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Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 571

Quaestio II. Utrum spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum.

Secundo quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad meriti usum, et est quaestio, utrum spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Romanos quinto1: Tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia autem probationem, probatio vero spem: ergo si in ipsa probatione consistit meritum, videtur, quod spes ex meritis habeat ortum.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per definitionem Magistri, quae ponitur in littera2: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis, proveniens ex gratia et meritis ».

3. Item, nullus habet virtutem spei, nisi qui in sperando sequitur dictamen fidei; sed fides dicit, nullum adultum salvari posse absque meritis3: ergo nullus recte sperat beatitudinem, nisi cui suppetunt merita: videtur ergo, quod spes ex meritis procedat.

4. Item, sicut se habet desperatio ad demerita, sic se habet spes ad bona merita; sed sic se habet desperatio ad demerita, quod nullus desperat nisi propter aliquam culpam commissam — mala enim conscientia est illa quae inducit in desperationem — ergo videtur, quod similiter spes ex bonis meritis habeat ortum4.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus5: « Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur »: ergo si spes virtus est, sicut ostensum est in praecedentibus, Deus eam in nobis operatur sine nobis: ergo non habet ortum ex meritis nostris.

2. Item, nihil quod est principium meritorum, ortum habet ex meritis6; sed spes est principium meritorum; nullus enim potest mereri apud Deum, nisi qui sperat: ergo spes ex meritis non habet ortum.

p. 572

3. Item, omnes virtutes simul infunduntur7: ergo si aliqua virtus praecedat merita, necesse est, quod omnes praecedant; et si aliqua subsequitur, necesse est, quod omnes subsequantur: igitur aut spes non procedit ex meritis, aut ceterae virtutes procedunt ex meritis. Sed impossibile est, ceteras virtutes ex meritis oriri: ergo impossibile est, ipsam spem ex meritis oriri.

4. Item, quanto quis perfectior est, tanto est humilior, et quanto humilior est, tanto minus praesumit sive confidit de meritis propriis: ergo si spes perfecta iuncta est cum humilitate perfecta, videtur, quod nec spes nec eius usus oriatur ex intuitu meritorum8.

Conclusio.

Spes, quatenus est habitus, non oritur ex meritis; quatenus est terminus sive obiectum ipsius, ortum habet ex meritis praecedentibus; quatenus dicit actum, vel statum, oritur ex intuitu meritorum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod spes aliquando nominat habitum virtutis, aliquando nominat actum, aliquando nominat statum, aliquando terminum sive obiectum9. — Secundum autem quod spes nominat habitum virtutis, sic non habet ortum ex meritis, sed potius merita habent ortum ex ea. — Secundum autem quod nominat actum, sic oriri habet ex meritorum intuitu; nullus enim sperat recte aeternam beatitudinem, nisi qui Deo servivit, vel proponit Deo servire. — Secundum autem quod nominat statum, sic ortum habet ex meritis praecedentibus et concomitantibus; et hoc modo accipitur ad Romanos quinto10: Tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia probationem, probatio spem; Glossa, id est « certitudinem spei », ad quam scilicet certitudinem pervenitur per bona merita, et maxime per tolerantiam et sustinentiam tribulationum. — Secundum autem quod spes nominat ipsam rem speratam, sic ortum habet ex meritis praecedentibus.

Et sic patet, quod spes secundum primam acceptionem simpliciter praecedit merita tanquam meritorum principium; secundum ultimam acceptionem simpliciter sequitur tanquam meritorum praemium; secundum duas medias medio modo se habet, quia quodam modo praecedit, quodam modo sequitur. Nam spes, prout nominat motum spei, procedit ex meritorum intuitu et secundum veritatem est principium meritorum sequentium. Prout autem spes dicitur quaedam certitudo et status, sic secundum veritatem ex meritis habet ortum, et est nihilominus adminiculum ad perfectius merendum11. Illa enim certitudo spei consurgit ex perpessione tribulationum et vehementer confirmat et confortat animam, ut a tribulationum sustinentia non recedat. — Et ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet nihilominus responsio ad obiecta, quia spes quodam modo accipiendi est ex meritis, et quodam modo principium meritorum; et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad oppositas partes, et utraeque secundum diversas vias probant et concludunt veritatem, exceptis duabus ultimis rationibus, adductis ad utramque partem.

Ad illud enim quod obiicitur de desperatione, potest responderi, quod non est simile, pro eo quod, cum desperatio dicat profunditatem peccati12, nullus illic demergitur, nisi per aliquam culpam praecedentem disponatur; non sic autem spes dicit meriti perfectionem secundum generalem sui acceptionem. Ideo non oportet, quod procedat ex meritis, prout nominat ipsam virtutem, vel eius actum, sicut desperatio, quae est vitium demergens in profundum, praeexigit aliud peccatum. — Praeterea, alia de causa non est simile, quia nos et ea quae sunt in nobis et a nobis, sunt principia vitiorum nostrorum; non sic autem est de bonis, quia omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum de sursum est13; ideo non sic oportet, spem ex nostro oriri merito, sicut desperatio oritur ex vitio.

p. 573

Ad illud similiter quod ultimo obiicitur ex alia parte, quod vir humilis merita non intuetur; dicendum, quod merita intueri contingit dupliciter: vel attribuendo sibi, vel attribuendo gratiae divinae. Intueri autem merita attribuendo sibi, hoc est superbiae et vanitatis; et sic intuentur superbi, qui dicunt: Manus nostra excelsa, et non Dominus fecit haec omnia14. Contra quos dicitur Deuteronomii nono: Ne dicas in corde tuo: Propter iustitiam meam introduxit me Dominus, ut terram hanc possiderem. Intueri autem merita referendo ad divinam gratiam, hoc est humilitatis et veritatis; et hoc modo motus spei ex intuitu meritorum habet oriri; per quem modum intuebatur Paulus merita sua, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto15: Abundantius omnibus laboravi; non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum. — Alia vero, quae obiiciuntur, satis sunt manifesta16.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether hope takes its rise from good merits.

Secondly it is asked about hope by comparison to the use of merit, and the question is whether hope takes its rise from good merits. And that it does, it seems.

1. To the Romans, chapter five1: Tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope: therefore if merit consists in trial itself, it seems that hope takes its rise from merits.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the definition of the Master, which is set down in the text2: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, proceeding from grace and merits ».

3. Likewise, no one has the virtue of hope, except one who in hoping follows the dictate of faith; but faith says that no adult can be saved without merits3: therefore no one rightly hopes for beatitude, except one for whom merits are at hand: therefore it seems that hope proceeds from merits.

4. Likewise, just as despair stands to demerits, so hope stands to good merits; but despair so stands to demerits that no one despairs except on account of some fault committed — for it is a bad conscience which leads into despair — therefore it seems that hope likewise takes its rise from good merits4.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine5: « Virtue is a good quality of the mind, which God works in us without us »: therefore if hope is a virtue, as was shown in what precedes, God works it in us without us: therefore it does not take its rise from our merits.

2. Likewise, nothing which is a principle of merits takes its rise from merits6; but hope is a principle of merits; for no one can merit before God except one who hopes: therefore hope does not take its rise from merits.

3. Likewise, all the virtues are infused together7: therefore if any virtue precedes merits, it is necessary that all precede; and if any follows after, it is necessary that all follow after: therefore either hope does not proceed from merits, or the rest of the virtues proceed from merits. But it is impossible that the rest of the virtues arise from merits: therefore it is impossible that hope itself arise from merits.

4. Likewise, the more perfect one is, the more humble he is, and the more humble he is, the less he presumes or trusts in his own merits: therefore if perfect hope is joined with perfect humility, it seems that neither hope nor its use arises from the regard of merits8.

Conclusion.

Hope, insofar as it is a habit, does not arise from merits; insofar as it is the terminus or object of itself, it takes its rise from preceding merits; insofar as it names an act, or a state, it arises from the regard of merits.

I respond: It must be said that hope sometimes names the habit of virtue, sometimes names an act, sometimes names a state, sometimes a terminus or object9. — But according as hope names the habit of virtue, thus it does not take its rise from merits, but rather merits take their rise from it. — But according as it names an act, thus it has to arise from the regard of merits; for no one rightly hopes for eternal beatitude except one who has served God, or proposes to serve God. — But according as it names a state, thus it takes its rise from preceding and concomitant merits; and in this way is taken the text to the Romans, chapter five10: Tribulation works patience, patience trial, trial hope; the Gloss, that is « the certitude of hope », to which certitude, namely, one arrives through good merits, and especially through the toleration and endurance of tribulations. — But according as hope names the very thing hoped for, thus it takes its rise from preceding merits.

And thus it is clear that hope, according to the first acceptation, simply precedes merits as a principle of merits; according to the last acceptation, it simply follows after as a reward of merits; according to the two middle ones, it stands in a middle way, because in a certain way it precedes, in a certain way it follows. For hope, as it names the motion of hope, proceeds from the regard of merits and according to truth is a principle of the merits that follow. But as hope is called a certain certitude and state, thus according to truth it takes its rise from merits, and is nonetheless a help toward meriting more perfectly11. For that certitude of hope rises up from the suffering of tribulations and vehemently confirms and comforts the soul, so that it does not withdraw from the endurance of tribulations. — And from these things the answer to the proposed question is clear; the answer to the objections is no less clear, because hope is in a certain way of accepting it from merits, and in a certain way a principle of merits; and according to this the reasonings run to the opposite sides, and both by diverse ways prove and conclude the truth, except for the two last reasonings, adduced to either part.

For to that which is objected concerning despair, it can be answered that it is not alike, for the reason that, since despair names the depth of sin12, no one is plunged there except as he is disposed by some preceding fault; but hope does not so name the perfection of merit according to its general acceptation. Therefore it is not necessary that it proceed from merits, as it names the virtue itself, or its act, as despair does, which, being a vice plunging into the deep, presupposes another sin. — Moreover, for another reason it is not alike, because we, and those things which are in us and from us, are the principles of our vices; but it is not so concerning goods, because every best gift and every perfect gift is from above13; therefore it is not so necessary that hope arise from our merit, as despair arises from vice.

To that likewise which is last objected from the other side, that the humble man does not regard merits; it must be said that to regard merits happens in two ways: either by attributing them to oneself, or by attributing them to the divine grace. But to regard merits by attributing them to oneself, this belongs to pride and vanity; and thus the proud regard them, who say: Our hand is exalted, and not the Lord has done all these things14. Against whom it is said in Deuteronomy nine: Say not in your heart: For my justice the Lord has brought me in, that I might possess this land. But to regard merits by referring them to the divine grace, this belongs to humility and to truth; and in this way the motion of hope has to arise from the regard of merits; in which way Paul regarded his merits, in the first to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen15: I have labored more abundantly than all; yet not I, but the grace of God with me. — But the other things which are objected are sufficiently manifest16.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 3. seq. — (P. 571, n. 2.)
    Verse 3 ff. — (P. 571, n. 2.)
  2. Hic c. 1. — (P. 571, n. 3.)
    Here, c. 1. — (P. 571, n. 3.)
  3. Matth. 5, 20: Nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra... non intrabitis in regnum caelorum. Cfr. ibid. 16, 17. — (P. 571, n. 4.)
    Matthew 5:20: Unless your justice abound... you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Cf. ibid. 16, 17. — (P. 571, n. 4.)
  4. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 31, enarrat. 2. n. 5: Spem enim gerit bona conscientia; quo modo mala conscientia tota in desperatione est, sic bona conscientia tota in spe. — (P. 571, n. 5.)
    Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 31, second enarration, n. 5: For a good conscience bears hope; in the way that a bad conscience is wholly in despair, so a good conscience is wholly in hope. — (P. 571, n. 5.)
  5. Vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 5. — Spem esse virtutem, ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 1. — (P. 571, n. 6.)
    See II Sent., the text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5. — That hope is a virtue was shown above, a. 1, q. 1. — (P. 571, n. 6.)
  6. Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 40. n. 62. seqq. ostendit, principium meriti, gratiam scilicet, non cadere sub merito; et n. 63. docet: Hominis quippe meritum superna gratia non, ut veniat, invenit, sed postquam venerit, facit etc. Quod etiam probat exemplo boni latronis, qui tres virtutes theologicas, « subita repletus gratia, et accepit et servavit in cruce ». — (P. 572, n. 1.)
    Gregory, Morals XVIII, c. 40, n. 62 ff., shows that the principle of merit, namely grace, does not fall under merit; and n. 63 teaches: For the supernal grace does not find a man's merit, that it might come, but after it has come, it makes it, etc. Which he also proves by the example of the good thief, who, « suddenly filled with grace, both received and preserved on the cross » the three theological virtues. — (P. 572, n. 1.)
  7. Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 1. — Pro praecedat nec non subinde pro praecedant Vat. praecedit (bis). — (P. 572, n. 2.)
    Cf. below, d. 36, q. 1. — For praecedat and then for praecedant the Vatican edition reads praecedit (twice). — (P. 572, n. 2.)
  8. Bernard., Serm. 1. in Ps. (90.) Qui habitat, n. 3: Periculosa habitatio eorum, qui in meritis suis sperant; periculosa, quia ruinosa. — (P. 572, n. 3.)
    Bernard, Sermon 1 on Ps. (90) Qui habitat, n. 3: Perilous is the dwelling of those who hope in their own merits; perilous, because ruinous. — (P. 572, n. 3.)
  9. Quae diversa acceptio spei insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. — (P. 572, n. 4.)
    Which diverse acceptation of hope is intimated here in the text of the Master, c. 1. — (P. 572, n. 4.)
  10. Vers. 3. seq. — Verba Glossae invenis supra pag. 566, nota 8. — Non ita multo ante pro servivit cod. Z servit. — (P. 572, n. 5.)
    Verse 3 ff. — The words of the Gloss you find above, p. 566, note 8. — Not much before, for servivit cod. Z reads servit. — (P. 572, n. 5.)
  11. Codd. W Y agendum vel merendum. Aliquanto inferius pro accipiendi, quod habent codd. H I L T V aa (bb a prima manu) in aliis et edd. accipienda. — (P. 572, n. 6.)
    Codd. W Y read agendum or merendum. Somewhat lower, for accipiendi, which codd. H I L T V aa (bb by the first hand) have, in others and in the editions accipienda. — (P. 572, n. 6.)
  12. Gregor., VIII. Moral. c. 18. n. 34: Potest etiam inferni nomine peccatoris desperatio designari, de qua per Psalmistam dicitur: In inferno autem quis confitebitur tibi (Ps. 6, 6.)? Unde rursum scriptum est: Impius, cum in profundum venerit peccatorum, contemnit (Prov. 18, 3.). Cfr. II. Sent. d. 43. a. 1. q. 2, ubi ostenditur, desperationem esse unam ex illis speciebus peccati in Spiritum S., quae nullo modo absque peccato praeambulo esse possunt. — Pro illic cod. V et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 48. hic. — (P. 572, n. 7.)
    Gregory, Morals VIII, c. 18, n. 34: Despair can also be designated by the name of hell, of the sinner, of which it is said through the Psalmist: But in hell who shall confess to you (Ps. 6:6)? Whence again it is written: The impious, when he has come into the depth of sins, contemns (Prov. 18:3). Cf. II Sent. d. 43, a. 1, q. 2, where it is shown that despair is one of those species of sin against the Holy Spirit which can in no way exist without a preceding sin. — For illic cod. V and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 48, read hic. — (P. 572, n. 7.)
  13. Iac. 1, 17. — (P. 572, n. 8.)
    James 1:17. — (P. 572, n. 8.)
  14. Dominus Deus tuus in conspectu tuo. — Mox pro referendo codd. A K attribuendo. — (P. 573, n. 1.)
    The Lord your God in your sight. — Soon, for referendo codd. A K read attribuendo. — (P. 573, n. 1.)
  15. Vers. 10. A re non alienum nobis videtur, ex Bernardi Serm. 68. in Cantic. n. 6. seq. afferre haec: Sufficit, ait S. Doctor, ad meritum scire, quod non sufficiant merita. Sed ut ad meritum satis est de meritis non praesumere, sic carere meritis satis ad iudicium est... Merita proinde habere cures; habita data noveris; fructum speraveris, Dei misericordiam; et omne periculum evasisti paupertatis, ingratitudinis, praesumtionis etc. — (P. 573, n. 2.)
    Verse 10. It seems to us not foreign to the matter to bring forward these things from Bernard, Sermon 68 on the Canticle, n. 6 ff.: It suffices, says the holy Doctor, for merit to know that merits do not suffice. But as for merit it is enough not to presume upon merits, so to lack merits is enough for judgment... Therefore take care to have merits; once had, you will know them as given; you will have hoped for the fruit, the mercy of God; and you have escaped every peril of poverty, of ingratitude, of presumption, etc. — (P. 573, n. 2.)
  16. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. — (P. 573, n. 3.)
    See the scholion to the preceding question. — (P. 573, n. 3.)
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