Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14
Articulus II. De poenitentia in comparatione.
Quaestio I. Quae vis animae sit subiectum virtutis poenitentiae.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de poenitentia in comparatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur de ipsa per comparationem ad subiectum. Secundo, quantum ad actum sive originem. Tertio, quantum ad ordinem.
Primo quaeritur, quae vis animae sit subiectum virtutis poenitentiae; et ostenditur, quod sit in vi animae irascibili.
1. Augustinus in libro de Poenitentia1, poenitentiam definiens, dicit, quod est « quaedam dolentis vindicta »; constans autem est, quod vindicta est ipsius irascibilis et vindictam appetere: ergo etc.
2. Item, super illud Psalmi2: Irascimini etc.; Glossa: « Quid iustius, quam ut suis quisque irascatur peccatis potius quam alienis, seque puniens per poenitentiam Deo offerat »: ergo irasci peccatis est per poenitentiam; sed constat, quod irasci est ipsius irascibilis: ergo et poenitere.
3. Item, Ioannes Chrysostomus3: « Perfecta poenitentia cogit poenitentem omnia libenter sufferre »; sed hoc est ipsius irascibilis: ergo poenitentia est in vi irascibili.
4. Item, poenitere, sicut patet ex ratione nominis, « est poenam tenere », et ipse Augustinus4 hanc etymologiam ponit; sed vis, quae respicit poenam et sustinet, est irascibilis: ergo etc.
5. Item, poenitentia virtus est, non solum secundum quod respicit culpam, sed secundum quod est in subiectum, scilicet in hominem, qui offendit, ut puniatur, et per poenam emenda fiat; et hoc patet per duo, quae Magister dicit in littera5. Dicit enim, quod « poenitentia dicitur a puniendo »; dicit etiam, quod per poenitentiam « mala plangimus cum emendationis proposito ». Ergo cum virtus, qua volumus, proximum peccantem puniri, sit in irascibili, scilicet ira per zelum, pari ratione et poenitentia erit in irascibili.
Sed contra: 1. Videtur, quod poenitentia sit in synderesi: quia cuius est actus, eius est habitus; sed actus poenitentiae est gemere, et gemere est synderesis: ergo et poenitentia. Prima patet; secunda probatur, quia scribitur ad Romanos octavo6: Spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus; sed Glossa dicit, quod spiritus est synderesis: ergo etc.
2. Item, videtur, quod in rationali: quia in ea vi est poenitentia, cuius est agere poenitentiam; sed agere poenitentiam est ipsius rationis: ergo et poenitentia. Prima patet; minor probatur, super illud Psalmi7: Spera in Deo etc.; Glossa: « Id est, de peccatis poenitentiam agam »; et ut habetur in Glossa: Quare tristis etc.: « Ratio confortat animam sensibilem »: ergo ratio agit poenitentiam: ergo etc.
3. Item, videtur, quod in concupiscibili: quia « opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem8 »; sed delectatio et tristitia sunt opposita, similiter dolor et gaudium, amor et odium; sed in poenitentia est dolor, tristitia et odium peccati: cum ergo horum opposita, scilicet amor, gaudium et delectatio, sint in concupiscibili; per praedictam regulam poenitentia est in concupiscibili: non ergo in irascibili.
4. Item, videtur, quod sit in qualibet vi animae: quia quae mutuo se expellunt habent esse circa idem susceptibile9; sed poenitentia expellit omnia peccata: ergo cum diversa genera peccatorum sint in diversis viribus, poenitentia non est in una vi, sed in diversis.
Conclusio. Probabilius est, poenitentiam esse in voluntate, et quidem in irascibili.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc varie opinati sunt diversi.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod poenitentia circuit omnes vires10, quia expellit omnia peccata et omnia deflet. Et quoniam pro omnibus deflet, et ad perfectum fletum concurrit motus omnium virtutum, et ad expulsionem vitiorum concurrunt habitus virtutum omnium; voluerunt, quod poenitentia in omnibus viribus esset tanquam iustitia generalis.
Et hoc nituntur ostendere per Glossam super illud Isaiae decimo sexto11: Venter meus ad Moab quasi cithara sonabit — interlinearis exponit: « Sonabit plangendo » — et Glossa dicit: « Sicut cithara compositum sonum non emittit, si una chorda rupta fuerit; sic spiritualis venter Prophetae, si una chorda virtutum rupta fuerit, dulces melodias non resonabit ». Et ex hoc volunt habere, quod similiter est in luctu poenitentiae, et ita quod poenitentia sit in omni vi. Et ideo dicunt, quod poenitentia definitur per actus diversarum virium; dicunt etiam, quod ei respondent12 actus virium diversarum. Satisfacit enim poenitens orando, et hoc est rationalis; ieiunando, et hoc est concupiscibilis; miserendo sive eleemosynam tribuendo, et hoc est similiter concupiscibilis; poenam sufferendo, et hoc est irascibilis.
— Sed ista positio partim supra13 improbata est. Si enim poenitentia est habitus specialis et unus, ut supra monstratum est; unus habitus in una est et potentia, cum unum accidens sit in uno subiecto14, et subiectum virtutis sit potentia: necesse est, quod poenitentia non in omni, sed in aliqua vi sit determinate. — Sed illud est quod decepit ponentes, quod in omnibus viribus esset, quia poenitentia ab omnibus imperatur; et hinc est, quod ad luctum poenitentiae omnes virtutes concurrunt ut annexae, et videtur, quod poenitentia sit in omnibus viribus et virtutes ceteras complectatur. — Istud etiam decepit eos, quia actum specialem et proprium poenitentiae non respexerunt, qui non est omnis, sed alicuius specialis vis. Et ideo haec positio non est multum probabilis.
Secunda positio est, quod poenitentia est in vi determinata, sed non est in aliqua trium virium praedictarum, sed in vi superiori ad illas tres; et hanc vocant liberum arbitrium, in quo coniugatae sunt vis cognitiva et motiva, eo quod imperat aliis viribus et ei non imperatur, et circa quod residet meritum ex parte nostra. Et quia virtus a nulla potentia imperatur, quia etiam virtus est ad merendum; posuerunt, omnes virtutes et poenitentiam esse in libero arbitrio tanquam in subiecto. Quia vero liberum arbitrium regit potentias inferiores; et per unam virtutem potest regere multas potentias, sicut per iustitiam et poenitentiam: hinc est, quod poenitentia videtur esse in inferioribus viribus, videtur etiam esse in pluribus, quamvis subiective sit in una sola. — Verumtamen, sicut alibi15 melius patet, liberum arbitrium non dicit aliam potentiam ab his, scilicet rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili, licet dicat per alium modum — quia dicit per modum moventis et imperantis: sed istae potentiae sunt ei obedientes, ita quod eadem potentia in quantum libera imperat sibi ut natura — et ideo, si ista positio velit dicere, quod liberum arbitrium dicat potentiam secundum rem et naturam distinctam ab his, rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili; tunc16 non intelligo nec credo, quod habeat veritatem. Si vero vult dicere, quod nominent eandem potentiam, sed tamen secundum alium modum se habendi; hoc ego non nego.
Sed adhuc remanet eadem dubitatio, si potentiae animae diversae sunt, in qua sit secundum rem; quia vel oportet ad hoc venire, quod illae tres potentiae sint in una potentia secundum rem; vel quod liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta ab illis; vel quod omnis virtus sit in aliqua istarum trium, scilicet vel in rationali, vel concupiscibili, vel irascibili, in quibus consueverunt communiter a doctoribus et patribus nostris tres virtutes theologicae poni, cum actus harum virium immediate tendant in Deum. Et certe, si theologicae ibi reponuntur, quare non et cardinales secundum aspectum earum ad inferius17?
Tertia positio est, quod poenitentia est in rationali; et ratio huius positionis haec est, quia poenitentia est pars iustitiae cardinalis. Cum enim sit virtus et non sit theologica, necesse est, quod reducatur ad aliquam virtutem. Cum ergo virtus cardinalis sufficienter et secundum Sanctos et secundum philosophos dividatur in quatuor; et poenitentia non sit sub aliqua aliarum: constat, quod poenitentia, ut praemissum est18, sub iustitia continetur; iustitia autem, cum sit habitus unus, non potest esse in pluribus viribus: ergo necesse est, quod sit in una. — Rursus, cum actus iustitiae, qui est « reddere unicuique quod suum est19 », proprie sit rationis, quia iste est actus iudicialis, et ratio est iudex in regno animae; dicunt, quod iustitia est in ratione, ut est iudex, sicut prudentia est in ea, ut est dux sive consiliarius. Et quoniam
ratio, ut est iudex, imperat toti animae; hinc est, quod iustitia cardinalis dicitur omnes vires animae circuire20. Et hinc est, quod habitus continet, qui videntur ad affectionem pertinere, sicut obedientiam et poenitentiam; et hinc est, quod poenitentia in una vi est, tamen multas circuire videtur; et ideo in rationali est, ut est regitiva irascibilis et concupiscibilis, ut moveat concupiscibilem ad gemendum pro culpa, et irascibilem ad puniendum ipsam animam.
Sed nec illud est multum rationabile inspicienti, quod poenitentia, quae in affectu maxime sonat, et humilitas, quae est species iustitiae, sit in rationali. — Et ulterius, habitus virtutis non debet poni circa virtutem imperantem, sed elicientem. Nam in eliciendo est difficultas, et respectu illius sive ratione illius est habilitatio; unde motus virtutis non dicitur esse huius proprie vel illius nisi virtutis elicientis: sicut si caritas imperet continere vel iustitia pugnare; tamen continere semper est continentiae, et recte pugnare est fortitudinis. Sicut ergo poenitere non est nisi poenitentiae, sic habitus non est in virtute imperante, sed eliciente; haec autem non est vis rationalis, sed vis affectiva, et maxime irascibilis, sicut patet ex rationibus prius visis21. Nam poenitentia non tantum respicit vitium, quod abominatur, quantum subiectum peccati, contra quod insurgit et quod insurgendo punit; et non tam respicit culpam sive offensam, quam etiam emendam; et ista emenda est in poenae sufferentia, et ideo recte dicitur vindicta.
Et ideo est alia opinio, quod poenitentia, ut est specialis virtus, est in irascibili. Hanc positionem credo probabiliorem. Non enim capio, quomodo poenitentia in omnibus viribus esse possit, cum sit habitus specialis. — Sic nec secundum capio, quomodo omnis virtus sit in una vi, supposito quod potentiae rationales sint plures, quae sunt proprie ipsius animae, ut rationalis est, sive sint plures in quantum22 potentiae, sive, ut dicunt alii, plures vires. — Nec tertium, quomodo poenitentia et humilitas sint in ratione, cum dicant, quod est affectionis, ut etiam ipsa spes vel caritas. — Et ideo dicendum, quod cum poenitentia de se dicat habitum affectionis, quod est in potentia affectiva. Cum autem dicat affectionem odii vel doloris ut vindictae et ut punientis, sicut patet ex multiplici auctoritate et ratione in opponendo23: et illud odium, quod est cum insurrectione, sit in irascibili potentia: quod ipsa poenitentia est in irascibili.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sit in synderesi; dicendum, quod argumentum illud deficit, quia gemere non est synderesis ut elicientis nec ut perfecte imperantis, quia sic nihil potest imperare libero arbitrio; sed potius est ut remurmurantis malo et dictantis bonum, quia naturaliter remurmurat malo; et in hoc errare non potest24. Et quoniam virtus est in potentia, penes quam residet facultas et imperium eliciendi actum: ideo non est in synderesi, sed in libero arbitrio. Libertas autem arbitrii non solum est in ratione, sed in concupiscibili et irascibili, quia complectitur rationem et voluntatem; et voluntas continet potentiam amandi et detestandi, scilicet concupiscibilem et irascibilem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sit in rationali; dicendum, quod ratio dicitur multipliciter; tamen quantum pertinet ad propositum, dicitur communiter et proprie25. Communiter comprehendit totam portionem animae divisam contra sensualitatem, in qua ponuntur tres potentiae; et sic accipitur in Glossa praedicta. Proprie accipitur pro potentia divisa contra concupiscibilem et irascibilem; et sic obiicitur, et sic non valet obiectio.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sit in concupiscibili propter hoc, quod odium est in eadem;
dicendum, quod odium dicitur dupliciter: aut cum quadam displicentia, aut cum insurrectione, vindicta et ira; et primum est in concupiscibili, secundum in irascibili; et tale est in poenitentia. Sicut enim per iram et per zelum irascitur homo et indignatur peccatis proximi; sic per poenitentiam peccatis suis.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sit in omnibus; dicendum, quod expellere omnia vitia est dupliciter; vel per modum detestantis, vel per modum informantis. Per poenitentiam expelluntur omnia vitia per modum detestantis et satisfacientis; sed per modum informantis unumquodque vitium expellitur per virtutem sibi oppositam. Quod primo modo expellit26 non necesse est esse in eadem potentia, sed quod secundo modo. Et sic patet illud.
I. Conclusio nostri Doctoris supponit distinctionem duplicis irascibilis, quarum una est in parte animae sensibili, altera in parte rationali, et quidem in affectiva, de quibus III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. plura dicta sunt. In decursu quaestionis multa tanguntur, quae I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, et II. Sent. d. 24. 25. 33, de divisione potentiarum animae, nec non II. Sent. d. 39, de conscientia et synderesi, fuse exposita sunt. Posteriores Scholastici, cum non admittant irascibilem proprie dictam in parte rationali animae, poenitentiam ponunt simpliciter in voluntate; quod Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 9.) sic explicat, ut in re vix discedat a S. Bonav. Dicit enim: « Actus [poenitentiae] est actus voluntatis, cuius est imperare intellectui et voluntati, et hoc imperio pertinente ad irascibilem et potentiam aliquam habentem in se aliquid simile virtuti irascibili. Sicut enim irascibilis in sensitiva suo modo vindicat, ita et illa potentia, quae imperat vindictam in parte intellectiva, habet quoddam simile irascibili ». — Primam opinionem hic relatam sustinuit Guliel. Antissiod. (S. p. IV. tr. 6. q. 3.), secundam vero Alex. Hal.; sed S. Bonaventurae consentit B. Albertus.
De I. quaestione praeter Scotum: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 2.
II. Quae in 2. quaestione de origine poenitentiae docentur, haec perfecte concordant iis quae contra novatores saeculi XVI. Concil. Trident. in Sess. VI. c. 6. decrevit de modo praeparationis ad iustificationem, et in Sess. XIV. c. 4. de contritione (cfr. infra d. 17. a. 2. q. 3.); cui doctrinae communiter Scholastici adhaerent. Nec dissentit Scot. quoad necessitatem gratiae (hic q. 2. n. 13.), ut ibi in adiecto scholio et commentario probatur.
De II. quaestione praeter Scotum: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Durand., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.
III. Circa 3. quaestionem et quoad habitum infusum poenitentiae (de quo cfr. supra a. 1. q. 3.) facile patet conclusio, quae respicit ordinem temporis. Tamen « secundum ordinem naturae simpliciter praecedunt ipsam virtutes theologicae » (S. Thom. S., III. q. 85. a. 6.). Cfr. S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. et 3, ubi in scholiis tangitur etiam sententia Scoti, qui virtutes cardinales per se infusas non admittit. Quoad ordinem vero consideratum in actibus cum S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.) conceditur, quod « poenitentia est prior quibusdam, scilicet caritate et sequentibus ipsam, at posterior aliis, scilicet fide et spe », quatenus sunt informes. Addit S. Thom. (S. loc. cit.), quod « actus autem et habitus caritatis simul sunt tempore cum actu et habitu poenitentiae... horum tamen duorum actuum primus naturaliter praecedit secundum; nam actus virtutis [infusae] poenitentiae est contra peccatum ex amore Dei; unde primus actus est ratio et causa secundi »; de qua doctrina clarius agitur infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 1–3. — De secunda tabula post naufragium (secundum phrasim S. Hieronymi) agitur hic dub. 1. et infra d. 22. a. 3. q. 2. S. Thom. (hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4.) locutionem illam aliter exponit, quod scilicet prima tabula fuerit ante naufragium peccati originalis, secunda post illud. Concil. Trid. (Sess. XIV. can. 2.) vocat cum S. Bonav. poenitentiam secundam tabulam, ut distinctam a baptismo.
De 3. quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 2. n. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2.
---
Article II. On penance in comparison.
Question I. Which power of the soul is the subject of the virtue of penance.
Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked concerning penance in comparison. And concerning this three matters are asked. First, it is asked concerning it by comparison to its subject. Second, as to its act or origin. Third, as to its order.
First, it is asked which power of the soul is the subject of the virtue of penance; and it is shown that it is in the irascible power of the soul.
1. Augustine in the book On Penance1, defining penance, says that it is "a certain vengeance of one grieving"; but it is agreed that vengeance and to desire vengeance belong to the irascible [power]: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, on that [verse] of the Psalm2: Be angry etc.; the Gloss: "What is more just than that each one be angry rather at his own sins than at another's, and, punishing himself by penance, offer himself to God": therefore to be angry at sins is by penance; but it is agreed that to be angry belongs to the irascible [power]: therefore also to do penance.
3. Likewise, John Chrysostom3: "Perfect penance compels the penitent to bear all things willingly"; but this belongs to the irascible [power]: therefore penance is in the irascible power.
4. Likewise, to do penance, as is clear from the meaning of the name, "is to hold punishment," and Augustine himself4 sets down this etymology; but the power which regards and sustains punishment is the irascible: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, penance is a virtue, not only according as it regards fault, but according as it is into [its] subject, namely into the man who offends, that he be punished, and through punishment amendment be made; and this is clear through two [things] which the Master says in the text5. For he says that "penance is named from punishing"; he also says that through penance "we bewail evils with a purpose of amendment." Therefore, since the virtue by which we will that a sinning neighbor be punished is in the irascible [power], namely anger through zeal, by parity of reasoning penance too will be in the irascible [power].
On the contrary: 1. It seems that penance is in the synderesis: because to whatever the act belongs, to it belongs the habit; but the act of penance is to groan, and to groan belongs to the synderesis: therefore also penance. The first is clear; the second is proven, because it is written in Romans the eighth6: The Spirit asks on our behalf with unutterable groanings; but the Gloss says that the spirit is the synderesis: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, it seems that [it is] in the rational [power]: because penance is in that power whose [office] it is to do penance; but to do penance belongs to reason itself: therefore also penance. The first is clear; the minor is proven, on that [verse] of the Psalm7: Hope in God etc.; the Gloss: "That is, that I may do penance for my sins"; and as is had in the Gloss: Why are you sad etc.: "Reason strengthens the sensible soul": therefore reason does penance: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it seems that [it is] in the concupiscible [power]: because "opposites are apt to come about concerning the same thing8"; but delight and sadness are opposites, likewise grief and joy, love and hatred; but in penance there is grief, sadness, and hatred of sin: since therefore the opposites of these, namely love, joy, and delight, are in the concupiscible [power]; by the aforesaid rule penance is in the concupiscible [power]: therefore not in the irascible.
4. Likewise, it seems that it is in any power whatever of the soul: because things that mutually expel one another have their being concerning the same susceptible [subject]9; but penance expels all sins: therefore, since the diverse kinds of sins are in diverse powers, penance is not in one power, but in diverse [powers].
Conclusion. It is more probable that penance is in the will, and indeed in the irascible [part].
I respond: It must be said that concerning this various [authors] have opined diversely.
For some have said that penance goes round all the powers10, because it expels all sins and bewails all things. And since it bewails on behalf of all, and to perfect weeping there concurs the motion of all the powers, and to the expulsion of vices there concur the habits of all the virtues; they held that penance is in all the powers as a general justice.
And this they strive to show by the Gloss on that [verse] of Isaiah the sixteenth11: My belly shall sound to Moab like a harp — the interlinear [Gloss] expounds it: "It shall sound by bewailing" — and the Gloss says: "Just as a harp does not emit a composed sound, if one string has been broken; so the spiritual belly of the Prophet, if one string of the virtues has been broken, will not resound sweet melodies." And from this they wish to hold that it is likewise in the mourning of penance, and thus that penance is in every power. And therefore they say that penance is defined by the acts of diverse powers; they also say that to it there correspond12 the acts of diverse powers. For the penitent makes satisfaction by praying, and this belongs to the rational [power]; by fasting, and this belongs to the concupiscible [power]; by showing mercy or by bestowing alms, and this likewise belongs to the concupiscible [power]; by bearing punishment, and this belongs to the irascible [power].
— But this position has been partly disproven above13. For if penance is a special and single habit, as was shown above; one habit is also in one power, since one accident is in one subject14, and the subject of a virtue is a power: it is necessary that penance be determinately not in every, but in some [one] power. — But that is what deceived those positing that it was in all the powers, [namely] that penance is commanded by all [the powers]; and hence it is that to the mourning of penance all the virtues concur as annexed, and it seems that penance is in all the powers and embraces the other virtues. — This also deceived them, because they did not regard the special and proper act of penance, which is not of every, but of some special power. And therefore this position is not very probable.
The second position is that penance is in a determinate power, but is not in any of the three aforesaid powers, but in a power superior to those three; and this they call free choice, in which are conjoined the cognitive and motive power, because it commands the other powers and is not commanded, and concerning which the merit on our part resides. And because a virtue is commanded by no power, since also a virtue is for meriting; they posited that all the virtues and penance are in free choice as in [their] subject. But because free choice rules the lower powers; and through one virtue can rule many powers, as through justice and penance: hence it is that penance seems to be in the lower powers, and seems also to be in several, although subjectively it is in one alone. — Nevertheless, as is better clear elsewhere15, free choice does not name a power other than these, namely the rational, concupiscible, and irascible, although it names [them] in another manner — because it names [them] by way of mover and commander: but these powers are obedient to it, so that the same power insofar as it is free commands itself as nature — and therefore, if that position wishes to say that free choice names a power really and naturally distinct from these, the rational, concupiscible, and irascible; then16 I neither understand nor believe that it has truth. But if it wishes to say that they name the same power, but nevertheless according to another manner of holding itself; this I do not deny.
But still the same doubt remains, if the powers of the soul are diverse, in which one [penance] is really; because either it is necessary to come to this, that those three powers be in one power really; or that free choice be a power distinct from them; or that every virtue be in some one of those three, namely either in the rational, or concupiscible, or irascible, in which the three theological virtues are commonly wont to be placed by our doctors and fathers, since the acts of these powers tend immediately into God. And certainly, if the theological [virtues] are placed there, why not also the cardinal [virtues] according to their aspect toward the lower17?
The third position is that penance is in the rational [power]; and the ground of this position is this, that penance is a part of cardinal justice. For since it is a virtue and is not theological, it is necessary that it be reduced to some [other] virtue. Since therefore the cardinal virtue is sufficiently divided into four both according to the Saints and according to the philosophers; and penance is not under any of the others: it is agreed that penance, as was premised18, is contained under justice; but justice, since it is one habit, cannot be in several powers: therefore it is necessary that it be in one. — Again, since the act of justice, which is "to render to each one what is his19," properly belongs to reason, because this is a judicial act, and reason is the judge in the kingdom of the soul; they say that justice is in reason, as it is judge, just as prudence is in it, as it is leader or counselor. And since
reason, as it is judge, commands the whole soul; hence it is that cardinal justice is said to go round all the powers of the soul20. And hence it is that it contains habits which seem to pertain to affection, such as obedience and penance; and hence it is that penance is in one power, yet seems to go round many; and therefore it is in the rational [power], as it is the ruler of the irascible and concupiscible, so that it moves the concupiscible to groaning for fault, and the irascible to punishing the soul itself.
But neither is that very reasonable to one inspecting [it], that penance, which most resounds in affection, and humility, which is a species of justice, be in the rational [power]. — And further, the habit of a virtue ought not to be placed about the commanding virtue, but the eliciting [one]. For in eliciting is the difficulty, and with respect to it or by reason of it is the habituation; whence the motion of a virtue is not said to belong properly to this or that [power] except [to that] of the eliciting virtue: just as if charity should command continence or justice command fighting; nevertheless to be continent is always of continence, and to fight rightly is of fortitude. As therefore to do penance belongs to nothing but penance, so the habit is not in the commanding power, but in the eliciting [one]; but this is not the rational power, but the affective power, and most of all the irascible, as is clear from the reasons seen before21. For penance regards not so much the vice, which it abominates, as the subject of sin, against which it rises up and which by rising up it punishes; and it regards not so much the fault or offense, as also the amendment; and this amendment is in the bearing of punishment, and therefore it is rightly called vengeance.
And therefore there is another opinion, that penance, as it is a special virtue, is in the irascible [power]. This position I believe more probable. For I do not grasp how penance could be in all the powers, since it is a special habit. — So neither do I grasp the second, how every virtue is in one power, supposing that the rational powers are several, which belong properly to the soul itself, as it is rational, whether they be several insofar as22 powers, or, as others say, several capacities. — Nor the third, how penance and humility are in reason, since they say that it is of affection, as even hope or charity itself is. — And therefore it must be said that, since penance of itself names a habit of affection, [it follows] that it is in the affective power. But since it names an affection of hatred or grief as of vengeance and as of one punishing, as is clear from manifold authority and reason in the objecting23: and [since] that hatred which is with rising up is in the irascible power: [it follows] that penance itself is in the irascible [power].
1. To that therefore which is objected, that it is in the synderesis; it must be said that that argument fails, because to groan does not belong to the synderesis as eliciting nor as perfectly commanding, because thus it could command nothing to free choice; but rather as murmuring against evil and dictating good, because it naturally murmurs against evil; and in this it cannot err24. And since a virtue is in the power in which resides the faculty and command of eliciting the act: therefore it is not in the synderesis, but in free choice. But the liberty of choice is not only in reason, but in the concupiscible and irascible, because it embraces reason and will; and the will contains the power of loving and of detesting, namely the concupiscible and the irascible.
2. To that which is objected, that it is in the rational [power]; it must be said that reason is named in many ways; yet as far as pertains to the proposal, it is named commonly and properly25. Commonly it comprehends the whole portion of the soul divided against sensuality, in which three powers are placed; and so it is taken in the aforesaid Gloss. Properly it is taken for the power divided against the concupiscible and irascible; and thus it is objected, and thus the objection does not avail.
3. To that which is objected, that it is in the concupiscible [power] on account of this, that hatred is in the same;
it must be said that hatred is named in two ways: either with a certain displeasure, or with rising up, vengeance, and anger; and the first is in the concupiscible, the second in the irascible; and such is [the hatred] in penance. For just as a man is angered by anger and by zeal and is indignant at the sins of his neighbor; so by penance [he is angered] at his own sins.
4. To that which is objected, that it is in all [the powers]; it must be said that to expel all vices is in two ways; either by way of detesting, or by way of informing. By penance all vices are expelled by way of detesting and making satisfaction; but by way of informing each single vice is expelled by the virtue opposed to it. [The penance] which expels in the first way26 need not be in the same power, but [that which expels] in the second way [must]. And so that is clear.
I. The conclusion of our Doctor supposes the distinction of a twofold irascible [power], of which one is in the sensible part of the soul, the other in the rational part, and indeed in the affective [part], concerning which much is said in III Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. In the course of the question many [points] are touched which were fully expounded in I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, and II Sent. d. 24. 25. 33, on the division of the powers of the soul, and also II Sent. d. 39, on conscience and synderesis. The later Scholastics, since they do not admit an irascible [power] properly so called in the rational part of the soul, place penance simply in the will; which Scotus (here q. 2. n. 9.) so explains that in reality he scarcely departs from St. Bonaventure. For he says: "The act [of penance] is an act of the will, whose [office] it is to command the intellect and the will, and this by a command pertaining to the irascible and to some power having in itself something similar to the irascible virtue. For just as the irascible in the sensitive [part] takes vengeance in its own way, so also that power which commands vengeance in the intellective part has something similar to the irascible." — The first opinion here related was upheld by William of Auxerre (S. p. IV. tr. 6. q. 3.), but the second by Alexander of Hales; but B. Albert agrees with St. Bonaventure.
On the 1st question, besides Scotus: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. subq. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. subq. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. 2.
II. What is taught in the 2nd question on the origin of penance perfectly accords with what the Council of Trent, against the innovators of the 16th century, decreed in Session VI. c. 6. on the manner of preparation for justification, and in Session XIV. c. 4. on contrition (cf. below d. 17. a. 2. q. 3.); to which doctrine the Scholastics commonly adhere. Nor does Scotus dissent as to the necessity of grace (here q. 2. n. 13.), as is proven there in the appended scholion and commentary.
On the 2nd question, besides Scotus: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 1. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. subq. 1; S. III. q. 85. a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. subq. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 2. — Durandus, IV Sent. d. 17. q. 1.
III. Concerning the 3rd question and as to the infused habit of penance (concerning which cf. above a. 1. q. 3.) the conclusion easily appears, which regards the order of time. Yet "according to the order of nature the theological virtues simply precede it" (St. Thomas, S. III. q. 85. a. 6.). Cf. St. Bonaventure, III Sent. d. 36. q. 1. and 3, where in the scholia there is touched also the opinion of Scotus, who does not admit the cardinal virtues to be per se infused. But as to the order considered in the acts, it is conceded with St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2. subq. 2.) that "penance is prior to some [virtues], namely charity and those following it, but posterior to others, namely faith and hope," insofar as they are unformed. St. Thomas adds (S. loc. cit.) that "the act and habit of charity are simultaneous in time with the act and habit of penance... yet of these two acts the first naturally precedes the second; for the act of the [infused] virtue of penance is against sin out of love of God; whence the first act is the ground and cause of the second"; concerning which doctrine it is treated more clearly below d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 1–3. — On the second plank after shipwreck (according to the phrase of St. Jerome) it is treated here in dub. 1. and below d. 22. a. 3. q. 2. St. Thomas (here loc. cit. subq. 4.) expounds that locution otherwise, namely that the first plank was before the shipwreck of original sin, the second after it. The Council of Trent (Session XIV. can. 2.) with St. Bonaventure calls penance a second plank, as distinct from baptism.
On the 3rd question, besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 3. a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 2. n. 9. 10. — B. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. subq. 2.
---
- 1De Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 8. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — De minori huius et seqq. argg. cfr. tom. III. pag. 570, nota 9, et Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum in Matth. 13, 39: Ut in ratione possideamus prudentiam, in ira odium vitiorum, in cupiditate desiderium virtutum.On True and False Penance (among the works of Augustine), c. 8. n. 22. See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — On the minor of this and the following arguments cf. vol. III. p. 570, note 9, and the ordinary Gloss according to Strabo on Matthew 13, 39: That in reason we possess prudence, in anger hatred of vices, in desire the longing for virtues.
- 2Psalm. 4, 6. — De Glossa, in qua post poenitentiam edd. addunt et satisfactionem, vide supra pag. 321, nota 10.Psalm 4, 6. — On the Gloss, in which after penance the editions add and satisfaction, see above p. 321, note 10.
- 3Cap. Perfecta poenitentia (50.), de Poenitentia, d. 1. (et d. 3. c. 8.), quod inscribitur: « Item Joannes Os aureum in homilia de poenitentia, quae incipit: Provida mente ». Ad quae verba in ed. Migne (Patrolog. Lat. tom. 187. col. 1832) haec in nota subiiciuntur: « Omissa est tanquam supposititia in ed. Maurinan. Ed. Maurin. tantum prae manibus habemus. Pro poenitentem in praenotato cap. substituitur peccatorem ».Chapter Perfecta poenitentia (50.), de Poenitentia, d. 1. (and d. 3. c. 8.), which is entitled: "Likewise John Golden-Mouth in a homily on penance, which begins: Provida mente." To which words in the Migne edition (Patrologia Latina vol. 187. col. 1832) these [things] are subjoined in a note: "It is omitted as spurious in the Maurinian edition. We have at hand only the Maurinian edition. For poenitentem in the aforenoted chapter is substituted peccatorem."
- 4De Vera et falsa Poenitentia, c. 18. n. 35. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.On True and False Penance c. 18. n. 35. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
- 5Cap. 1. et 2. — Inferius pro ira cod. X irascendo.Chapters 1 and 2. — Below, for ira codex X [reads] irascendo.
- 6Vers. 26. — Glossam, quae est Hieronymi in Ezech. 1, 7, vide II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. — Ratio exhibita in maiori insinuatur ab Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 1: Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus.Verse 26. — The Gloss, which is Jerome's on Ezekiel 1, 7, see II Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1. — The ground set forth in the major is intimated by Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking c. 1: For to whatever the potency belongs, to it also belongs the act.
- 7Psalm. 41, 6. — Ibid. etiam est seq. textus. — Illae Glossae exhibentur a Strabo et Lyrano ut ordinariae. Prima sumta est ex Cassiodoro, in hunc locum: « Id est de peccatis meis poenitentiam gero ». Secunda iuxta Strabum est: Quare tristis? etc. De perturbationibus, contra quas ratio confirmat animam sensualem spe Dei. — Post in Glossa cod. H addit super illud.Psalm 41, 6. — In the same place is also the following text. — Those Glosses are exhibited by Strabo and Lyranus as ordinary. The first is taken from Cassiodorus, on this passage: "That is, I do penance for my sins." The second, according to Strabo, is: Why are you sad? etc. On the perturbations, against which reason confirms the sensual soul by hope of God. — After in the Gloss codex H adds on that [verse].
- 8Secundum Aristot.; vide supra pag. 19, nota 5.According to Aristotle; see above p. 19, note 5.
- 9Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 27. (III. c. 6.); V. text. 16. (IV. c. 10.), et X. text. 11. (IX. c. 4.).Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV. text 27 (III. c. 6.); V. text 16 (IV. c. 10.), and X. text 11 (IX. c. 4.).
- 10Idem dicitur secundum August., de iustitia. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 720, nota 11. — In seq. propos. pro concurrunt, quod alii codd. omittunt, codd. HL concurrit.The same is said according to Augustine, on justice. Cf. vol. III. p. 720, note 11. — In the following proposition, for concurrunt, which other codices omit, codices HL [read] concurrit.
- 11Vers. 11. — Glossa interlinearis, quam exhibet Lyranus, sumta est ex Haymone (in hunc locum): « Sicut cithara sonat, sic sonabit sensus et intellectus meus ad Moab plangendo ». Secunda, quae est ordinaria, praebetur ab Hieronymo (in hunc locum); cfr. III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1.Verse 11. — The interlinear Gloss, which Lyranus exhibits, is taken from Haymo (on this passage): "Just as a harp sounds, so my sense and intellect shall sound to Moab by bewailing." The second, which is the ordinary [Gloss], is furnished by Jerome (on this passage); cf. III Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1.
- 12Ita cod. H, alii codd. et edd. respondet. Mox pro virium codd. I K virtutum.So codex H; other codices and the editions [read] respondet. Soon, for virium codices I K [read] virtutum.
- 13Art. praeced. q. 2.The preceding article, q. 2.
- 14Cfr. tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. — Inferius pro quod in omnibus viribus esset edd. poenitentiam in omnibus viribus esse, et subinde ergo videtur pro et videtur [cod. et ideo videtur, cod. X et ex hoc videtur], ac pro tudum codd. I K actum.Cf. vol. II. p. 119, note 8. — Below, for quod in omnibus viribus esset the editions [read] poenitentiam in omnibus viribus esse, and thereupon ergo videtur for et videtur [codex et ideo videtur, codex X et ex hoc videtur], and for tudum codices I K [read] actum.
- 15Libr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 25. n. 1. q. 2. seqq. (praecipue q. 6. ad 2.).Book II Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. and d. 25. n. 1. q. 2 ff. (especially q. 6. ad 2).
- 16Codd. KL (l a secunda manu) eam, Vat. tunc eam, ed. 1 cum non paucis codd. tamen.Codices KL (l by a second hand) [read] eam, the Vatican [edition] tunc eam, edition 1 with not a few codices tamen.
- 17Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2, d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 2. q. 5, d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, d. 33. q. 1. ad 3. et q. 3.Cf. III Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2, d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. and a. 2. q. 5, d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, d. 33. q. 1. ad 3 and q. 3.
- 18Art. I. q. 3. — De numero virtutum cardinalium cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. q. 4. — Cod. aa praevisum est.Article I. q. 3. — On the number of the cardinal virtues cf. III Sent. d. 33. q. 4. — Codex aa [reads] praevisum est.
- 19Ut dicit iam Plato; cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 1.As Plato already says; cf. vol. III. p. 728, note 1.
- 20Vide supra pag. 323, nota 10.See above p. 323, note 10.
- 21Cfr. tom. III. pag. 720, nota 1. verba Aristot. — Inferius pro in affectu maxime sonat [cfr. opinio 1.] edd. est in affectu maxime (cod. N iam affectum maxime sonat).Cf. vol. III. p. 720, note 1, the words of Aristotle. — Below, for in affectu maxime sonat [cf. opinion 1] the editions [read] est in affectu maxime (codex N iam affectum maxime sonat).
- 22Pro in quantum, quod edd. omittunt, cod. X inquam.For in quantum, which the editions omit, codex X [reads] inquam.
- 23Scilicet in fundam.Namely in the fundamenta.
- 24Vers. 14. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria (sumta ex August., cuius verba vide tom. III. pag. 720, nota 11.), hoc elicit ex eo, quod de Euphrate non dicitur, ipsum circuire determinatam terram.Verse 14. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary [Gloss] (taken from Augustine, whose words see in vol. III. p. 720, note 11), elicits this from the fact that of the Euphrates it is not said that it goes round a determinate land.
- 25Cod. G unicuique quod suum est. — Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Aliquanto inferius post secundum sed edd. supplent etiam.Codex G [reads] to each one what is his. — Cf. II Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1 ff. — Somewhat below, after secundum, [before] sed the editions supply etiam.
- 26Vide II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. P. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 2, ubi 7 modi afferuntur, quibus ratio sumi potest.See II Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, S. P. IV. q. 12. m. 2. a. 3. § 2, where 7 ways are brought forward, in which reason can be taken.