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Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio IV. Utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum omne mendacium sit mortale viris perfectis. Et quod sic, videtur.

Argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Primo super illud Psalmi1: Perdes omnes etc.; Glossa: «Perfectis omnino mentiri non convenit»; sed hoc non dicit, nisi quia alterius generis peccatum est perfectis et imperfectis — quod enim omnino non licet indicatur esse mortale — ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus de Mendacio2: «Quomodo, inquit, diligit proximum tanquam se ipsum, cui ut praestet temporalem vitam, perdit aeternam»? loquitur de perfectis: ergo videtur, quod pro mendacio officioso perdat perfectus aeternam vitam: igitur peccat mortaliter.

3. Item, Augustinus tractans illud Proverbiorum vigesimo nono3, secundum translationem Septuaginta: Verbum suscipiens filius a perditione longe aberit, et nihil falsi ex ore eius procedit; hoc exponens Augustinus dicit sic: «Filius suscipiens per gratiam Verbum aeternum tam clausum sibi deputat ad subveniendum homini per mendacium, quam si per stuprum transire cogatur». Si ergo per stuprum transire peccatum est mortale, videtur, quod filiis supernae Ierusalem mentiri propter salutem alicuius sit mortale peccatum.

4. Item, nulli credendum est, si viris perfectis non creditur; sed si viri perfecti mentirentur, eis

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non esset credendum: si autem nulli creditur, perit fides in terra: ergo mendacium perfectorum fidem tollit et evacuat, per quam reguntur homines et regna. Si igitur talis fides auferri non potest sine mortali culpa, videtur, quod viri perfecti in qualibet specie mendacii incurrant reatum mortalis peccati4.

Sed contra:

1. Circumstantia non aggravat peccatum in infinitum: si ergo status perfectionis est circumstantia ex parte personae, non aggravabit peccatum in infinitum. Sed mortale excedit veniale in infinitum5: ergo quod est veniale imperfecto non est mortale perfecto.

2. Item, non mentiri omni genere mendacii aut est consilium, aut est praeceptum. Si praeceptum: ergo cum ad praeceptum omnes obligentur, omnes qui mentiuntur, peccant mortaliter, quod supra6 improbatum est. Si consilium; sed ad consilia nemo tenetur nisi ex voto: ergo cum viri perfecti illud non voverint, videtur, quod nec mortaliter peccent in quolibet genere mendacii.

3. Item, si mendacium generaliter repugnat caritati perfectae, aut ergo in quantum est caritas, aut in quantum est perfecta. Si in quantum est caritas: ergo cuilibet caritati: ergo quilibet peccaret mortaliter. Si in quantum perfecta: ergo videtur, quod per mendacium non cadat vir perfectus a caritate, sed solum a perfectione: igitur non peccat mortaliter per quodcumque mendacium.

4. Item, vir perfectus in verbo otioso, in motu irae et in motibus carnis et in aliis, quae sunt venialia de ratione sui generis, non dicitur peccare mortaliter: ergo pari ratione nec in mendacio iocoso et officioso, cum de ratione sui generis sint venialia.

Conclusio.

Potest probabiliter concedi secundum Augustinum, quod viris perfectis, quorum perfectio publica est, quantumcumque parvum mendacium imputetur in peccatum mortale.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est7 triplex modus dicendi.

Opinio 1. Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod mendacia illa, quae sunt venialia imperfectis, sunt etiam venialia perfectis viris; sed tamen, quia perfecti minorem habent pronitatem ad mendacium quam imperfecti, hinc est, quod gravius peccant. Unde Augustinus non vult ostendere, ut dicunt, quod omne mendacium sit mortale peccatum perfectis, sed8 cum nullum mendacium possit bene fieri, magis tamen indecens est et inconveniens circa perfectos quam circa imperfectos, non quia ipse perfectus propter quodcumque peccatum animam suam occidat et mereatur ire in perditionem, sed quia ex hoc ipso, dum minus adhaeret veritati, approximat iniquitati et disponit se ad lapsum et praecipitium.

Opponitur. Sed quoniam verba Augustini expresse videntur praetendere, quod periculosum sit viris perfectis mentiri — dicitur enim in Glossa super illud9: Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium; quod «perfectis non convenit mentiri, nec etiam pro temporali vita alicuius servanda»; et post subdit, quod «perfectus falsum non dicat, ne pro vita alterius animam suam occidat»; et sic videtur expresse dicere, quod mendacium officiosum sit viris perfectis mortale — Opinio 2. ideo videtur aliter aliis esse dicendum, quod est perfectio voti sive religionis, et perfectio caritatis, per quam perfecte adhaeret homo summae Veritati et Bonitati per intellectum et affectum, prout possibile est in via; et ista dicitur perfectio tranquillitatis10. De primis perfectis non intelligit Augustinus, sed de secundis. Illi enim perfecti, pro eo quod maxime adhaerent summae Veritati, non habent pronitatem ad mentiendum; et ideo, cum mentiuntur, non excusantur, sed intervenit veritatis contemptus, et est eis qualecumque mendacium deliberative dictum mortale peccatum. Exemplum. Et ponitur exemplum de homine primo, qui in statu innocentiae propter tranquillitatem, quam habebat, non poterat peccare venialiter, quia nulla erat in ipso pronitas infirmitatis ipsum excusans, ut in peccato suo diceretur esse dignus venia vel temporali poena11. — Improbatur multipliciter. Sed illud adhuc calumniabile est, quia paucissimos aut nullos est reperire in ista caritatis perfectione. Praeterea, quantumcumque sit aliquis perfectus perfectione tranquillitatis, si dicat aliquod verbum otiosum, non peccat mortaliter. Et iterum, quanto homo est maioris perfectionis in vita praesenti, tanto maioris est pietatis; et quanto maioris pietatis, tanto pronior est ad subveniendum alienae saluti. Quando ergo vir perfectus videt, quod potest subvenire alienae saluti corporali vel spirituali per falsitatem verbi sui; videtur, quod non modicum12 debeat inclinari ex ipsa pietate et dulcedine, sicut videmus, quod magis pronus est pater ad mentiendum pro salute

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filii quam pro salute unius extranei. Esto etiam, quod nulla sit pronitas; cum mendacium iocosum et officiosum non sit prohibitum, si aliquis ad hoc non astrinxerit13 se per votum; quantumcumque sit perfectus, non videtur, quod incurrat mortale peccatum.

Opinio 3. Et propterea adhuc est tertius modus dicendi, quod ad aliquid obligatur homo specialiter praeter alios Rationes obligandi: vel ratione voti emissi, vel ratione officii commissi, vel ratione scandali imminentis14, vel ratione conscientiae dictantis. Si ergo dicamus, viros perfectos obligari ad non mentiendum aliquo genere peccati; cum hoc non sit ex praecepto nec ex officio commisso nec ex voto, Axioma: erit hoc propter scandalum et conscientiae vinculum. — Perfecti publici et occulti. Propter quod nota, quod quidam sunt perfecti publici, quidam sunt perfecti occulti. Viris publice perfectis adhibetur fides tanquam conservatoribus veritatis. Et quia mendacium deprehensum facit, ut homo alteri non credat; si viri perfecti mentirentur, iam nec ipsis crederetur nec aliquibus, et magnum ipsi veritati fieret praeiudicium, et daretur aliis occasio scandalizandi15. Et ideo tales viri perfecti debent habere conscientiam, quod pro nulla re dicant falsum scienter; quando ergo dicunt, peccant mortaliter, tum quia faciunt contra conscientiae dictamen, tum etiam quia alios scandalizant active. — Non sic autem homines scandalizantur de his qui sunt imperfecti, vel etiam de perfectis occultis; ideo tales non sic obligantur ad omne mendacium vitandum. Exemplum. Et est exemplum huius: quia, si quis impugnaret fidem, licitum esset imperfectis fugere et latere; sed viri perfecti tenentur stare et libere confiteri, ne per ipsorum fugam et latitationem populus infirmus cadat a fide; unde conscientia debet eis hoc rationabiliter dictare.

Conclusio. Potest igitur concedi secundum Augustinum, quod viris perfectis, quorum perfectio publica est, mendacium quantumcumque parvum imputatur in mortale peccatum, quoniam propter scandalum vitandum dictare debet eis conscientia, nullatenus esse mentiendum, ne faciant veritatem venire in contemptum. Et hoc videtur sensisse Augustinus16, qui fuit praecipuus veritatis amator; et omnis vir, qui veritatem amat, vehementer odit mendacium. Unde dicitur in Ecclesiastico17: Potior est fur quam assiduitas viri mendacis. — Unde et auctoritates et rationes ad hanc partem inductae concedendae sunt.

Solutio oppositorum:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod circumstantia personae non aggravat peccatum in infinitum; dicendum, quod illud est verum, quantum est de se; Notandum. sed ubi aliqua circumstantia introducit scandalum alienum et conscientiae vinculum, per consequens mutat peccati genus et facit esse mortale, quod alias esset veniale. Vinculum enim conscientiae etiam in indifferentibus facit alios peccare mortaliter, quanto magis in his quae dictat rationabiliter18?

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non mentiri omni genere mendacii aut est consilium, aut est praeceptum etc.; dicendum, quod quantum ad quaedam genera mendacii prohibitum est, quantum ad aliqua non est proprie prohibitum, sed cohibitum. Notandum. Venialia enim non dicuntur prohibita, sed cohibita19. Sed quae ex divino praecepto non sunt omnino prohibita — quia praeceptum respicit omnes — ex conscientiae vinculo et scandalo, quod respicit speciales personas, efficiuntur prohibita. Et sic intelligendum est se habere in parte ista.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mendacium aut repugnat caritati simpliciter, aut caritati perfectae; dicendum, quod mendacium repugnat utrique. Repugnat enim caritati ratione perfectionis superadditae, quoniam ipsa perfectio viri iusti aliis manifesta20 introducit occasionaliter scandalum et conscientiae vinculum, et per consequens peccatum, quod non tantum tollit perfectionem, sed etiam ipsam caritatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vir perfectus non peccat in verbo otioso nec in primis motibus, sicut nec alius imperfectus; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia ex aliis venialibus peccatis non ita oritur scandalum, nec ita veritas venit in contemptum, sicut de mendacio, si reperiatur circa virum perfectum, secundum quod superius est explanatum.

Restrictio conclusionis. Haec autem sunt dicta de mendacio, secundum quod verba beati Augustini praetendunt, qui propter magnum veritatis zelum maxime detestatus est mendacium21, et cum non posset mendacium ab omnibus excludere, saltem a viris perfectis voluit elongare, ut veritas in aliquibus inveniret solidam sedem. Explicatio verborum August. Et propterea, si quis velit intelligere, quod mendacium, quod est aliis veniale, non sit viris perfectis mortale; poterit ad verba Augustini respondere, intelligendo per ea, mendacium semper esse indecens et malum viris perfectis, qui22 mentiendo disponunt se et alios ad malum; non autem quod semper sit eis mortale peccatum. Et per hoc declinari possunt omnes rationes adductae ad oppositum. — Notandum. Quidquid autem horum verum sit, viro tamen, qui perfectionem profitetur, summopere cavendum est omne mendacium.

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Scholion

I. Quaestio haec est de mendacio officioso vel iocoso, sive de eo quod per se est veniale; sed talia mendacia ratione scandali vel alius circumstantiae annexae fieri possunt mortalia. Secundam opinionem hic relatam sequitur Alex. Hal. Communiter autem cum S. Thoma (hic a. 4. ad 4; S. II. II. q. 110. a. 4. ad 5.) et Scoto (hic q. unica n. 8. 9.) improbantur duae primae opiniones, immo etiam positio in tertia opinione a nostro auctore allata, quod «publice perfectis», quibus quasi incumbit onus veritatis in societate humana conservandae, omne mendacium sit mortale. Hoc enim S. Thom. ita restringit, ut iidem ad hoc non teneantur sub mortali nisi «ex officio in iudicio, vel doctrina». Revera autem ab his non dissentit S. Bonav., licet referat ex S. Augustino istum modum loquendi; quod satis manifestat additamentum conclusionem restringens (post solutionem oppositorum). Cfr. etiam supra d. 30. q. 3.

De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. II. q. 123. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Durand., hic q. 2.

II. In seq. (5.) quaest. S. Augustini et Magistri distinctio trium mendacii specierum (hic c. 1.) et etiam octo generum (c. 2.) communiter est recepta. — Quoad mendacium iocosum S. Bonav. (hic ad 4. et infra q. 6. ad 5.) assentit S. Thomae (S. loc. cit. a. 3. ad 6.), qui in solutione eiusdem obiectionis dicit: «Mendacium iocosum ex ipso genere operis habet rationem fallendi, quamvis ex intentione dicentis non dicatur ad fallendum nec fallat ex modo dicendi. Nec est simile de hyperbolicis, aut quibuscumque figuratis locutionibus, quae in s. Scriptura inveniuntur» etc. Scot. autem (loc. cit. n. 8.) vult, quod «mendacium iocosum est, quando aliquis iocando intendit decipere, ita quod deceptus vere decipitur, non tamen in aliquo, in quo sibi nocumentum magnum inferatur; in quo etiam iocantur illi qui sciunt, ipsum decipi». Econtra dicit: «Iocosum non est narrare fabulam, de qua omnes audientes sciunt, quod non est verum, nec narratur tanquam verum; ubi nec audiens decipitur, nec loquens intendit decipere, nec sermo est de se deceptivus, quia non est talis, qui sit natus credi ab audientibus». Tamen in re ipsa vix videtur esse differentia, ut patet ex dictis supra q. 2. ad 2.

De eadem (5.) quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 7, ubi etiam de seq. aliisque qq. fit sermo. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2.

III. In ultima (6.) quaestione ostenditur, gradus culpae, quos ex S. Augustino refert Magister (hic c. 2.), convenienter esse distinctos. Consentiunt: S. Thom., hic a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether every lie is mortal for perfect men.

Fourthly it is asked whether every lie is mortal for perfect men. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

Arguments for the affirmative side:

1. First, upon that text of the Psalm1: Thou wilt destroy all etc.; the Gloss: «It is altogether unbecoming for the perfect to lie»; but it says this only because it is a sin of another kind for the perfect and for the imperfect — for what is altogether not permitted is indicated to be mortal — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, On Lying2: «How, he says, does he love his neighbor as himself, who, that he may grant him temporal life, loses eternal life»? he speaks of the perfect: therefore it seems that for an officious lie the perfect man loses eternal life: therefore he sins mortally.

3. Likewise, Augustine, treating that passage of Proverbs the twenty-ninth3, according to the translation of the Septuagint: A son receiving the word shall be far from perdition, and nothing false proceeds from his mouth; Augustine, expounding this, speaks thus: «A son receiving the eternal Word through grace reckons it as much closed off to him to help a man through a lie as if he were compelled to pass through fornication». If, then, to pass through fornication is a mortal sin, it seems that for the sons of the heavenly Jerusalem to lie for the safety of someone is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, no one is to be believed, if perfect men are not believed; but if perfect men were to lie, they

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would not be believable: but if no one is believed, faith perishes from the earth: therefore the lying of the perfect destroys and empties out the faith by which men and kingdoms are governed. If, then, such faith cannot be taken away without mortal fault, it seems that perfect men in any kind of lie whatsoever incur the guilt of mortal sin4.

On the contrary:

1. A circumstance does not aggravate a sin infinitely: if, then, the state of perfection is a circumstance on the part of the person, it will not aggravate the sin infinitely. But the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely5: therefore what is venial for the imperfect is not mortal for the perfect.

2. Likewise, not to lie by every kind of lie is either a counsel or a precept. If a precept: then since all are bound to a precept, all who lie sin mortally, which above6 was disproved. If a counsel; but to counsels no one is bound except by a vow: therefore since perfect men have not vowed this, it seems that they do not sin mortally even in any kind of lie whatsoever.

3. Likewise, if a lie repugns perfect charity generally, then either inasmuch as it is charity, or inasmuch as it is perfect. If inasmuch as it is charity: then for any charity whatsoever: then anyone would sin mortally. If inasmuch as it is perfect: then it seems that through a lie the perfect man does not fall from charity, but only from perfection: therefore he does not sin mortally through any lie whatsoever.

4. Likewise, the perfect man in an idle word, in a motion of anger, and in the motions of the flesh, and in other things which are venial by reason of their kind, is not said to sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning neither in a jocose and officious lie, since by reason of their kind they are venial.

Conclusion.

It can probably be conceded, according to Augustine, that to perfect men, whose perfection is public, a lie however small is imputed unto mortal sin.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there is7 a threefold manner of speaking.

Opinion 1. For some have wished to say that those lies which are venial for the imperfect are also venial for perfect men; yet nevertheless, because the perfect have less proneness to lying than the imperfect, hence it is that they sin more gravely. Hence Augustine does not wish to show, as they say, that every lie is mortal sin for the perfect, but8 since no lie can be done well, it is nevertheless more unbecoming and unfitting concerning the perfect than concerning the imperfect, not because the perfect man for any sin whatsoever slays his own soul and merits to go into perdition, but because by this very fact, while he adheres less to truth, he approaches iniquity and disposes himself to fall and ruin.

An objection is raised. But since the words of Augustine seem expressly to put forward that it is perilous for perfect men to lie — for it is said in the Gloss upon that text9: Thou wilt destroy all who speak a lie; that «it is not becoming for the perfect to lie, not even for the temporal life of someone to be preserved»; and afterward it adds that «the perfect man should not speak a falsehood, lest for the life of another he slay his own soul»; and thus it seems expressly to say that an officious lie is mortal for perfect men — Opinion 2. therefore it seems that the matter must be put otherwise by others, namely that there is a perfection of vow or of religion, and a perfection of charity, by which a man perfectly adheres to the supreme Truth and Goodness through intellect and affection, as far as is possible in this life; and this is called the perfection of tranquillity10. Of the first perfect Augustine does not understand [it], but of the second. For those perfect, by reason that they adhere most to the supreme Truth, do not have a proneness to lying; and therefore, when they lie, they are not excused, but there intervenes a contempt of truth, and any lie whatsoever deliberately spoken is for them mortal sin. An example. And the example is given of the first man, who in the state of innocence, on account of the tranquillity which he had, could not sin venially, because there was in him no proneness of infirmity excusing him, so that in his sin he might be said to be worthy of pardon or of temporal punishment11. — It is disproved on many counts. But this is still open to objection, because very few or none are to be found in this perfection of charity. Furthermore, however perfect someone may be with the perfection of tranquillity, if he speaks some idle word, he does not sin mortally. And again, the more a man is of greater perfection in the present life, the more he is of greater piety; and the more of greater piety, the more prone he is to helping another's safety. When, therefore, the perfect man sees that he can help another's bodily or spiritual safety through the falsehood of his word; it seems that he should not a little12 be inclined by piety itself and sweetness, just as we see that a father is more prone to lying for the safety

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of his son than for the safety of one stranger. Granted even that there be no proneness; since a jocose and officious lie is not prohibited, if someone has not bound himself13 to this by a vow; however perfect he may be, it does not seem that he incurs mortal sin.

Opinion 3. And therefore there is still a third manner of speaking, namely that a man is bound to something specially beyond others (grounds of obligating): either by reason of a vow taken, or by reason of an office committed [to him], or by reason of imminent scandal14, or by reason of conscience dictating. If, then, we say that perfect men are bound to not lying by any kind of sin; since this is not from a precept nor from an office committed nor from a vow, (an axiom) this will be on account of scandal and the bond of conscience. — (the perfect public and hidden). On account of which note that some are perfect public, some are perfect hidden. To publicly perfect men faith is granted as to preservers of truth. And because a lie detected makes a man not believe another; if perfect men were to lie, then neither would they themselves be believed nor any others, and great prejudice would be done to truth itself, and occasion of scandalizing15 would be given to others. And therefore such perfect men ought to have a conscience such that for nothing should they knowingly speak a falsehood; when therefore they speak [it], they sin mortally, both because they act against the dictate of conscience, and also because they actively scandalize others. — Not so, however, are men scandalized about those who are imperfect, or even about the hidden perfect; therefore such are not bound in the same way to avoiding every lie. An example. And there is an example of this: that, if someone were to assail the faith, it would be lawful for the imperfect to flee and hide; but perfect men are bound to stand and freely confess, lest by their flight and concealment the weak people fall from the faith; whence conscience ought reasonably to dictate this to them.

Conclusion. It can therefore be conceded, according to Augustine, that to perfect men, whose perfection is public, a lie however small is imputed unto mortal sin, since on account of scandal to be avoided their conscience ought to dictate to them that in no way is there to be lying, lest they make truth come into contempt. And this Augustine16 seems to have held, who was a chief lover of truth; and every man who loves truth vehemently hates a lie. Whence it is said in Ecclesiasticus17: Better is a thief than the constancy of a lying man. — Whence also the authorities and reasons brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposed [arguments]:

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that a circumstance of the person does not aggravate a sin infinitely; it must be said that that is true, as far as it is in itself; (to be noted) but where some circumstance introduces another's scandal and a bond of conscience, consequently it changes the kind of sin and makes that to be mortal which otherwise would be venial. For the bond of conscience even in indifferent matters makes others sin mortally, how much more in those things which it reasonably dictates18?

2. To that which is objected, that not to lie by every kind of lie is either a counsel or a precept etc.; it must be said that as to certain kinds of lie it is prohibited, as to certain others it is not properly prohibited, but restrained. (to be noted) For venial sins are not called prohibited, but restrained19. But those which by divine precept are not altogether prohibited — because a precept regards all — by the bond of conscience and by scandal, which regards special persons, are made prohibited. And thus it must be understood to hold in this part.

3. To that which is objected, that a lie either repugns charity simply, or perfect charity; it must be said that a lie repugns both. For it repugns charity by reason of the superadded perfection, since the very perfection of the just man, manifest20 to others, introduces occasionally scandal and a bond of conscience, and consequently sin, which not only takes away perfection, but also charity itself.

4. To that which is objected, that the perfect man does not sin in an idle word nor in first motions, just as neither does another imperfect man; it must be said that it is not alike: because from other venial sins there does not so arise scandal, nor does truth so come into contempt, as in the case of a lie, if it be found about a perfect man, according to what was explained above.

Restriction of the conclusion. These things, however, have been said about lying according as the words of blessed Augustine put forward, who on account of his great zeal for truth most greatly detested a lie21, and since he could not exclude lying from all, [wished] at least to remove it far from perfect men, so that truth might find a solid seat in some. Explanation of Augustine's words. And therefore, if someone wishes to understand that a lie which is venial to others is not mortal for perfect men; he will be able to answer to the words of Augustine, understanding by them that a lie is always unbecoming and evil for perfect men, who22 by lying dispose themselves and others to evil; but not that it is always mortal sin for them. And by this all the reasons brought forward for the opposite can be set aside. — (to be noted). Whatever of these be true, nevertheless for a man who professes perfection, every lie is to be most exceedingly avoided.

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Scholion

I. This question is about the officious or jocose lie, that is, about that which is venial of itself; but such lies, by reason of scandal or of another annexed circumstance, can become mortal. The second opinion here related is followed by Alexander of Hales. But commonly, with St. Thomas (here a. 4 ad 4; Summa II–II q. 110 a. 4 ad 5) and Scotus (here q. unica n. 8, 9), the first two opinions are disproved, and indeed also the position laid down in the third opinion by our author, namely that for «the publicly perfect», upon whom as it were lies the burden of preserving truth in human society, every lie is mortal. For St. Thomas so restricts this, that the same are not bound to it under mortal [sin] except «from office, in judgment, or [in] teaching». But in truth St. Bonaventure does not dissent from these, although he reports from St. Augustine that manner of speaking; which the addition restricting the conclusion (after the solution of the opposed [arguments]) sufficiently manifests. Cf. also above d. 30 q. 3.

On this question, besides those praised: Alex. of Hales, Sum. p. II q. 123 m. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 6 quaestiunc. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here circa lit.; Durandus, here q. 2.

II. In the following (5th) question the distinction of St. Augustine and the Master, of the three species of lying (here c. 1) and also of the eight kinds (c. 2), is commonly received. — As to the jocose lie, St. Bonaventure (here ad 4 and below q. 6 ad 5) agrees with St. Thomas (S. loc. cit. a. 3 ad 6), who in the solution of the same objection says: «A jocose lie has, from the very kind of the work, the character of deceiving, although from the intention of the speaker it is not said [to be] for deceiving nor does it deceive by the manner of speaking. Nor is it like in the case of hyperbolic, or any figurative locutions whatsoever, which are found in sacred Scripture» etc. But Scotus (loc. cit. n. 8) holds that «a jocose lie is when someone, joking, intends to deceive, in such a way that the one deceived is truly deceived, yet not in anything in which great harm is inflicted on him; in which also those who know that he is being deceived join in the joke». On the contrary he says: «It is not jocose to tell a story about which all the hearers know that it is not true, nor is it told as true; where neither is the hearer deceived, nor does the speaker intend to deceive, nor is the speech of itself deceptive, because it is not of such a kind as is fit to be believed by the hearers». Yet in the matter itself there scarcely seems to be a difference, as is plain from what was said above q. 2 ad 2.

On the same (5th) question, besides the places cited: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 7, where also concerning the following and other questions there is discussion. — S. Thom., here a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 3, 6. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 2.

III. In the last (6th) question it is shown that the degrees of fault, which the Master reports from St. Augustine (here c. 2), are fittingly distinguished. They agree: S. Thom., here a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Psalm. 5, 7. — Glossa, quae est secundum August. in hunc locum, exhibetur a Strabo et Lyrano ut ordinaria. — Codd. omittunt Glossa.
    Ps. 5:7. — The Gloss, which is according to Augustine on this passage, is given by Strabo and by Lyra as the ordinary [gloss]. — The codices omit Gloss.
  2. Cap. 6. n. 9, ubi textus originalis pro perdit aeternam substituit ipse amittit aeternam. — Inferius pro pro mendacio officioso cod. F per mendacium officiosum.
    [Augustine, On Lying] c. 6 n. 9, where the original text, instead of loses eternal [life], substitutes he himself forfeits eternal. — Below, for for an officious lie, cod. F [reads] through an officious lie.
  3. Vers. 27; iuxta Vulgatam: Verbum custodiens filius extra perditionem erit. Verba August. habentur in lib. contra Mendacium, c. 20. n. 40, in quibus pro subveniendum multi codd. cum edd. superveniendum. — Pro fine arg. notentur ea quae proferuntur ab August., contra Mendacium, c. 16. n. 33: Sed nos cum quaerimus, sitne boni hominis aliquando mentiri, non de homine quaerimus adhuc ad Aegyptum, vel ad Iericho, vel ad Babyloniam pertinente, vel adhuc ad ipsam Ierusalem terrenam, quae servit cum filiis suis, sed de cive illius civitatis, quae sursum est libera mater nostra [Gal. 4, 25. seq.] aeterna in caelis. Et respondetur quaerentibus nobis: Omne mendacium non est ex veritate [I. Ioan. 2, 21.]. Filii autem illius civitatis, illi sunt utique veritatis etc.
    Verse 27; according to the Vulgate: A son keeping the word shall be outside perdition. The words of Augustine are had in the book Against Lying, c. 20 n. 40, in which, for to help, many codices with the editions [read] to come upon [in aid]. — For the end of the argument let there be noted those things which are brought forward by Augustine, Against Lying, c. 16 n. 33: But we, when we ask whether it ever belongs to a good man to lie, do not ask about a man still pertaining to Egypt, or to Jericho, or to Babylon, or still to the earthly Jerusalem itself, which serves with her children, but about a citizen of that city which is above, our free mother [Gal. 4:25 ff.], eternal in the heavens. And it is answered to us asking: Every lie is not of the truth [1 John 2:21]. But the children of that city, they assuredly are [children] of the truth etc.
  4. Vide supra q. 2. fundam. 2. sententiam August., in qua hoc arg. fundatur.
    See above q. 2, fundamentum 2, the saying of Augustine, on which this argument is founded.
  5. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — In initio arg. post Circumstantia Vat. addit personae.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 42 a. 2 q. 1 ff. — At the beginning of the argument, after A circumstance, the Vatican edition adds of the person.
  6. Quaest. praeced. — Inferius pro voverint plures codd. voverunt, et subinde post peccent cod. A addit mentiendo.
    The preceding question. — Below, for have vowed, several codices [read] vowed, and thereupon after sin cod. A adds by lying.
  7. Cod. X fuit.
    Cod. X [reads] was.
  8. Edd. cum uno alteroque cod. sed quod.
    The editions, with one and another codex, [read] but that.
  9. Psalm. 5, 7. Glossa est secundum August., in hunc locum.
    Ps. 5:7. The Gloss is according to Augustine, on this passage.
  10. Vide supra d. 30. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius pro Illi enim plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 Illi etiam, codd. O F illi autem.
    See above d. 30 q. 3 in the body. — A little below, for For those, very many codices with edd. 1, 2 [read] Those also, codd. O F but those.
  11. De quo vide II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 1.
    Concerning which see II Sent. d. 21 a. 3 q. 1.
  12. Ita codd. A B Q R S bb, alii codd. quod hoc modicum, edd. quod hoc mendacium. Mox post debeat cod. P supplet ipsum, et pro inclinari, quod est in cod. A, in aliis inclinare. Paulo inferius pro unius extranei cod. G alicuius extranei.
    Thus codd. A B Q R S bb; other codices [read] that this little, the editions that this lie. Soon after should cod. P supplies himself, and for be inclined, which is in cod. A, in others to incline. A little below, for of one stranger cod. G [reads] of some stranger.
  13. Plures codd. astrinxit; cod. R legit nisi aliquis ad hoc astrinxerit.
    Several codices [read] bound; cod. R reads unless someone has bound himself to this.
  14. Pro imminentis, quod habent codd. A H U Z, cod. bb vitandi, cod. X intervenientis, cod. Y multitudinis, alii vel imitantis vel mutantis vel invitantis, edd. olim: alias vitantis.
    For imminent, which codd. A H U Z have, cod. bb [reads] to be avoided, cod. X intervening, cod. Y of the multitude, others either imitating or changing or inviting, the editions formerly: otherwise avoiding.
  15. Cod. A et edd. scandali. Aliquanto superius pro nota cod. A notandum. Inferius pro quando ergo cod. T cum ergo.
    Cod. A and the editions [read] of scandal. Somewhat above, for note cod. A [reads] it must be noted. Below, for when therefore cod. T [reads] since therefore.
  16. Praecipue in lib. de Mendacio, et contra Mendacium, ex quibus etiam fundam. huius quaest. sumpta sunt. Cfr. etiam Enarrat. in Ps. 5. (7.) n. 7.
    Especially in the book On Lying, and Against Lying, from which also the foundations of this question are taken. Cf. also Enarrat. in Ps. 5 (7) n. 7.
  17. Cap. 20, 27.
    [Ecclesiasticus] c. 20:27.
  18. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. — Superius pro quod alias unus cod. A quod aliter.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 39 a. 1 q. 3. — Above, for which otherwise one cod. A [reads] which in another way.
  19. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 42 a. 2 q. 1 ad 2.
  20. Cod. A manifestat.
    Cod. A [reads] manifests.
  21. Vat., refragantibus codd. et ex parte edd. 1, 2, superflue adiungit: et conatus est illud ab omnibus excludere, saltem a viris perfectis.
    The Vatican edition, against the codices and in part the editions 1, 2, superfluously adds: and he endeavored to exclude it from all, at least from perfect men.
  22. Edd. quoniam.
    The editions [read] since.
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