the original text, reads coinquinat. See here the Master's text, c. 2.
  7. 7
    Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa finem verba Augustini. — Inferius pro poenitentem codd. I K poenitenti.
    Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2, near the end, the words of Augustine. — Lower down, in place of poenitentem, codices I K read poenitenti.
  8. 8
    De quo vide III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.
    On which see III Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 1.
  9. 9
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. dub. 4. et d. 8. p. l. a. 1. — Verbo fieri Vat. praemittit notum.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, dub. 4, and d. 8, p. l, a. 1. — Before the word fieri the Vatican edition prefixes notum.
  10. 10
    Vide III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Pro sed men[dose] codd. sed tantum.
    See III Sent., d. 23, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — In place of sed, the codices read, by error, sed tantum.
  11. 11
    Cod. R non est necesse.
    Codex R reads non est necesse ("it is not necessary").
  12. 12
    Cfr. supra p. 1. dub. 4.
    Cf. above, p. 1, dub. 4.
Cited by

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1 further reference addresses the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3Dist. 14, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2