Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum sit ponere connexionem in virtutibus gratuitis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicit Hieronymus super illud Isaiae decimo sexto¹: Venter meus ad Moab etc.; ibi Glossa: « Sicut cithara sonum compositum non emittit, si una chorda rupta fuerit; sic spiritus, vel venter prophetae, si una virtus defuerit, dulce melos non resonabit »; sed quando gratia est in anima et Spiritus sanctus in corde hominis, est in ea dulce melos spirituale: ergo necesse est, ibi simul omnes virtutes esse.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in quarto Sententiarum, distinctione decima quinta², quod « impium est a Deo dimidiam veniam sperare »: ergo pari ratione impium est sperare dimidiam gratiam: ergo sicut impossibile est, unum mortale peccatum sine alio dimitti: sic videtur, quod impossibile est, quod una virtus sine alia nobis donetur.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Nullus potest habere virtutem gratuitam, nisi habeat gratiam; nullus habet gratiam, qui non sit templum Dei; nullus autem potest esse templum Dei, nisi sit templum eius secundum totum, quia nulla est conventio Christi ad Belial, neque templo Dei cum idolis³: si ergo ad hoc, quod anima consecretur in templum Dei, necesse est, ipsam habere omnes virtutes dirigentes et rectificantes eius potentias; videtur esse necessarium, quod si habet unam virtutem, quod habeat ceteras.

4. Item, quicumque habet unicam virtutem gratuitam, necessarium est, ipsum habere caritatem — nulla enim virtus gratuita remanet, caritate exclusa — sed qui habet caritatem habet vinculum perfectionis⁴ et plenitudinem Legis, et per hoc potest pervenire ad salutem: si ergo nemo habet perfectionem in genere moris nec potens est ad implendum omnia mandata Legis, nisi habeat universitatem virtutum; necessario videtur sequi, ut qui unam virtutem gratuitam habet, nulla sibi desit.

1. Sed contra hoc primo fertur instantia in Christo et in Beatis; Christus enim et Beati caritatem habent, et tamen in eis nec est fides nec spes, sicut ex praecedentibus⁵ apparet: ergo non est necesse, ut qui habet unam virtutem gratuitam habeat omnes.

2. Item, fertur secundo instantia in innocentibus et coniugatis; innocentes enim non habent virtutem poenitentiae, coniugati non habent virginitatem; et tamen hae sunt virtutes gratuitae: ergo non est necesse, quod qui habet unam virtutem gratuitam habeat omnes.

3. Item, tertio fertur instantia in praescitis et reprobis, qui, cum sunt in gratia, habent aliquas virtutes, et tamen nunquam habent perseverantiam, quoniam, si illam haberent, salvarentur, sicut dicit Dominus⁶: Qui perseveraverit usque in finem etc.: si ergo perseverantia virtus est, secundum quod vult Tullius et Bernardus, videtur, quod non sit connexio virtutum gratuitarum.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione. Habitus virtutum gratuitarum sunt diversi formaliter, sicut diversae species eiusdem generis, ita quod ex opposito dividuntur, nec unum est principium alterius⁷; sed quando aliquae proprietates invicem distinguuntur, ita quod una ab altera dividitur, nec altera ab altera causatur; possibile est, haberi unam sine reliqua: si ergo virtutes gratuitae sunt huiusmodi, videtur, quod non sit necessarium, eas esse connexas.

5. Item, habitus virtutum per actus suos habent notificari et distingui⁸: igitur quae est comparatio actus ad actum, eadem est comparatio habitus ad habitum; sed non est necesse, actus virtutum esse connexos, immo unus potest exerceri sine altero: ergo etc.

6. Item, si habitus virtutum sunt connexi, aut hoc est ratione principii, aut ratione subiecti, aut ratione obiecti. Si ratione principii, quia sunt a Deo; tunc, cum omnis proprietas a Deo sit, connexio esset in omnibus proprietatibus. Si ratione subiecti, quia sunt in eodem: ergo cum omnes scientiae sint in eadem anima, qui haberet unam scientiam, haberet ceteras; quod manifeste falsum est. Si ratione obiecti; contra: penes obiecta distinguuntur⁹: ergo penes illa non connectuntur, cum idem non sit principium distinctionis et connexionis.

Conclusio.

Necesse est, habentem gratiam habere omnes virtutes, quae sunt perfectae, vel aliquid eis correspondens.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod de virtutibus gratuitis contingit loqui tripliciter, videlicet quantum ad habitum substratum et quantum ad statum superadditum et quantum ad defectum imperfectionis annexum¹⁰.

Si loquamur de virtutibus sub ratione imperfectionis annexae, non est necesse, esse connexionem simpliciter, pro eo quod non est necesse, hominem habentem gratiam habere imperfectionem adiunctam. — Similiter si loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad statum superadditum, qui non est de necessitate virtutis, sicut est reperire in continentia virginali et viduali; sic adhuc non est necesse, virtutes esse connexas. — Si vero loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad habitus substratos, tunc distinguendum est: quia aut illi habitus habent necessario annexam imperfectionem, aut non. Si habent necessario annexam imperfectionem, sicut habet habitus fidei et spei; sic non sunt necessario connexi aliis virtutibus nisi pro eo tempore, quo quis est in statu viae. Quodsi non habent necessario annexam imperfectionem, tunc connexionem habent simpliciter sive in statu viae, sive in statu patriae. Unde secundum omnem statum verum est, quod necesse est, habentem gratiam habere omnes virtutes, quae sunt perfectae, vel aliquid eis correspondens, sicut loco fidei in patria habebimus visionem et loco spei perfectam tentionem¹¹.

Ratio autem huius connexionis sumi potest quadrupliciter secundum quadruplex genus causae: primum quidem ex parte causae materialis, quae scilicet est nostra necessitas; secundo ex parte causae efficientis, quae est Dei largitas; tertio ex parte causae formalis, quae est virtutum conformitas; quarto ex parte causae finalis, quae est praemii dignitas. — Causa enim materialis virtutum assignari potest non ex qua¹², sed in qua. Et haec quidem est rationalis anima secundum suas potentias, secundum quas ipsa anima potest obliquari et dirigi. Et quoniam illae potentiae animae non possunt per unum habitum virtutis rectificari, sed per diversos; necesse est ad hoc, quod anima perficiatur in esse gratuito et fiat Deo placita et iusta, quod ipsa secundum diversos virtutis habitus rectificetur in se et in qualibet eius potentia. Ideo propter necessitatem ex parte susceptibilis necesse est, virtutes gratuitas esse connexas¹³.

Causa vero virtutum efficiens est divina liberalitas, cuius est nullo modo deficere in necessariis, sed omnia administrare affluenter et abunde¹⁴. Unde sicut divina liberalitas perficiens rem in esse primo dat ei totum, per quod possit in esse conservari;

ita perficiens eam in esse secundo dat illi integram perfectionem, per quam et in illo esse manere possit et singulis vitiis obviare. Ideo conveniens est divinae largitati, cum gratificat hominem, diversitatem virtutum, in quibus consistit rectitudo vitae, eidem tribuere.

Causa autem formalis ipsarum virtutum gratuitarum est ipsa Dei gratia, quae virtutes ceteras quantum ad habitus sibi substratos perficit et informat, et hoc per suam praesidentiam et influentiam, per quam animam facit gratam et quantum ad se et quantum ad eius potentias. Unde quia illa gratia conformiter se habet ad omnes virtutes; ex quo¹⁵ ipsa habetur, aut quaelibet virtus habetur, aut nulla; et ideo necesse est, virtutes esse connexas.

Causa autem finalis virtutum est ipsa gloria, quae veniens in animam undique et plene perficit eam; et ideo necesse est, quod per gratiam undique disponatur. Nisi enim praecedat sufficiens dispositio, non inducitur perfectio. Necesse est ergo necessitate finis¹⁶, omnes potentias animae perfici per virtutes gratuitas, ut idoneae sint et dispositae ad susceptionem gloriae. — Et sic patet, quod ratio connexionis virtutum gratuitarum sumitur ex quadruplici genere causae; unde et rationes hoc probantes sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Christo et Beatis, in quibus non est reperire virtutem spei nec fidei; iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt: quoniam hae virtutes propter imperfectionem sibi annexam¹⁷ se non compatiuntur cum statu gloriae. Verumtamen ex hoc non infringitur connexio virtutum, pro eo quod ipsae aliis virtutibus connectuntur in statu viae; in statu vero patriae loco ipsarum dotes eis correspondentes cum aliis virtutibus, quae ibi permanent, connexionem habent.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de innocentibus et coniugatis, iam patet responsio: quoniam poenitentia¹⁸ et virginitas non tantum habitus virtutum nominant, sed etiam status, ratione quorum, ut praedictum est, non necessaria est connexio virtutum gratuitarum, pro eo quod in diversis statibus salvari potest essentia gratiae et virtutum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de perseverantia, quae non est in praescitis; dicendum, quod perseverantia dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur perseverantia voluntas perferendi passiones sine defectione; et sic est species fortitudinis¹⁹. Alio modo dicitur perseverantia propositum perseverandi in bono usque in finem; et sic est conditio annexa cuilibet virtuti. Tertio modo dicitur perseverantia continuatio boni usque in finem; et hoc modo non est nomen virtutis, sed potius status consequentis ad omnes virtutes. Et primis quidem duobus modis habet connecti aliis virtutibus et reperitur in iustis praescitis; hoc autem tertio modo in praescitis non reperitur nec necessario aliis nectitur, quia virtutis non nominat habitum, sed magis consequentem statum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus virtutum gratuitarum sunt diversi formaliter; dicendum, quod quamvis formaliter dividantur quantum ad habitus substratos, tamen, in quantum gratuiti sunt, communicant in ipsa gratia, quae est omnium virtutum gratuitarum perfectiva in esse gratuito²⁰. Et ideo ratio illa non cogit: quoniam, etsi in formalibus propriis distinguantur, tamen in formali communi, ratione cuius habent esse gratuiti, uniuntur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione habituum et actuum; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod egressus actuum est voluntarius et ab arbitrii libertate, introductio vero habituum in ipsam animam est a divina largitate; voluntas autem²¹ specialiter applicatur ad unum bonum, divina vero largitas complet totum: ideo non sequitur, quod quamvis actus unius virtutis gratuitae ab altero separetur, propter hoc similiter habitus ab habitu.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, unde veniat connexio habituum; iam patet responsio: venit enim ex quadruplici genere causae, sicut praedictum est; nec est simile de illis, in quibus instat²², sicut apparet de se.

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether a connection is to be posited among the gratuitous virtues. And that it is so, seems [to be the case]:

1. First, from that which Jerome says upon that text of Isaiah, chapter sixteen¹: My belly shall sound for Moab etc.; there the Gloss says: « Just as a cithara does not emit a composed sound if one string has been broken, so the spirit, or the belly of the prophet, if one virtue is lacking, will not resound a sweet melody »; but when grace is in the soul and the Holy Spirit in the heart of man, there is in it a sweet spiritual melody: therefore it is necessary that all the virtues be there at once.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is held in the fourth [book] of the Sentences, distinction fifteen², that « it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God »: therefore by parity of reasoning it is impious to hope for half a grace: therefore just as it is impossible that one mortal sin be remitted without another, so it seems that it is impossible that one virtue be given to us without another.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. No one can have a gratuitous virtue unless he has grace; no one has grace who is not a temple of God; but no one can be a temple of God unless he be a temple of Him according to the whole, because there is no agreement of Christ with Belial, nor of the temple of God with idols³: if therefore, for the soul to be consecrated into a temple of God, it is necessary that it have all the virtues directing and rectifying its powers; it seems to be necessary that, if it has one virtue, it have the rest.

4. Likewise, whoever has a single gratuitous virtue, it is necessary that he have charity — for no gratuitous virtue remains when charity is excluded — but he who has charity has the bond of perfection⁴ and the fullness of the Law, and through this can attain to salvation: if therefore no one has perfection in the genus of morals, nor is able to fulfill all the commandments of the Law, unless he have the totality of the virtues; it seems necessarily to follow that he who has one gratuitous virtue lacks none.

1. But against this, first an instance is brought forward in Christ and in the Blessed; for Christ and the Blessed have charity, and yet in them there is neither faith nor hope, as appears from what precedes⁵: therefore it is not necessary that he who has one gratuitous virtue have all.

2. Likewise, secondly an instance is brought forward in the innocent and the married; for the innocent do not have the virtue of penance, the married do not have virginity; and yet these are gratuitous virtues: therefore it is not necessary that he who has one gratuitous virtue have all.

3. Likewise, thirdly an instance is brought forward in the foreknown and the reprobate, who, when they are in grace, have certain virtues, and yet never have perseverance, since, if they had it, they would be saved, as the Lord says⁶: He who shall persevere unto the end etc.: if therefore perseverance is a virtue, according as Tullius and Bernard hold, it seems that there is no connection of the gratuitous virtues.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by reason. The habits of the gratuitous virtues are diverse formally, like the diverse species of one genus, so that they are divided by opposition, and one is not the principle of another⁷; but when certain properties are distinguished from one another, so that one is divided from the other, nor is the one caused by the other; it is possible for one to be had without the rest: if therefore the gratuitous virtues are of this sort, it seems that it is not necessary that they be connected.

5. Likewise, the habits of the virtues come to be made known and distinguished through their acts⁸: therefore, as is the comparison of act to act, the same is the comparison of habit to habit; but it is not necessary that the acts of the virtues be connected, nay rather one can be exercised without another: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if the habits of the virtues are connected, this is either by reason of the principle, or by reason of the subject, or by reason of the object. If by reason of the principle, because they are from God; then, since every property is from God, the connection would be in all properties. If by reason of the subject, because they are in the same [subject]: therefore since all the sciences are in the same soul, he who had one science would have the rest; which is manifestly false. If by reason of the object; on the contrary: they are distinguished according to objects⁹: therefore they are not connected according to those [objects], since the principle of distinction and of connection is not the same.

Conclusion.

It is necessary that he who has grace have all the virtues which are perfect, or something corresponding to them.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that it happens that one speaks of the gratuitous virtues in three ways, namely as regards the underlying habit, and as regards the superadded state, and as regards the defect of imperfection annexed [to them]¹⁰.

If we speak of the virtues under the aspect of annexed imperfection, it is not necessary that there be a connection absolutely, for the reason that it is not necessary that a man having grace have an imperfection adjoined. — Similarly, if we speak of the virtues as regards the superadded state, which is not of the necessity of the virtue, as is found in virginal and widowed continence; so still it is not necessary that the virtues be connected. — But if we speak of the virtues as regards the underlying habits, then a distinction must be made: for either those habits have an imperfection necessarily annexed, or not. If they have an imperfection necessarily annexed, as the habit of faith and of hope has; so they are not necessarily connected with the other virtues except for that time during which one is in the state of the wayfarer. But if they do not have an imperfection necessarily annexed, then they have a connection absolutely, whether in the state of the wayfarer or in the state of the homeland. Hence according to every state it is true that it is necessary that he who has grace have all the virtues which are perfect, or something corresponding to them, just as in place of faith in the homeland we shall have vision, and in place of hope, perfect holding¹¹.

Now the ground of this connection can be taken in a fourfold manner, according to the fourfold genus of cause: first indeed on the part of the material cause, which namely is our necessity; secondly on the part of the efficient cause, which is God's largesse; thirdly on the part of the formal cause, which is the conformity of the virtues; fourthly on the part of the final cause, which is the dignity of the reward. — For the material cause of the virtues can be assigned not as that from which¹², but as that in which. And this indeed is the rational soul according to its powers, according to which the soul itself can be bent crooked and directed [straight]. And since those powers of the soul cannot be rectified through one habit of virtue, but through diverse [habits]; it is necessary, for the soul to be perfected in gratuitous being and made pleasing to God and just, that it be rectified according to the diverse habits of virtue, in itself and in each of its powers. Therefore, on account of the necessity on the part of that which is susceptible [of perfection], it is necessary that the gratuitous virtues be connected¹³.

But the efficient cause of the virtues is the divine liberality, whose property it is in no way to be deficient in things necessary, but to administer all things abundantly and in plenty¹⁴. Hence just as the divine liberality, perfecting a thing in being, first gives it the whole by which it can be conserved in being;

so, perfecting it in the second being, gives it the entire perfection by which it can both remain in that being and resist individual vices. Therefore it is fitting to the divine largesse, when it makes a man graced, to bestow upon the same the diversity of virtues, in which the rectitude of life consists.

Now the formal cause of the gratuitous virtues themselves is the very grace of God, which perfects and informs the other virtues as regards the habits underlying them, and this through its presidency and influence, through which it makes the soul graced both as regards itself and as regards its powers. Hence, since that grace holds itself conformably to all the virtues; from the fact that¹⁵ it is had, either each and every virtue is had, or none; and therefore it is necessary that the virtues be connected.

Now the final cause of the virtues is glory itself, which, coming into the soul, perfects it on every side and fully; and therefore it is necessary that through grace it be disposed on every side. For unless a sufficient disposition precede, perfection is not induced. It is necessary therefore, by the necessity of the end¹⁶, that all the powers of the soul be perfected through the gratuitous virtues, that they may be fit and disposed for the reception of glory. — And thus it is clear that the ground of the connection of the gratuitous virtues is taken from the fourfold genus of cause; whence also the reasons proving this are to be conceded.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary concerning Christ and the Blessed, in whom the virtue of hope nor of faith is not to be found; the response is now clear from what has been said: since these virtues, on account of the imperfection annexed to them¹⁷, are not compatible with the state of glory. Nevertheless from this the connection of the virtues is not undone, for the reason that they themselves are connected with the other virtues in the state of the wayfarer; but in the state of the homeland, in place of them the endowments corresponding to them, together with the other virtues which there remain, have connection.

2. To that which is objected concerning the innocent and the married, the response is now clear: since penance¹⁸ and virginity name not only habits of virtue, but also states, by reason of which, as has been said, a connection of the gratuitous virtues is not necessary, for the reason that in diverse states the essence of grace and of the virtues can be preserved.

3. To that which is objected concerning perseverance, which is not in the foreknown; it must be said that perseverance is spoken of in three ways. In one way perseverance is said [to be] the will of enduring sufferings without failing; and so it is a species of fortitude¹⁹. In another way perseverance is said [to be] the purpose of persevering in the good unto the end; and so it is a condition annexed to every virtue. In a third way perseverance is said [to be] the continuation of the good unto the end; and in this way it is not the name of a virtue, but rather of a state consequent upon all the virtues. And in the first two ways indeed it has [the property of] being connected with the other virtues and is found in the just foreknown; but in this third way it is not found in the foreknown, nor is it necessarily linked to the others, because it does not name the habit of virtue, but rather a consequent state.

4. To that which is objected, that the habits of the gratuitous virtues are diverse formally; it must be said that, although they are formally divided as regards the underlying habits, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are gratuitous, they communicate in grace itself, which is perfective of all the gratuitous virtues in gratuitous being²⁰. And therefore that reason does not compel: since, even if in their proper formal characters they are distinguished, nevertheless in the common formal character, by reason of which they have gratuitous being, they are united.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of habits and acts; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that the going-forth of acts is voluntary and from the freedom of choice, but the introduction of habits into the soul itself is from the divine largesse; the will moreover²¹ applies itself specially to one good, but the divine largesse completes the whole: therefore it does not follow that, although the act of one gratuitous virtue is separated from another, on this account the habit is likewise [separated] from the habit.

6. To that which is objected last, whence the connection of the habits comes; the response is now clear: for it comes from the fourfold genus of cause, as has been said before; nor is it similar concerning those in which the [objection] presses²², as is clear of itself.