Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14
Quaestio II. Utrum poenitentia oriatur ex timore.
Secundo quaeritur de origine poenitentiae; dicit Magister in littera, quod «poenitentia-virtus timore concipitur».
Sed contra hoc est: 1. Quia, si est virtus, est per infusionem1: non ergo per conceptionem.
2. Item, cum conceptio non sit sine generatione, quare magis dicit concipitur quam generatur?
3. Item, quare magis timore quam alio principio? Et videtur, quod magis amore, quia timor causatur ab amore2: ergo prima ratio generandi et concipiendi est in amore: ergo etc.
4. Item, tam timor quam amor est ex fidei cognitione3: ergo deberet dicere, quod fide concipitur.
5. Item, si timore; aut servili, aut initiali, aut filiali. Non servili, quia cum illo manet voluntas peccandi; non initiali neque filiali, quia, antequam habeat timorem filialem, vel initialem, necesse est, quod de peccato poeniteat4.
6. Item, timor est donum; sed poenitentia-virtus est ante dona naturali ordine5: ergo non concipitur timore aliquo.
Conclusio. Origo poenitentiae effectiva Deus est, sed dispositio quodam modo et ordine est a nobis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod origo poenitentiae virtutis effectiva Deus est, sed dispositiva a nobis, quia «qui creavit nos sine nobis, non iustificat nos sine nobis»6. — Dispositio autem hoc ordine procedit. Primo necesse est Dei bonitatem et iustitiam cognoscere — cui displicet omne malum et inordinatio, et ab illa offenditur et nullo modo malum relinquit impunitum — et se aliquid fecisse, quod suae displicere debeat bonitati; et haec est cognitio culpae, et ex hoc cognoscit se homo ex divina sententia obligatum ad poenam. — Necesse est etiam secundo cognoscere Dei misericordiam, qua paratus est omni revertenti et dolenti de culpa commissa sibi remittere et indulgere. — Ex prima cognitione generatur timor; ex secunda generatur spes remissionis; et ex his voluntas revertendi et confoederandi Deo et satisfaciendi per gemitum et alias poenas; et si incipiat facere quod in se est, dispositus est ad iustificationem7.
1. 2. Ex hoc igitur patet responsio, quomodo poenitentiae virtus concipitur per dispositionem suscipiendi8 eam; et quare magis dicitur concipitur quam generatur; quia generare est efficientis et principii effectivi, sed concipere receptivi.
3. 4. Ex hoc patet quare magis dicit9 timore quam amore, quia peccator non habet amorem Dei, sed sui; et iste amor nunquam generat poenitentiam, nisi quia timet; unde quamdiu amat et credit, non refugit peccatum, sed quando timet; et ideo non concipitur fide, quia ante timorem non est poenitentiae seminarium, quod est cessare a malo. Ex hoc etiam patet, quare magis timore quam spe, quia timor concipit, sed spes promovet.
5. Ex hoc patet, quod concipitur timore servili. Nec est inconveniens, quia conceptio ista non est per productionem in esse, sed per dispositionem et praeparationem; et ideo non oportet, quod poenitentia sit cum timore servili, sed sufficit, quod timor praeparet ad poenitentiam.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poenitentia est ante dona; dicendum, quod est donum Spiritus sancti, cum quo est Spiritus sanctus et datur; et hoc est gratiae gratum facientis, et de hoc verum est quod obiicit. Et est donum, quod est sine Spiritus sancti donatione proprie dicta, quae est per inhabitationem; et hoc est gratiae gratis datae, et tale donum est timor servilis, et hic antecedit virtutes; et tali timore concipitur poenitentia. Ideo non valet obiectio10.
Scholion in articulum II (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.
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Question II. Whether penance arises from fear.
Secondly it is asked concerning the origin of penance; the Master says in the text that «penance-as-virtue is conceived in fear».
But on the contrary: 1. Because, if it is a virtue, it is [had] through infusion1: therefore not through conception.
2. Likewise, since conception is not without generation, why does he say is conceived rather than is generated?
3. Likewise, why rather by fear than by another principle? And it seems [it should rather be] by love, because fear is caused by love2: therefore the first ground of generating and conceiving is in love: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, both fear and love are from the knowledge of faith3: therefore he ought to say that it is conceived by faith.
5. Likewise, if [it is conceived] by fear; [it is] either by servile, or by initial, or by filial [fear]. Not by servile, because together with it the will to sin remains; not by initial nor by filial, because, before one has filial or initial fear, it is necessary that one repent of sin4.
6. Likewise, fear is a gift; but penance-as-virtue is prior to the gifts in the natural order5: therefore it is not conceived by any fear.
Conclusion. The effective origin of penance is God, but the disposition is in a certain manner and order from us.
I respond: It must be said that the effective origin of the virtue of penance is God, but the dispositive [origin is] from us, because «He who created us without us does not justify us without us»6. — But the disposition proceeds in this order. First it is necessary to know the goodness and justice of God — to whom every evil and disorder is displeasing, and by it He is offended, and in no way does He leave evil unpunished — and [to know] that one has done something which ought to be displeasing to His goodness; and this is the knowledge of fault, and from this a man knows himself to be bound to punishment by the divine sentence. — It is necessary, secondly, to know the mercy of God, by which He is ready to remit and pardon every one who returns and grieves over the fault committed. — From the first knowledge is generated fear; from the second is generated hope of remission; and from these [is generated] the will of returning and of being reconciled to God and of making satisfaction through groaning and other penalties; and if one begins to do what is in oneself, one is disposed for justification7.
1. 2. From this, therefore, the response is clear, how the virtue of penance is conceived through the disposition for receiving8 it; and why it is said rather to be conceived than generated; because to generate belongs to the efficient [cause] and to the effective principle, but to conceive to the receptive [one].
3. 4. From this it is clear why he says [it is conceived] rather by fear than by love9, because the sinner does not have the love of God, but of himself; and that love never generates penance, except because he fears; whence as long as he loves and believes, he does not flee from sin, but [only] when he fears; and therefore it is not conceived by faith, because before fear there is no seedbed of penance, which is to cease from evil. From this it is also clear why [it is conceived] rather by fear than by hope, because fear conceives, but hope advances.
5. From this it is clear that it is conceived by servile fear. Nor is this unfitting, because this conception is not through a production into being, but through disposition and preparation; and therefore it is not necessary that penance be [held] together with servile fear, but it suffices that the fear prepare [one] for penance.
6. To the objection that penance is prior to the gifts; it must be said that it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, together with whom the Holy Spirit is and is given; and this belongs to grace which makes pleasing [gratia gratum faciens], and concerning this what he objects is true. And it is a gift which is without the giving of the Holy Spirit properly so called, which is through indwelling; and this belongs to gratuitously given grace [gratia gratis data], and such a gift is servile fear, and this precedes the virtues; and by such fear penance is conceived. Therefore the objection does not hold10.
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — Scholion in articulum II (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.
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- 1Respicitur communis definitio virtutis: Virtus est bona qualitas mentis... quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3.Reference is made to the common definition of virtue: Virtue is a good quality of the mind... which God works in us without us. Cf. Sentences II, d. 27, dubium 3.
- 2Sicut enim amor (qui est in concupiscibili) est complacentia boni, sic odium est displicentia mali.For just as love (which is in the concupiscible [power]) is a complacency in the good, so hatred is a displeasure at evil.
- 3Ut enim August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2. ait: Fugiens [amor] quod ei adversatur timor est.For as Augustine says, On the City of God XIV, c. 7, n. 2: Love fleeing what is opposed to it is fear.
- 4Cfr. Hebr. 11, 6.Cf. Hebrews 11:6.
- 5Vide III. Sent. d. 34. p. II. per totam.See Sentences III, d. 34, p. II, throughout.
- 6August., Serm. 169. (alias 15. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 11. n. 13: Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te.Augustine, Sermon 169 (otherwise 15, On the Words of the Apostle), c. 11, n. 13: He therefore who made you without you does not justify you without you.
- 7Vide infra d. 17. p. 1. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 2. q. 3.See below, d. 17, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 3.
- 8Codd. F aa suscipientis.Codices F aa [read] suscipientis («of [one] receiving»).
- 9Plures codd. dixit, scilicet Magister. — Aliquanto inferius post quamdiu amat cod. X bene addit se, omisso subinde et credit (quo tamen alia obiectio superius posita stringitur).Several codices [read] dixit («said»), namely the Master. — Somewhat below, after quamdiu amat codex X rightly adds se, with et credit then omitted (by which, however, another objection posited above is touched upon).
- 10Cfr. III. Sent. d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.Cf. Sentences III, d. 34, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. — See the scholion on the preceding question. ---