Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 18, Part 2, Dubia

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus

p. 495

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: Sibi ipsis relinquuntur, ut sit eis liberum arbitrium ruere in peccatum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia liberum arbitrium non recipit magis et minus: ergo non est modo liberius post excommunicationem ad peccatum quam ante. — Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur, quae sint mala, quae incurrit quis per excommunicationem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod libertas peccandi non est libertas, sed defectus libertatis¹. Liberum ergo arbitrium, prout dicitur liberum a culpa, quia hoc non est libertas essentialis, sed accidentalis, dicitur magis et minus liberum; et tunc magis est liberum, quando melius se potest defendere, et minus liberum, quando minus se potest defendere a peccati dominio. Quoniam igitur meritis orationum Ecclesiae multi sustentantur et defenduntur a culpis; tunc dicuntur liberiores ad peccandum fieri, quando auferuntur suffragia Ecclesiae. Unde patet, quomodo illud verbum intelligitur.

Et nota, quod multa sunt incommoda, quae incurrunt excommunicati, quae notantur his versibus:

Gratia subtrahitur, magis ac magis obice rupto. De vitio ruit in vitium, suffragia perdit Ecclesiae; satanae vexandus traditur ille, Quem ligat ex propriis anathematizatio culpis.

Et intelliguntur quantum ad expositionem vel desertionem²; sicut rex diceretur militem tradere inimico, quem non defenderet ab eius vexatione.

Dub. II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sed intelligendum est de his quorum merita solvunt vel ligant. — Quaeritur ergo hic, si aliquis sit iniuste excommunicatus, utrum se debeat habere pro excommunicato. Et quod sic, videtur: quia dicitur in iure³: «Sententia pastoris, sive iusta sive iniusta, tenenda est et timenda». — Sed contra: Magister⁴ dicit, quod illam solam sententiam approbat curia caelestis, quae datur ex meritis. — Item, favere et tenere sententiam iniustam est praestare patrocinium iniustitiae: ergo talis sententia, ut videtur, nullo modo tenenda est, nec ab eo qui excommunicatur, nec ab aliis.

Item, quaeritur, quomodo sit sententia excommunicationis iniuste lata.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sententia iniusta dicitur ex animo, ex causa, ex ordine⁵: ex animo, ut cum infertur non zelo iustitiae, sed vindictae; ex causa, ut cum non est meritum sufficiens, vel certum, propter quod debeat excommunicari ille cui infligitur; ex ordine, ut cum praetermittitur ordo iuris.

Si ergo talis excommunicatio feratur in aliquem, distinguendum est: quia aut fertur ab habente canonicam iurisdictionem, aut a non habente. Si ab habente; dicendum, quod tenenda est et timenda, quia non est subditorum discutere sententias maiorum; et si contemnat, graviter peccat⁶. — Excipiuntur autem duo casus, videlicet si sententia illa lata est post appellationem legitimam, vel quando continet intolerabilem errorem, ut si diceretur: Excommunico te, quia credis in Deum. In his duobus casibus non quaerentes absolutionem admittuntur ad eorum probationem; alias autem non admittuntur, nisi humiliter petant absolutionem. — Absolvit autem dominus Papa in omnibus ad cautelam⁷, non propter hoc quod reputet fuisse excommunicatos, vel excommunicandos, sed ut ostendat, Ecclesiae sententiam, quantumcumque sit iniusta, esse formidandam. Unde timetur et tenetur non consideratione iniustitiae, sed ob reverentiam potestatis ecclesiasticae. Hoc sentiendum est secundum iura, si excommunicetur ab habente iurisdictionem canonicam.

Si autem ab alio excommunicetur, qui non habet canonicam iurisdictionem, et hoc constat; tunc non est tenenda, utpote si sint haeretici, vel schismatici, apostatae, intrusi, suspensi a iurisdictione⁸. Si autem talium crimen sit occultum, toleranda est talium sententia, sicut et ipsi tolerantur ab Ecclesia.

p. 496

Dub. III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod peccatum dicitur tenebrae, quia intellectus obtunditur et totus interior homo obtenebratur. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia videmus multos peccatores in peccatis existentes, qui valde bene intelligunt et addiscunt, et ita experimentum est contra hoc. Item, Domini documentum, Lucae decimo sexto⁹: Filii saeculi huius prudentiores sunt filiis lucis. — Item, cum multo magis sit peccatum deordinativum affectus quam intellectus, et corruptivum amoris quam luminis, et caritatis quam fidei; videtur potius esse dicendum, quod peccatum sit frigus quam tenebra.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod gratia magis dicitur lux quam calor, quoniam lux in se habet et virtutem illuminandi, et illuminando magis et magis virtutem calefaciendi; et ideo plus complectitur lux quam calor. Et gratia in quantum lux non tantum respicit intellectum, verum etiam affectum, immo lux, ut dicitur de gratia, nominat eam ut respicit totam animam; quoniam, sicut lux¹⁰ est forma totius orbis primi, et per cuius influentiam fiunt generationes circa partes inferiores, et una est ratio actualitatis et diffusionis, secundum quod innuit et dicit aperte Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus¹¹: et quia hoc competit gratiae, quae est radix omnium habituum gratuitorum et principium omnis boni operis: hinc est, quod dicitur lux, et peccatum dicitur tenebra; quia¹² tenebra non tantum privat actum lucis, secundum quem est in sensum visus, sed etiam alios actus, secundum quos est operativa: et ita ista tenebra non respicit intellectum tantum, sed intellectum ut extensum ad calorem affectus, vel ad operationem effectus.

Ex his patent obiecta. Quod enim dicitur, quod intellectus viget in peccatoribus; dicendum, quod verum est secundum actum, qui est purae speculationis, sed non prout extenditur ad affectum, vel opus. Unde aliter habuit prophetiam Balaam¹³, aliter David. Ille enim solum videbat, iste videbat et gaudebat et secundum hoc se in opere regulabat et se ipsum dirigebat. Exemplum est in musico et bono citharoedo; aliter enim novit consonantiam citharae musicus, aliter bonus citharoedus¹⁴. Et quantum ad hanc obtunditur intellectus manifeste, licet non quantum ad primam ita aperte; credo tamen firmiter, quod quantum ad utramque.

Dub. IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ipsa ergo dissimilitudo, quae inest animae ex peccato, animae macula est. Videtur enim male dicere. Omnis enim macula deformitas dicitur, aut quia aliquid est remotum, aut quia aliquid, quod non debet, circa rem ponitur; sicut patet: truncatus naso est deformatus, sed habens morpheam¹⁵ vel aliquid tale est maculatus; sed peccatum non corrumpit bona naturalia, quia nihil corrumpit «in eo quod est essentia vel natura¹⁶»; aut si corrumpit, tamen nihil ponit: ergo nullo modo debet dici macula. Si tu dicas, quod ponit malam habilitatem et pronitatem ad malum, et illa est macula; contra: illa pronitas potest auferri per oppositam pronitatem: ergo macula peccati deleret maculam; quod inconveniens est dicere. Item, a pronitate liberatur per assuefactionem; solus autem Deus liberat a macula, ut dicitur in littera.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod peccatum non est aliud quam privatio ordinis debiti, et voco ordinem debitum, prout comprehendit modum, speciem et ordinem, prout circa ipsum consistit praecipue ratio boni¹⁷. Ista ergo deordinatio remanens in anima est culpa ipsa et peccatum, quia est ex proprio actu, ubi debet esse ordo iustitiae. Haec autem habet considerari secundum rationem aversionis et secundum rationem conversionis et utriusque.

p. 497

Secundum primam rationem competit ei ratio privationis; secundum secundum modum ratio infectionis, et haec¹⁸ iungit sibi rem turpem; secundum tertium modum ratio obligationis. — Quantum ad primum modum dicitur peccatum tenebra et deformitas; quoniam bonum dupliciter potest considerari, scilicet in se, et sic dicitur lux, et per oppositum peccatum dicitur tenebra; et in comparatione ad vim cognitivam, et sic dicitur pulcritudo animae, et per oppositum peccatum deformitas. — Quantum autem ad conversionem¹⁹ sic dicitur macula et foetor; et hoc similiter secundum duplicem comparationem illius coniunctionis cum delectabili terreno: in se, et sic macula; ad vim cognitivam, et sic foetor; quantum ad utrumque, sic competit esse vinculum mortis aeternae²⁰²¹.

English Translation

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this, that the Master says: They are left to themselves, so that they have free choice to rush into sin. For it seems to be said badly, because free choice does not admit of more and less: therefore it is not now freer toward sin after excommunication than before. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked what are the evils that one incurs through excommunication.

I respond: It must be said that the freedom of sinning is not freedom, but a defect of freedom¹. Therefore free choice, insofar as it is called free from fault, because this is not essential freedom but accidental, is called more and less free; and then it is more free when it can better defend itself, and less free when it can less defend itself from the dominion of sin. Since therefore by the merits of the prayers of the Church many are sustained and defended from faults; then they are said to become freer toward sinning, when the suffrages of the Church are withdrawn. Whence it is plain how that word is understood.

And note that there are many harms which the excommunicate incur, which are noted in these verses:

Grace is withdrawn, more and more as the barrier is broken. From vice he rushes into vice, he loses the suffrages Of the Church; he is handed over to Satan to be vexed, He whom the anathematization binds for his own faults.

And they are understood as to exposure or abandonment²; just as a king would be said to hand a soldier over to the enemy, whom he would not defend from his vexation.

Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: But it is to be understood of those whose merits loose or bind. — It is asked therefore here, if someone is unjustly excommunicated, whether he ought to regard himself as excommunicated. And that he should, it seems: because it is said in the law³: «The sentence of the pastor, whether just or unjust, is to be held and feared». — But on the contrary: the Master⁴ says that the heavenly court approves only that sentence which is given from merits. — Likewise, to favor and hold an unjust sentence is to lend patronage to injustice: therefore such a sentence, as it seems, is in no way to be held, neither by him who is excommunicated, nor by others.

Likewise, it is asked how a sentence of excommunication is unjustly passed.

I respond: It must be said that an unjust sentence is so called from the intention, from the cause, from the order⁵: from the intention, as when it is imposed not from zeal for justice, but for vengeance; from the cause, as when there is no sufficient or certain merit for which he ought to be excommunicated upon whom it is inflicted; from the order, as when the order of law is omitted.

If therefore such an excommunication is passed against someone, a distinction must be made: because either it is passed by one having canonical jurisdiction, or by one not having [it]. If by one having [it]; it must be said that it is to be held and feared, because it is not for subjects to discuss the sentences of their superiors; and if one despises [it], he sins gravely⁶. — But two cases are excepted, namely if that sentence was passed after a legitimate appeal, or when it contains an intolerable error, as if it were said: I excommunicate you, because you believe in God. In these two cases those not seeking absolution are admitted to their proof; but otherwise they are not admitted, unless they humbly ask absolution. — Now the lord Pope absolves in all cases for caution⁷, not because he reckons that they were excommunicated, or to-be-excommunicated, but to show that the sentence of the Church, however unjust it be, is to be dreaded. Whence it is feared and held not from consideration of [its] injustice, but out of reverence for ecclesiastical power. This is to be understood according to the laws, if one is excommunicated by one having canonical jurisdiction.

But if one is excommunicated by another, who does not have canonical jurisdiction, and this is established; then it is not to be held, namely if they are heretics, or schismatics, apostates, intruders, [or persons] suspended from jurisdiction⁸. But if the crime of such persons is hidden, the sentence of such persons is to be tolerated, just as they too are tolerated by the Church.

p. 496

Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says, that sin is called darkness, because the intellect is blunted and the whole interior man is darkened. For it seems to be said falsely, because we see many sinners existing in sins, who understand and learn very well, and so experience is against this. Likewise, the Lord's teaching, Luke sixteen⁹: The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light. — Likewise, since sin is much more disordering of the affection than of the intellect, and corruptive of love than of light, and of charity than of faith; it seems rather to be said that sin is cold rather than darkness.

I respond: It must be said that grace is called light rather than heat, because light has in itself both the power of illuminating, and, by illuminating, more and more the power of heating; and therefore light comprehends more than heat. And grace insofar as light regards not only the intellect, but even the affection, indeed light, as it is said of grace, names it as it regards the whole soul; because, just as light¹⁰ is the form of the whole first orb, and through whose influence generations come about in the lower parts, and there is one ground of actuality and of diffusion, according as Dionysius intimates and says openly in the book On the Divine Names¹¹: and because this belongs to grace, which is the root of all gratuitous habits and the principle of every good work: hence it is that it is called light, and sin is called darkness; because¹² darkness not only deprives of the act of light, according to which it is in the sense of sight, but also [of] the other acts according to which [the soul] is operative: and so this darkness regards not the intellect only, but the intellect as extended to the heat of affection, or to the operation of effect.

From these things the objections are plain. For as to what is said, that the intellect flourishes in sinners; it must be said that it is true as to the act which is of pure speculation, but not as it is extended to affection or work. Whence Balaam had prophecy in one way¹³, David in another. For the former only saw, the latter saw and rejoiced and according to this regulated himself in work and directed himself. There is an example in the musician and the good cithara-player; for the musician knows the consonance of the cithara in one way, the good cithara-player in another¹⁴. And as to this [latter] the intellect is manifestly blunted, although not as openly as to the first; yet I firmly believe that [it is blunted] as to both.

Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: Therefore that very unlikeness, which is in the soul from sin, is the soul's stain. For it seems to be said badly. For every stain is called a deformity, either because something is removed, or because something which ought not [to be] is placed about the thing; as is plain: one cut off as to the nose is deformed, but one having morphew¹⁵ or some such thing is stained; but sin does not corrupt natural goods, because nothing is corrupted «in that which is essence or nature¹⁶»; or if it corrupts, yet it places nothing: therefore in no way ought it to be called a stain. If you say that it places an evil aptitude and proneness to evil, and that is the stain; on the contrary: that proneness can be removed by an opposite proneness: therefore the stain of sin would delete the stain; which it is unfitting to say. Likewise, one is freed from proneness by habituation; but God alone frees from the stain, as is said in the text.

I respond: It must be said that sin is nothing else than the privation of due order, and I call due order [that] insofar as it comprehends mode, species, and order, insofar as about it consists chiefly the ground of the good¹⁷. This disorder therefore remaining in the soul is the fault itself and sin, because it is from one's own act, where there ought to be the order of justice. But this has to be considered according to the ground of aversion and according to the ground of conversion and of both.

p. 497

According to the first ground there belongs to it the ground of privation; according to the second mode the ground of infection, and this¹⁸ joins to itself a base thing; according to the third mode the ground of obligation. — As to the first mode sin is called darkness and deformity; because the good can be considered in two ways, namely in itself, and thus it is called light, and by opposition sin is called darkness; and in comparison to the cognitive power, and thus it is called the beauty of the soul, and by opposition sin [is called] deformity. — But as to conversion¹⁹ thus it is called stain and foulness; and this likewise according to the twofold comparison of that conjunction with the earthly delightful thing: in itself, and thus stain; to the cognitive power, and thus foulness; as to both, thus there belongs [to it] to be the bond of eternal death²⁰²¹.

Apparatus Criticus

1
Secundum Anselm. Vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 3. ibid. q. 1, ubi explicantur diversi status liberi arbitrii, et quomodo in omnibus aequaliter reperitur, non secundum magis et minus. Vide etiam ibid. lit. Magistri.
According to Anselm. See II Sent., d. 25, p. II, q. 3, and there at q. 1, where the diverse states of free choice are explained, and how it is found equally in all, not according to more and less. See also there the text of the Master.
2
Edd. de se eiectionem.
The editions [read] casting-out from oneself.
3
Causa II. q. 3. c. 1. ex Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 6.
Cause II, q. 3, c. 1, from Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels, Book II, homily 26, n. 6.
4
Hic in lit. c. 7. — Pro curia codd. I K iudex. Subinde pro favere edd. fovere, et pro quomodo cod. Z quando.
Here in the text, c. 7. — For court codices I K [read] judge. Then for to favor the editions [read] to foster, and for how codex Z [reads] when.
5
Secundum Gratian. super C. Episcopus, presbyter (65.), C. 11. q. 3.
According to Gratian on C. Episcopus, presbyter (65), C. 11, q. 3.
6
Cfr. Gratian. super C. Non solum ille reus (77.), C. 11. q. 3. — Duo seqq. casus excipiuntur in C. Per tuas litteras (40.), X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 31.). Cfr. ibid. C. Ad nostram (3.), de Appellat. (lib. II. tit. 28.).
Cf. Gratian on C. Non solum ille reus (77), C. 11, q. 3. — The two following cases are excepted in C. Per tuas litteras (40), X, On the Sentence of Excommunication (bk. V, tit. 31). Cf. ibid. C. Ad nostram (3), On Appeals (bk. II, tit. 28).
7
Cfr. Can. cit. Per tuas litteras.
Cf. the cited Canon Per tuas litteras.
8
Vide C. Audivimus, quod (4.), C. 24. q. 1, eiusque expositionem per Gratian.; ibid. C. Aperte, inquit (36.), seq. — Idem dub. solvunt Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 22. m. 2. q. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 4; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 5.
See C. Audivimus, quod (4), C. 24, q. 1, and its exposition by Gratian; ibid. C. Aperte, inquit (36) and following. — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. IV, q. 22, m. 2, q. 2; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 3; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 5.
9
Vers. 8.
Verse 8.
10
Vide codd. F G (E a secunda manu) addidimus lux, cod. bb legit: quoniam est sicut ipsa forma. — Forma propositionis deficit.
See codices F G (E by a second hand); we have added light; codex bb reads: because it is as the form itself. — The form of the proposition is lacking.
11
Cap. 4. § 4. Cfr. Aristot., II. Generat. et corrupt. text. 88. (c. 10.).
Chapter 4, § 4. Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Book II, text 88 (c. 10).
12
Cod. Z et quia. Aliquanto inferius edd. omittunt ita, et subinde sola Vat. vel ad operationem effectus.
Codex Z [reads] and because. Somewhat below the editions omit ita [so], and then the Vatican edition alone [reads] or to the operation of effect.
13
Cfr. Num. c. 22. seqq.
Cf. Numbers c. 22 and following.
14
Musicus novit speculative, bonus citharoedus vero practice. «Cithara canendo, ut ait Aristot. (II. Ethic. c. 1.), citharoedi efficiuntur... ex eo enim, quod citharam pulsant, et boni et mali citharistae evadunt». — Ibid. VI. c. 3. dicit: «Vitium enim eiusmodi est, ut principium [rerum agendarum] corrumpat»; et c. 12: Id [principium], nisi bono viro, non apparet, propterea quod distorquet pravitas facitque, ut circa activa principia fallamur. Quare non posse quempiam prudentem esse, nisi bonus sit, manifestum est. — Mox pro primam et utramque [notitiam?] edd. primum et cum cod. M utrumque, incongrue, nisi pro hanc ponatur hunc [actum intellectus]. Sed vox aliqua excidisse videtur. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
The musician knows speculatively, but the good cithara-player practically. «By playing the cithara, as Aristotle says (Ethics II, c. 1), cithara-players are produced... for from the fact that they pluck the cithara, both good and bad citharists turn out». — Ibid. VI, c. 3, he says: «For vice is of such a kind that it corrupts the principle [of things to be done]»; and c. 12: That [principle] does not appear except to a good man, because depravity distorts [it] and makes us err about the active principles. Wherefore it is manifest that no one can be prudent unless he be good. — Presently for primam [the first] and utramque [knowledge?] the editions [read] primum and, with codex M, utrumque, incongruously, unless for hanc one puts hunc [act of the intellect]. But some word seems to have dropped out. — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 8; St. Thomas, here on the text.
15
Morphea, ut docet du Cange (Glossarium etc.), est infirmitas, cum color [cutis] in alium mutatur... Italis Morfea est species scabiei. Cfr. Avicenna, IV. Canon. Fen 3. tr. 3. c. 1.
Morphew, as du Cange (the Glossary, etc.) teaches, is an infirmity, when the color [of the skin] is changed into another... To the Italians Morfea is a species of scabies. Cf. Avicenna, Canon IV, Fen 3, tr. 3, c. 1.
16
Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23: Οὐδὲ φθείρεταί τι τῶν ὄντων καθ' ὃ οὐσία καὶ φύσις, i. e. Nihil corrumpitur existentium, in eo [sive: secundum] quod est essentia et natura. Hinc non placet lectio codd. et edd. ponentium corrumpit pro corrumpitur, sicut etiam tom. II. pag. 813, nota 4. eandem lectionem multorum codd. reprobavimus (cfr. ibid. pag. 822, nota 9.), cum nullum exemplum in vocabulariis, quae prae manibus habemus, nobis praestetur, quod verbum corrumpit accipiatur intransitive pro corrumpitur. Quia tamen hic lectio codd. et edd. explicari potest, supplendo scil. aliud post corrumpit, ipsam retinuimus. Aliter iudicandum de seqq. verbis Dionysii, in quibus codd. et edd. perperam substituunt existentia pro essentia. — Secunda pars disiunctionis (peccatum nihil ponit) est secundum August. supra pag. 130, nota 5. allegatum.
Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 23: Nothing of existing things is corrupted in that according to which it is essence and nature. Hence we are not pleased with the reading of the codices and editions placing corrumpit [corrupts] for corrumpitur [is corrupted], just as also in vol. II, p. 813, note 4, we reprobated the same reading of many codices (cf. ibid. p. 822, note 9), since no example is furnished us in the lexicons which we have at hand, that the word corrumpit be taken intransitively for corrumpitur. Yet because here the reading of the codices and editions can be explained, by supplying namely aliud [something else] after corrumpit, we have retained it. Otherwise it is to be judged concerning the following words of Dionysius, in which the codices and editions wrongly substitute existentia for essentia. — The second part of the disjunction (sin places nothing) is according to Augustine cited above on p. 130, note 5.
17
Hic c. 8.
Here c. 8.
18
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. q. 2. a. 2. seq. et d. 35. per totam. — Inferius pro debet codd. F G deberet, et pro Haec autem Vat. Hic autem.
Cf. II Sent., d. 34, q. 2, a. 2, and following, and d. 35 throughout. — Below, for debet [ought] codices F G [read] deberet [would be obliged], and for Haec autem [but this] the Vatican edition [reads] Hic autem [but here].
19
Ita codd. E I K L bb et ed. 1, Vat. hic, codd. R S in hoc, alii hoc (ablativus?).
Thus codices E I K L bb and edition 1; the Vatican edition [reads] hic [here], codices R S in hoc [in this], others hoc (ablative?).
20
Edd. perperam aversionem.
The editions wrongly [read] aversion.
21
Vide supra p. I. dub. 1; II. Sent. d. 35. dub. 6. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
See above, p. I, dub. 1; II Sent., d. 35, dub. 6. — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 8; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.