Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

Quaestio III. Utrum mendacium sit peccatum mortale ratione sui generis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum mendacium sit peccatum mortale ratione sui generis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur in Psalmo¹: Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium; Glossa: « Plus est perdere quam odire »; sed Deus neminem odit nisi propter peccatum mortale: ergo omne mendacium est peccatum mortale.

2. Item, Sapientiae primo²: Os, quod mentitur, occidit animam; quod verbum tractans Augustinus dicit in libro de Conflictu vitiorum et virtutum: « Nec officioso mendacio nec simplici verbo oportet quemquam decipere, quia, quomodolibet mentiatur quis, occidit animam »; sed non occiditur aliquis nisi per mortale peccatum: ergo quomodocumque mentiatur quis, peccat mortaliter.

3. Item, super illud³: Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium; ibi Glossa: « Si quis non vult hominem ad mortem prodere, verum taceat, sed non falsum dicat, ne pro corpore alterius animam suam occidat »; sed nullum mendacium est levius peccatum quam mendacium officiosum: ergo si illud occidit animam, et omne aliud. Cum ergo anima non occidatur nisi per mortale peccatum, videtur etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione. Omne quod est contrarium veritati et eius peremptorium⁴, est peccatum mortale; sed omne mendacium repugnat veritati, sicut fornicatio castitati: ergo sicut fornicatio est peccatum mortale de ratione sui generis, ita et mendacium.

5. Item, « omnis qui facit contra conscientiam, aedificat ad gehennam⁵ »; sed omnis mentiens contra conscientiam loquitur, quia dicit falsum cum intentione fallendi: ergo proferens mendacium aedificat ad gehennam; sed non dicitur homo aedificare ad gehennam nisi per peccatum mortale: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne peccatum, in quo est plenus consensus, et quod fit ex certa scientia, est peccatum mortale, quia in peccato, in quo est plenus consensus, superior portio rationis manducat⁶; peccatum autem, quod est ex certa scientia, est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quod est gravissimum: cum ergo omne mendacium de ratione sui generis sit peccatum ex certa scientia, et in quo est plenus consensus; videtur, quod omne mendacium sit peccatum mortale.

Sed contra: 1. Primo Glossa super primum Exodi⁷: « Infirmis mentiri conceditur »; sed nullum mortale alicui conceditur: ergo mendacium non est mortale peccatum.

2. Item, Gregorius⁸ loquens de mendacio obstetricum dicit: « Hoc peccati genus facile credimus relaxari »; sed peccatum, quod facile relaxatur, est in genere venialis: ergo etc.

3. Item, nihil est peccatum mortale, nisi ubi libido intervenit, vel contemptus⁹; sed mendacium officiosum de sua ratione non dicit libidinem nec contemptum: ergo non videtur, quod sit mortale peccatum.

4. Item, cum quis iocat¹⁰ cum proximo suo dicendo ei fabulam, non facit contra aliquam prohibitionem: ergo non videtur, quod peccet mortaliter; sed mentitur mendacio iocoso: ergo non omne mendacium est peccatum mortale.

Conclusio.

Non omne mendacium est peccatum mortale, sed de ratione sui generis indifferens est et ad mortale et ad veniale.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio non omne mendacium est peccatum mortale, immo quantum est de ratione sui generis, indifferens est et ad mortale et ad veniale. — Et ratio huius est: quia lingua posita est in lubrico¹¹, et facilius est loqui quam tacere; ideo non semper ponderatur actus linguae nec ponderari potest faciliter. Propter quod dicitur Iacobi tertio¹²: Qui non offendit in verbo, hic perfectus est vir; propter quod etiam peccatum mendacii non est generaliter mortale. — Sed mortale fit ratione materiae circa quam et ratione contemptus et ratione nocumenti et etiam ratione libidinis mentiendi, quae faciunt, mendacium esse perniciosum et mortale peccatum; et quia haec non semper concurrunt ad esse mendacii: ideo potest esse aliquando veniale, aliquando mortale, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem adductae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Psalmi, quod omnes perduntur, qui loquuntur mendacium; dicendum, quod, sicut Glossa¹³ exponit, non intelligitur hoc dictum de mendacio generaliter, sed secundum differentiam mendacii perniciosi; unde distributio illa non refertur ad ipsum mendacium, sed ad personas mentientes illo genere mendacii. Ideo et in processu illo est fallacia figurae dictionis propter commutationem suppositionis eius quod dico mendacium, quia fit processus a determinata ad confusam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Sapientiae, dici potest, quod similiter auctoritas illa non intelligitur de quolibet mendacio, sed de mendacio pernicioso. — Et si obiiciat, quod Augustinus exponit, quod quocumque modo mentitur quis, occidit animam; dicendum, quod nec ibi intendit Augustinus distribuere pro omnibus differentiis mendacii; sed intelligens de mendacio pernicioso, quod est in doctrina religionis, dicit, quod nullo pacto, nullo fine potest quis mentiri, quin occidat animam; et illud melius potest colligi ex littera sequenti¹⁴.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo non debet mentiri pro salute alterius, ne animam suam occidat; potest dici, quod verbum illud solummodo ad perfectos se extendit, de quibus loquitur Augustinus in originali¹⁵, unde Glossa illa sumta est. — Posset etiam dici, quod verbum illud est dictum consultorie, quia homo non tenetur mentiri pro aliquo nec tenetur animam suam laedere pro salute alterius corporali. Quoniam ergo quodlibet mendacium, etsi non inducat mortem, quia tamen peccatum est, ad mortem disponit; ideo consulit, ut non mentiatur pro salute corporis alterius servanda. Et sic ex hoc non habetur, quod omne mendacium sit mortale peccatum, sed quod est mortale peccatum, vel praeparat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne mendacium est peremptorium virtutis veritatis; dicendum, quod virtus veritatis potius est voluntas dicendi verum, cum oportet et expedit, quam sit continua enuntiatio veri¹⁶. Quamvis autem prolatio ipsius mendacii repugnet actui dicendi verum, non tamen repugnat ipsi veritati, qua quis refugit mendacium perniciosum. — Nec est simile de fornicatione respectu castitatis, quoniam actus ille universaliter est prohibitus; non sic autem omnis differentia mendacii, et hoc est propter lubricum ipsius linguae. Unde quaedam sunt mendacia exteriora, quae non opponuntur ipsi virtuti-veritati, sicut peccata venialia, et sicut primi motus castitati. Quaedam vero opponuntur sicut pec-

cata mortalia; et ista prohibentur in quinto mandato, in quo dicit Magister¹⁷, mendacium et periurium prohiberi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui facit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam; dicendum, quod conscientia aliquid dictat refugiendum sicut contrarium iustitiae, aliquid sicut quod facit aliquo modo a iustitia declinare. Qui primo modo facit contra dictamen conscientiae peccat mortaliter propter contemptum intervenientem, et ille est qui aedificat ad gehennam. Qui vero secundo modo, non aedificat ad gehennam nec proprie dicitur facere contra conscientiam, sed praeter conscientiam¹⁸. Et primo modo sunt contra conscientiam mendacia perniciosa, secundo modo alia. Conscientia enim non dictat, omnia mendacia aequaliter esse vitanda, sed quaedam sicut mortalia, quaedam sicut venialia. Et si tu obiicias, quod omnis mentiens, quocumque genere mendacii mentiatur, semper dicit directe contrarium ei quod conscientia dictat; dicendum, quod conscientia dictat de aliquo, quod sit verum, et de aliquo, quod sit¹⁹ dicendum, vel eius contrarium. Et cum quis profert falsum scienter, etsi directe faciat contra conscientiam, quae dictat aliquid esse verum; non tamen facit contra conscientiam illam, quae dictat, aliquid non esse dicendum. Et quantum ad secundum dictamen conscientiae, quod dirigit in agendis, pensatur quantitas peccati, non quantum ad iudicium conscientiae, quod regit in cognoscendis²⁰.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in omni mendacio superior pars rationis comedit, et certa scientia concurrit; dicendum, quod, sicut in secundo libro²¹ fuit determinatum, manducatio superioris portionis facit peccatum mortale solum in his quorum actus sunt simpliciter et universaliter prohibiti, sicut in peccato carnis; hoc autem locum non habet in peccato mendacii. — Similiter non omne peccatum, quod fit ex certa scientia, est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, sed illud, in quo cum certa scientia concurrit ipsa malitia²². — Et si tu obiicias, quod omne mendacium impugnat veritatem agnitam, quae est una species peccati in Spiritum sanctum; dicendum, quod non qualiscumque veritatis impugnatio nec qualiscumque impugnatio est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, sed impugnatio veritatis secundum pietatem, et ulterius impugnatio, quae est cum quadam protervitate et mentis obfirmatione²³, quam non est in quolibet mendacio reperire. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod omne mendacium sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, nec etiam, quod universaliter sit mortale peccatum²⁴.

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Question III. Whether a lie is a mortal sin by reason of its kind.

Thirdly it is asked whether a lie is a mortal sin by reason of its kind. And that it is, it seems:

1. First, by that which is said in the Psalm¹: Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie; the Gloss: « To destroy is more than to hate »; but God hates no one except on account of mortal sin: therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 1²: The mouth that lieth killeth the soul; treating which word Augustine says in the book On the Conflict of the Vices and Virtues: « Neither by an officious lie nor by a simple word ought one to deceive anyone, because, in whatever way one lies, he kills the soul »; but no one is killed except by a mortal sin: therefore in whatever way one lies, he sins mortally.

3. Likewise, on that text³: Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie; there the Gloss: « If anyone does not wish to betray a man to death, let him keep silent the truth, but let him not utter a falsehood, lest for the body of another he kill his own soul »; but no lie is a lighter sin than an officious lie: therefore if that one kills the soul, so does every other. Since therefore the soul is not killed except by a mortal sin, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by reason. Everything that is contrary to truth and destructive of it⁴ is a mortal sin; but every lie is repugnant to truth, as fornication to chastity: therefore just as fornication is a mortal sin by reason of its kind, so too is a lie.

5. Likewise, « everyone who acts against conscience builds toward Gehenna⁵ »; but everyone who lies speaks against conscience, because he says what is false with the intention of deceiving: therefore one who utters a lie builds toward Gehenna; but a man is not said to build toward Gehenna except by mortal sin: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every sin in which there is full consent, and which is done from certain knowledge, is a mortal sin, because in a sin in which there is full consent, the higher portion of reason eats⁶; but a sin which is from certain knowledge is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is the gravest: since therefore every lie by reason of its kind is a sin from certain knowledge, and one in which there is full consent; it seems that every lie is a mortal sin.

On the contrary: 1. First, the Gloss on the first [chapter] of Exodus⁷: « To the weak it is granted to lie »; but no mortal [sin] is granted to anyone: therefore a lie is not a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, Gregory⁸, speaking of the lie of the midwives, says: « This kind of sin we readily believe to be remitted »; but a sin which is readily remitted is in the genus of the venial: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, nothing is a mortal sin except where lust intervenes, or contempt⁹; but an officious lie of its own account does not name lust nor contempt: therefore it does not seem that it is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, when someone jests¹⁰ with his neighbor by telling him a tale, he does not act against any prohibition: therefore it does not seem that he sins mortally; but he lies with a jesting lie: therefore not every lie is a mortal sin.

Conclusion.

Not every lie is a mortal sin, but by reason of its kind it is indifferent both to the mortal and to the venial.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt not every lie is a mortal sin; nay, as regards what is by reason of its kind, it is indifferent both to the mortal and to the venial. — And the reason for this is: because the tongue is set on a slippery place¹¹, and it is easier to speak than to be silent; therefore the act of the tongue is not always weighed, nor can it easily be weighed. On account of which it is said in James 3¹²: He that offendeth not in word, this man is a perfect man; on account of which also the sin of a lie is not generally mortal. — But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter about which and by reason of contempt and by reason of harm and also by reason of the lust of lying, which make a lie to be pernicious and a mortal sin; and because these do not always concur to the being of a lie: therefore it can be sometimes venial, sometimes mortal, as the reasons brought forward to this side show.

1. To that indeed which is objected from the authority of the Psalm, that all are destroyed who speak a lie; it must be said that, as the Gloss¹³ explains, this is not understood as said of a lie generally, but according to the difference of the pernicious lie; whence that distribution is not referred to the lie itself, but to the persons who lie with that kind of lie. And so in that process there is the fallacy of figure of speech on account of the change of the supposition of that which I call lie, because a process is made from the determinate to the confused.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Wisdom, it can be said that likewise that authority is not understood of every lie, but of the pernicious lie. — And if it be objected that Augustine explains that in whatever way one lies, he kills the soul; it must be said that not even there does Augustine intend to distribute over all the differences of a lie; but understanding it of the pernicious lie, which is in the teaching of religion, he says that by no means, by no end, can one lie without killing the soul; and that can better be gathered from the text that follows¹⁴.

3. To that which is objected, that a man ought not to lie for the salvation of another, lest he kill his own soul; it can be said that that word extends only to the perfect, of whom Augustine speaks in the original¹⁵, whence that Gloss is taken. — It could also be said that that word is said by way of counsel, because a man is not bound to lie for anyone, nor is he bound to harm his own soul for the bodily welfare of another. Since therefore any lie whatever, even if it does not induce death, because nevertheless it is a sin, disposes toward death; therefore he counsels that one not lie for the preserving of the bodily welfare of another. And so from this it is not had that every lie is a mortal sin, but that it is a mortal sin, or prepares [for it].

4. To that which is objected, that every lie is destructive of the virtue of truth; it must be said that the virtue of truth is rather the will of speaking the truth, when it is fitting and expedient, than that it is a continual enunciation of the true¹⁶. But although the uttering of the lie itself is repugnant to the act of speaking the truth, nevertheless it is not repugnant to truth itself, by which one shuns the pernicious lie. — Nor is it similar concerning fornication with respect to chastity, since that act is universally prohibited; but not so every difference of a lie, and this is on account of the slipperiness of the tongue itself. Whence there are certain exterior lies which are not opposed to the virtue-of-truth itself, like venial sins, and like the first motions to chastity. But certain ones are opposed like mor-

tal sins; and these are prohibited in the fifth commandment, in which the Master says¹⁷ that lying and perjury are prohibited.

5. To that which is objected, that he who acts against conscience builds toward Gehenna; it must be said that conscience dictates that something be shunned as contrary to justice, and something as that which makes [one] in some way turn aside from justice. He who in the first way acts against the dictate of conscience sins mortally on account of the intervening contempt, and he is the one who builds toward Gehenna. But he who [acts] in the second way does not build toward Gehenna nor is he properly said to act against conscience, but beside conscience¹⁸. And in the first way pernicious lies are against conscience, in the second way the others. For conscience does not dictate that all lies are equally to be avoided, but some as mortal, some as venial. And if thou object that everyone who lies, with whatever kind of lie he lies, always says directly the contrary of that which conscience dictates; it must be said that conscience dictates concerning something that it is true, and concerning something that it is¹⁹ to be said, or the contrary of it. And when someone utters what is false knowingly, although he acts directly against the conscience which dictates that something is true, nevertheless he does not act against that conscience which dictates that something is not to be said. And as regards the second dictate of conscience, which directs in things to be done, the magnitude of the sin is weighed, not as regards the judgment of conscience, which governs in things to be known²⁰.

6. To that which is objected, that in every lie the higher part of reason eats, and certain knowledge concurs; it must be said that, as was determined in the second book²¹, the eating of the higher portion makes a mortal sin only in those whose acts are simply and universally prohibited, as in the sin of the flesh; but this has no place in the sin of a lie. — Likewise not every sin which is done from certain knowledge is a sin against the Holy Spirit, but that in which malice itself concurs together with certain knowledge²². — And if thou object that every lie impugns the truth that is recognized, which is one species of the sin against the Holy Spirit; it must be said that not any kind of impugning of truth nor any kind of impugning is the sin against the Holy Spirit, but the impugning of truth according to piety, and further an impugning which is with a certain insolence and obstinacy of mind²³, which is not to be found in every lie. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that every lie is a sin against the Holy Spirit, nor even that it is universally a mortal sin²⁴.

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