Bonaventure

Quaestio III. Utrum spes praecedat caritatem ordine naturae, an e converso.

Tertio quaeritur de spe per comparationem ad habitum caritatis, et est quaestio, utrum spes praecedat caritatem ordine naturae, an e converso; et loquimur hic de habitibus in comparatione ad actus. Et quod spes praecedat, videtur.

1. Super illud Matthaei primo¹: Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac genuit Iacob; Glossa, id est, « fides generat spem, spes generat caritatem »: ergo si generans secundum ordinem naturae prius est generato, necesse est, quod spes praecedat caritatem.

2. Item, constructio aedificii spiritualis similis est aedificio materiali; sed in aedificio materiali non solum fundamentum praecedit aedificii complementum, sed etiam paries secundum rectum ordinem antecedit ipsum tectum: si ergo fides assimilatur ipsi fundamento sustentanti, et spes parieti erigenti, et caritas tecto consummanti²; videtur, quod spes praecedat ipsam caritatem.

3. Item, secundum naturalem ordinem imperfectum antecedit perfectum, non e converso; sed caritas maior est et perfectior quam fides et spes, secundum quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio³: Maior autem horum est caritas: ergo etc.

4. Item, nullus potest amare propter se et super omnia bonum, ad quod non sperat se posse pervenire⁴: si ergo caritas diligit Deum propter se et super omnia, actus caritatis consequitur actum spei: ergo caritas ipsam spem.

Sed contra obiicitur: 1. Primo auctoritate Magistri in littera⁵: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis, veniens ex meritis praecedentibus ipsam spem, quam natura praeit caritas »: ergo secundum naturalem ordinem caritas est ante spem.

2. Item, Augustinus in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei⁶ dicit, quod omnis affectio oritur ex amore, ergo omnis affectio recta ex amore recto: cum ergo caritas dirigat ipsum amorem voluntatis, virtus autem spei dirigat unam de quatuor affectionibus; videtur, quod spes sit posterior caritate.

3. Item, nullus sperat nisi quod amat — quod enim non cupit aliquis nullo modo sperat — ergo rectitudo amoris praecedit rectitudinem exspectationis; sed caritas dirigit in amando, spes autem dirigit in exspectando: ergo caritas⁷ ante spem.

4. Item, timor et spes sunt duae affectiones quasi simul currentes — unde in Glossa, Deuteronomii vigesimo quarto⁸, dicuntur esse « duae molae »; sed omnis timor procedit ex amore: ergo et omnis

spes: ergo spes gratuita procedit ex amore gratuito: igitur secundum naturalem ordinem caritas antecedit spem.

5. Item, « quanto aliquid est communius, tanto prius⁹ »; sed omne sperandum est amandum, et non convertitur: ergo communior est actus dilectionis quam actus spei: et si communior, ergo prior.

6. Item, is est ordo virtutis ad virtutem, qui est ordo dotis ad dotem; sed perfecta tentio, quae est dos correspondens spei, sequitur perfectam dilectionem, quae est dos correspondens caritati: ergo videtur, quod in via caritas praecedat spem secundum naturalem ordinem.

Conclusio.

Actus spei secundum ordinem naturae antecedit actum caritatis; unde etiam habitus spei in comparatione ad talem actum prior est caritate, licet secundum se consideratus cum habitu caritatis habeat simultatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est comparare habitum spei ad habitum caritatis, aut ratione habituum, secundum se consideratorum, aut ratione habituum comparatorum ad actus. Si loquamur de ipsis habitibus, secundum se consideratis, sic non habent ordinem, sed simultatem. Omnes enim virtutes gratuitae simul infunduntur, secundum quod infra¹⁰ manifestabitur. — Si autem loquamur de ipsis habitibus in comparatione ad actus, sic unus habet ordinem ad alterum, quia actus unius praeparat et disponit ad actum alterius, et praeparando et disponendo est eius quodam modo principium et origo; et ratione talis praeparationis et originis est ibi ordo. Quoniam igitur actus spei praeparat et disponit ad actum caritatis tanquam ad perfectionem et spiritualis aedificii complementum — nemo enim diligit aliquod bonum propter se et super omnia, nisi speret, se ad illud bonum perventurum — hinc est, quod secundum ordinem naturae actus spei antecedit actum caritatis; et hinc est, quod habitus spei in comparatione ad talem actum caritate prior est. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium ex auctoritate Magistri, quod spem natura praecedit caritas; dicendum, quod spes accipitur ibi vel pro re sperata, vel pro ipso statu spei, non autem pro primo eius actu, vel habitu¹¹. — Posset etiam dici, quod istud dicit Magister secundum suam opinionem, qua credidit, caritatem non esse habitum creatum, sed Spiritum sanctum, qui est principium omnium aliorum bonorum. Unde quia in hac opinione communiter Magister non sustinetur, et illud est verbum suum, auctoritas illa nullum habet robur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor est principium omnium affectionum; dicendum, quod verum est de amore secundum statum imperfectum; sed sicut amor secundum imperfectionem status est omnium affectionum principium, sic secundum suam perfectionem est omnium affectionum terminus finalis et complementum. Unde omnes affectiones animae ad id ordinantur, ut Deus ametur perfecte; caritas autem non nominat qualemcumque amorem, sed amorem praecipuum. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod caritas secundum naturalem ordinem praecedat ipsam spem¹².

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus sperat nisi quod amat; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod spes caritatem sequatur, pro eo quod caritas addit talem circumstantiam super amorem, quae necessario subsequitur actum sperandi et eius rectitudinem, sicut prius tactum est. Cum enim duplex sit motus amoris caritatis, videlicet amor concupiscentiae et amor amicitiae; caritas amore concupiscentiae desiderat Deum super omnia, amore vero amicitiae similiter diligit Deum propter se et super omnia. Unde Deum concupiscit plus quam aliud bonum, Deo etiam bonum optat plus, quam habens caritatem optet sibi ipsi¹³. Amor autem concupiscentiae adeo intensus esse non potest nisi praeambula exspectatione. Similiter nec amor amicitiae potest esse adeo elevatus, nisi praecedat confidentia. Nullus enim vult plus bonum alii quam sibi, nisi in illum totaliter confidat; nullus etiam aliquod bonum super omnia concupiscit, nisi qui se ad illud aliquando perventurum praesumit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor consequitur amorem, ergo et spes similiter; respondendum est, sicut dictum est, quod licet haec affectio

praecedat illam, tamen habitus iste in comparatione ad actum non praecedit illum, propter praecipuam perfectionem, quam caritas ponit circa actum diligendi. — Praeterea, cum dicitur, quod timor sequitur ad amorem: hoc non intelligitur de quolibet amore, sed de amore sui. Ideo enim quis timet poenam, quia se ipsum amat; caritas autem non dicit principaliter amorem sui, sed amorem Dei. Et propterea non sequitur, quod actus caritatis praecedat actum timoris; nec ex hoc potest concludi, quod similiter praecedat actum spei.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod « prius est, a quo non convertitur consequentia¹⁴ »; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in his quae essentialiter consequuntur ad se invicem; in his autem, quae se invicem concomitantur, non habet veritatem. Et hoc patet, quia sequitur, si est nix, quod sit album; sed non convertitur, tamen albedo nivis non praecedit ipsam nivis substantiam. Quoniam ergo sperare et amare sunt actus se invicem concomitantes; ideo, quamvis actus amandi se extendat ad diligibilia, non oportet, quod sit prius secundum ordinem naturae. — Praeterea, quamvis caritas generalior sit a parte obiecti, tamen spes generalior et in plus est a parte subiecti. Omnis enim viator, qui habet caritatem, habet spem; sed non convertitur, quia spes potest esse in peccatore¹⁵; et ideo actus spei origine praecedit actum caritatis respectu subiecti, a quo uterque actus sumit originem. Et sic ratio non valet.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de dotibus, quod perfecta tentio sequitur perfectam dilectionem; dicendum, quod illud non est usquequaque simile, propter hoc quod dotes in patria erunt aequalis perfectionis; in via autem caritas maioris perfectionis et dignitatis est, quantum est de ratione virtutis, quam sit ipsa spes¹⁶; et ideo non oportet, quod si in via exspectatio praecedit dilectionem praecipuam, quod propter hoc in patria tentio praecedat dilectionem perfectam. Quamvis enim virtutes aequales sint quantum ad rationem merendi, perfectior tamen est actus dilectionis quam exspectationis: sed in gloria perfecte diligere non est maioris dignitatis quam perfecte habere et perfecte tenere. Unde quamvis in via actus irascibilis praecedat actum concupiscibilis, non tamen sic oportet esse in patria, ubi est reformatio perfecta, immo potest esse e contrario. — Sunt autem et hic alii modi respondendi, qui causa brevitatis omittuntur ad praesens propter hoc, quod trahunt extra materiam istam ad ordinem et distinctionem ipsarum dotum¹⁷.

Question III. Whether hope precedes charity in the order of nature, or the reverse.

Thirdly it is asked concerning hope by comparison to the habit of charity, and the question is whether hope precedes charity in the order of nature, or the reverse; and we speak here of the habits in comparison to acts. And that hope precedes, it seems.

1. Upon that text of Matthew, chapter one¹: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob; the Gloss, that is, « faith generates hope, hope generates charity »: therefore if that which generates is, according to the order of nature, prior to what is generated, it is necessary that hope precede charity.

2. Likewise, the construction of the spiritual edifice is similar to a material building; but in a material building not only does the foundation precede the completion of the building, but also the wall, according to right order, precedes the roof itself: if therefore faith is likened to the sustaining foundation, and hope to the rising wall, and charity to the consummating roof²; it seems that hope precedes charity itself.

3. Likewise, according to the natural order the imperfect precedes the perfect, not the reverse; but charity is greater and more perfect than faith and hope, according to what is said in the first to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen³: But the greater of these is charity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no one can love a good for its own sake and above all things, to which he does not hope that he is able to attain⁴: if therefore charity loves God for his own sake and above all things, the act of charity follows the act of hope: therefore charity follows hope itself.

On the contrary it is objected: 1. First, by the authority of the Master in the text⁵: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from merits preceding hope itself, which charity precedes by nature »: therefore according to the natural order charity is before hope.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fourteenth book of the City of God⁶ says that every affection arises from love, therefore every right affection from a right love: since therefore charity directs the very love of the will, while the virtue of hope directs one of the four affections; it seems that hope is posterior to charity.

3. Likewise, no one hopes except for what he loves — for what one does not desire he in no way hopes — therefore the rightness of love precedes the rightness of expectation; but charity directs in loving, while hope directs in expecting: therefore charity⁷ is before hope.

4. Likewise, fear and hope are two affections running as it were together — whence in the Gloss, on Deuteronomy chapter twenty-four⁸, they are said to be « two millstones »; but every fear proceeds from love: therefore also every

hope: therefore gratuitous hope proceeds from gratuitous love: therefore according to the natural order charity precedes hope.

5. Likewise, « by however much something is more common, by so much is it prior⁹ »; but everything to be hoped for is to be loved, and the converse does not hold: therefore the act of love is more common than the act of hope: and if more common, then prior.

6. Likewise, that is the order of one virtue to another which is the order of one dowry to another; but perfect holding, which is the dowry corresponding to hope, follows perfect love, which is the dowry corresponding to charity: therefore it seems that on the way charity precedes hope according to the natural order.

Conclusion.

The act of hope, according to the order of nature, precedes the act of charity; whence also the habit of hope, in comparison to such an act, is prior to charity, although, considered in itself together with the habit of charity, it has simultaneity.

I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of comparing the habit of hope to the habit of charity: either by reason of the habits considered in themselves, or by reason of the habits compared to acts. If we speak of the habits themselves, considered in themselves, then they have no order, but simultaneity. For all the gratuitous virtues are infused together, according to what will be shown below¹⁰. — But if we speak of the habits themselves in comparison to acts, then one has an order to the other, because the act of one prepares and disposes to the act of the other, and by preparing and disposing it is in a certain way its principle and origin; and by reason of such preparation and origin there is order there. Since therefore the act of hope prepares and disposes to the act of charity as to a perfection and to the completion of the spiritual edifice — for no one loves any good for its own sake and above all things, unless he hopes that he will attain to that good — hence it is that according to the order of nature the act of hope precedes the act of charity; and hence it is that the habit of hope, in comparison to such an act, is prior to charity. — Whence the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary from the authority of the Master, that charity precedes hope by nature; it must be said that hope is taken there either for the thing hoped for, or for the very state of hope, not however for its first act, or habit¹¹. — It could also be said that the Master says this according to his own opinion, by which he believed that charity is not a created habit, but the Holy Spirit, who is the principle of all other goods. Whence, because in this opinion the Master is commonly not upheld, and that is his own word, that authority has no force.

2. To that which is objected, that love is the principle of all the affections; it must be said that this is true of love according to the imperfect state; but just as love according to the imperfection of its state is the principle of all the affections, so according to its perfection it is the final term and completion of all the affections. Whence all the affections of the soul are ordered to this, that God be loved perfectly; charity, however, does not name just any love, but the chief love. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that charity, according to the natural order, precedes hope itself¹².

3. To that which is objected, that no one hopes except for what he loves; it must be said that this is true; yet nevertheless from this it does not follow that hope follows charity, for the reason that charity adds such a circumstance upon love as necessarily follows upon the act of hoping and its rightness, as was touched on before. For since the motion of the love of charity is twofold, namely the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship; charity by the love of concupiscence desires God above all things, and by the love of friendship it likewise loves God for his own sake and above all things. Whence it desires God more than any other good, and wishes good to God more than one having charity would wish it for himself¹³. But the love of concupiscence cannot be so intense except by a preceding expectation. Likewise neither can the love of friendship be so elevated, unless confidence precede it. For no one wills good to another more than to himself, unless he confide in him totally; nor does anyone desire any good above all things, except he who presumes that he will at some time attain to it.

4. To that which is objected, that fear follows love, therefore so does hope likewise; it must be answered, as has been said, that although this affection

precedes that one, yet this habit in comparison to its act does not precede it, on account of the chief perfection which charity sets about the act of loving. — Moreover, when it is said that fear follows upon love: this is not understood of any love, but of self-love. For one fears punishment because he loves himself; charity, however, does not principally name self-love, but the love of God. And therefore it does not follow that the act of charity precedes the act of fear; nor from this can it be concluded that it likewise precedes the act of hope.

5. To that which is objected, that « that is prior from which the consequence is not converted¹⁴ »; it must be said that this holds true in those things which essentially follow upon one another; but in those which accompany one another, it does not hold true. And this is plain, because it follows, if there is snow, that it is white; but it is not converted, yet the whiteness of snow does not precede the very substance of the snow. Since therefore to hope and to love are acts accompanying one another; therefore, although the act of loving extends to lovable things, it is not necessary that it be prior in the order of nature. — Moreover, although charity is more general on the side of the object, yet hope is more general and extends to more on the side of the subject. For every wayfarer who has charity has hope; but it is not converted, because hope can be in a sinner¹⁵; and therefore the act of hope in its origin precedes the act of charity in respect of the subject, from which both acts take their origin. And so the argument has no force.

6. To that which is objected concerning the dowries, that perfect holding follows perfect love; it must be said that this is not alike in every respect, on account of this, that the dowries in the fatherland will be of equal perfection; but on the way charity is of greater perfection and dignity, as far as pertains to the nature of the virtue, than hope itself is¹⁶; and therefore it is not necessary that, if on the way expectation precedes the chief love, on this account in the fatherland holding should precede perfect love. For although the virtues are equal as to the ground of meriting, yet the act of love is more perfect than that of expectation: but in glory to love perfectly is not of greater dignity than to have perfectly and to hold perfectly. Whence although on the way the act of the irascible precedes the act of the concupiscible, yet it is not necessary that it be so in the fatherland, where there is perfect reformation, nay it can be the reverse. — There are also here other ways of responding, which for the sake of brevity are omitted for the present, on account of this, that they draw beyond this matter to the order and distinction of the dowries themselves¹⁷.

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