Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

Quaestio V. De ipsius mendacii divisione.

Quinto quaeritur de ipsius mendacii divisione. Dividit enim Augustinus et Magister¹ mendacium per tres differentias primas, videlicet in officiosum, iocosum et perniciosum. Sed contra istam divisionem obiicitur:

1. Primo ratione primi membri. Officiosum enim mendacium dicitur, quod alicui prodest; sed quod mendacium prosit, hoc est valde per accidens, cum sit malum²: ergo penes hoc quod est prodesse, non est aliquam speciem ipsius mendacii assignare.

2. Item, idem mendacium secundum speciem potest prodesse et potest obesse: ergo penes ista³ non contingit assignare ipsius mendacii species diversas.

3. Item, contra secundam differentiam obiicitur, quae quidem est mendacium iocosum: quoniam, sicut contingit peccatum mendacii ioco perpetrari, ita etiam et alias peccatorum differentias: ergo si alia peccata non habent dividi per iocosum et non iocosum, videtur, quod nec ipsum mendacium.

4. Item, cum quis falsum dicit intendens iocare, non intendit fallere; « sed mendacium, ut dicit Augustinus⁴, est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi »: ergo ubi iocus intervenit, ibi non est mendacium: videtur ergo, quod mendacium iocosum non sit species mendacii, immo potius defectus et diminutio ipsius.

5. Item, obiicitur contra tertiam differentiam, quae est mendacium perniciosum. Si enim perniciosum dicitur mendacium, quod inducit mortem, et omne peccatum mortale inducit mortem; esse⁵ perniciosum est generale omni peccato mortali: ergo non est differentia mendacii.

6. Item, mendacium perniciosum si distinguitur ab aliis, aut hoc est ratione materiae, aut ratione voluntatis. Ratione materiae non, ut videtur, quia in qualibet materia potest homo mentiri graviter et perniciose, si mentiatur ex malignitate. Nec ratione voluntatis, quoniam in quolibet genere mendacii potest voluntas inordinate moveri et inducere mortem sive perniciem in mentiente: ergo non videtur, quod sit differentia specialis mendacii.

Item, obiicitur contra differentias praedictas: quoniam Augustinus⁶ dividit mendacium in octo differentias: aut ergo divisio illa est superflua, aut ista est diminuta, aut necesse est, unam reduci ad aliam. Si ergo reducitur, quaeritur, per quam viam; quaeritur etiam, quis sit specierum mendacii numerus, et quae sufficientia.

Conclusio.

Tria sunt genera mendaciorum, quae secundum varietatem intentionis mentientium subdividuntur in octo membra.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum mendacium habeat pro formali et completivo intentionem fallendi⁷, secundum intentionem ipsius mentientis habet in species diversificari. Mentiens autem aut intendit prodesse, aut delectare, aut laedere⁸. Secundum quod intendit prodesse, est mendacium officiosum; secundum quod intendit delectare, est mendacium iocosum; secundum quod intendit laedere, est mendacium perniciosum. Laedere autem potest aliquis dupliciter: vel damno temporali, vel damno spirituali. Et si laedit damno temporali, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut⁹ simpliciter laedit, aut ita laedit unum, quod alteri prodest. — Et secundum hoc sunt tres differentiae mendacii perniciosi, quarum una consistit in eo genere mendacii, quo quis mentitur in doctrina religionis; et hoc quidem facit ad nocumentum boni spiritualis, scilicet fidei. Alia differentia consistit in hoc, ut mendacium simpliciter obsit. Tertia vero differentia in hoc, quod mendacium non simpliciter obest, sed alicui prodest, alicui obest. — Si vero quis mentitur, ut delectet, sic est mendacium iocosum; et sic potest esse dupliciter: aut ut delectet alterum, et sic est mendacium simpliciter iocosum; aut ut delectet semetipsum in mentiendo, et sic est mendacium libidinosum¹⁰. — Si vero quis mentitur, ut prosit alteri; aut mentitur, ut prosit in rebus, et sic est una differentia mendacii officiosi; aut ut prosit in salute et vita corporis, et sic est alia; aut ut prosit in sanctitate et castitate mentis, et sic est tertia.

Et sic patet, quod tria sunt genera mendaciorum prima, quae subdividuntur in octo membra, ita quod utraque divisio sumta est secundum variationem intentionis mentientis, et una illarum in altera habet includi, et hoc satis rationabiliter, sicut tactum est. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod accidit mendacio, quod prosit; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est de ratione sui generis; quia tamen in moribus intentio imponit nomen operi, ex ipsa intentione potest illa conditio adeo fieri mendacio essentialis, ut secundum ipsam accipiantur diversae species ipsius mendacii.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem mendacium secundum speciem potest obesse et prodesse; dicendum, quod illud verum est, loquendo de mendacio quantum ad sermonem exteriorem, sed non est verum de ipso quantum ad interiorem intentionem; mendacium autem non sortitur speciem a falsa locutione, sed potius ab ipsa intentione, sicut tactum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alia peccata habent fieri ioco, sicut et mendacium; dicendum, quod denominationes non fiunt ab his quae raro accidunt, sed ab his quae frequenter¹¹. Licet igitur contingat, alia peccata per iocum perpetrari; quia tamen non ita frequenter alia committuntur ioco, secundum quod ipsum mendacium: hinc est, quod esse iocosum non est differentia alterius peccati, sicut mendacii. Praeterea, etsi omnia opera sortiantur denominationem ab ipsa intentione, maxime sermo ab intentione denominatur; et quia mendacium est in sermone¹²: inde est, quod magis denominatur iocosum, quando fit intentione ludendi, quam alia peccata.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi intervenit iocus, ibi non est intentio fallendi; dicendum, quod, sicut in littera¹³ explanabitur, cum dicitur: mendacium est falsa vocis prolatio cum intentione fallendi, secundum quod generaliter accipitur, non idem est fallere quod decipere, sed idem est fallere quod falsum dicere. Unde sensus est: cum intentione fallendi, hoc est falsum dicendi; et hoc utique convenit mendacio iocoso, licet minus complete quam pernicioso.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod esse perniciosum convenit omni generi peccati mortalis; dicendum, quod perniciosum assignatur esse differentia ipsius peccati, non quia sit proprium eius simpliciter; sed hoc est ratione mendacii officiosi, contra quod distinguitur¹⁴ perniciosum, quia illud prodest, et istud obest; et quoniam alia genera peccatorum non ita distinguuntur per officiosum, sicut mendacium: hinc est, quod nec ita distinguuntur per perniciosum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum distinguatur ratione materiae, vel voluntatis; dicendum, quod ratione voluntatis¹⁵ principaliter, licet etiam posset dici, quod ratione materiae quantum ad illam differentiam mendacii perniciosi, quae quidem consistit

in doctrina religionis. Et si tu obiicias, quod ista prava voluntas potest esse in omni genere mendacii; iam patet responsio, quia hoc est falsum, secundum quod explanatum est: quia, secundum quod verba deserviunt intentioni, fit diversificatio specierum mendacii¹⁶.

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Question V. On the division of a lie itself.

Fifthly it is asked concerning the division of a lie itself. For Augustine and the Master¹ divide a lie by three primary differences, namely into the officious, the jocose, and the pernicious. But against this division it is objected:

1. First, by reason of the first member. For a lie is called officious which benefits someone; but that a lie should benefit, this is very much by accident, since it is an evil²: therefore in respect of this, that it benefits, no species of the lie itself can be assigned.

2. Likewise, the same lie according to species can benefit and can harm: therefore in respect of these³ it does not happen that diverse species of a lie itself can be assigned.

3. Likewise, it is objected against the second difference, which indeed is the jocose lie: since, just as the sin of a lie happens to be perpetrated in jest, so too the other differences of sins: therefore if other sins do not admit of being divided by the jocose and the non-jocose, it seems that neither does the lie itself.

4. Likewise, when someone says what is false intending to jest, he does not intend to deceive; « but a lie, as Augustine says⁴, is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving »: therefore where jesting intervenes, there is no lie: it seems therefore that a jocose lie is not a species of lie, but rather a defect and diminution of it.

5. Likewise, it is objected against the third difference, which is the pernicious lie. For if that lie is called pernicious which induces death, and every mortal sin induces death; to be⁵ pernicious is general to every mortal sin: therefore it is not a difference of a lie.

6. Likewise, a pernicious lie, if it is distinguished from the others, this is either by reason of matter, or by reason of will. Not by reason of matter, as it seems, because in any matter whatever a man can lie gravely and perniciously, if he lie out of malignity. Nor by reason of will, since in any kind whatever of a lie the will can be moved inordinately and induce death or destruction in the one lying: therefore it does not seem that it is a special difference of a lie.

Likewise, it is objected against the aforesaid differences: since Augustine⁶ divides a lie into eight differences: therefore either that division is superfluous, or this one is diminished, or it is necessary that one be reduced to the other. If therefore it is reduced, it is asked, by what way; it is also asked, what is the number of the species of a lie, and what its sufficiency.

Conclusion.

There are three genera of lies, which, according to the variety of the intention of those who lie, are subdivided into eight members.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that, since a lie has for its formal and completive [element] the intention of deceiving⁷, according to the intention of the one lying it admits of being diversified into species. Now the one who lies either intends to benefit, or to delight, or to harm⁸. According as he intends to benefit, it is an officious lie; according as he intends to delight, it is a jocose lie; according as he intends to harm, it is a pernicious lie. But one can harm in two ways: either by temporal harm, or by spiritual harm. And if he harms by temporal harm, this can be in two ways: either⁹ he simply harms, or he so harms the one that he benefits the other. — And according to this there are three differences of the pernicious lie, of which one consists in that kind of lie by which someone lies in the teaching of religion; and this indeed makes for the harm of a spiritual good, namely of faith. Another difference consists in this, that the lie simply harms. But the third difference [consists] in this, that the lie does not simply harm, but benefits one and harms another. — But if someone lies in order to delight, thus it is a jocose lie; and thus it can be in two ways: either to delight another, and thus it is a simply jocose lie; or to delight himself in lying, and thus it is a libidinous lie¹⁰. — But if someone lies in order to benefit another; either he lies to benefit in things, and thus it is one difference of the officious lie; or to benefit in the health and life of the body, and thus it is another; or to benefit in the sanctity and chastity of the mind, and thus it is a third.

And thus it is plain that there are three primary genera of lies, which are subdivided into eight members, in such a way that each division is taken according to the variation of the intention of the one lying, and one of them admits of being included in the other, and this quite reasonably, as has been touched on. And by this is plain the response to that which was asked last.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary, that it is accidental to a lie that it benefit; it must be said that this is true, as regards what is by reason of its kind; yet because in morals the intention imposes the name on the work, from the intention itself that condition can become so essential to the lie that according to it the diverse species of the lie itself are taken.

2. To that which is objected, that the same lie according to species can harm and benefit; it must be said that this is true, speaking of a lie as regards the exterior speech, but it is not true of it as regards the interior intention; for a lie does not take its species from the false utterance, but rather from the intention itself, as has been touched on.

3. To that which is objected, that other sins admit of being done in jest, just as a lie [does]; it must be said that denominations are not made from those things which rarely happen, but from those which frequently¹¹. Although therefore it may happen that other sins be perpetrated through jest; yet because the others are not so frequently committed in jest as a lie itself: hence it is that to be jocose is not a difference of another sin, as [it is] of a lie. Moreover, even though all works take their denomination from the intention itself, most of all does speech take its denomination from the intention; and because a lie is in speech¹²: hence it is that it is more denominated jocose, when it is done with the intention of playing, than the other sins.

4. To that which is objected, that where jesting intervenes, there is no intention of deceiving; it must be said that, as will be explained in the text¹³, when it is said: a lie is a false uttering of the voice with the intention of deceiving, according as it is taken generally, to deceive is not the same as to delude, but to deceive is the same as to say what is false. Whence the sense is: with the intention of deceiving, that is, of saying what is false; and this certainly belongs to a jocose lie, although less completely than to a pernicious one.

5. To that which is objected, that to be pernicious belongs to every kind of mortal sin; it must be said that pernicious is assigned to be a difference of the sin itself, not because it is proper to it simply; but this is by reason of the officious lie, against which the pernicious is distinguished, because that one benefits and this one harms¹⁴; and since the other kinds of sins are not so distinguished by the officious, as a lie [is]: hence it is that neither are they so distinguished by the pernicious.

6. To that which is objected, whether it be distinguished by reason of matter, or of will; it must be said that [it is distinguished] by reason of will¹⁵ principally, although it could also be said that [it is] by reason of matter as regards that difference of the pernicious lie which indeed consists

in the teaching of religion. And if thou object that this depraved will can be in every kind of lie; the response is already plain, because that is false, according to what was explained: because, according as words serve the intention, the diversification of the species of a lie comes about¹⁶.

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