Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 42, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 42

Textus Latinus

p. 970

Articulus III. De modis dividendi peccata.

Consequenter quaeritur tertio loco de modis dividendi peccata. Et cum multi sint modi dividendi, de quibus valde prolixum esset hic disputare, his omissis, in generali quaeruntur hic duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum peccatum habeat dividi per differentias materiales tantum, an per differentias formales et specificas¹.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum dividi habeat per conversionem et aversionem tanquam per diversas peccatorum differentias.

Quaestio I. Utrum peccatum habeat dividi per differentias materiales tantum, an etiam per formales.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum dividi habeat per differentias materiales tantum, an etiam per formales. Et quod non tantum per materiales, sed etiam per formales dividi habeat, ostenditur sic.

1. Sicut se habet castitas ad virtutem, ita se habet luxuria ad vitium: ergo sicut castitas est species virtutis, ita luxuria est species vitii; sed una species distinguitur ab altera per differentias formales²: ergo etc.

2. Item, bonum opponitur malo non tantum materialiter, sed etiam formaliter, et diversis bonis diversa opponuntur mala³; sed bona, quibus mala opponuntur, formaliter distinguuntur: ergo pari ratione et mala, quae eis formaliter opposita sunt, formaliter differunt.

3. Item, circa unum actum peccati assignantur diversae differentiae peccatorum, sicut patet in peccato Adae, in quo dicitur fuisse gula et superbia et inobedientia⁴; sed peccata, quae consistunt circa unum actum, non habent differentiam materialem: ergo si aliquo modo differunt, necesse est, quod habeant differentiam formalem.

4. Item, multiplicatio secundum materiam est multiplicatio secundum numerum⁵, et multiplicatio secundum numerum non habet statum: ergo si peccata solummodo distinguerentur per differentias materialiter differentes, nunquam peccatum posset dividi sufficienti divisione. Si igitur in Scriptura peccatum dividitur differentiis, ipsum sufficienter dividentibus et omne peccatum complectentibus; videtur, quod peccata ad invicem distinguantur non solum differentiis materialibus, verum etiam formalibus.

p. 971

Sed contra: 1. Formale in genere peccati mortalis est aversio; sed peccata a parte aversionis non distinguuntur, immo conveniunt — omnia enim dicunt aversionem a Deo — si ergo distinguuntur, hoc est solum a parte conversionis, quae est in peccato materialis: ergo tantum dividitur peccatum per differentias materiales, non per formales.

2. Item, peccatum, formaliter loquendo, nihil est; sed quod nihil est non habet differentias dividentes⁶: ergo si peccatum dividitur, nullo modo dividitur, in quantum formaliter consideratur: restat igitur, quod solum dividatur per illud quod est materiale in ipso, et ita redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, omne illud, quod habet differentias formales et specificas, aliquo modo, formaliter loquendo, habet speciem; sed peccatum sive malum, formaliter loquendo, est privatio speciei⁷; et privatio speciei non habet speciem; et quod caret specie caret differentia formali et specifica: ergo etc.

4. Item, si peccatum haberet differentias ipsum formaliter dividentes, ergo haberet veras species; sed omne tale habet ordinari in genere directe⁸; illud autem, quod est in genere, a Deo est: ergo peccatum, formaliter loquendo, a Deo esset; quod est contra fidem.

5. Item, prima divisio peccati est in originale et actuale; sed originale et actuale peccatum non distinguuntur formaliter, quia quod est originale uni fuit alteri actuale, sicut patet, quia quod est originale nobis fuit actuale Adae. Si igitur prima membra maxime differunt⁹, et originale et actuale non sunt differentiae peccati formaliter differentes; multo fortius nec aliae.

6. Item, prima divisio actualis peccati est per mortale et veniale; sed mortale et veniale non dicunt diversas differentias secundum formam et speciem: ergo multo minus nec aliae differentiae secundum speciem et formam faciunt differre. Maior propositio manifesta est. Minor probatur per hoc, quod veniale peccatum efficitur mortale sola intensione libidinis circa idem genus delectabilis¹⁰. Ergo si magis et minus non faciunt diversitatem secundum speciem et formam, videtur, quod peccatum veniale et mortale non addant formalem differentiam: ergo nec alia.

Conclusio

Peccatum abstracte sumtum habet differentias formales tantum per accidens, concrete sumtum etiam per se.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit loqui de peccato: aut in concretione, aut in abstractione¹¹. Si in abstractione; sic dicendum est, quod quemadmodum peccatum, cum sit privatio, non habet ordinari nisi per accidens, scilicet per comparationem ad suum oppositum, sic etiam non habet formaliter distingui nisi ratione sui oppositi; privationes enim distinguuntur per habitus. Unde sicut castitas et fortitudo sunt virtutes formaliter differentes in genere virtutis, sic etiam luxuria et pusillanimitas, quae sunt opposita istarum duarum virtutum, formaliter dicuntur differre in genere vitiorum, non tamen secundum formam suam, sed secundum formam sui oppositi¹². — Si autem loquamur de peccato in concretione, sic non tantum dicit privationem, sed etiam actum, vel habitum substratum; et quoniam actus, vel habitus substratus peccato non tantummodo diversificatur¹³ materialiter, immo etiam formali differentia — alia est enim pronitas ad luxuriam, alia pronitas ad superbiam, et alius actus, quo superbit aliquis, et alius quo luxuriatur, non tantummodo secundum materiam, sed etiam secundum formam propter formalem differentiam obiectorum¹⁴ — hinc est, quod peccatum, secundum quod concretive accipitur, dividi habet per differentias non tantum materiales, verum etiam formales, formales dico, non respectu deformitatis, sed respectu habitus, vel actus substrati.

Et sic patet, quod sive peccatum accipiatur abstracte, sive concrete, differentias habet formales; sed uno modo per se, alio modo per accidens, quia uno modo dicit ens in genere secundum rectam coordinationem, alio modo dicit ens in genere solum per reductionem.

p. 972

— Et quia hoc modo rationes ad primam partem procedunt, ideo concedendae sunt.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod formale in peccato est aversio; dicendum, quod verum est, quod aversio est formale respectu conversionis; proprie tamen loquendo, peccatum magis debet dici formaliter privatio boni sibi oppositi quam aversio a Deo, aut saltem aeque proprie. Et quamvis peccatum ratione aversionis a Deo non multiplicetur, quia unum est, a quo fit aversio; tamen ratione privationis boni, cui opponitur, multiplicari habet; et ita ratione eius quod est in ipso formale, habet diversas differentias. Praeterea, ad esse peccati non tantummodo concurrit aversio, sed etiam conversio¹⁵; et quoniam conversio respicit obiecta creata, quae non tantum distinguuntur materialiter, sed etiam formaliter differunt; hinc est, quod ex illa parte peccatum habet plurificari per formales differentias. Item, nec dicitur conversio esse materiale in peccato, simpliciter loquendo, sed solum ratione aversionis; nec omnino est materialis respectu aversionis; nam etsi aversio dat conversioni, quod sit peccatum, conversio tamen dat aversioni, quod sit tale peccatum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum, formaliter loquendo, nihil est; dicendum, quod verum est. Quamvis autem nihil sit, tamen alicuius est, non solum ut subiecti, verum etiam ut oppositi; et ea ratione, qua alicuius est, cui formaliter opponitur, formaliter habet distingui, non secundum formam, quae est in ipso, sed secundum formam, quae est in suo opposito¹⁶.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est privatio speciei, ergo non habet speciem; iam patet responsio. Verum est enim, quod non habet speciem proprie, secundum quod privatio; nec dicitur habere differentias formales et specificas isto modo, scilicet quod in se diversas habeat species; sed quia opponitur diversis bonis secundum speciem, in quantum illa privat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si haberet species, esset in genere¹⁷; dicendum, quod verum est, si haberet species in se et per se; peccatum autem, secundum quod accipitur abstracte et formaliter, sicut non est in genere per se nisi per reductionem, sic non habet dividi per differentias formales differentes per se, sed solum per accidens. Quamvis autem peccatum, secundum quod nihil est et accipitur abstracte, non sit in genere; tamen secundum quod accipitur concrete, scilicet ratione actus substrati et habitus, in genere est; actio enim peccato substrata a Deo est¹⁸.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de originali et actuali, dicendum, quod originale et actuale non solummodo differunt, quod hoc sit ab actu, et illud a natura, sed etiam differunt penes bonum, quod privant; unde et actuale privat iustitiam gratuitam sive personalem; originale vero tollit iustitiam originalem, sive quae respicit hominem, secundum quod est natura¹⁹. Praeterea, aliter dicitur in nobis originale, et aliter in Adam. In nobis dicitur originale, quia est ab origine tractum; in Adam vero, quia fuit origo aliorum peccatorum. Et quamvis originale secundo modo dictum possit esse idem quod actuale; prout tamen primo modo dicitur, non potest originale concurrere in idem peccati genus cum actuali; et hoc modo ponitur differentia inter ea.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de veniali et mortali, quod non differunt formaliter, quia magis et minus non variant speciem; dicendum, quod prima propositio falsa est. — Ad hoc autem quod dicitur, quod differentia secundum minus et magis non variat speciem; respondetur tripliciter. Primo, quod hoc est verum in genere naturae, sed non est verum in genere moris, sicut patet: quia vitia diversificantur formaliter secundum speciem penes superabundantiam et defectum, non solum a se invicem, sed etiam a virtute²⁰. — Secundo modo respondetur, quod hoc intelligitur de magis et minus accidentali; delectari autem sub Deo est essentiale veniali, et delectari supra Deum est essentiale mortali. — Tertio modo respondetur, quod hoc est verum de magis et minus citra terminum, sed non de magis et minus ultra terminum; unde calidum in quarto gradu est alterius speciei quam calidum in tertio. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod amare aliquid citra Deum est terminus venialis peccati; et quantumcumque intendatur amor, dum tamen citra Deum est, veniale peccatum est; si autem praeponit aliquid Deo, tunc exit suum terminum; et sic cadit in aliud peccati genus, scilicet in peccatum mortale.

Scholion

I. De multis divisionibus peccatorum cfr. hic dub. 2, et de septem vitiis capitalibus dub. 3. et 4. De his dubiis S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1–4.) aliique antiqui distinctis quaestionibus tractant, et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 107. m. 2. — Primam huius articuli quaestionem Petrus a Tar. (et similiter Richard. a Med.) sic inscribit: « An diversa peccata specie distinguantur », qui cum S. Bonav., S. Thoma aliisque utitur distinctione inter peccatum ratione deformitatis et peccatum ratione actus substrati. Primo modo, cum sic non sit in genere per se, sed per accidens, id est per habitum oppositum sive per reductionem, non potest proprie per species distingui per se, sed tantum per species habituum oppositorum. Secundo autem modo, sicut est in genere per se, sic potest distingui per differentias formales, scilicet per comparationem ad obiecta, secundum quae actus formaliter distinguuntur. Scotus autem (II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 9.) vult, quod peccata distinguantur formaliter non pro specifica diversitate obiectorum, sed magis pro specifica diversitate rectitudinum, quae actibus inesse deberent.

p. 973

II. De seq. (2.) quaestione pauci antiqui explicite tractant. Hi cum S. Bonav. utuntur distinctione inter motum aversionis specialem, qui speciale peccatum odii constituit, et motum aversionis, qui generaliter in omni malo actu conversionis ad creaturam implicatur et cum ipso unum peccatum constituit. — S. Thom. rem tangit S. 1. II. q. 87. a. 4. et passim. Specialiter de ea disputant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1.

---

English Translation

Article III. On the modes of dividing sins.

There follows, in the third place, the question concerning the modes of dividing sins. And since there are many modes of dividing, about which it would be very lengthy to dispute here, leaving those aside, two are asked here in general.

First it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or by formal and specific differences¹.

Second it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by aversion and conversion as by diverse differences of sins.

Question I. Whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or also by formal ones.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or also by formal ones. And that it is to be divided not only by material differences, but also by formal ones, is shown thus.

1. As chastity stands to virtue, so lust stands to vice: therefore, as chastity is a species of virtue, so lust is a species of vice; but one species is distinguished from another by formal differences²: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, good is opposed to evil not only materially, but also formally, and to diverse goods diverse evils are opposed³; but the goods to which the evils are opposed are formally distinguished: therefore by parity of reasoning the evils too, which are formally opposed to them, formally differ.

3. Likewise, concerning a single act of sin diverse differences of sins are assigned, as is plain in the sin of Adam, in which there is said to have been gluttony and pride and disobedience⁴; but sins that consist in a single act do not have a material difference: therefore if they differ in any way, it is necessary that they have a formal difference.

4. Likewise, multiplication according to matter is multiplication according to number⁵, and multiplication according to number has no limit: therefore if sins were distinguished only by materially differing differences, sin could never be divided by a sufficient division. If therefore in Scripture sin is divided by differences that divide it sufficiently and embrace every sin; it seems that sins are distinguished from one another not only by material differences, but also by formal ones.

On the contrary: 1. The formal element in the genus of mortal sin is aversion; but sins are not distinguished on the side of aversion, indeed they agree — for all of them imply aversion from God — if therefore they are distinguished, this is only on the side of conversion, which is the material element in sin: therefore sin is divided only by material differences, not by formal ones.

2. Likewise, sin, formally speaking, is nothing; but what is nothing has no dividing differences⁶: therefore if sin is divided, in no way is it divided insofar as it is considered formally: it remains, therefore, that it is divided only by that which is material in it, and thus the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, everything that has formal and specific differences in some way, formally speaking, has a species; but sin or evil, formally speaking, is a privation of species⁷; and a privation of species has no species; and what lacks species lacks formal and specific difference: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if sin had differences formally dividing it, then it would have true species; but everything of this sort is ordered in a genus directly⁸; but that which is in a genus is from God: therefore sin, formally speaking, would be from God; which is against the faith.

5. Likewise, the first division of sin is into original and actual; but original and actual sin are not formally distinguished, because what is original to one was actual to another, as is plain, since what is original to us was actual to Adam. If therefore the first members differ most⁹, and original and actual are not formally differing differences of sin; much more neither are the others.

6. Likewise, the first division of actual sin is by mortal and venial; but mortal and venial do not state diverse differences according to form and species: therefore much less do the other differences according to species and form make [things] differ. The major proposition is manifest. The minor is proved by this, that a venial sin is made mortal by the sole intensity of desire concerning the same genus of the pleasurable¹⁰. Therefore if more and less do not make diversity according to species and form, it seems that venial and mortal sin do not add a formal difference: therefore neither do the others.

Conclusion

Sin taken abstractly has formal differences only by accident; taken concretely, also per se.

I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of speaking about sin: either in its concretion, or in its abstraction¹¹. If [it is taken] in abstraction; then it must be said that, just as sin, since it is a privation, cannot be ordered except by accident, namely by comparison to its opposite, so likewise it cannot be formally distinguished except by reason of its opposite; for privations are distinguished by [their] habits. Hence, just as chastity and fortitude are virtues formally differing in the genus of virtue, so likewise lust and pusillanimity, which are the opposites of those two virtues, are said to differ formally in the genus of vices, yet not according to their own form, but according to the form of their opposite¹². — But if we speak of sin in its concretion, then it states not only a privation, but also an act, or an underlying habit; and since the act, or habit, underlying the sin is diversified¹³ not only materially, but indeed also by a formal difference — for one thing is the proneness to lust, another the proneness to pride, and one is the act by which someone is proud, and another that by which he is lustful, not only according to matter, but also according to form on account of the formal difference of the objects¹⁴ — hence it is that sin, according as it is taken concretively, is to be divided by differences not only material, but also formal; formal, I say, not with respect to the deformity, but with respect to the habit, or act, underlying [it].

And thus it is plain that whether sin be taken abstractly or concretely, it has formal differences; but in one way per se, in the other way by accident, because in one way it states a being in a genus according to right co-ordination, in the other way it states a being in a genus only by reduction.

— And because in this way the arguments proceed to the first part, therefore they are to be conceded.

To the arguments:

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the formal element in sin is aversion; it must be said that it is true that aversion is the formal element with respect to conversion; yet, properly speaking, sin ought rather to be called formally a privation of the good opposed to it than aversion from God, or at least equally properly. And although sin is not multiplied by reason of aversion from God, because that from which the aversion takes place is one; yet by reason of the privation of the good to which it is opposed, it is to be multiplied; and thus by reason of that which is the formal element in it, it has diverse differences. Moreover, to the being of sin there concurs not only aversion, but also conversion¹⁵; and since conversion regards created objects, which are not only distinguished materially, but also differ formally; hence it is that on that side sin can be multiplied by formal differences. Likewise, conversion is not said to be the material element in sin, absolutely speaking, but only by reason of the aversion; nor is it altogether material with respect to the aversion; for although aversion gives to conversion that it be sin, conversion nonetheless gives to aversion that it be such a sin.

2. To that which is objected, that sin, formally speaking, is nothing; it must be said that it is true. But although it be nothing, nevertheless it is of something, not only as of a subject, but also as of an opposite; and by that ground by which it is of something to which it is formally opposed, it has to be formally distinguished, not according to the form which is in it, but according to the form which is in its opposite¹⁶.

3. To that which is objected, that sin is a privation of species, therefore it does not have a species; the response is already plain. For it is true that it does not have a species properly, according as it is a privation; nor is it said to have formal and specific differences in this way, namely that it have in itself diverse species; but because it is opposed to diverse goods according to species, insofar as it deprives those.

4. To that which is objected, that if it had species, it would be in a genus¹⁷; it must be said that it is true, if it had species in itself and per se; but sin, according as it is taken abstractly and formally, just as it is not in a genus per se except by reduction, so it is not to be divided by formal differences differing per se, but only by accident. But although sin, according as it is nothing and is taken abstractly, is not in a genus; nevertheless according as it is taken concretely, namely by reason of the underlying act and habit, it is in a genus; for the action underlying the sin is from God¹⁸.

5. To that which is objected concerning the original and the actual, it must be said that the original and the actual not only differ in that the one is from an act, and the other from nature, but also differ as regards the good which they deprive; whence the actual deprives the gratuitous or personal justice; but the original takes away the original justice, that is, that which regards man according as he is nature¹⁹. Moreover, the original is spoken of in one way in us, and in another way in Adam. In us it is called original because it is drawn from [our] origin; but in Adam, because he was the origin of the other sins. And although the original spoken of in the second way can be the same as the actual; yet as it is spoken of in the first way, the original cannot concur in the same genus of sin with the actual; and in this way a difference is set between them.

6. To that which is objected concerning the venial and the mortal, that they do not differ formally, because more and less do not vary the species; it must be said that the first proposition is false. — But to this which is said, that a difference according to less and more does not vary the species; it is answered in three ways. First, that this is true in the genus of nature, but is not true in the genus of morals, as is plain: for vices are formally diversified according to species by superabundance and defect, not only from one another, but also from virtue²⁰. — In the second way it is answered, that this is understood of more and less that is accidental; but to take delight under God is essential to the venial, and to take delight above God is essential to the mortal. — In the third way it is answered, that this is true of more and less short of the limit, but not of more and less beyond the limit; whence the hot in the fourth degree is of another species than the hot in the third. So too in the matter at hand it is to be understood that to love something short of God is the limit of venial sin; and however much the love be intensified, so long as it is short of God, it is a venial sin; but if it prefers something to God, then it goes beyond its limit; and thus it falls into another genus of sin, namely into mortal sin.

Scholion

I. Concerning the many divisions of sins, see here dubium 2, and concerning the seven capital vices, dubia 3 and 4. On these dubia St. Thomas (here q. 2, aa. 1–4) and the other ancients treat in distinct questions, and Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 107, m. 2. — The first question of this article Peter of Tarentaise (and likewise Richard of Mediavilla) entitles thus: "Whether diverse sins are distinguished in species," who, with St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and others, makes use of the distinction between sin by reason of deformity and sin by reason of the underlying act. In the first way, since it is thus not in a genus per se, but by accident, that is, by an opposite habit or by reduction, it cannot properly be distinguished per se by species, but only by the species of opposite habits. But in the second way, just as it is in a genus per se, so it can be distinguished by formal differences, namely by comparison to the objects, according to which acts are formally distinguished. But Scotus (II Sent., d. 37, q. 1, n. 9) holds that sins are distinguished formally not by the specific diversity of the objects, but rather by the specific diversity of the rectitudes which ought to inhere in the acts.

II. Concerning the following (2nd) question few of the ancients treat explicitly. These, with St. Bonaventure, make use of the distinction between a special motion of aversion, which constitutes the special sin of hatred, and a motion of aversion which is generally implied in every evil act of conversion to a creature and constitutes one sin with it. — St. Thomas touches the matter, S. 1.II, q. 87, a. 4, and elsewhere. Specially do they dispute about it: Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1.

---

Apparatus Criticus

Vat. addit et specificas.
The Vatican edition adds et specificas ("and specific").
Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie et c. de Differentia.
Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on Species and the chapter on Difference.
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis: Contrarium autem bono quidem ex necessitate malum est; hoc autem per singulorum inductionem palam est, ut sanitati languor et iustitiae iniustitia et fortitudini timiditas; similiter autem et in aliis.
Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites: "But the contrary of a good is necessarily an evil; and this is plain by the induction of particular cases, as languor is contrary to health and injustice to justice and timidity to fortitude; and likewise also in the rest."
Vide supra d. XXXIII. lit. Magistri, c. 2. et ibid. Comment. dub. 1.
See above, d. XXXIII, the text of the Master, c. 2, and there in the Commentary, dubium 1.
Cfr. locc. ex Aristot. supra pag. 89, nota 7. citt. — Seq. propos. illustratur istis verbis Porphyrii, de Praedicab. c. de Specie: Individua autem... infinita sunt. Quapropter usque ad specialissima a generalissimis [generibus] descendentes iubebat Plato quiescere... infinita vero, inquit, relinquenda sunt, neque enim eorum scientiam posse fieri. — De distinctione peccati, qualiter in Script. habetur, vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq. — Mox pro ergo si peccata solummodo distinguerentur cod. T ergo si peccatum solummodo distingueretur. Circa finem arg. pro ad invicem codd. l⁰ K T Y ee et alii ab invicem.
Cf. the passages from Aristotle cited above on p. 89, note 7. — The following proposition is illustrated by these words of Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on Species: "But individuals... are infinite. Wherefore Plato bade us, descending from the most general [genera] down to the most special, to rest there... but the infinite, he says, must be left aside, for there can be no knowledge of them." — On the distinction of sin, as it is found in Scripture, see here the text of the Master, c. 4 f. — Shortly after, for ergo si peccata solummodo distinguerentur cod. T reads ergo si peccatum solummodo distingueretur. Near the end of the argument, for ad invicem codd. l⁰ K T Y ee and others read ab invicem.
Cod. cc et ed. 1 animam.
Cod. cc and the first edition read animam.
Fere omnes codd. et primae edd. omittunt aeterna. Paulo ante pro poenae cod. T substituit bene.
Almost all the codices and the first editions omit aeterna. Shortly before, for poenae cod. T substitutes bene.
Edd. cum paucis codd. multiplicetur.
The editions, with a few codices, read multiplicetur.
Libr. X. c. 29. n. 40.
Book X, c. 29, n. 40.
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion on the preceding question.
Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3. — De maiori vide supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3.
Cf. above p. 111, note 3. — On the major, see above d. 34, a. 2, q. 3.
Ut probatum est supra d. 33. a. 2. q. 1.
As was proved above, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1.
Vide supra pag. 48, nota 1. Enuntiatio seq. fundatur in eo, quod illud quod est in genere, dicit quid positivum, ut iam supra pag. 814, nota 8. in fine dictum est. In conclusione huius arg. pro a Deo esset cod. T a Deo est. De conclusione ipsa cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.
See above p. 48, note 1. The following statement is grounded in this, that what is in a genus states something positive, as was already said above on p. 814, note 8, at the end. In the conclusion of this argument, for a Deo esset cod. T reads a Deo est. On the conclusion itself, cf. above d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.
Cfr. locc. ex Aristot. supra pag. 937, nota 1. citt.
Cf. the passages from Aristotle cited above on p. 937, note 1.
In Iure can. 3. d. 25. Unum orarium: Nullum peccatum est adeo veniale, quod non fiat criminale, dum placet. Cfr. supra pag. 576, nota 6. — Quod magis et minus non variant speciem, vide supra pag. 639, nota 7. — Paulo superius omnes edd. perperam intentione pro intensione. In fine arg. pro alia [scil. differentia sive divisio peccati], quam lectionem codd. L O exhibent, in aliis codd. et edd. exhibetur perperam aliam; in cod. bb, qui nunc cum Vat. concordat, primitus legebatur ergo nec alia aliam.
In Canon Law, dist. 25, Unum orarium: "No sin is so venial that it does not become criminal while it pleases." Cf. above p. 576, note 6. — That more and less do not vary the species, see above p. 639, note 7. — A little above, all the editions wrongly read intentione for intensione. At the end of the argument, for alia [namely, difference or division of sin], which reading codices L and O exhibit, in other codices and editions it is wrongly given as aliam; in cod. bb, which now agrees with the Vatican edition, it was originally read ergo nec alia aliam.
De quo vide supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius post ordinari Vat. addit in genere.
On which see above d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — A little below, after ordinari the Vatican edition adds in genere.
Cfr. Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 1.
Cf. Aristotle, Ethics V, c. 1.
Edd., excepta 1, diversificat. Proxime post pro materialiter codd. C H R S T V Y Z ee formaliter, falso.
The editions, except the first, read diversificat. Immediately after, for materialiter codd. C H R S T V Y Z ee read formaliter, falsely.
Cfr. supra pag. 361, nota 3. — Paulo inferius pro dividi habet cod. T dividi potest. Procedente quaestione, edd. et nonnulli codd. sibi constantes pro abstracte et concrete habent abstractive et concretive.
Cf. above p. 361, note 3. — A little below, for dividi habet cod. T reads dividi potest. As the question proceeds, the editions and several codices, consistent with themselves, have for abstracte and concrete the forms abstractive and concretive.
Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq., et supra d. 30. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. — Aliquanto superius pro non variat cod. T non diversificat.
See Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6 ff., and above d. 30, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — Somewhat above, for non variat cod. T reads non diversificat.

← Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 2 Dist. 42, Art. 3, Q. 2→