Dist. 30, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 30
Articulus II. De quidditate originalis peccati.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo, videlicet quid sit originale peccatum. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur:
Primo quaeritur, utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ignorantia.
Quaestio I. Utrum peccatum originale sit concupiscentia.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ad Romanos sexto1: Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore, ibi Glossa: Peccatum, id est «fomes peccati»; sed fomes peccati non est aliud quam concupiscentia: si igitur fomes peccati est peccatum, et non est peccatum actuale; restat, quod sit originale.
2. Item, ad Romanos septimo2: Concupiscentiam nesciebam esse peccatum etc., Glossa: «Concupiscentia est, unde omnia mala proveniunt». Si igitur illud quod est origo omnium malorum, est originale peccatum; videtur, quod originale peccatum nihil aliud sit quam concupiscentia.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Quales sunt actus, tales sunt habitus3; sed concupiscere est peccatum: ergo necessitas concupiscendi mala est et peccatum. Sed necessitatem concupiscendi a natura contrahimus: si igitur peccatum, quod a natura contrahitur, est peccatum originale: videtur etc.
4. Item, in omni peccato est conversio aliqua ad commutabile bonum, vel in actu vel in habitu4: si igitur peccatum originale est peccatum, ergo est ibi aliqua conversio inordinata ad bonum commutabile. Sed conversio inordinata ad bonum commutabile nihil est aliud quam concupiscentia: ergo necesse est, peccatum originale esse concupiscentiam.
Sed contra: 1. Ad Romanos septimo5: Peccatum, occasione accepta, per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam; hoc autem non potest intelligi de peccato actuali: intelligitur ergo de originali. Si igitur operans non est operatum, ergo concupiscentia non est originale peccatum, nec e converso.
2. Item, Beda6 dicit, quod quatuor sunt nobis p. 722 inflicta propter primum peccatum, videlicet ignorantia, infirmitas, malitia et quartum, ex his conflata concupiscentia; sed quod est inflictum pro peccato, non est ipsum peccatum: ergo si haec merito originalis peccati sunt nobis inflicta, secundum quod dicit Beda: ergo etc.
3. Item, concupiscentia manet cum gratia; originale peccatum non potest manere cum gratia: ergo originale peccatum non est concupiscentia. Si tu dicas, quod concupiscentia manet cum gratia, in quantum est remissa, et sic est poena; in quantum autem est intensa, non manet, et sic est culpa7; contra: magis et minus non diversificant speciem: ergo si concupiscentia remissa non est culpa, sed poena, pari ratione videtur, quod nec concupiscentia intensa. — Item, concupiscentia, postquam remissa est, intendi potest et in pristinum dominium revocari, sicut experimento patet: si igitur originale peccatum esset8 iterabile, tunc et baptismus; quod est contra institutionem Ecclesiae.
Est igitur quaestio, quid sit originale peccatum per essentiam. Et cum a Magistro dicatur, et ab Augustino esse concupiscentia, sicut patet in littera, ab Anselmo autem in libro de Conceptu virginali dicatur esse debitae iustitiae carentia, quaestio est, quomodo ista duo verba possint esse simul vera; et in quo horum verborum magis explicatur, quid sit originalis culpa.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Peccatum originale est concupiscentia, prout in se claudit debitae iustitiae carentiam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut actuale peccatum non dicit omnimodam privationem, eo quod non tantum dicit aversionem, immo etiam quandam conversionem; non etiam dicit omnimodam boni privationem, immo relinquit aptitudinem et aliquem actum, privando circumstantiam erga ipsum9: sic etiam in originali suo modo intelligendum est. Unde sicut non dicitur peccatum actuale esse in aliquo ex hoc solo, quod careat iustitia — quia tunc lapis diceretur peccatum habere — sed ex hoc, quod aliquam inclinationem habet ad aliquid, in qua10, cum deberet esse iustitia, non reperitur: sic etiam originale peccatum dicitur esse in aliquo non solum, quia caret iustitia originali, sed etiam, quia curvitatem habet et necessitatem concupiscendi. Unde quemadmodum videmus in aegritudine corporali, utpote in paralysi, quod talis morbus inest ex quadam dissolutione virtutis, ita tamen, quod non omnino privatur virtus motiva, sicut in mortuo, sed aliquo modo manet, non potens membrum regere; et ita sequitur partim ex positione, partim ex defectu manus tremulatio: sic intelligendum est tam in actuali quam in originali peccato. Quemadmodum igitur, si quis quaereret, quid esset peccatum carnis, dupliciter posset ei notificari, videlicet ratione inclinationis deordinatae, ut dicatur esse immoderatus appetitus rei tractabilis secundum carnem11; et ratione privationis boni, ut dicatur esse privatio castitatis et continentiae; et utroque modo respondetur satis convenienter: sic, cum quaeritur, quid sit originale peccatum, recte respondetur, quod sit concupiscentia immoderata; recte etiam respondetur, quod sit debitae iustitiae carentia; et in una istarum responsionum clauditur altera, licet una notificet ipsum originale ratione eius quod est in ipso habens modum conversionis, altera vero, ratione privationis.
Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt, et Magister dicit in littera, quod originale peccatum est concupiscentia, et haec non quaecumque, sed concupiscentia, prout claudit in se debitae iustitiae carentiam. Haec autem est concupiscentia immoderata et intensa, adeo ut sit carnis ad spiritum praedominantia, et talis semper est iuncta carentiae debitae iustitiae, et secundum quod inest nobis ab origine, dicitur peccatum originale. Et hoc est quod dicit Glossa super illud12: Beati, quorum remissae sunt iniquitates, Glossa: «Iniquitatem dicit fomitem, qui ante baptismum non tantum poena est, sed culpa; post baptismum vero poena tantum est, et non culpa. Cum enim deletur originale, non deletur, ut omnino non sit, sed ut non sit peccatum». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. Ad rationes autem ad oppositum satis planum est respondere per ea quae dicta sunt.
Ad argumenta ad oppositum:
Ad 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod peccatum operatur concupiscentiam; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de concupiscentia quantum ad actum; quam13 dicitur operari mandatum, quia occasiona- p. 723 liter excitat in nobis ipsam concupiscentiam, quae se habet per modum habitus.
Ad 2. 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod concupiscentia est nobis inflicta per peccatum; dicendum, quod intelligitur14 de concupiscentia, prout est remissa, et sic sortitur rationem poenae; et hoc modo non est originalis culpa, sed ipsius sequela. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens quod obiicitur, quod manet simul cum gratia; non enim manet, prout dictum est in opponendo15, prout intensa est, quia sic dicit animae perversionem, ac per hoc originalis iustitiae privationem; prout autem est remissa per gratiae praesentiam, hoc non dicit. Et si obiicias, quod magis et minus non variant speciem; dicendum, quod etsi istud locum habeat in naturalibus, non tamen habet veritatem in moralibus, quoniam virtutes et vitia in moribus attenduntur penes medietatem, et eius extrema, quae sunt superfluum et diminutum. Et hoc non solum verum est apud moralem philosophum16, sed etiam apud theologum, qui dicit, quod amor creaturae citra Deum vel sub Deo non est peccatum mortale; si vero supra Deum intendatur, mortale peccatum efficitur.
Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod concupiscentia remissa iterum potest intendi; dicendum, quod etsi intendi possit et intendatur, hoc est per peccatum actuale; concupiscentia vero intensa non dicebatur esse peccatum originale, nisi prout sic contrahebatur a prima origine; et quia hoc non potest esse nisi semel, quantumcumque et quotiescumque concupiscentia intendatur, originale peccatum non iteratur.
I. Ad hanc intricatissimam de essentia peccati originalis quaestionem facilius intelligendam iuvat pauca annotare tum de erroribus principalibus fidei catholicae contrariis, tum de sententia, cui adhaeret S. Bonaventura.
1. Errores duo reprobandi exprimuntur eisdem verbis, hac scilicet propositione, quod ipsa concupiscentia per se sit tota essentia peccati originalis; quae tamen a diversis intelligitur in sensu extreme opposito. Quidam enim, rationalismo addicti, eam ita intelligunt, ut in peccato originali rationem peccati sive culpae vel penitus eliminent, vel saltem indebite infirment; unde ab his concupiscentia et ipsum peccatum originale restringitur ad defectum quendam naturae, qui retardat vel impedit vitam moralem. Non defuerunt etiam inter recentiores catholicos, qui huic opinioni vel omnino, vel ex parte adhaererent. Huic errori S. Bonav. iam praevenit contraria sua doctrina, supra a. 1. q. 2. — Ex adverso stat interpretatio praedictae propositionis, quam induxerunt novatores saec. XVI. et XVII., qui, dum simul exaggerabant malum concupiscentiae in homine lapso, asserebant, tum concupiscentiam solam constituere peccati originalis essentiam, tum ipsam esse peccatum per se, nullo habito respectu ad liberam voluntatem nec Adae nec hominis, in quo est, licet sit renatus baptismo; ex quo falso principio, a Concilio Trid. (Sess. V. can. 5.) reprobato, scaturiunt plurimi alii et nefandi errores. Ad rem spectat condemnata Baii propositio 47: «Unde peccatum originis vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla relatione ac respectu ad voluntatem, a qua originem habuit» (cfr. propp. 46. 48. 49. 50. 51.). — S. Bonav. e contrario duo distinguit in peccato originali: «aut prout est culpa reddens animam Deo odiosam, aut prout est vitium deordinans ipsam potentiam» (infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. cfr. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.); et distincte docet, a) in peccato originali praeter concupiscentiam esse carentiam iustitiae originalis (hic et passim); b) rationem culpae concupiscentiae inesse non per se, sed per reatum annexum, qui resultat ex relatione, quam interior vitiosus status hominis lapsi habet ad praevaricationem Adae (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. schol.). Ille autem reatus ita annexus est concupiscentiae, ut ab ea possit separari (hic in corp.), quod revera fit per gratiam Christi in renatis, ut infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. docetur. In eodem sensu intelligenda sunt verba S. Augustini et Magistri, quando concupiscentiam dicunt esse peccatum.
2. Quoad sententiam S. Bonaventurae haec notamus.
a) Iam constat ex praedictis, quod ipse quoad rationem culpae, quae inest peccato originali, consentiat S. Thomae (S. I. II. q. 81. a. 1, q. 83. a. 1.), qui docet, ipsam fundari non praecise in inordinato habitu vel dispositione hominis lapsi, i. e. in sola carentia gratiae sanctificantis et integritatis, sed potius in eadem, quatenus est privatio derivata a primo parente peccante (cfr. idem II. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2.).
b) In ipso statu vel habitu vitioso animae S. Doctor duo distinguit: alterum, quod ipsi deest, at inesse deberet, scilicet ipsa iustitia originalis sive conversio habitualis ad finem; alterum, quod inest, at deesse deberet, scil. inordinata concupiscentia (hic et a. 1. q. 2.) sive conversio inordinata, sed habitualis, ad commutabile bonum. Haec inordinatio a S. Bonav. vocatur passim corruptio, vel vitium, morbus, curvitas naturae. Unde in Breviloq. p. III. c. 6. dicit: «Et sic incurrit simul carentiam iustitiae et morbum concupiscentiae, ex quibus duobus, tanquam ex aversione et conversione, dicitur integrari, secundum Augustinum et Anselmum, peccatum originale». Consentit S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 82. a. 3.). Sed notandum, quod «concupiscentia non accipitur hic specialiter pro eo quod est potentiae concupiscibilis; sed generaliter, prout est cuiuslibet appetitivae rationalis ex coniunctione primaria cum carne corrupta. Est tamen alia concupiscentia, quae est partis sensibilis, et haec dicitur esse poena. Illa vero, quae rationalis est, aliquando dicitur culpa» etc. (ita Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3.). Unde etiam a S. Thoma (S. loc. cit.) concupiscentia notatur ut inordinatio virium animae, ex qua omne genus peccati oriri potest (cfr. Bonav. infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.).
c) Haec concupiscentia sive pronitas ad peccandum in peccato originali est sicut materiale, carentia vero iustitiae originalis sicut formale (infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). Consentiunt S. Thom. (locis citt. et de Malo, q. 4. a. 2.) et Alex. Hal., qui (loc. cit. m. 1. a. 1. ad 2.) dicit: «Cum dicitur: peccatum originale est concupiscentia, materialis videtur esse praedicatio; formalis autem, cum dicitur macula sive deformitas [privatio iustitiae], ex origine primorum parentum contracta». Idem docent Scotus (hic q. 2.) aliique communiter.
d) Hinc concupiscentia, in praedicto sensu accepta, non est solummodo poena peccati originalis, sicut mors corporalis aliaeque poenalitates, sed ea pertinet ad ipsum peccatum origi- p. 724 nale, quatenus dicit habitum vitiosum sive inordinatam dispositionem animae. Consentit S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 82. a. 1, praesertim ad 1., ubi dicit, quod illud peccatum non est privatio pura, sed (positive) quidam habitus corruptus. Haec facilius intelligi possunt, si comparamus habitum peccati originalis cum habituali peccato ipsius Adae, postquam actuale peccatum commisit. Actuale enim peccatum Adae in duobus distinguitur a quocumque alio peccato et angelorum et hominum; primo quidem, quia ipse perdidit in se non tantum donum gratiae sanctificantis (quod in omni peccato mortali accidit), sed etiam dona integritatis, quorum nonnulla ad ipsam interiorem animae rectitudinem spectant; secundo vero, quia utraque dona non tantum sibi, sed etiam toli generi humano perdidit. Ad peccatum autem habituale ipsius Adae sive ad pravam dispositionem, quae ex actuali eiusdem peccato orta erat, praeter carentiam gratiae sanctificantis pertinet etiam carentia praedictae interioris rectitudinis, in cuius locum successit habitualis conversio inordinata ad bonum commutabile, ita ut utraque carentia in ipso esset culpabilis. Simili modo etiam de habitu peccati originalis in aliis hominibus iudicari potest. Ex quo conficitur, ut, sicut privatio gratiae sanctificantis habet rationem culpae, et quidem principaliter, ita etiam concupiscentia non tantum sit poena vel sequela huius peccati, sed in non renatis etiam suo modo culpa; id quod toties cum S. Augustino et plurimis antiquis Scholasticis S. Bonav. repetit. Consentit S. Thom. (de Malo, q. 4. a. 2. in corp.) his verbis: «Superior pars animae, et etiam quaedam inferiorum virium, quae sunt sub voluntate et ei natae sunt obedire, recipiunt huiusmodi sequelam primi peccati secundum rationem culpae... Sed inferiores vires, quae non subduntur voluntati, scilicet potentiae animae vegetabilis et etiam ipsum corpus, suscipiunt huiusmodi sequelam secundum rationem poenae, non secundum rationem culpae, nisi forte virtualiter» etc. (cfr. S. I. II. q. 83. a. 1.). Concordat etiam Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, l. III. q. 82. a. 3.
e) Differentia tamen notabilis est quoad doctrinam hanc inter Ss. Bonaventuram et Thomam. Nam licet conveniant in hoc, quod peccatum originale asserunt esse privationem iustitiae originalis sive carentiam eiusdem cum debito eam habendi; tamen non eodem modo intelligunt ipsam iustitiam originalem, ut iam dictum est (supra d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. 2.), et per consequens nec privationem eiusdem. Nam secundum S. Thomam ipsa gratia sanctificans est essentia iustitiae originalis et radix omnium aliorum donorum; hinc etiam originale peccatum primario et constitutive est privatio eiusdem gratiae. Secundum S. Bonav. vero iustitia originalis primo consistit in illa rectitudine integritatis, quae concipitur ut dispositio, ad quam posterius ipsa gratia sanctificans secuta est. Hinc praevaricatio primitiva primo et directe aufert hanc rectitudinem integritatis, qua ablata, etiam gratia sanctificans perditur. Aliis verbis: peccatum originale inchoative et praecise consistit in privatione iustitiae integritatis, quae est quaedam «mentis et carnis integritas» (supra d. 8. a. 3. q. 1. in corp., et d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 2.), sed completur in privatione gratiae sanctificantis. Secundum hanc positionem culpabilis illa inordinatio et rebellio concupiscentiae et vitiatio naturae est illud quod praecipue spectatur in peccato originali (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, praesertim ad 6.). — Ex hac principali differentia inter duos Ss. Doctores etiam aliae variationes sententiae consequuntur, de quibus infra d. 31.
II. Solutio ad 1. 2, in qua distinguitur concupiscentia remissa et intensa, maiori explicatione eget, quam ipse auctor dat infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.
III. Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3, m. 7. a. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 2. — S. Thom., locis citt. — B. Albert., hic q. 3; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 107. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 5. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.
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Article II. On the quiddity of original sin.
Next there is inquiry concerning the second point, namely what original sin is. And concerning this two things are asked:
First it is asked, whether original sin is concupiscence.
Second it is asked, whether it is ignorance.
Question I. Whether original sin is concupiscence.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether original sin is concupiscence. And that it is, it seems.
1. To the Romans, chapter six1: Let not sin reign in your mortal body, where the Gloss says: Sin, that is, "the tinder of sin"; but the tinder of sin is nothing other than concupiscence: if therefore the tinder of sin is sin, and is not actual sin; it remains that it be original.
2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter seven2: I did not know that concupiscence was sin etc., the Gloss: "Concupiscence is that from which all evils proceed." If therefore that which is the origin of all evils is original sin; it seems that original sin is nothing other than concupiscence.
3. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason. As the acts are, so are the habits3; but to lust is sin: therefore the necessity of lusting after evils is also sin. But we contract the necessity of lusting from nature: if therefore the sin which is contracted from nature is original sin: it seems so etc.
4. Likewise, in every sin there is some turning toward a changeable good, whether in act or in habit4: if therefore original sin is sin, then there is in it some disordered turning toward a changeable good. But a disordered turning toward a changeable good is nothing other than concupiscence: therefore it is necessary that original sin be concupiscence.
On the contrary: 1. To the Romans, chapter seven5: Sin, taking occasion, wrought in me by the commandment all concupiscence; but this cannot be understood of actual sin: it is understood therefore of original sin. If therefore the working is not the thing worked, then concupiscence is not original sin, nor conversely.
2. Likewise, Bede6 says that four things are inflicted upon us p. 722 on account of the first sin, namely ignorance, infirmity, malice, and a fourth, concupiscence, conflated out of these; but what is inflicted for sin is not sin itself: therefore if these are inflicted upon us by the merit of original sin, according to what Bede says: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, concupiscence remains together with grace; original sin cannot remain together with grace: therefore original sin is not concupiscence. If you say that concupiscence remains together with grace insofar as it is remitted, and thus is a punishment; but insofar as it is intense, it does not remain, and thus is a fault7; on the contrary: more and less do not diversify the species: therefore if remitted concupiscence is not a fault but a punishment, by parity of reasoning it seems that neither is intense concupiscence. — Likewise, concupiscence, after it has been remitted, can be intensified and recalled to its former dominion, as is plain by experience: if therefore original sin were8 repeatable, then so too would baptism be; which is against the institution of the Church.
There is therefore a question as to what original sin is by its essence. And since by the Master, and by Augustine, it is said to be concupiscence, as is plain in the text, but by Anselm in the book On the Virginal Conception it is said to be the lack of due justice, the question is how these two terms can both be true at once; and in which of these terms is more explained what original fault is.
Conclusio
Conclusion. Original sin is concupiscence, insofar as it encloses within itself the lack of due justice.
I respond: It must be said that, just as actual sin does not bespeak total privation, since it bespeaks not only an aversion but also a certain turning; nor does it bespeak total privation of the good, but rather leaves the aptitude and some act, depriving it of a circumstance with respect to it9: so too in the original it must be understood after its own manner. Hence just as actual sin is not said to be in someone from this alone, that he lacks justice — for then a stone would be said to have sin — but from this, that he has some inclination toward something, in which10, where justice ought to be, it is not found: so too original sin is said to be in someone not only because he lacks original justice, but also because he has a crookedness and a necessity of lusting. Hence just as we see in bodily sickness, for instance in paralysis, that such a disease is present from a certain dissolution of power, yet so that the motive power is not wholly removed, as in a dead man, but in some manner remains, unable to govern the member; and thus there follows, partly from a positive cause, partly from a defect, the trembling of the hand: so it must be understood both in actual and in original sin. Therefore just as, if someone were to ask what the sin of the flesh is, it could be made known to him in two ways, namely by reason of the disordered inclination, so that it be said to be an immoderate appetite for a thing manageable according to the flesh11; and by reason of the privation of the good, so that it be said to be a privation of chastity and continence; and in either way it is answered fittingly enough: so, when it is asked what original sin is, it is rightly answered that it is immoderate concupiscence; it is also rightly answered that it is the lack of due justice; and in one of these answers the other is enclosed, although the one makes known the original itself by reason of that which is in it having the mode of a turning, the other by reason of privation.
It must therefore be granted, as the reasons show, and as the Master says in the text, that original sin is concupiscence, and this not any whatever, but concupiscence insofar as it encloses within itself the lack of due justice. And this is immoderate and intense concupiscence, so much so that it is a predominance of the flesh over the spirit, and such is always joined to the lack of due justice, and according as it is in us from our origin, it is called original sin. And this is what the Gloss says upon that text12: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, the Gloss: "It calls the tinder iniquity, which before baptism is not only punishment but fault; but after baptism it is punishment only, and not fault. For when the original is destroyed, it is not destroyed so that it be not at all, but so that it be not sin." — The reasons therefore which show this must be granted. But to the reasons to the opposite it is plain enough to respond through the things that have been said.
To the arguments to the opposite:
To 1. For to that which is objected first, that sin works concupiscence; it must be said that this is understood of concupiscence as to the act; which13 the commandment is said to work, because it occasion- p. 723 ally excites in us concupiscence itself, which holds itself after the manner of a habit.
To 2 and 3. But to that which is objected, that concupiscence is inflicted upon us by sin; it must be said that it is understood14 of concupiscence insofar as it is remitted, and thus takes on the character of punishment; and in this way it is not original fault, but its sequel. — And through this the response is plain to what is objected next, that it remains together with grace; for it does not remain, as was said in the objecting15, insofar as it is intense, because thus it bespeaks a perversion of the soul, and through this the privation of original justice; but insofar as it is remitted by the presence of grace, this it does not bespeak. And if you object that more and less do not vary the species; it must be said that, although this holds in natural matters, it nevertheless does not hold true in moral matters, since virtues and vices in morals are attended to according to a mean, and its extremes, which are the superfluous and the diminished. And this is true not only with the moral philosopher16, but also with the theologian, who says that love of a creature below God or under God is not mortal sin; but if it be directed above God, it becomes mortal sin.
But to that which is objected, that remitted concupiscence can again be intensified; it must be said that, although it can be intensified and be intensified, this is by actual sin; but intense concupiscence was not said to be original sin, except insofar as it was thus contracted from the first origin; and since this cannot be except once, however much and however often concupiscence be intensified, original sin is not repeated.
I. To make this most intricate question concerning the essence of original sin more easily understood, it helps to note a few things, both concerning the principal errors contrary to the Catholic faith, and concerning the opinion to which St. Bonaventure adheres.
1. Two errors to be reproved are expressed in the same words, namely in this proposition, that concupiscence itself by itself is the whole essence of original sin; which nevertheless is understood by different persons in an extremely opposite sense. For some, addicted to rationalism, so understand it that in original sin they either entirely eliminate the character of sin or fault, or at least unduly weaken it; whence by these concupiscence and original sin itself is restricted to a certain defect of nature which retards or impedes the moral life. Nor were there lacking even among more recent Catholics those who adhered to this opinion either entirely or in part. To this error St. Bonav. has already forestalled with his contrary doctrine, above a. 1. q. 2. — On the opposite side stands the interpretation of the aforesaid proposition, which the innovators of the 16th and 17th centuries introduced, who, while at the same time exaggerating the evil of concupiscence in fallen man, asserted both that concupiscence alone constitutes the essence of original sin, and that it is sin by itself, with no regard had to the free will either of Adam or of the man in whom it is, although he be reborn by baptism; from which false principle, reproved by the Council of Trent (Sess. V. can. 5.), spring forth very many other and abominable errors. To the point belongs the condemned proposition 47 of Baius: "Hence the sin of origin truly has the character of sin without any relation and regard to the will from which it took its origin" (cf. propp. 46. 48. 49. 50. 51.). — St. Bonav., on the contrary, distinguishes two things in original sin: "either insofar as it is a fault rendering the soul hateful to God, or insofar as it is a vice disordering the power itself" (below d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. in the body; cf. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.); and he distinctly teaches, a) that in original sin, besides concupiscence, there is the lack of original justice (here and throughout); b) that the character of fault is in concupiscence not by itself, but through an annexed guilt, which results from the relation which the interior vicious state of fallen man has to the transgression of Adam (cf. above a. 1. q. 2. scholion). But that guilt is so annexed to concupiscence that it can be separated from it (here in the body), which truly happens through the grace of Christ in the reborn, as is taught below d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. In the same sense are to be understood the words of St. Augustine and of the Master, when they say concupiscence to be sin.
2. As to the opinion of St. Bonaventure we note these things.
a) It is already clear from what has been said that he, as to the character of fault which is in original sin, agrees with St. Thomas (Summa I. II. q. 81. a. 1, q. 83. a. 1.), who teaches that it is founded not precisely on the disordered habit or disposition of fallen man, i.e. on the mere lack of sanctifying grace and integrity, but rather on the same, insofar as it is a privation derived from the first parent sinning (cf. the same, II Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2.).
b) In the very vicious state or habit of the soul the holy Doctor distinguishes two things: one, which is lacking to it, but ought to be present, namely original justice itself or the habitual turning toward the end; the other, which is present, but ought to be absent, namely disordered concupiscence (here and a. 1. q. 2.) or the disordered, but habitual, turning toward a changeable good. This disorder is called by St. Bonav. throughout corruption, or vice, disease, crookedness of nature. Hence in the Breviloquium p. III. c. 6. he says: "And thus it incurs at once the lack of justice and the disease of concupiscence, out of which two, as out of aversion and conversion, original sin is said to be integrated, according to Augustine and Anselm." St. Thom. agrees (here q. 1. a. 3; Summa I. II. q. 82. a. 3.). But it must be noted that "concupiscence is not taken here specially for that which belongs to the concupiscible power; but generally, insofar as it belongs to any rational appetite from its primary conjunction with the corrupt flesh. There is, however, another concupiscence, which belongs to the sensible part, and this is said to be a punishment. But that which is rational is sometimes called fault" etc. (so Alex. Hal., Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3.). Hence also by St. Thomas (Summa, loc. cit.) concupiscence is noted as a disorder of the powers of the soul, from which every kind of sin can arise (cf. Bonav. below d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.).
c) This concupiscence or proneness to sinning in original sin is as it were the material, but the lack of original justice is as it were the formal (below d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). St. Thom. agrees (in the places cited and de Malo, q. 4. a. 2.) and Alex. Hal., who (loc. cit. m. 1. a. 1. ad 2.) says: "When it is said: original sin is concupiscence, the predication seems to be material; but it is formal when it is called a stain or deformity [the privation of justice], contracted from the origin of the first parents." The same is taught by Scotus (here q. 2.) and others commonly.
d) Hence concupiscence, taken in the aforesaid sense, is not only the punishment of original sin, like bodily death and the other penalties, but it pertains to original sin itself, p. 724 inasmuch as it bespeaks a vicious habit or disordered disposition of the soul. St. Thom. agrees, Summa I. II. q. 82. a. 1, especially ad 1., where he says that that sin is not a pure privation, but (positively) a certain corrupt habit. These things can be more easily understood if we compare the habit of original sin with the habitual sin of Adam himself, after he committed the actual sin. For the actual sin of Adam is distinguished in two ways from any other sin both of angels and of men; first indeed, because he lost in himself not only the gift of sanctifying grace (which happens in every mortal sin), but also the gifts of integrity, some of which pertain to the interior rectitude of the soul itself; but secondly, because he lost both gifts not only for himself, but also for the whole human race. But to the habitual sin of Adam himself, or to the depraved disposition which had arisen from his actual sin, besides the lack of sanctifying grace there pertains also the lack of the aforesaid interior rectitude, in whose place succeeded a habitual disordered turning toward a changeable good, so that both lacks in him were culpable. In a similar way it can be judged also of the habit of original sin in other men. From which it follows that, just as the privation of sanctifying grace has the character of fault, and indeed principally, so also concupiscence is not only the punishment or sequel of this sin, but in the unregenerate is also in its own way a fault; which St. Bonav. so often repeats with St. Augustine and very many ancient Scholastics. St. Thom. agrees (de Malo, q. 4. a. 2. in the body) in these words: "The superior part of the soul, and also certain of the inferior powers, which are under the will and are born to obey it, receive this sequel of the first sin according to the character of fault... But the inferior powers, which are not subject to the will, namely the powers of the vegetable soul and also the body itself, receive this sequel according to the character of punishment, not according to the character of fault, unless perhaps virtually" etc. (cf. Summa I. II. q. 83. a. 1.). Scotus also concurs, in Hier. de Montefortino, l. III. q. 82. a. 3.
e) There is, however, a notable difference as to this doctrine between Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas. For although they agree in this, that they assert original sin to be the privation of original justice or the lack of the same together with the debt of having it; nevertheless they do not understand original justice itself in the same way, as has already been said (above d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. 2.), and consequently neither the privation of the same. For according to St. Thomas sanctifying grace itself is the essence of original justice and the root of all the other gifts; hence also original sin is primarily and constitutively the privation of that same grace. But according to St. Bonav. original justice first consists in that rectitude of integrity which is conceived as a disposition, upon which afterward sanctifying grace itself followed. Hence the primitive transgression first and directly takes away this rectitude of integrity, and when it is taken away, sanctifying grace too is lost. In other words: original sin inchoatively and precisely consists in the privation of the justice of integrity, which is a certain "integrity of mind and flesh" (above d. 8. a. 3. q. 1. in the body, and d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 2.), but is completed in the privation of sanctifying grace. According to this position, that culpable disorder and rebellion of concupiscence and vitiation of nature is that which is chiefly regarded in original sin (cf. below d. 31. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1, especially ad 6.). — From this principal difference between the two holy Doctors there follow also other variations of opinion, concerning which see below d. 31.
II. The solution to 1 and 2, in which remitted and intense concupiscence are distinguished, needs a fuller explanation, which the author himself gives below d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.
III. Alex. Hal., on this and the following question, Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 3, m. 7. a. 1. — Scotus, in both Writings, here q. 2. — St. Thom., in the places cited. — B. Albert, here q. 3; Summa p. II. tr. 18. q. 107. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4. q. 1. — Aegidius Rom., here q. 1. a. 5. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question, here q. 1.
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- Vers. 12. — Glossam, quae est interlinearis, vide apud Lyranum. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. II.Verse 12. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, see in Lyra. Cf. here the Master's text, c. II.
- Vers. 7: Nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. — Glossa ordinaria, quae est secundum August., de Spir. et lit. c. 4. n. 6, apud Strabum et Lyranum sic sonat: Nam concupiscentiam; hoc elegit Apostolus generale, unde omnia. Bona lex, quae dum hoc prohibet, omnia prohibet. Concupiscentiam; aliqui generalem intelligunt... quia ex ea omne malum.Verse 7: For I did not know concupiscence, except the law had said: Thou shalt not covet. — The ordinary Gloss, which is according to Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter c. 4. n. 6, in Strabo and Lyra reads thus: For concupiscence; this the Apostle chose as something general, whence all things. The good law, which while it forbids this, forbids all things. Concupiscence; some understand it generally... because from it is every evil.
- Cfr. supra pag. 635, nota 5, et pag. 653, nota 6. — Paulo inferius post mala est Vat. omittit et.Cf. above p. 635, note 5, and p. 653, note 6. — A little below, after mala est, the Vatican edition omits et.
- Vide infra d. 35. dub. 6, ubi hoc principium S. Augustini ponitur, quod magis explicatur infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 2 et a. 3. q. 2.See below d. 35. dub. 6, where this principle of St. Augustine is set down, which is more explained below d. 42. a. 1. q. 2 and a. 3. q. 2.
- Vers. 8: Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per etc. — Paulo inferius pro operatum Vat. peccatum.Verse 8: But sin, taking occasion, by etc. — A little below, for operatum the Vatican edition reads peccatum.
- Vide supra pag. 528, nota 2. Cfr. etiam Appendix ad Hugonis opera, I. Excerpt. c. 3.See above p. 528, note 2. Cf. also the Appendix to Hugh's works, Excerpt. I, c. 3.
- Cfr. infra d. XXXII, lit. Magistri, c. 1, et Comment. a. 1. q. 1. — De prop. seq. vide supra pag. 338, nota 2 in fine, et pag. 659, nota 7.Cf. below d. XXXII, the Master's text, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 1. q. 1. — On the following proposition see above p. 338, note 2 at the end, and p. 659, note 7.
- Supple cum cod. Y concupiscentia, videtur quod haberet iterari, et si peccatum originale esset.Supply with codex Y: concupiscence, it seems that it would have to be repeated, and if original sin were [repeatable].
- Hic c. 8, seqq., ubi et Augustini verba exhibentur, Anselmus loc. cit. c. 3, sic ait: Non est aliud originale peccatum quam iniustitia. Quod si ita est, et iniustitia non est aliud quam absentia debitae iustitiae; non enim videtur esse iniustitia nisi in natura, quae, cum debet habere, iustitiam non habet: utique originale peccatum clauditur sub eadem definitione iniustitiae. — Paulo inferius post simul Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 addit et semel.Here c. 8 and following, where Augustine's words also are set forth, Anselm in the place cited c. 3 says thus: Original sin is nothing other than injustice. But if this is so, and injustice is nothing other than the absence of due justice; for injustice does not seem to be except in a nature which, when it ought to have justice, does not have it: original sin is certainly enclosed under the same definition of injustice. — A little below, after simul, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 adds et semel.
- Cfr. infra d. 34. a. 2. q. 2, d. 35. per totam. — Vat. circa ipsum.Cf. below d. 34. a. 2. q. 2, d. 35. throughout. — The Vatican edition reads circa ipsum.
- Codd. A L quo.Codices A L read quo.
- Psalm. 31, 1. — Glossa, quae est secundum August., l. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 23. n. 28, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. Cfr. infra d. XXXII, lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi agitur de modo, quo peccatum originale baptismo deletur.Psalm 31, 1. — The Gloss, which is according to Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence c. 23. n. 28, is found in Strabo and Lyra. Cf. below d. XXXII, the Master's text, c. 1, where the manner is treated in which original sin is destroyed by baptism.
- Cfr. Aristot., VII. Ethic. 4; II. Magnor. Moral. c. 7 (c. 6.). — Paulo inferius pro satis convenienter, quod ex codd. K M Q aa bb ee restauravimus, Vat. sic convenienter, codd. F I et ed. 1 convenienter tantum.Cf. Aristotle, Ethics VII. 4; Great Morals II. c. 7 (c. 6.). — A little below, for satis convenienter, which we have restored from codices K M Q aa bb ee, the Vatican edition reads sic convenienter, codices F I and edition 1 convenienter only.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 quem.The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads quem.
- Pro intelligitur codd. C H R S (T a prima manu) bb et alii non intelligit [scil. Beda], lectio mutila, quae suppletur verbis intensa, sed, ut legitur in codd. A I K: quod non intelligit de concupiscentia intensa, sed prout cod. I verbis intensa, sed etiam addit intelligit de concupiscentia.For intelligitur the codices C H R S (T by the first hand) bb and others read non intelligit [namely, Bede], a mutilated reading, which is supplied with the words intensa, sed, as is read in codices A I K: that he does not understand of intense concupiscence, but; while codex I by the words intensa, sed also adds he understands of concupiscence.
- In hac ipsa obiectione. — Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. et infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, ubi agitur de differentia quae est inter peccata mortalia et venialia. — Vat. adiicit prima.In this very objection. — Cf. Aristotle, Ethics II. c. 6. and below d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, where the difference between mortal and venial sins is treated. — The Vatican edition adds prima.