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Dist. 35, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
p. 836

Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

Dub. I. In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa definitione, quam primo ponit: Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei. Videtur enim dicere falsum. Aut enim hoc intelligitur disiunctive, aut subdisiunctive1. Si subdisiunctive: ergo membra non possunt simul stare: ergo nullum idem peccatum est concupitum et factum; sed hoc falsum est, quia omne peccatum factum est concupitum2. — Item, videtur, quod non conveniat omni peccato, quia peccatum omissionis nec est factum nec concupitum nec dictum: ergo videtur, quod male sit assignata, quia non convenit omni peccato mortali actuali.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta definitio est peccati actualis et mortalis. Pro hoc, quod est peccati actualis, dicitur, quod est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, secundum triplicem actum, videlicet potentiae interpretativae et operativae et affectivae, quae omnes sunt potentiae quodam modo motivae. Secundum quod est mortale, dicitur, quod est contra legem Dei; et sic convenit omni et soli. Omni, quia omne peccatum actuale aut est concupitum tantum, aut est concupitum et exterius consummatum, et hoc vel per verbum, vel per opus. Soli vero convenit, quia non convenit veniali, cum non sit contra legem Dei3; nec originali, cum non sit dictum, vel factum. — Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum vel teneatur ibi disiunctive, vel subdisiunctive; dicendum, quod disiunctive; sed ultimum membrum intelligendum est cum praecisione; reliqua vero minime. Unde sensus est, quod omne peccatum aut est dictum et concupitum, aut factum et concupitum, aut concupitum tantum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de peccato omissionis, dicendum, quod omne peccatum, sicut vult Augustinus4, radicem habet amorem malum; et ideo, quamvis in peccato omissionis sit privatio alicuius actus principalis; quia tamen illa privatio ortum habet ex amore alicuius boni commutabilis — quod patet, quia aliquis non vult ad matutinas surgere, quia vult in lecto quiescere — ideo peccatum omissionis cadit sub hoc membro, quod dicitur concupitum5.

Dub. II. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Peccatum est voluntas retinendi, vel assequendi quod iustitia vetat. Aliquod enim est peccatum, in quo aliquis nec vult aliquid retinere nec aliquid assequi, immo potius intendit destruere, sicut est in ira et odio et invidia. — Item, velle assequi quod iustitia vetat, vel retinere, hoc est avaritiae vel rapinae: ergo omne peccatum erit rapina.

Est igitur quaestio, cum peccata ita bene sint contra alias virtutes, sicut contra iustitiam: quare magis definitur peccatum per oppositum6 ad iustitiam, quam per oppositum ad virtutes alias?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus7 definit peccatum per illud quod est radix omnis mali; hoc autem est amor libidinosus. Et quoniam omnis amor libidinosus vel est rei habitae, vel habendae, et hoc praeter ordinem et regulam legis aeternae; ideo dicit, quod peccatum est voluntas assequendi, vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, ita quod describit amorem inordinatum, qui est radix omnis peccati, et per id ad quod est, et per id contra quod est.

Quod ergo obiicitur de ira et odio, dicendum, quod etsi ibi sit detestatio consequens, est tamen ibi delectatio antecedens, et propterea continetur sub hac assignatione.

p. 837 Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc omne peccatum erit rapina; dicendum, quod assecutio ibi stat non solummodo pro cupiditate rerum terrenarum, immo etiam cuiuslibet appetibilis: iustitia vero non tantum ibi stat, prout est cardinalis virtus, sed prout est virtus generalis, quae omnes virtutes complectitur, et cui omnia vitia opponuntur8.

Dub. III. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In utraque assignatione de actuali peccato agitur et mortali, non veniali. Videtur enim, quod male fiat assignatio peccati. Si enim recta descriptio vel assignatio debeat convenire omni descripto9; et praedictae definitiones non conveniant omni peccato: ergo non recte assignantur. Si tu dicas, quod peccatum non dicitur de eis univoce, sed aequivoce; contra: quae conveniunt in causa et effectu, habent univocationem10. Sed omne genus peccati ortum habet ex peccato Adae, tam originale quam actuale quam etiam veniale; omnia etiam genera peccatorum in hoc conveniunt, quod animam reddunt dignam poena et privant ab ea aliquod bonum, quod est iustitia, vel ad iustitiam ordinatum: ergo videtur, quod de eis univoce dicatur peccatum; et si hoc: ergo videtur, quod una ratio communis debeat assignari de peccato, prout dicitur de his omnibus generibus.

Est igitur quaestio, utrum contingat unam communem rationem assignare omni generi peccati; hoc est quaerere, utrum peccatum de eis dicatur univoce. Et si tu dicas, quod sic; in contrarium est, quia quae univocantur in aliquo habent proportionem11: sed mortalis et venialis nulla est proportio: ergo nec univocatio. — Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit, quod praedictae assignationes non conveniunt peccato veniali. Veniale enim peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, et contra legem Dei, sicut dicitur ad Romanos septimo12 super illud: Non concupisces, Glossa: «Bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omnia mala prohibet»; ergo venialia prohibentur a lege Dei, sunt igitur contra legem Dei: ergo praedicta ratio convenit veniali.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod peccatum, prout dicitur de originali, actuali mortali et veniali, nec dicitur omnino univoce nec dicitur omnino aequivoce, sed quasi medio modo, scilicet analogice. Ratio enim culpabilitatis primo et principaliter reperitur in peccato actuali mortali, et consequenter in originali, et postremo in veniali; et ideo notificationes, quae dantur de peccato simpliciter, potissime referuntur ad peccatum actuale mortale, quod est peccatum simpliciter.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa quae obiiciuntur. Nam ex hoc, quod illa tria genera peccatorum conveniunt in causa et in effectu, non concluditur, quod peccatum dicatur de eis univoce, sed analogice, quia in his non communicant aequaliter, sed secundum prius et posterius.

Et ideo cum quaeritur, utrum possit una communis ratio assignari, dicendum, quod potest una assignari ratio, quae conveniat eis secundum prius et posterius, et ita secundum communitatem analogice, utpote si dicatur, quod peccatum est meritum poenae vel privatio boni. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod nulla est proportio; dicendum, quod etsi nulla est proportio quantum ad commensurationem quantitatis demeriti, est tamen proportio inter veniale et mortale secundum consimilem comparationem et ad originem et ad effectum consequentem.

Dub. IV. Item quaeritur de alia definitione Ambrosii, quam ponit: Peccatum est praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum. Videtur enim, quod haec ratio non conveniat omni peccato. Quaedam enim, ut dicit Augustinus13, sunt mala, quia prohibita; quaedam prohibita, quia mala: ergo si nulla esset lex, nec aliqua praecepta data, adhuc essent peccata: non ergo omne peccatum est praevaricatio legis etc. — Item, sicut obedientia distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus, ita inobedientia ab aliis vitiis: ergo male definitur omne peccatum per inobedientiam. — Item, ita peccat qui non obedit praelato, sicut qui non obedit Deo: ergo non tantum est peccatum inobedientia caelestium praeceptorum, sed etiam terrenorum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod lex aliquando accipitur stricte pro lege scripta vel data; aliquando large, prout comprehendit legem naturae et legem Scripturae et legem gratiae. Et in praedicta notificatione lex accipitur large.

p. 838 Ad illud quod obiicitur de obedientia, dicendum, quod obedientia dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, prout dicit observantiam mandatorum Dei, et sic est communis omnibus virtutibus; alio modo, prout specialiter considerat rationem praecepti, et sic est virtus divisa ab aliis, quia potissime habet usum suum in his quae ideo sunt bona, quia praecepta. Et sic obedientia dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large et stricte, et in praedicta notificatione accipitur large. — Ad illud quod obiicitur de obedientia praelati, dicendum, quod totum pendet ex mandato Dei, quia Deus mandat, quod obediatur homini14.

Dub. V. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non consistente peccato, virtus fortasse non esset. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia, si non esset culpa, purior esset caritas: ergo virtus perfectior et verior. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non asserit, sed sub dubitatione dicit; contra: ita falsum dicit qui certum proponit ut dubium, sicut qui dubium asserit ut certum.

Et dicendum, quod in illo verbo non ponitur nec significatur virtus non esse, non existente malitia, sed hoc significatur, quod non ita appareret, sicut nunc apparet; et ideo dicit: fortassis non esset, id est, non cognosceretur ita esse.

Dub. VI. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in illo capitulo15: Potest etiam quaeri, quod peccatum est privatio sive corruptio boni. Si enim privatio et positio opponuntur, et peccatum recte definitum est supra: peccatum est dictum, vel factum etc.: ergo male definitur per privationem.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum unius rei una sit definitio: unde est hoc, quod peccatum ita multipliciter et varie definitur a Sanctis? Quaeritur etiam, penes quid illae definitiones distinguantur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de peccato est loqui formaliter, et est loqui materialiter, scilicet ratione substrati. Et quia, formaliter loquendo, privatio est, materialiter vero loquendo substernit sibi actum; ideo aliquando definitur per privationem, aliquando per positionem, quia quaedam sunt formales definitiones, quaedam materiales; et utroque modo multipliciter.

p. 839 Si enim consideremus peccatum, secundum quod dicit privationem, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut in quantum simpliciter16 dicit recessum a bono, aut in quantum dicit recessum a rectitudine naturae, aut in quantum dicit recessum ab omnis boni complemento et perfectione.

Primo modo sumitur definitio triplex ab Augustino, quae omnes idem circumloquuntur diversis verbis, quarum prima sumitur in libro de Civitate Dei17, et est haec: «Peccatum est absentia boni, ubi debet esse». — Secunda, de libro de Vera Religione: «Peccatum non est appetitio naturarum malarum, sed desertio meliorum». — Tertia, de libro de Natura boni: «Peccatum est corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis».

Secundo modo, scilicet prout peccatum dicit recessum a rectitudine naturae, inveniuntur tres definitiones, quae idem circumloquuntur, quamvis aliter et aliter; quarum una est Damasceni18, quae est: «Peccatum est ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam aversio». — Alia est Anselmi: «Peccatum est carentia debitae iustitiae». — Tertia est Augustini: «Peccatum est defectus quidam a luce veritatis, naturam non perimens, sed obscurans».

Tertio vero modo, videlicet prout dicit recessum ab omnis boni complemento et perfectione, sic reperitur triplex definitio, quae differt solo dicendi modo, quarum prima sumitur ab Augustino in libro de Libero Arbitrio19: «Malum est aversio a bono incommutabili». — Altera vero ab eodem, in libro de Vera Religione: «Peccatum est carere bonis incommutabilibus, quibus fruendum est.» — Tertia sumitur ab eodem Augustino: «Peccatum est tenebra intelligibilis»; hoc enim dictum est, in quantum privat a visione lucis aeternae. — Hae omnes sunt notificationes peccati quasi formales.

Sunt et aliae notificationes, quae concernunt actum substratum. Et istae variantur secundum triplicem considerationem peccati, quam habet sub hac ratione: aut videlicet ad Deum, quem offendit; aut ad virtutem, quam excludit; aut ad bonum ut nunc, quod praetendit.

Si in comparatione ad Deum, quem offendit, sic est triplex, quarum una accipitur ab Augustino, in libro contra Manichaeos20: «Peccatum est in veritatis praeceptis, vel in ipsa veritate errare». — Alia ab Ambrosio, in libro de Paradiso: «Peccatum est praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia praeceptorum». — Tertia ab eodem Augustino, et habetur in littera: «Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei».

Secundo modo, scilicet per comparationem ad virtutem, quam excludit, sic reperitur triplex definitio, quarum una sumta est a Basilio21: «Peccatum est dispositio animae contrarie se habens ad virtutem». — Secunda ab Augustino, in libro de Duabus Animabus: «Peccatum est voluntas retinendi, vel assequendi quod iustitia vetat»; accipitur enim ibi iustitia generaliter, prout omnem virtutem complectitur. — Tertia ab eodem Augustino, in libro de Vera Religione: «Peccatum est appetere quae Christus contempsit, vel contemnere quae Christus appetiit». Nam Christus fuit omnis virtutis speculum et exemplar.

Tertio modo, scilicet per comparationem ad bonum, quod praetendit, similiter invenitur triplex assignatio re conveniens, licet differat modo dicendi, quarum una est ab Augustino, in libro de Civitate Dei22: «Peccatum est male uti bono». — Secunda vero, in libro de Trinitate: «Peccatum est uti fruendis et frui utendis»; et similiter in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum. — Tertia est eiusdem Augustini, in libro de Libero Arbitrio: «Peccatum est, spreto incommutabili bono, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere».

Fortassis autem et aliae notificationes ab istis duodeviginti poterunt reperiri. Nam duae aliae sunt, quae videntur circumloqui peccatum secundum utramque acceptionem, ut est illa: Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni23. Et illa: Peccatum est meritum poenae aeternae. — Et sic in universo sunt viginti.

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English Translation

Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

Doubt I. In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition which he first sets down: Sin is a thing said, or done, or desired against the law of God. For it seems to say what is false. For either this is understood disjunctively, or subdisjunctively1. If subdisjunctively: then the members cannot stand together: therefore no one and the same sin is both desired and done; but this is false, because every sin done is desired2. — Likewise, it seems that it does not suit every sin, because the sin of omission is neither done nor desired nor said: therefore it seems that it is badly assigned, because it does not suit every actual mortal sin.

I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid definition is of actual and mortal sin. For that which belongs to actual sin, it is said to be a thing said, or done, or desired, according to the threefold act, namely of the interpretative and operative and affective power, which are all in a certain manner motive powers. Insofar as it is mortal, it is said to be against the law of God; and thus it suits all and only [such sins]. All, because every actual sin is either only desired, or is both desired and outwardly consummated, and this either by word or by deed. And it suits only [such], because it does not suit the venial [sin], since this is not against the law of God3; nor original [sin], since this is not a thing said, or done. — To that which is asked, whether it is to be held there disjunctively or subdisjunctively; it must be said, disjunctively; but the last member is to be understood with precision, the rest by no means. Hence the sense is, that every sin is either said and desired, or done and desired, or only desired.

But to that which is objected concerning the sin of omission, it must be said that every sin, as Augustine holds4, has for its root an evil love; and therefore, although in the sin of omission there is the privation of some principal act; yet because that privation takes its origin from the love of some changeable good — which is plain, because someone is unwilling to rise for matins, because he wishes to rest in bed — therefore the sin of omission falls under this member, which is called desired5.

Doubt II. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Sin is the will of retaining, or of obtaining, that which justice forbids. For there is some sin in which one neither wishes to retain anything nor to obtain anything, but rather intends to destroy, as is the case in anger and hatred and envy. — Likewise, to wish to obtain or to retain that which justice forbids, this belongs to avarice or to rapine: therefore every sin will be rapine.

There is therefore a question, since sins are as much against the other virtues as against justice: why is sin rather defined by what is opposed6 to justice, than by what is opposed to the other virtues?

I respond: It must be said that Augustine7 defines sin by that which is the root of all evil; but this is libidinous love. And since all libidinous love is either of a thing possessed or to be possessed, and this apart from the order and rule of the eternal law; therefore he says that sin is the will of obtaining, or of retaining, that which justice forbids, so that he describes the inordinate love, which is the root of all sin, both by that toward which it is, and by that against which it is.

As for that, then, which is objected concerning anger and hatred, it must be said that although there is there a consequent detestation, yet there is there an antecedent delight, and therefore it is contained under this assignation.

p. 837 To that which is objected, that then every sin will be rapine; it must be said that obtaining there stands not only for the cupidity of earthly things, but indeed of any appetible whatever: but justice does not there stand only insofar as it is the cardinal virtue, but insofar as it is the general virtue, which embraces all the virtues, and to which all vices are opposed8.

Doubt III. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: In each assignation it is treated of actual and mortal sin, not venial. For it seems that the assignation of sin is badly made. For if a right description or assignation ought to suit everything described9; and the aforesaid definitions do not suit every sin: then they are not rightly assigned. If you say that sin is not said of them univocally, but equivocally; on the contrary: things which agree in cause and effect have univocation10. But every genus of sin takes its origin from the sin of Adam, both original and actual and also venial; all the genera of sins also agree in this, that they render the soul worthy of punishment and deprive it of some good, which is justice, or ordered to justice: therefore it seems that sin is said of them univocally; and if this: then it seems that one common account ought to be assigned of sin, insofar as it is said of all these genera.

There is therefore a question, whether it happens that one common account may be assigned to every genus of sin; that is to ask, whether sin is said of them univocally. And if you say that yes; on the contrary it stands, because things which are univocated in something have a proportion11: but between mortal and venial there is no proportion: therefore neither univocation. — Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that the aforesaid assignations do not suit venial sin. For venial sin is a thing said, or done, or desired, and against the law of God, as it is said in Romans seven12 upon that text: You shall not covet, Gloss: «The law is good, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils»; therefore venial [sins] are forbidden by the law of God, they are therefore against the law of God: therefore the aforesaid account suits the venial [sin].

I respond: It must be said that sin, insofar as it is said of original, actual mortal, and venial [sin], is neither said altogether univocally nor said altogether equivocally, but as it were in a middle manner, namely analogically. For the formal character of culpability is found first and principally in actual mortal sin, and consequently in original [sin], and lastly in venial [sin]; and therefore the notifications which are given of sin simply are most of all referred to actual mortal sin, which is sin simply.

And by this the answer to those things which are objected becomes plain. For from this, that those three genera of sins agree in cause and in effect, it is not concluded that sin is said of them univocally, but analogically, because in these they do not communicate equally, but according to prior and posterior.

And therefore when it is asked whether one common account can be assigned, it must be said that one account can be assigned which suits them according to prior and posterior, and thus according to the analogical commonness, as for instance if it be said that sin is the meriting of punishment or the privation of good. — To that, then, which is objected, that there is no proportion; it must be said that although there is no proportion with regard to the commensuration of the quantity of demerit, yet there is a proportion between venial and mortal according to a like comparison both to the origin and to the consequent effect.

Doubt IV. Likewise it is asked about the other definition of Ambrose, which he sets down: Sin is the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience to the heavenly commandments. For it seems that this account does not suit every sin. For some things, as Augustine says13, are evil because forbidden; some forbidden because evil: therefore if there were no law, nor any precepts given, there would still be sins: therefore not every sin is the transgression of a law, etc. — Likewise, just as obedience is distinguished from the other virtues, so disobedience [is distinguished] from the other vices: therefore every sin is badly defined by disobedience. — Likewise, he sins who does not obey a prelate, just as he who does not obey God: therefore sin is not only the disobedience to the heavenly precepts, but also to the earthly.

I respond: It must be said that law is sometimes taken strictly for the written or given law; sometimes broadly, insofar as it comprehends the law of nature and the law of Scripture and the law of grace. And in the aforesaid notification law is taken broadly.

p. 838 To that which is objected concerning obedience, it must be said that obedience is taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it bespeaks the observance of the commandments of God, and thus it is common to all the virtues; in another way, insofar as it specially considers the formal character of precept, and thus it is a virtue divided from the others, because it has its use most of all in those things which are good for the reason that they are commanded. And thus obedience is taken in two ways, namely broadly and strictly, and in the aforesaid notification it is taken broadly. — To that which is objected concerning obedience to a prelate, it must be said that the whole depends on the commandment of God, because God commands that one obey man14.

Doubt V. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Sin not existing, virtue perhaps would not be. For it seems to say what is false, because, if there were no fault, charity would be purer: therefore virtue more perfect and truer. If you say that he does not assert this, but says it under doubt; on the contrary: he speaks as falsely who proposes what is certain as doubtful, as he who asserts what is doubtful as certain.

And it must be said that in that word it is neither posited nor signified that virtue does not exist, malice not existing, but this is signified, that it would not so appear as it now appears; and therefore he says: perhaps it would not be, that is, it would not be known to be so.

Doubt VI. Likewise it is asked about that which he says in that chapter15: It can also be asked, since sin is the privation or corruption of good. For if privation and position are opposed, and sin was rightly defined above: sin is a thing said, or done etc.: then it is badly defined by privation.

In connection with this it is asked, since of one thing there is one definition: whence is it, that sin is so manifoldly and variously defined by the Saints? It is also asked, by what those definitions are distinguished.

I respond: It must be said that of sin one may speak formally, and one may speak materially, namely by reason of the substratum. And because, speaking formally, it is a privation, but speaking materially it spreads beneath itself an act; therefore it is sometimes defined by privation, sometimes by position, because some definitions are formal, some material; and in each way manifoldly.

p. 839 For if we consider sin insofar as it bespeaks privation, this can be in three ways: either insofar as it simply16 bespeaks a withdrawal from good, or insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal from the rectitude of nature, or insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal from the completion and perfection of all good.

In the first manner is taken a threefold definition from Augustine, which all express the same thing in different words, of which the first is taken in the book On the City of God17, and is this: «Sin is the absence of good, where it ought to be». — The second, from the book On True Religion: «Sin is not the appetite of evil natures, but the desertion of better ones». — The third, from the book On the Nature of Good: «Sin is the corruption of measure, species, and order».

In the second manner, namely insofar as sin bespeaks a withdrawal from the rectitude of nature, three definitions are found, which express the same thing, though in different ways; of which one is of Damascene18, which is: «Sin is the turning-away from that which is according to nature into that which is beside nature». — Another is of Anselm: «Sin is the lack of due justice». — The third is of Augustine: «Sin is a certain defect from the light of truth, not destroying nature, but obscuring it».

In the third manner, namely insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal from the completion and perfection of all good, there is found a threefold definition, which differs only in the manner of speaking, of which the first is taken from Augustine in the book On Free Choice19: «Evil is a turning-away from the unchangeable good». — The other from the same, in the book On True Religion: «Sin is to be without the unchangeable goods, which are to be enjoyed.» — The third is taken from the same Augustine: «Sin is an intelligible darkness»; for this was said insofar as it deprives [one] of the vision of the eternal light. — All these are as it were formal notifications of sin.

There are also other notifications, which concern the underlying act. And these vary according to the threefold consideration of sin, which it has under this aspect: namely either to God, whom it offends; or to virtue, which it excludes; or to the good as now, which it puts forward.

If in comparison to God, whom it offends, thus it is threefold, of which one is taken from Augustine, in the book Against the Manichees20: «Sin is to err in the precepts of truth, or in the truth itself». — Another from Ambrose, in the book On Paradise: «Sin is the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience to the heavenly precepts». — The third from the same Augustine, and it is had in the text: «Sin is a thing said, or done, or desired against the law of God».

In the second manner, namely by comparison to virtue, which it excludes, there is found a threefold definition, of which one is taken from Basil21: «Sin is a disposition of the soul holding itself contrarily to virtue». — The second from Augustine, in the book On the Two Souls: «Sin is the will of retaining, or of obtaining, that which justice forbids»; for justice is there taken generally, insofar as it embraces every virtue. — The third from the same Augustine, in the book On True Religion: «Sin is to desire those things which Christ despised, or to despise those things which Christ desired». For Christ was the mirror and exemplar of every virtue.

In the third manner, namely by comparison to the good which it puts forward, there is likewise found a threefold assignation agreeing in reality, although it differs in the manner of speaking, of which one is from Augustine, in the book On the City of God22: «Sin is to use a good badly». — The second, in the book On the Trinity: «Sin is to use the things to be enjoyed and to enjoy the things to be used»; and likewise in the book Of the Eighty-three Questions. — The third is of the same Augustine, in the book On Free Choice: «Sin is, the unchangeable good being spurned, to cleave to changeable things».

But perhaps still other notifications beyond these eighteen will be able to be found. For there are two others, which seem to express sin according to either acceptation, as is that one: Sin is an act befalling from the defect of good23. And that one: Sin is the meriting of eternal punishment. — And thus in all there are twenty.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Priscian., XVI. Grammat. c. 1: Disiunctivae [coniunctiones] sunt quae, quamvis dictiones coniungant, sensum tamen disiunctum habent, et alteram quidem rem esse, alteram vero non esse significant, ut ve, vel, aut... [v. g.] vel dies est, vel nox... Subdisiunctivae sunt quae voce disiunctivarum utrumque tamen esse significant vel simul, ut copulativae, vel discrete. Simul, ut Terentius in Eunucho: «Vel rex semper maximas mihi gratias agebat», pro: etiam rex... Discrete, utrumque tamen esse significat, ut: tota die vel legit iste, vel cogitat; significat enim et legere et cogitare, sed non simul utrumque facere, sed aliis horis legere, aliis cogitare etc. — Post Aut enim hoc Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiungunt quod est, vel. Mox pro Si subdisiunctive cod. cc et ed. 1 perperam Si disiunctive.
    Priscian, Grammar, Bk. XVI, c. 1: Disjunctive [conjunctions] are those which, although they conjoin words, yet have a disjoined sense, and signify that the one thing indeed is, but the other is not, as ve, vel, aut [or]... [e.g.] vel dies est, vel nox [either it is day, or night]... Subdisjunctive are those which, with the voice of disjunctives, yet signify that both are, either at once, like the copulatives, or separately. At once, as Terence in the Eunuch: «Vel rex semper maximas mihi gratias agebat» [Even the king always gave me the greatest thanks], for: etiam rex [even the king]... Separately, it yet signifies that both are, as: tota die vel legit iste, vel cogitat [all day this man either reads or thinks]; for it signifies both to read and to think, but not to do both at once, but at some hours to read, at others to think, etc. — After Aut enim hoc the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add quod est, vel. Soon after, for Si subdisiunctive codex cc and edition 1 wrongly read Si disiunctive.
  2. In cod. L a manu secunda, sed suppari adiectum est: si disiunctive, ergo potest esse peccatum oris et operis sine peccato voluntatis, quod est falsum. Aliquanto inferius post assignata cod. T supplet definitio.
    In codex L, by a second hand, but of nearly the same age, there is added: if disjunctively, then there can be a sin of mouth and of deed without a sin of will, which is false. Somewhat below, after assignata codex T supplies definitio.
  3. Codd. I O R X Z bb dd et alii cum ed. 1 Per, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 Secundum.
    Codices I, O, R, X, Z, bb, dd, and others with edition 1 read Per; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 Secundum.
  4. Cfr. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
    Cf. below, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.
  5. Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 22. n. 1. Cfr. ibid. XIV. c. 7. n. 2; Enarrat. in Ps. 9. n. 15. et in Ps. 79. n. 13; de Gratia Christi contra Pelag. et Caelest. c. 20. n. 21.
    On the City of God, Bk. XXII, c. 22, n. 1. Cf. ibid., Bk. XIV, c. 7, n. 2; Enarrations on the Psalms, on Ps. 9, n. 15, and on Ps. 79, n. 13; On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Caelestius, c. 20, n. 21.
  6. Vide supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 107. m. 1. et q. 114. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3; S. Thom., hic a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. Locis hic citt. tanguntur etiam dubia, quae subsequuntur.
    See above, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 107, m. 1, and q. 114, m. 1; B. Albert, here, a. 3; Summa, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 3; St. Thomas, here, a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 1, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 1. In the places here cited the doubts which follow are also touched upon.
  7. Propter abbreviationem vocis oppositum, a librariis factam, in nonnullis codd. pro ea legi posset oppositionem, quam lectionem cod. bb hic et paulo inferius praebet.
    On account of the abbreviation of the word oppositum, made by the scribes, in several codices in its place might be read oppositionem, which reading codex bb here and a little below presents.
  8. Libr. de Duabus Animabus, c. 11. n. 13, unde textus huius dubii depromptus est.
    The book On the Two Souls, c. 11, n. 13, whence the text of this doubt is drawn.
  9. Huius dubii solutionem dant etiam S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.
    The solution of this doubt is also given by St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 1.
  10. Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. Vide supra pag. 828, nota 2.
    According to Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VI, c. 1. See above, p. 828, note 2.
  11. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. et tom. I. pag. 51, nota 11. — Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13: Nam univocum omne, comparabile. Cfr. VII. Physic. text. 24. seqq. (c. 4.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VII, c. 1, and vol. I, p. 51, note 11. — Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, c. 13: For everything univocal is comparable. Cf. Physics, Bk. VII, text 24 ff. (c. 4).
  12. Vers. 7. De Glossa adiuncta vide supra pag. 721, nota 2. — Paulo superius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt et ante contra.
    Verse 7. Concerning the adjoined Gloss see above, p. 721, note 2. — A little above, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 omit et before contra.
  13. Cfr. quae Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6, de analogis profert, quae describens docet, quod ab uno sint, vel ad unum conferantur et quandam proportionem inter se habeant. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 analogiae. Mox pro vel cod. cc et ed. 1 et. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 4; B. Albert., hic a. 1. seq.; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4. a. 1. partic. 1. — Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 6: Non sane ideo [adulterium] malum est, quia vetatur lege, sed ideo vetatur lege, quia malum est.
    Cf. what Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, c. 6, brings forward concerning analogous things, which in describing he teaches to be from one, or to be referred to one and to have a certain proportion among themselves. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 read analogiae. Soon after, for vel codex cc and edition 1 read et. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 108, m. 4; B. Albert, here, a. 1 ff.; Summa, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4, a. 1, partic. 1. — On Free Choice, Bk. I, c. 3, n. 6: It is not indeed for this reason that [adultery] is evil, because it is forbidden by law, but for this reason is it forbidden by law, because it is evil.
  14. Cfr. infra d. 44. a. 2. et 3. Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 3. — Paulo superius plures codd., ut I bb cc ee, cum ed. 1 Et sicut pro Et sic. — Cfr. supra d. 29. a. 3. q. 2. — Vide August., de Mendacio, c. 3. n. 3. — Cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., dub. lit. 5.
    Cf. below, d. 44, a. 2 and 3; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 3. — A little above, several codices, such as I, bb, cc, ee, with edition 1 read Et sicut for Et sic. — Cf. above, d. 29, a. 3, q. 2. — See Augustine, On Lying, c. 3, n. 3. — Cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, doubt on the text, 5.
  15. Cap. 3. — Hic dub. 1. — Quod unius rei una tantum sit definitio, docet Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.).
    Chapter 3. — Here, doubt 1. — That of one thing there is but one definition, Aristotle teaches, Topics, Bk. VI, c. 3 (c. 4).
  16. Edd., excepta 1, abstulerunt hinc vocem simpliciter eamque posuerunt in tertio disiunctionis membro ante recessum ab omnis boni.
    The editions, except the first, removed from here the word simpliciter and placed it in the third member of the disjunction before recessum ab omnis boni.
  17. Libr. XI. c. 9. et 22, ubi S. Doctor malum amissionem sive privationem boni definit. Deinde c. 17. et XII. c. 1-9 ostendit, malum et vitium esse non posse, nisi in eis quibus adimendo bonum noceat naturae. Cfr. etiam XIX. c. 13. n. 2. — Secunda definitio est in libro de Vera Relig. c. 20. n. 38, ubi exposito, quod nulla substantia mala sit, sed omnis substantia bona; quodque duplex sit bonum, aeternum scil. et temporale etc, concluditur: «Est igitur quoddam bonum, quod si diligit anima rationalis, peccat, quia infra illam ordinatum est; quare ipsum peccatum malum est, non ea substantia, quae peccando diligitur. Non ergo arbor illa malum est, quae in medio paradiso plantata scribitur, sed divini praecepti transgressio» etc. Similiter in libro de Natura boni, c. 34. et 36. ait: Peccatum vel iniquitas non est appetitio naturarum malarum, sed desertio meliorum. Cfr. etiam Contra Secundinum Manich. c. 15, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8. — Tertia definitio est in libro de Natura boni, c. 4. — Pro in libro de Civitate Dei cod. W rectius de libro de Civitate Dei.
    On the City of God, Bk. XI, c. 9 and 22, where the holy Doctor defines evil as the loss or privation of good. Then in c. 17 and Bk. XII, c. 1–9, he shows that evil and vice cannot be except in those things to which by taking away the good it harms nature. Cf. also Bk. XIX, c. 13, n. 2. — The second definition is in the book On True Religion, c. 20, n. 38, where, having explained that no substance is evil, but every substance is good, and that good is twofold, namely eternal and temporal, etc., it is concluded: «There is therefore a certain good which, if the rational soul love it, it sins, because it is ordered beneath that [soul]; wherefore the sin itself is evil, not that substance which is loved in sinning. Therefore not that tree is the evil which is written to have been planted in the midst of paradise, but the transgression of the divine precept» etc. Likewise in the book On the Nature of Good, c. 34 and 36, he says: Sin or iniquity is not the appetite of evil natures, but the desertion of better ones. Cf. also Against Secundinus the Manichee, c. 15, and Bk. XII On the City of God, c. 8. — The third definition is in the book On the Nature of Good, c. 4. — For in libro de Civitate Dei codex W more correctly de libro de Civitate Dei.
  18. Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 20. Cfr. etiam II. c. 30. et Dialog. contra Manich., ubi plures definitionum peccati, hic propositarum, explicantur. — Seq. Anselmi definitio est in libro de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et 6; vide supra pag. 722, nota 3. et pag. 816, nota 8. — Tertia Augustini definitio habetur Enarrat. in Ps. 58. serm. 1. n. 18, ubi inter alia haec: «Est quaedam origo fonsque virtutis, est quaedam radix sapientiae, est quaedam, ut ita dicam, si et hoc dicendum est, regio incommutabilis veritatis; ab hac anima recedens tenebratur, accedens illuminatur» etc. Ibid. in Ps. 7. n. 19; iam vero tenebris significari peccata et in Propheta invenitur... et in Apostolo dicente... Abiiciamus opera tenebrarum et induamur arma lucis (Rom. 13, 12.). Non quod aliqua sit natura tenebrarum. Omnis enim natura, in quantum natura est, esse cogitur; esse autem ad lucem pertinet, non-esse ad tenebras. Qui ergo deserit eum, a quo factus est, et inclinatur in id, unde factus est, id est in nihilum, in hoc peccato tenebratur, et tamen non penitus perit, sed in infimis ordinatur. Cfr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 9. et XII. c. 9, ubi S. Auctor de peccato angelorum tractans docet, istos aversione a luce aeterna et incommutabili factos esse tenebras. Cfr. et XIX. c. 13. n. 2.
    On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. IV, c. 20. Cf. also Bk. II, c. 30, and the Dialogue against the Manichees, where several of the definitions of sin here proposed are explained. — The following definition of Anselm is in the book On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, c. 3 and 6; see above, p. 722, note 3, and p. 816, note 8. — The third definition, of Augustine, is had in the Enarrations on the Psalms, on Ps. 58, sermon 1, n. 18, where among other things [is] this: «There is a certain origin and fountain of virtue, there is a certain root of wisdom, there is, so to speak, if this too must be said, a certain region of unchangeable truth; from this the soul, withdrawing, is darkened, drawing near, is illumined» etc. Ibid., on Ps. 7, n. 19; that indeed sins are signified by darkness is found both in the Prophet... and in the Apostle saying... Let us cast off the works of darkness and put on the armor of light (Rom. 13:12). Not that there is any nature of darkness. For every nature, insofar as it is nature, is compelled to be; but to be pertains to light, not-to-be to darkness. He therefore who deserts him by whom he was made, and is inclined into that whence he was made, that is into nothing, is darkened in this sin, and yet does not utterly perish, but is ordered among the lowest things. Cf. Bk. XI On the City of God, c. 9, and Bk. XII, c. 9, where the holy Author, treating of the sin of the angels, teaches that they were made darkness by a turning-away from the eternal and unchangeable light. Cf. also Bk. XIX, c. 13, n. 2.
  19. Libr. I. c. 16. n. 35; II. c. 19. n. 53; III. c. 1. n. 2. — Secunda definitio eruitur ex iis quae c. 11-14 libri de Vera Relig. docentur de vita eiusque opposito, scil. morte, quae vocatur nequitia (quae vox, secundum quod ipse interpretatur, derivatur ab eo quod ne quidquam est), qua voluntas deficiendo ab eo cuius essentia fruenda est, et inhaerendo inferioribus tendit ad nihilum, unde privatur bonis incommutabilibus etc. — Tertia definitio, quae sententialiter potius quam verbotenus apud August. esse videtur, non ita intelligenda est, tanquam tenebrae peccati essent aliquid in se et per se intelligibile — hoc enim Augustinus expresse negat in Exposit. propos. ex Epist. ad Rom., propos. 43, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7, afferens illud Ps. 81, 12: Delicta quis intelligit? — sed intelligenda est et in oppositione ad tenebras corporales, et in comparatione ad subiectum, in quo tenebrae sunt, scil. in substantiis intellectu praeditis. Nam in Gen. ad lit. imperf. lib. c. 5. n. 24. seq. distinguit triplicem lucem, scil. corporalem, sensualem et rationalem, eique contrarias triplices tenebras, scil. corporales, sensuales (cognitioni sensuum convenientes) et rationales, scil. ignorantia et peccata, quatenus afficiunt superiorem partem rationis, quae Deo et aeternis intendit et intelligentia vocatur. I. de Baptismo contra Donat. c. 11. n. 16. autem ait: «Peccata enim tenebrae animarum sunt», et Enarrat. in Ps. 17. n. 29: «Nos enim peccatis nostris tenebrae sumus». De voce intelligibilis dicta de materia cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 88. a. 1. ad 2. — Paulo superius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 differunt pro differt.
    Bk. I, c. 16, n. 35; Bk. II, c. 19, n. 53; Bk. III, c. 1, n. 2. — The second definition is drawn out from those things which are taught in c. 11–14 of the book On True Religion concerning life and its opposite, namely death, which is called nequitia ("worthlessness") (which word, according as he himself interprets it, is derived from this, that it is ne quidquam, "not anything"), by which the will, by failing from that whose essence is to be enjoyed, and by cleaving to lower things, tends toward nothing, whence it is deprived of the unchangeable goods, etc. — The third definition, which seems to be in Augustine sententially rather than word for word, is not to be understood as though the darkness of sin were something intelligible in itself and through itself — for this Augustine expressly denies in the Exposition of Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, prop. 43, and Bk. XII On the City of God, c. 7, citing that text of Ps. 81:12: Who understands his faults? — but it is to be understood both in opposition to corporeal darkness, and in comparison to the subject in which the darkness is, namely in substances endowed with intellect. For in the Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, c. 5, n. 24 ff., he distinguishes a threefold light, namely corporeal, sensual, and rational, and contrary to it a threefold darkness, namely corporeal, sensual (corresponding to the cognition of the senses), and rational, namely ignorance and sins, insofar as they affect the higher part of the reason, which is intent upon God and eternal things and is called intelligence. But in Bk. I On Baptism against the Donatists, c. 11, n. 16, he says: «For sins are the darkness of souls», and Enarrations on the Psalms, on Ps. 17, n. 29: «For we by our sins are darkness». Concerning the word intelligibilis said of matter, cf. St. Thomas, Summa, I, q. 88, a. 1, ad 2. — A little above, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 read differunt for differt.
  20. De Fide contra Manich. c. 8: Peccare enim quid aliud est, nisi in veritatis praeceptis, vel in ipsa non stare veritate? — Secunda definitio, ex Ambrosio allata, habetur in libro cit. c. 8. n. 39. — De tertia vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    On Faith against the Manichees, c. 8: For what else is it to sin, than not to stand in the precepts of truth, or in the truth itself? — The second definition, brought from Ambrose, is had in the book cited, c. 8, n. 39. — Concerning the third, see here the text of the Master, c. 1.
  21. In Hexaem. homil. 2. n. 4, ubi contra Manichaeos dicit: Quid igitur dicimus? Quod malum non est substantia vivens aut animata, sed dispositio (διάθεσις) in anima contrarie se habens ad virtutem etc. — Pro Basilio codd. 1 N Z ee et alii Anselmo, cod. A Ambrosio. — Secunda definitio invenitur loc. cit. c. 11. n. 15. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. In hac secunda definitione edd. praeter 1 cum pluribus codd. pro retinendi substituunt recipiendi, et textus origin. pro assequendi habet consequendi. — Tertia definitio sententialiter habetur loc. cit. c. 16. n. 31, ubi S. Doctor ait: Non enim ullum peccatum committi potest, nisi aut dum appetuntur ea quae ille [Christus] contempsit, aut fugiuntur quae ille sustinuit.
    On the Hexaemeron, homily 2, n. 4, where against the Manichees he says: What therefore do we say? That evil is not a living or animate substance, but a disposition (διάθεσις) in the soul holding itself contrarily to virtue etc. — For Basilio codices 1, N, Z, ee and others read Anselmo; codex A Ambrosio. — The second definition is found in the place cited, c. 11, n. 15. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. In this second definition the editions except the first, with several codices, for retinendi substitute recipiendi, and the original text for assequendi has consequendi. — The third definition is had sententially in the place cited, c. 16, n. 31, where the holy Doctor says: For no sin can be committed, except either when those things are desired which he [Christ] despised, or those are fled which he endured.
  22. Libr. XII. c. 8, ubi sententialiter habetur, S. Doctore docente, amorem perversum et inordinatum, non res ipsas, vitium constituere. Definitio ad verbum habetur in libr. de Natura boni, c. 36: Malum est enim male uti bono. — Secunda definitio innititur verbis X. de Trin., c. 10. n. 13. prolatis: «Nec est alia vita hominum vitiosa atque culpabilis, quam male utens et male fruens». Similia occurrunt in libr. 83 Qq. q. 30: Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui. — Tertia definitio exprimitur, II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53, his verbis: Sed malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona. — Paulo superius pro re conveniens Vat. rei conveniens.
    On the City of God, Bk. XII, c. 8, where it is had sententially, the holy Doctor teaching that perverse and inordinate love, not the things themselves, constitutes vice. The definition is had word for word in the book On the Nature of Good, c. 36: For evil is to use a good badly. — The second definition rests on the words set forth in Bk. X On the Trinity, c. 10, n. 13: «Nor is there another life of men, vicious and culpable, than [one] using badly and enjoying badly». Similar things occur in the book Of the 83 Questions, q. 30: And so all human perversion, which is also called vice, is to wish to use the things to be enjoyed and to enjoy the things to be used. — The third definition is expressed, Bk. II On Free Choice, c. 19, n. 53, in these words: But let evil be its turning-away from the unchangeable good and its turning toward changeable goods. — A little above, for re conveniens the Vatican edition reads rei conveniens.
  23. Hanc definitionem, quae Augustino tribuitur (cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVII. c. 1.), Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 107. m. 1.) sic enucleat: Peccatum dicitur actus incidens, non quia casualiter incidat, sed quia non ex necessitate, sed contingenter provenit ex voluntate; in voluntate enim est peccare, vel non peccare... Defectus boni dicitur dupliciter: vel ut notet causam ipsius actus contingentis ex voluntate (voluntas enim aliquando ex infirmitate, aliquando ex certa malitia peccat), vel potest defectus boni dicere privationem quandam boni, quod est virtus, et secundum hoc haec praepositio ex non notat causam materialem, sed causam formalem, ut sit sensus: peccatum est actus deformatus. — De Fide ad Petr. c. 21. n. 64. Fulgent. ait: Unde constat, geminum esse creaturae rationalis malum: unum, quo voluntarie ipsa defecit a summo bono Creatore suo; alterum, quo invita punietur ignis aeterni supplicio; illud passura iuste, quia hoc admisit iniuste, et quae ordinem in se non servavit divinae institutionis, ordinem divinae non effugiet ultionis. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 2, q. 97. et q. 107. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 3. et 8; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3; S. Thom., hic a. 2.
    This definition, which is attributed to Augustine (cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XXXVII, c. 1), Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. II, q. 107, m. 1) thus unfolds: Sin is called an act befalling, not because it befalls by chance, but because it comes forth not from necessity, but contingently from the will; for it is in the will to sin or not to sin... The defect of good is said in two ways: either so as to note the cause of the act itself contingent from the will (for the will sometimes sins from weakness, sometimes from settled malice), or the defect of good can bespeak a certain privation of good, which is virtue, and according to this the preposition ex (from) does not note a material cause, but a formal cause, so that the sense is: sin is a deformed act. — On Faith, to Peter, c. 21, n. 64, Fulgentius says: Whence it is clear that the evil of the rational creature is twofold: one, by which it itself voluntarily failed from the highest good, its Creator; the other, by which unwillingly it will be punished by the torment of eternal fire; the former it will suffer justly, because it admitted the latter unjustly, and that which did not keep in itself the order of the divine institution, will not escape the order of the divine vengeance. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 94, m. 2, q. 97, and q. 107, m. 1; B. Albert, here, a. 3 and 8; Summa, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 3; St. Thomas, here, a. 2.
← Dist. 35, Art. 2, Q. 3