Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 17
Articulus II. De ordine eorum quae concurrunt ad iustificationem.
Consequenter viso de his quae concurrunt ad iustificationem impii in se, quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de ordine ipsorum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quatuor quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, utrum infusio gratiae necessario praecedat expulsionem culpae.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum expulsio culpae necessario praecedat contritionem.
Tertio, utrum ante contritionem necesse sit praecedere attritionem.
Quarto, utrum confessio necessario sequatur iustificationem.
Quaestio I. Utrum infusio gratiae necessario praecedat peccati expulsionem.
Circa primum, quod gratiae infusio necessario praecedat peccati expulsionem, videtur.
1. Ambrosius1 dicit: « Quemadmodum intrans animam sapientis disciplina imprudentiam tollit, ita perfecta virtus iniquitatem »: si ergo iniquitatem non tollit nisi perfecta virtus intrans, et haec est gratia: ergo etc.
2. Item, gratiam infundi non est aliud quam ipsam creari2; sed creatio gratiae praecedit expulsionem culpae, quia culpa non expellitur nisi per gratiam: ergo et gratiae infusio.
3. Item, si prius naturaliter expellitur culpa, quam infundatur gratia; cum culpa non possit expelli nisi per habitationem Dei in anima, tunc prius inhabitaret Deus animam, quam infunderet gratiam; et hoc est impossibile3.
4. Item, cum ignis expellit frigus, prius naturaliter immittit virtutem in materiam, quam illud expellit: si ergo Deus expellit culpam immittendo gratiam, ergo prior est gratiae immissio per naturam quam culpae expulsio.
Sed contra:
1. In qualibet mutatione prius est terminus a quo quam terminus ad quem secundum naturam, vel secundum tempus4; sed iustificatio incipit a malo et terminatur ad bonum: ergo si malum, a quo incipit, est peccatum, et bonum, ad quod tendit, est gratia; videtur, quod prior per naturam sit peccati expulsio quam gratiae infusio.
2. Item, « prius est natura a quo non convertitur secundum necessitatem consequentia5 »; sed necessario ad esse gratum sequitur esse mundum, et non e converso, ut patet in primo homine et Angelo, in quibus ante fuit status innocentiae quam gratiae: ergo naturaliter prius est esse mundum quam gratum. Sed esse mundum est per culpae expulsionem, esse gratum per infusionem gratiae: ergo culpae expulsio prior.
3. Item, medium est secundum naturam et secundum actualem existentiam, et licet inter culpam et gratiam non sit medium secundum actualem existentiam, est tamen medium secundum naturam, videlicet innocentia; sed medium secundum naturam in mutatione naturaliter praecedit extrema6: ergo etc.
4. Item, culpa expellitur, aut quando est, aut quando non est. Non quando non est, quia tunc semper expelleretur. Si quando est; sed quando est culpa in anima, non est infusa gratia, quia tunc simul essent duo opposita in eodem7: ergo ante expellitur culpa, quam infundatur gratia.
5. Item, si Deus successive operaretur, prius expelleret culpam, quam infunderet gratiam, prius, inquam, tempore; sed subita operatio, si8 tollat ordinem temporis, non tamen tollit ordinem naturae: ergo cum subito iustificet, prius naturaliter culpam expellit, quam det gratiam.
6. Item, non videtur, quod sit9 aliquis ordo, quoniam privare privationem nihil aliud est quam restituere habitum; sed culpa est privatio, gratia est habitus: ergo omnino est idem gratiam infundi et culpam expelli: ergo videtur, quod simul sint tempore et natura, cum eiusdem ad se non sit aliquis ordo.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Gratiae infusio, ut egrediens a suo principio, in iustificatione naturaliter praecedit expulsionem peccati.
Respondeo: Ad hoc voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod Deus se ipso expellit culpam; nam ipse de se dicit Isaiae quadragesimo tertio10: Ego sum, qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me. Unde secundum hos prius Deus mundat animam et postmodum dat gratiam simul tempore, tamen posterius natura.
Sed quia verum esse communiter ponitur, et credo, quod Deus expellit peccatum per gratiam, sicut sol per radios tenebras, sicut dicitur Actuum decimo quinto11: Fide purificans etc., et hoc supra monstratum est; ideo, cum causa praecedat effectum, infusio gratiae naturaliter prior est expulsione peccati, sicut lux praeit effugationem tenebrarum.
Ad quod intelligendum notandum est, quod qualitas aliqua, quae agit in aliud, habet triplicem comparationem, scilicet ad principium, a quo exit, et ad contrarium vel12 oppositum, quod expellit, et ad subiectum, quod perficit. Et sunt istae comparationes ordinatae. Prius enim comparatur ad principium, a quo producitur; secundo ad oppositum, quod expellitur; tertio ad subiectum, quod perficitur. Subiectum enim informatum aliqua qualitate, vel deformatum vitio, non potest intelligi informari aliqua bona qualitate vel perfectione, nisi prius intelligatur expulsio contrariae. Et impossibile est, quod aliquid intelligatur expulsum ab aliquo, quin prius intelligatur illud egredi a suo principio. Quoniam igitur gratiae infusio non dicit perfectionem subiecti nisi per concomitantiam, sed potius ipsius gratiae productionem ab agente; ideo patet, quod prior est quam expulsio, sicut causa prior est suo causato13.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium:
Ad 1. Quod obiicitur primo, quod prius est terminus a quo; dicendum, quod terminus ad quem non est gratiae infusio, sed magis subiectum esse gratum et mundatum et gratia informatum. Unde bene concedo, quod gratia prius per naturam habet rationem agentis quam informantis; et secundum quod habet rationem agentis, sic est principium iustificationis; secundum quod habet rationem informantis, sic est terminus.
Ad 2. Ad quod obiicitur, quod prius est esse mundum quam gratum; dicendum, quod quamvis prior sit mundatio per naturam quam gratificatio, non tamen est prior quam ipse mundans; et quia gratia non tantum est gratificans, sed etiam mundans; ideo praecedit. Unde ratio illa bona esset, si mundatio non esset a gratia tanquam a principio immediato et creato14; nunc autem ratio illa tantum valet, quod prius per naturam competit gratiae expellere culpam quam subiectum informare; et hoc verum est. Forma enim, quae inducitur in materiam aliquam, prius est ibi ut potentia sive ut agens, quam sit ut perficiens sive ut actus. Sive igitur expulsio culpae sit idem quod mundificatio, sive non; sequitur infusionem gratiae; gratia enim mundificat, et hoc per naturam prius habet facere quam subiectum denominare.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod munditia vel innocentia est medium inter gratiam et culpam; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non propter hoc est prius animae mundificatio quam gratiae infusio. Gratia enim creata in anima ipsam informat; et quia informare non potest, quamdiu obstaculum ibi est, scilicet quamdiu15 subiectum opposito habitu informatur; culpam expellit. Unde prius est culpae expulsio naturaliter quam animae informatio. Et ante haec duo prius est gratiae creatio quam aliquod horum; gratiae autem infusio non est aliud quam ipsius creatio. Unde cum dicit, quod gratiae infusio est ipsius subiecti habilitatio, hoc dictum est per concomitantiam.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur: quando culpa expellitur? aut quando est, aut quando non est; dicendum, quod quia expulsio est mutatio subita, et in mutatione subita simul est fieri et factum esse; ideo simul est expulsio et expulsum esse; unde expellitur, quando primo non est. Dicitur ergo pro tanto expelli, quia prius fuit et adhuc esset, nisi contrarium repugnaret; et non semper dicitur expelli, sed solum in primo instanti et in quo esse desinit, et tunc quidem non est.
Aliqui tamen volunt aliter dicere, quod quia culpa habet esse temporale, ideo non est in sui termino, sed gratia est in termino et in initio; et ideo dicunt, quod cum gratia infunditur, et incipit et est tunc; peccatum autem, cum desinit esse, non est. — Sed quidquid sit de verbo desinendi16, p. 427tamen credo, quod culpa bene habet esse in instanti, sicut et gratia, et est in sui termino, termino, inquam, intra; sed expulsio est terminus extra, quia simul est cum expulsum esse. — Et si tu obiicias, quod duo instantia sunt immediata; tunc respondendum est, sicut superius17 responsum fuit de transitione panis in corpus Christi, ubi positae sunt quinque responsiones, quas non oportet iterare propter brevitatem; et in ultima credo esse standum.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si Deus operaretur successive etc.; dicendum, quod aliud18 mundaret animam quam gratia, et tunc esset alius ordo naturae; nunc autem cum mundet19 per gratiam, necesse est, ordine naturae ipsam praecedere expulsionem culpae. Hoc autem posito, quod per gratiam mundet; impossibile est intelligere, quod successive, quia tunc simul esset gratia cum culpa; gratia autem talis proprietas est, quae culpae nullatenus possit permisceri.
Ad 6. Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod idem est removere privationem et dare habitum; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi est pura privatio; verum est etiam, ubi datur habitus praecise removens illam privationem. Nunc autem non est ita, sed peccatum, etsi dicat deformitatem, nihilominus tamen concernit aliquam materiam secundum quosdam20. Quidquid tamen sit de hoc, gratia non tantum reparat habitum oppositum culpae, qui est innocentia, sed superaddit, ut visum est supra21; et ideo non est omnino idem culpam expellere et gratiam dare. — Et illud tenet communis opinio, quae illa quatuor distinguit, quae concurrunt ad iustificationem impii, inter quae primum est gratiae infusio, ultimo vero ponitur culpae expulsio.
I. In quaestionibus huius articuli Scholastici quoad principia conveniebant, sed quoad quasdam subtiles quaestiones dissidebant. Affirmabant communiter, iustificationem impii fieri in instanti, et in eodem instanti quatuor coniungi inter se distinguenda. Haec ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 4. a. 6. § 4.) sic exponuntur: « In iustificatione enim sunt duo termini, scilicet a malo et ad bonum; unde ex parte Dei requiritur aliquid ex parte termini a quo, et aliquid ex parte termini ad quem; similiter ex parte nostra... Ex parte quidem Dei respectu termini in quem est infusio gratiae, respectu termini a quo remissio peccati. Ex parte nostra respectu termini in quem est motus liberi arbitrii [per fidem in Deum], respectu termini a quo contritio, quae est detestatio peccati ». Concordant perfecte S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 113. a. 6.) et S. Bonav. cum ceteris antiquis (cfr. scholion supra a. I. q. I.). — Non autem ita omnes conveniebant in solvenda quaestione, quo ordine naturae quatuor praedicta, quae ordine temporis coincidunt, ad invicem se habeant. — Et observandum est, quod haec quaestio minime respicit praeparationem, quae tempore iustificationem adulti praecedere debet (de qua saeculo XVIII. quoad qualitatem attritionis fuerunt graves controversiae), ut bene observant Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 7. § 1.) et S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 28. a. 3. 8.). Nec ipsa respicit actum contritionis a iam iustificato factum et a caritate vel elicitum, vel imperatum (cfr. infra q. 2. ad 1. 2. 3.). Recolatur etiam differentia in definienda contritione, quae inter antiquos et recentiores theologos versatur et supra in scholio ad a. 1. q. 1. notata est.
II. Controversia igitur est 1. de ordine naturae, qui est inter expulsionem culpae et infusionem gratiae (hic q. I.); 2. de eodem ordine inter actum contritionis et expulsionem culpae et gratiae infusionem; quae quaestiones intime cohaerent, et simul implicatur alia quaestio, utrum iste actus contritionis procedat ab ipsa gratia gratum faciente (habituali), an a gratia gratis data (actuali). — Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.) refert de his quinque opiniones, quarum ultima (quam censet esse probabilem) tenet, non esse quaerendum de prioritate secundum ordinem naturae, sed tantum de quatuor illis secundum rationem. Primo autem loco ipse recenset sententiam S. Thomae (S. I. II. q. 113. a. 8.), quam improbat, quod scilicet ordine naturae primum sit gratiae infusio, secundum motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, tertium motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, quartum remissio culpae. In qua sententia simul supponit S. Thom. ultimam dispositionem istam (contritionis actum) procedere ab ipsa gratia gratum faciente, « quia secundum ordinem causae formalis, efficientis et finalis infusio gratiae natura prior est », licet « secundum ordinem causae materialis remissio culpae praecedat infusionem gratiae » (hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1.). Similiter, « motus liberi arbitrii praecedit naturaliter gratiae infusionem, sicut dispositio materialis formam [sive secundum rationem causae materialis]. Si autem attendatur secundum rationem causae formalis, est e converso » (de Verit. q. 28. a. 8.). Hinc discipuli S. Thomae communius docent, contritionem procedere ab ipsa gratia habituali et sequi eandem in genere causae efficientis, ipsam vero praecedere in genere causae materialis. Et re vera ipsa verba S. Doctoris hoc satis clare docere videntur. Nihilominus cum aliis Thomistis Gotti (Theol. scholast. II. tr. 7. q. 2. dub. 4. § 6.) dicit, hanc assertionem non paucis scatere difficultatibus, probabiliusque videri, ultimam dispositionem illam non esse efficienter ab ipsa gratia habituali, sed ab auxilio supernaturali, et per consequens praecedere iustificationem.
III. Sententia S. Bonav. (de qua cfr. etiam supra d. 14. p. I. q. 3.) et Alexandri Hal. facile intelligitur, si attenditur duplex distinctio, quam facit S. Doctor. Prima fit circa gratiam (q. I. in corp.), quam considerat sub triplici ratione simulque dicit, quod prius per naturam habeat rationem agentis quam informantis (ibid. ad 1.) et mundantis quam gratificantis. Simul est observandum, quod gratiae infusio ab ipso hic intelligitur productio eius a primo principio, non informatio et perfectio subiecti nisi per concomitantiam (in fine corp.). Unde patet, quod gratiae productio prior est expulsione peccati, haec vero natura prior quam eadem gratia, quatenus subiectum informat et gratificat, quod est ultimus terminus ad quem (ad 1. 2. 3.). De gratia ut movente cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6. — Similiter auctor distinguit22 actum contritionis (hic q. 2. ad 1. 2. 3.) sive potius formationem huius actus, ut sit scilicet vel a gratia eliciente et imperante, vel tantum adveniente; sive aliis verbis, in adulto p. 428peccatore iste actus in primo instanti naturae praeintelligitur informis, in secundo intelligitur formata; ut informis necessario praecedit et expulsionem peccati et gratiae informationem. Hoc docet etiam Scot. et communior opinio (cfr. infra q. 3.). In solut. ad 4. adhibentur eadem principia, quae explicata sunt supra d. 11. p. I. q. 5. et in scholio.23
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Article II. On the order of the things that concur unto justification.
Consequently, having considered the things that concur unto the justification of the sinner in itself, with respect to the second article inquiry is made about the order of these things to one another. And concerning this four things are asked.
First it is asked, whether the infusion of grace necessarily precedes the expulsion of sin.
Second it is asked, whether the expulsion of sin necessarily precedes contrition.
Third, whether before contrition it is necessary that attrition precede.
Fourth, whether confession necessarily follows justification.
Question I. Whether the infusion of grace necessarily precedes the expulsion of sin.
Concerning the first: that the infusion of grace necessarily precedes the expulsion of sin, it seems so.
1. Ambrose1 says: « Just as the discipline of wisdom, entering the soul, takes away imprudence, so perfect virtue takes away iniquity »: if therefore iniquity is not taken away except by perfect virtue entering in, and this is grace: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, for grace to be infused is nothing other than for it to be created2; but the creation of grace precedes the expulsion of sin, because sin is not expelled except through grace: therefore so too is the infusion of grace.
3. Likewise, if sin is naturally expelled first, before grace is infused; since sin cannot be expelled except through the indwelling of God in the soul, then God would dwell in the soul before He would infuse grace; and this is impossible3.
4. Likewise, when fire expels cold, it first naturally sends its power into the matter, before it expels the cold: if therefore God expels sin by sending in grace, then the sending-in of grace is prior by nature to the expulsion of sin.
On the contrary:
1. In any change the terminus from which is naturally prior to the terminus to which, whether according to nature or according to time4; but justification begins from evil and terminates at good: therefore if the evil from which it begins is sin, and the good to which it tends is grace; it seems that the expulsion of sin is by nature prior to the infusion of grace.
2. Likewise, « that is prior in nature from which the consequence is not converted according to necessity5 »; but to being clean there necessarily follows being in grace, and not conversely, as is clear in the first man and the Angel, in whom there was the state of innocence before that of grace: therefore by nature being clean is prior to being in grace. But being clean is through the expulsion of sin, being in grace through the infusion of grace: therefore the expulsion of sin is prior.
3. Likewise, the mean is [a mean] according to nature and according to actual existence, and although between sin and grace there is no mean according to actual existence, there is nevertheless a mean according to nature, namely innocence; but a mean according to nature in a change naturally precedes the extremes6: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, sin is expelled either when it is, or when it is not. Not when it is not, because then it would always be being expelled. If when it is; but when sin is in the soul, grace is not infused, because then two opposites would be at once in the same thing7: therefore sin is expelled before grace is infused.
5. Likewise, if God were to operate successively, He would first expel sin before He would infuse grace, first, I say, in time; but a sudden operation, even if8 it removes the order of time, nevertheless does not remove the order of nature: therefore since He justifies suddenly, He first naturally expels sin before He gives grace.
6. Likewise, it does not seem that there is any order, since to deprive a privation is nothing other than to restore the habit; but sin is a privation, grace is a habit9: therefore it is altogether the same for grace to be infused and for sin to be expelled: therefore it seems that they are simultaneous in time and nature, since of the same thing in relation to itself there is no order.
Conclusion
Conclusion. The infusion of grace, as proceeding from its principle, in justification naturally precedes the expulsion of sin.
I respond: To this some have wished to say that God expels sin by Himself; for He says of Himself in Isaiah forty-three10: I am He who blots out your iniquities for My own sake. Hence according to these, God first cleanses the soul and afterward gives grace, [the two] simultaneous in time, yet posterior in nature.
But because the true [view] is more commonly held, and I believe that God expels sin through grace, as the sun [expels] darkness through its rays, as is said in Acts fifteen11: Purifying by faith etc., and this was shown above; therefore, since the cause precedes the effect, the infusion of grace is naturally prior to the expulsion of sin, just as light goes before the driving-away of darkness.
For the understanding of this it must be noted that some quality which acts upon another thing has a threefold relation, namely to the principle from which it issues, and to the contrary or12 opposite which it expels, and to the subject which it perfects. And these relations are ordered. For first it is related to the principle from which it is produced; second to the opposite which is expelled; third to the subject which is perfected. For a subject informed by some quality, or deformed by a vice, cannot be understood to be informed by some good quality or perfection, unless first the expulsion of the contrary is understood. And it is impossible that anything be understood as expelled from something, unless first that thing be understood to issue from its principle. Since therefore the infusion of grace does not signify the perfection of the subject except by concomitance, but rather the production of grace itself by the agent; therefore it is plain that it is prior to the expulsion, just as a cause is prior to its effect13.
To that, then, which is objected on the contrary:
To 1. To what is objected first, that the terminus from which is prior; it must be said that the terminus to which is not the infusion of grace, but rather the subject's being in grace and cleansed and informed by grace. Hence I readily grant that grace by nature has the character of an agent before that of an informing [form]; and insofar as it has the character of an agent, thus it is the principle of justification; insofar as it has the character of an informing [form], thus it is the terminus.
To 2. To what is objected, that being clean is prior to being in grace; it must be said that although cleansing is by nature prior to gracing, nevertheless it is not prior to the one cleansing itself; and because grace is not only that which graces, but also that which cleanses; therefore it precedes. Hence that argument would be good, if cleansing were not from grace as from an immediate and created principle14; but as it is, that argument has only this force, that by nature it belongs to grace to expel sin before it informs the subject; and this is true. For a form which is introduced into some matter is first there as a potency or as an agent, before it is there as perfecting or as an act. Whether therefore the expulsion of sin be the same as cleansing, or not; it follows the infusion of grace; for grace cleanses, and this by nature it has to do before it denominates the subject.
To 3. To that which is objected, that cleanness or innocence is a mean between grace and sin; it must be said that this is true; but not on account of this is the cleansing of the soul prior to the infusion of grace. For grace, created in the soul, informs it; and because it cannot inform so long as an obstacle is there, namely so long as15 the subject is informed by the opposite habit; it expels sin. Hence the expulsion of sin is naturally prior to the informing of the soul. And before these two, the creation of grace is prior to any of them; but the infusion of grace is nothing other than its creation. Hence when he says that the infusion of grace is the enabling of the subject itself, this is said by concomitance.
To 4. To that which is asked: when is sin expelled? either when it is, or when it is not; it must be said that, because expulsion is a sudden change, and in a sudden change the coming-to-be and the having-come-to-be are simultaneous; therefore the expulsion and the having-been-expelled are simultaneous; hence it is expelled when first it is not. It is therefore said to be expelled inasmuch as it was before and would still be, were the contrary not to oppose it; and it is not always said to be expelled, but only in the first instant and in the [instant] in which its being ceases, and then indeed it is not.
Some, however, wish to say otherwise, that because sin has temporal being, therefore it is not in its terminus, but grace is in the terminus and in the beginning; and therefore they say that when grace is infused, it both begins and is then; but sin, when it ceases to be, is not. — But whatever may be the case as to the word "ceasing"16, yet I believe that sin too has being in an instant, just as grace does, and is in its terminus, in the terminus, I say, within; but the expulsion is the terminus without, because it is simultaneous with the having-been-expelled. — And if you object that two instants are immediate; then it must be answered, just as was answered above17 concerning the transition of bread into the body of Christ, where five answers were set down, which need not be repeated for the sake of brevity; and in the last one I believe one must stand.
To 5. To that which is objected, if God were to operate successively etc.; it must be said that something other than grace would cleanse the soul18, and then there would be another order of nature; but as it is, since He cleanses19 through grace, it is necessary that, in the order of nature, it precede the expulsion of sin. But this being granted, that He cleanses through grace, it is impossible to understand that [it be] successive, because then grace would be simultaneous with sin; but grace is such a property that it can in no way be mingled with sin.
To 6. To what is objected lastly, that it is the same to remove a privation and to give a habit; it must be said that this is true where there is a pure privation; it is true also where a habit is given that precisely removes that privation. But as it is, it is not so, but sin, even though it bespeaks a deformity, nevertheless concerns some matter according to certain ones20. Yet whatever may be the case about this, grace not only repairs the habit opposed to sin, which is innocence, but superadds [something], as was seen above21; and therefore it is not altogether the same to expel sin and to give grace. — And this the common opinion holds, which distinguishes those four things that concur unto the justification of the sinner, among which the first is the infusion of grace, while the expulsion of sin is placed last.
I. In the questions of this article the Scholastics agreed as to principles, but as to certain subtle questions they differed. They commonly affirmed that the justification of the sinner takes place in an instant, and that in the same instant four things to be distinguished from one another are conjoined. These are expounded by Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. IV, q. 17, m. 4, a. 6, § 4) thus: « For in justification there are two termini, namely from evil and to good; whence on the part of God something is required on the part of the terminus from which, and something on the part of the terminus to which; likewise on our part... On the part of God indeed, with respect to the terminus to which is the infusion of grace, with respect to the terminus from which the remission of sin. On our part, with respect to the terminus to which is the movement of free will [through faith into God], with respect to the terminus from which contrition, which is the detestation of sin ». St. Thomas (Summa I-II, q. 113, a. 6) and St. Bonaventure agree perfectly with the other ancients (cf. the scholion above on a. 1, q. 1). — But not all agreed in solving the question, in what order of nature the four aforesaid things, which coincide in the order of time, are related to one another. — And it must be observed that this question by no means concerns the preparation which in time must precede the justification of an adult (about which, in the eighteenth century, there were grave controversies as to the quality of attrition), as Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., a. 7, § 1) and St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 28, a. 3, 8) well observe. Nor does it concern the act of contrition made by one already justified and either elicited or commanded by charity (cf. below, q. 2, ad 1, 2, 3). Let there also be recalled the difference in defining contrition which obtains between the ancient and the more recent theologians, and which was noted above in the scholion on a. 1, q. 1.
II. The controversy therefore is 1. about the order of nature which is between the expulsion of sin and the infusion of grace (here, q. I); 2. about the same order between the act of contrition and the expulsion of sin and the infusion of grace; which questions are intimately connected, and at the same time another question is involved, whether this act of contrition proceeds from grace itself that makes acceptable (habitual), or from grace gratuitously given (actual). — Richard of Mediavilla (here, a. 1, q. 4) reports five opinions concerning these, of which the last (which he judges to be probable) holds that there is no inquiry to be made about priority according to the order of nature, but only about those four according to reason. But in the first place he reviews the opinion of St. Thomas (Summa I-II, q. 113, a. 8), which he disapproves, namely that in the order of nature the first is the infusion of grace, the second the movement of free will into God, the third the movement of free will against sin, the fourth the remission of sin. In which opinion St. Thomas at the same time supposes that this last disposition (the act of contrition) proceeds from grace itself that makes acceptable, « because according to the order of formal, efficient, and final cause the infusion of grace is by nature prior », although « according to the order of material cause the remission of sin precedes the infusion of grace » (here, q. 1, a. 4, quaestiuncula 1). Likewise, « the movement of free will naturally precedes the infusion of grace, just as a material disposition [precedes] the form [or according to the account of material cause]. But if it be considered according to the account of formal cause, it is the reverse » (de Verit. q. 28, a. 8). Hence the disciples of St. Thomas more commonly teach that contrition proceeds from habitual grace itself and follows it in the genus of efficient cause, but precedes it in the genus of material cause. And in truth the very words of the holy Doctor seem to teach this clearly enough. Nevertheless, with other Thomists, Gotti (Theol. scholast. II, tr. 7, q. 2, dub. 4, § 6) says that this assertion teems with not a few difficulties, and that it seems more probable that that last disposition is not efficiently from habitual grace itself, but from a supernatural help, and consequently precedes justification.
III. The opinion of St. Bonaventure (about which cf. also above, d. 14, p. I, q. 3) and of Alexander of Hales is easily understood, if one attends to the twofold distinction which the holy Doctor makes. The first is made concerning grace (q. I, in corp.), which he considers under a threefold account, and at the same time says that by nature it has the character of an agent before that of an informing [form] (ibid., ad 1) and of that which cleanses before that which graces. At the same time it must be observed that the infusion of grace is here understood by him [as] its production from the first principle, not the informing and perfection of the subject except by concomitance (at the end of the corpus). Hence it is plain that the production of grace is prior to the expulsion of sin, but this is by nature prior to the same grace insofar as it informs and graces the subject, which is the ultimate terminus to which (ad 1, 2, 3). On grace as a moving [cause] cf. II Sent., d. 26, q. 6. — Likewise the author distinguishes22 the act of contrition (here, q. 2, ad 1, 2, 3), or rather the formation of this act, that it be namely either from grace eliciting and commanding, or only supervening; or in other words, in the adult sinner this act in the first instant of nature is pre-understood as unformed, in the second is understood as formed; so that as unformed it necessarily precedes both the expulsion of sin and the informing of grace. This Scotus also teaches, and the more common opinion (cf. below, q. 3). In the solution to argument 4 the same principles are employed which were explained above in d. 11, p. I, q. 5, and in the scholion.23
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- 1In Apologia prophetae David, c. 13. n. 63. Post tollit textus originalis addit et scientia ignorantiam. Cfr. C. Ille rex (25.), § 4. de Poenitentia, d. 3.In the Apology of the Prophet David, c. 13, n. 63. After tollit the original text adds et scientia ignorantiam [and knowledge ignorance]. Cf. C. Ille rex (25), § 4, On Penance, d. 3.
- 2Vide I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4. in corp.See I Sent., d. 9, q. 4, in the corpus.
- 3Cfr. Sap. 1, 4. — Verbis cum culpa plures codd. interserunt omnis, et subinde pro tunc prius plurimi codd. tunc primum, cod. H tunc prius primum.Cf. Wisdom 1:4. — To the words cum culpa several codices insert omnis, and thereafter for tunc prius very many codices read tunc primum, codex H tunc prius primum.
- 4Cfr. Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 40. seqq. (c. 5.).Cf. Aristotle, Physics VI, text 40 ff. (c. 5).
- 5Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori: Secundo autem [prius alterum altero dicitur], quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unum duobus prius est; duobus enim existentibus, mox unum esse consequens est; uno vero existente, duo esse non necessarium est; quare non convertitur ab uno consequentia, ut reliquum sit; prius autem illud esse videtur, a quo non convertitur eius quod est esse consequentia. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 574, nota 1. et pag. 573, nota 1. — De primo statu Angelorum et hominis vide II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 29. a. 2. q. 2. — Inferius post quam gratiae codd. RS addunt infusio.Aristotle, Categories, c. On the Prior: In the second way [one thing is said to be prior to another], that which is not converted according to the consequence of subsisting, as one is prior to two; for two existing, that one exists is at once a consequence; but one existing, that two exist is not necessary; wherefore the consequence is not converted from the one, so that the other should remain; but that is seen to be prior from which the consequence of that which is, as to being, is not converted. Cf. tome III, p. 574, note 1, and p. 573, note 1. — On the first state of the Angels and of man see II Sent., d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 29, a. 2, q. 2. — Below, after quam gratiae, codices RS add infusio.
- 6Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 22. (IX. c. 7.): Media namque illa dicimus, in quae necesse est primo transmutari quod transmutetur, ut puta... si ex albo ad nigrum veniat, prius ad puniceum et fuscum, quam ad nigrum veniet. Cfr. V. Phys. text. 6. et 52. (c. 1. et 5.). — In hoc arg. ex codd. DFG (ea secunda manu) supplevimus videlicet innocentia, quae lectio confirmatur falsa lectione codd. R S bb videlicet in essentia. Pro actualem existentiam fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 perperam actualem exigentiam (cfr. supra a. I. q. I. in corp. et ad 3.).Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 22 (IX, c. 7): For we call those things means into which it is necessary that whatever is changed first be changed, for instance... if it passes from white to black, it will come first to crimson and dusky, before it comes to black. Cf. Physics V, text 6 and 52 (c. 1 and 5). — In this argument, from codices DFG (in a second hand) we have supplied videlicet innocentia, which reading is confirmed by the false reading of codices R S bb videlicet in essentia. For actualem existentiam nearly all codices and ed. 1 wrongly [read] actualem exigentiam (cf. above, a. I, q. I, in the corpus and ad 3).
- 7Quod est impossibile secundum Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.).Which is impossible according to Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 4 (c. 14).
- 8Edd. cum pluribus codd. etsi. Cod. P huic arg. subnectit: De hoc est auctoritas VII. Levit. [scil. Glossa ordinaria in v. 33. sumta ex Origen. homil. 5. n. 12.]: Cum ablatum fuerit a corde tuo omne crassum, et mundatum fuerit ab omni inquinamento [Glossa: operimento], quod igni tradendum est, restat, ut ei apponatur gratia Spiritus sancti: ergo etc.The editions, with several codices, [read] etsi. Codex P appends to this argument: On this there is the authority of Leviticus 7 [namely the Glossa ordinaria on v. 33, taken from Origen, homily 5, n. 12]: When all that is gross has been taken away from your heart, and it has been cleansed from every defilement [Gloss: covering], which must be given over to the fire, it remains that the grace of the Holy Spirit be added to it: therefore etc.
- 9Non pauci codd. et ed. 1 omittunt quod sit.Not a few codices and ed. 1 omit quod sit.
- 10Vers. 25. Vide supra pag. 419, nota 4.Verse 25. See above, p. 419, note 4.
- 11Vers. 9. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. seq.Verse 9. Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1 and following.
- 12Ex codd. FGHL adiecimus vel. Inferius post istae cod. bb subiungit tres, et pro quod perficitur codd. GRSbb a quo expellitur.From codices FGHL we have added vel. Below, after istae, codex bb subjoins tres, and for quod perficitur codices GRSbb [read] a quo expellitur.
- 13Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.): Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa. — Post prior est cod. X supplet infusio gratiae et culpae post expulsio.Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, c. 17 (c. 14): For a cause is prior to that of which it is the cause. — After prior est codex X supplies infusio gratiae et culpae post expulsio.
- 14Cod. aa immediante et creante.Codex aa [reads] immediante et creante [as an immediate and creating (principle)].
- 15Pro scilicet quamdiu, quod habet cod. A et quod non pauci codd. omittunt, codd. ELaa et, cod. K (1a secunda manu) dum, edd. legunt: ideo subiectum opposito habitu informat et culpam expellit. Codd. HPQ, omisso scilicet quamdiu, post informatur addunt qui. In fine solut. pro habilitatio plures codd. habitatio.For scilicet quamdiu, which codex A has and which not a few codices omit, codices ELaa [read] et, codex K (in a second hand) dum, the editions read: thus it informs the subject with the opposite habit and expels sin. Codices HPQ, omitting scilicet quamdiu, after informatur add qui. At the end of the solution, for habilitatio several codices [read] habitatio.
- 16Cfr. tom. III. pag. 252, nota 3. — Inferius pro cum expulsum esse cod. X cum eo quod est expulsum esse, cod. Z expelli et expulsum esse.Cf. tome III, p. 252, note 3. — Below, for cum expulsum esse codex X [reads] cum eo quod est expulsum esse, codex Z expelli et expulsum esse.
- 17Dist. 11. p. I. q. 5. ad 4. — Pro transitione codd. R S bb transsubstantiatione.Distinction 11, p. I, q. 5, ad 4. — For transitione codices R S bb [read] transsubstantiatione.
- 18Codd. A aa cum non mundet nisi.Codices A aa [read] cum non mundet nisi [since He cleanses only].
- 19Vide II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. scholion. — Pro materiam codd. EL naturam, plures alii maculam.See II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, scholion. — For materiam codices EL [read] naturam, several others maculam.
- 20Vide II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. scholion. — Pro materiam codd. EL naturam, plures alii maculam. [Idem ac nota praecedens; vide supra.][This reference belongs with the variant noted above on materiam; the editors' note treats secundum quosdam with II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, scholion.] [?]
- 21Art. 1. q. I. Ibid. q. 3. de quatuor, quae concurrunt ad iustificationem. — Superius pro reparat cod. aa recuperat; subinde post culpae ex eodem cod. aa cum cod. N substituimus qui est pro quae est.Article 1, q. I. Ibidem, q. 3, on the four things that concur unto justification. — Above, for reparat codex aa [reads] recuperat; thereafter, after culpae, from the same codex aa together with codex N we have substituted qui est for quae est.
- 22[Scholion, sect. III:] auctor distinguit actum contritionis (hic q. 2. ad 1. 2. 3.).[Scholion, sect. III:] the author distinguishes the act of contrition (here, q. 2, ad 1, 2, 3).
- 23[Scholion, in fine, p. 428:] De utraque quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 17. m. 4. a. 7. § 1-3. — Scot., supra d. 16. q. 2. praesertim n. 18. 19. — B. Albert., hic a. II. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1-4. — De his et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 1; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.[Scholion, at the end, p. 428:] On both questions, besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., q. 17, m. 4, a. 7, §§ 1-3. — Scotus, above d. 16, q. 2, especially nn. 18, 19. — Bl. Albert, here a. II. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunculae 1-4. — On these and the following question, Durandus, here q. 1; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. ---