Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16
Articulus II. De contritione quoad quantitatem.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de contritione quantum ad quantitatem. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum.
Secundo, utrum possibile sit, in illo dolore cadere excessum.
Quaestio I. Utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum.
Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum, id est, utrum ad hoc, quod contritio sit sufficiens, necesse sit plus dolere de peccato quam de aliquo temporali. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ieremiae sexto1: Luctum unigeniti fac tibi; Glossa: « Docet poenitentem, quid facere debeat »; et alia Glossa: « Nihil dolentius morte unigeniti »: ergo tantum debet quis dolere de peccato, quod de nullo magis.
2. Item, Augustinus, vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei2: « Necesse est, ut tantum urat dolor, quantum haeserat amor »: ergo si dolet plus de amissione rei temporalis quam de amissione Dei per culpam, plus ergo diligit rem temporalem quam Deum; sed nullus talis poenitet vere: ergo etc.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia dolor fundatur in amore et omnis affectio, ut dicit Augustinus3; sed amor Dei debet esse maior omni amore creaturae: ergo et dolor ex amissione Dei.
4. Item, dolor contritionis est a gratia et libero arbitrio, sed alius4 tantum a culpa et libero arbitrio; sed gratia plus roborat in bono, quam culpa inclinet ad malum: ergo motus doloris fortior.
5. Item, animus iustus plus Deo unitur quam sibi per amorem; sed de eo cui magis unitur, magis dolet, cum separatur: ergo magis dolet, se per peccatum separatum esse a Deo5, quam de morte proximi et corporis, si esset possibile.
6. Item, omnis habens animum ordinatum plus dolet de amissione maioris boni; sed Deus est summum bonum, et omnis contritus habet animum ordinatum: ergo plus dolet de amissione Dei quam de amissione alterius boni creati.
Sed contra: 1. Ostenditur, quod non oportet, esse maiorem quam de aliquo temporali: quia « albius est quod est nigro impermixtius6 »: ergo maior dolor est qui minus habet de gaudio; sed dolor contritionis est admixtus gaudio, aliquis autem alius sine aliquo gaudio est quandoque: ergo ille maior.
2. Item, magis dolendum est de eo quod recuperari non potest, quam de eo quod recuperari potest et recuperatum est; sed amissio filii non potest recuperari, amissio Dei in poenitente est recuperata: ergo non tantum debet dolere de amissione Dei quantum de amissione filii.
3. Item, quod non oporteat tantum dolere, videtur, quia, quantumcumque parva sit gratia, delet omnem culpam: ergo similiter ex parte doloris, quantumcumque parvus est, dum tamen gratia sit informatus, delebit omnem culpam: ergo non oportet, quod sit maior omni alio.
4. Item, si hoc oporteret, tunc pauci essent contriti; pauci enim sunt qui mallent esse caeci quam nunquam peccasse; videmus etiam multos viros poenitentes, qui flent ex morte consanguineorum, qui non possunt flere pro peccatis.
Conclusio. Dolor contritionis quoad sensualitatem non debet esse maximus, neque quoad displicentiam rationis absolute, sed tantum maior in comparatione ad alios dolores.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de quantitate doloris, dolor potest dici displicentia rationis, vel passio ex hac resultans in sensualitatem7. Si hoc secundo modo accipiatur; dico, quod non est necesse magis dolere de peccato quam de re temporali, nec etiam necesse est dolere, quia non est in potestate cuiuslibet. Talis enim dolor non consequitur amorem, sed consequitur ipsam affectionem, et affectio experimentalem cognitionem; et quia non omnes habent experientiam divinae dilectionis8: ideo non omnes ita sensibiliter dolent de peccatis. Tamen quod magis etiam sensibiliter doleat aliquis de peccato quam de aliquo damno, hoc est perfectionis et congruum, non necessarium.
Sed in quantum dolor dicitur displicentia rationis; sic dico, quod ista displicentia mensuratur secundum quantitatem caritatis. Quantitas autem caritatis dupliciter potest accipi: vel in se, vel in comparatione ad alios amores: in se, sic dico, quod est parva et maior et maxima; in comparatione ad alios sic dico, quod vindicat sibi dominium in corde, quamdiu est; nec unquam ibi est, nisi sit domina; unde dico, quod ad hoc, quod
aliquis habeat caritatem, necesse est, quod diligat Deum super omnia; hoc autem est diligere super omnia, quod pro nullo damno vel commodo velit offendere Deum. Sic intelligendum est de displicentia contritionis. — Unde dico, quod peccatum debet tantum displicere rationi, quod nullo pacto, nullo commodo vel incommodo velit in ipsum consentire vel consensisse; quoniam voluntas, quae ex aliqua causa consentit in peccatum, iusta non est. — Unde sicut non oportet, habentem caritatem velle mori pro Christo — sed in casu, in quo vel oportet ipsum amittere caritatem, vel vitam; tunc tenetur magis velle mori pro Christo quam caritatem amittere — sic in proposito est intelligendum, quod non teneor nunc pro satisfactione peccati omnem poenam sustinere ad reconciliationema, quia Deus non exigit. Et ideo, sicut ego possum salvari non sustinendo martyrium, sic possum reconciliari Deo sine multis doloribus et amissionibus rerum temporaliumb.
Si vero de comparatione et praeelectionec quaeratur; respondent aliqui et faciunt in hoc vim, quia potest intelligi respectu praeteriti vel futuri. — Sed ego non video in hoc vim, quia iusta voluntas et vere poenitens ita detestatur praeteritum peccatum, ut futurum, ne fiat; et ita est peccatum velle peccasse, sicut velle peccare. Ideo de peccati praecedentis dolore et detestatione dicendum, quod in casu, in quo oportet praeeligere vel consentire in peccatum sive complacentiam peccati, vel tolerantiam poenae, quilibet tenetur praeeligere sive magis eligere poenam quam velle peccare vel peccasse. — Praeter casum necessitatis dico, quod praeeligere omnem poenam est perfectae virtutis; dubitare vero est infirmitatis, quia timor naturalis valde facit dubitare, et ista dubitatio simul potest stare cum caritate; sed praeeligere culpam alicui poenae, hoc est iniquitatis, si est cum deliberatione et plena voluntate, quia omnis talis voluntas est iniqua, quae peccatum vult vel absolute, vel conditionaliter. — Unde periculum est et stultitia quaerere hoc ab aliquo infirmo, vel etiam a se ipso, quia hoc est hominem ponere in tentationem; unde nullus confessor debet hoc ab aliquo, qui sibi confitetur, quaerere. Sed si poenitens se offerat et dicat, se malle mortuum esse quam peccasse, vel simile aliquod; gaudendum est, quia hoc est signum bonae voluntatis.
Si ergo quaeratur, utrum dolorem contritionis necesse sit esse maximum; si dicatur de dolored sensualitatis, manifestum est, quod non; si de displicentia rationis, aut quantum ad intensionem motus absolute, et sic nec hoc modo oportet esse maximum: si in comparatione ad alios dolores dico, sicut de amore, quod oportet, quod habeat praedominium. — Et sic procedunt rationes probantes, ipsum inter omnes alios dolores de rebus creatis obtinere principatum. — Quod si intelligatur de dolore sensualitatis ad omnes per interemptioneme solvendum est, sicut tactum est, quia sequitur experientiam et delectationem et etiam complexionem, vel aliquid tale; ideo sensibiliter magis dolet quis de morte unigeniti.
Ad argumenta:
Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur ultimo, quod semper superior movet inferioresf; dicendum, quod verum est in his, in quibus natae sunt simpliciter obedire, sicut in motu manuum, vel pedum; sed non est ita in affectionibus nisi per multam assuefactionem.
Ad 1. quod obiicitur, quod parvus, quia admixtus gaudio; dicendum, quod dolor contritionis, quando est in anima bene disposita, valde magnus est, et gaudium mitigat dolorem et intendit. Ideo enim dolet, quia vult dolere; et quanto magis appetit dolere, tanto magis dolet; et quanto videt, se magis dolere, tanto magis gaudet. Ideo patet, quod non remittitur, quia non habet oppositionem, immo unum est causa alteriusg; tamen bene concedo, quod mitigatur et minus laedit; unde intenditur et mitigatur: intenditur respectu peccati, et mitigatur respectu poenitentis; intenditur respectu obiecti, mitigatur respectu subiecti; vel intenditur sub ratione displicentiae, mitigatur sub ratione poenae.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest recuperari; dicendum, quod hoc etiam mitigat dolorem, ut dolor contriti non sit cum desperatione, sed cum speh. Tamen quia contritus de se non sperat; quantum est de se, ita se affligit dolore, ac si omnino perdidisset; respirat tamen in misericordia Dei. — Et quod obiicit, quod magis est dolendum de re irre-
cuperabili; dicendum, quod verum est, ceteris paribus.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod minima gratia delet omnem culpam; dicendum, quod dolor, quantumcumque sit parvus, sufficit, si sit gratia informatus; sed tamen nunquam gratia informat, quin vindicet sibi in corde dominium quoad actum vel motum voluntatis rationalis, non sensualitatisi.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pauci, vel nulli mallent esse caeci quam peccasse; iam patet responsio secundum viam praetactam. Si enim in necessitate essent positi, scilicet vel quod a detestatione peccati desisterent, vel quod oculos amitterent — et loquor de detestatione interiori — necesse haberent praeeligere; nunc autem non habent.
I. Communis est distinctio inter dolorem sive displicentiam in parte sensitiva et in voluntate rationali, et etiam doctrina, quod contritio essentialiter non est nisi in voluntate, et quod haec displicentia debet esse appretiative summa, scilicet in comparatione ad displicentiam respectu aliorum malorum. Non autem requiritur, quod actus contritionis sit intensive summus, immo contra nonnullos cum Ss. Bonav. et Thoma communiter docetur, non requiri necessario certum aliquem gradum intensionis. — Notatu digna est explicatio in corp. quoad res ad praxim spectantes.
De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 1. q. 8. — Durand., loc. cit. n. 6. 7. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 2. n. 11, et cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. n. 16. 17. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 31. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 6. 0. — Durand., infra d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. infra d. 17. q. 1.
II. De seq. (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 4. — S. Thom. loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert. rem tangit hic a. 30. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 8. — Durand., loc. cit. n. 6. 7.
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Article II. On contrition as to its quantity.
Next, as to the second article, the inquiry concerns contrition as regards its quantity. And about this two things are asked.
First, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest.
Second, whether it is possible for an excess to occur in that sorrow.
Question I. Whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest.
As to the first, then, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest — that is, whether, in order for contrition to be sufficient, it is necessary to grieve more over sin than over any temporal thing. And that it is so, it seems.
1. Jeremiah 61: Make for thyself the mourning of an only son; the Gloss: « It teaches the penitent what he ought to do »; and another Gloss: « Nothing is more grievous than the death of an only son »: therefore one ought to grieve so much over sin that over nothing more.
2. Likewise, Augustine, in the twenty-first book On the City of God2: « It is necessary that the sorrow burn as much as the love had clung »: therefore if one grieves more over the loss of a temporal thing than over the loss of God through fault, then he loves the temporal thing more than God; but no such person truly repents: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because sorrow is founded on love and every affection, as Augustine says3; but the love of God ought to be greater than every love of a creature: therefore the sorrow from the loss of God also [ought to be greater].
4. Likewise, the sorrow of contrition is from grace and free will, but the other4 is only from fault and free will; but grace strengthens more toward the good than fault inclines toward evil: therefore the motion of sorrow [is] stronger.
5. Likewise, the just soul is united more to God than to itself by love; but over that to which one is more united, one grieves more when it is separated: therefore he grieves more that he is separated from God through sin5 than over the death of a neighbor and of his body, if it were possible.
6. Likewise, everyone having an ordered soul grieves more over the loss of a greater good; but God is the highest good, and every contrite person has an ordered soul: therefore he grieves more over the loss of God than over the loss of another created good.
On the contrary: 1. It is shown that it need not be greater than [the sorrow] over some temporal thing: because « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black6 »: therefore that sorrow is greater which has less of joy; but the sorrow of contrition is mixed with joy, while some other [sorrow] is sometimes without any joy: therefore that one is greater.
2. Likewise, one ought to grieve more over that which cannot be recovered than over that which can be recovered and has been recovered; but the loss of a son cannot be recovered, [whereas] the loss of God in the penitent has been recovered: therefore he need not grieve as much over the loss of God as over the loss of a son.
3. Likewise, that one need not grieve so much seems [true], because, however small the grace may be, it blots out all fault: therefore likewise on the side of sorrow, however small it is, provided it be informed by grace, it will blot out all fault: therefore it need not be greater than every other.
4. Likewise, if this were required, then few would be contrite; for few are those who would rather be blind than have never sinned; we see also many penitent men who weep at the death of kinsmen, who cannot weep for their sins.
Conclusion. The sorrow of contrition need not be the greatest as to sensuality, nor as to the displeasure of reason absolutely, but only greater in comparison with other sorrows.
I respond: It must be said that, when the question concerns the quantity of sorrow, sorrow can be called the displeasure of reason, or the passion resulting from it in sensuality7. If it be taken in this second way, I say that it is not necessary to grieve more over sin than over a temporal thing, nor even is it necessary to grieve, because it is not in everyone's power. For such sorrow does not follow upon love, but follows upon the affection itself, and the affection [follows upon] experiential knowledge; and because not all have experience of divine love8: therefore not all grieve so sensibly over sins. Nevertheless, that someone should grieve also more sensibly over sin than over some loss — this belongs to perfection and is fitting, [but is] not necessary.
But insofar as sorrow is called the displeasure of reason, thus I say that this displeasure is measured according to the quantity of charity. Now the quantity of charity can be taken in two ways: either in itself, or in comparison with other loves: in itself, thus I say that it is small and greater and greatest; in comparison with others, thus I say that it claims for itself dominion in the heart as long as it is present; nor is it ever there unless it be mistress; whence I say that, in order that
someone may have charity, it is necessary that he love God above all things; and this is to love above all things, that for no loss or advantage he be willing to offend God. Thus is it to be understood concerning the displeasure of contrition. — Whence I say that sin ought so to displease reason that by no pact, no advantage, would he be willing to consent or to have consented to it; since the will which from some cause consents to sin is not just. — Whence, just as it is not required that one having charity be willing to die for Christ — except in a case in which either he must lose charity or [his] life; then he is bound to be more willing to die for Christ than to lose charity — so in the case proposed it is to be understood that I am not bound now, for the satisfaction of sin, to undergo every penalty for reconciliationa, because God does not exact it. And therefore, just as I can be saved without undergoing martyrdom, so I can be reconciled to God without many sorrows and losses of temporal thingsb.
But if the question concerns comparison and preferencec; some answer and lay stress on this point, that it can be understood with respect to the past or the future. — But I see no force in this, because the just will and the truly penitent so detests the past sin, as [it detests] a future one, lest it occur; and so to will to have sinned is a sin, just as to will to sin. Therefore concerning the sorrow and detestation of the preceding sin it must be said that in a case in which one must either prefer or consent to sin, that is, to the complacency of sin, or [accept] the toleration of penalty, anyone is bound to prefer, or rather to choose, the penalty than to be willing to sin or to have sinned. — Apart from a case of necessity I say that to prefer every penalty belongs to perfect virtue; but to hesitate belongs to weakness, because natural fear makes one hesitate greatly, and this hesitation can coexist with charity; but to prefer fault to any penalty — this belongs to iniquity, if it be with deliberation and full will, because every such will is iniquitous, which wills sin either absolutely or conditionally. — Whence it is a danger and folly to demand this of someone weak, or even of oneself, because this is to set a man in temptation; whence no confessor ought to demand this of one who confesses to him. But if the penitent offer himself and say that he would rather be dead than to have sinned, or something similar; one should rejoice, because this is a sign of good will.
If therefore it be asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest; if it be spoken of the sorrowd of sensuality, it is manifest that [it need] not; if of the displeasure of reason, either as to the intensity of the motion absolutely, then in this way too it need not be the greatest: if in comparison with other sorrows, I say, as concerning love, that it must have predominance. — And thus proceed the arguments proving that it obtains primacy among all other sorrows over created things. — But if it be understood of the sorrow of sensuality with respect to all by way of intensitye, it is to be resolved, as has been touched on, because it follows experience and delight and also complexion, or something of the sort; therefore one grieves more sensibly over the death of an only son.
To the arguments:
To that, however, which is objected lastly, that the superior always moves the inferiorsf; it must be said that this is true in those things which are naturally fitted simply to obey, as in the motion of the hands or feet; but it is not so in the affections except through much habituation.
To 1. As to what is objected, that [the sorrow] is small because mixed with joy; it must be said that the sorrow of contrition, when it is in a well-disposed soul, is very great, and the joy mitigates the sorrow and intensifies it. For he grieves because he wills to grieve; and the more he desires to grieve, the more he grieves; and the more he sees himself grieving, the more he rejoices. Therefore it is clear that it is not lessened, because it does not have opposition, rather the one is the cause of the otherg; nevertheless I readily grant that it is mitigated and wounds less; whence it is intensified and mitigated: it is intensified with respect to the sin, and mitigated with respect to the penitent; it is intensified with respect to the object, mitigated with respect to the subject; or it is intensified under the aspect of displeasure, mitigated under the aspect of penalty.
To 2. As to what is objected, that it can be recovered; it must be said that this too mitigates the sorrow, so that the sorrow of the contrite is not with despair, but with hopeh. Nevertheless, because the contrite of himself does not hope; so far as concerns himself, he afflicts himself with sorrow as if he had lost everything; yet he takes breath in the mercy of God. — And as to its objecting that one ought to grieve more over an irre-
coverable thing; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal.
To 3. As to what is objected, that the least grace blots out all fault; it must be said that sorrow, however small it be, suffices, if it be informed by grace; but nevertheless grace never informs without claiming for itself dominion in the heart as to the act or motion of the rational will, not of sensualityi.
To 4. As to what is objected, that few, or none, would rather be blind than have sinned; the response is already plain according to the way set out above. For if they were placed in necessity — namely, either that they desist from the detestation of sin, or that they lose their eyes (and I speak of interior detestation) — they would necessarily have to prefer [to lose their eyes]; but now they are not.
I. The distinction is common between sorrow or displeasure in the sensitive part and in the rational will, and likewise the doctrine that contrition essentially is only in the will, and that this displeasure ought to be supreme by estimation — that is, in comparison with the displeasure with respect to other evils. But it is not required that the act of contrition be supreme in intensity; rather, against certain authors, it is commonly taught with Saints Bonaventure and Thomas that no certain degree of intensity is necessarily required. — Worthy of note is the explanation in the body [of the question] as to matters bearing on practice.
On this first question: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. IV q. 17 m. 2 a. 1 q. 8. — Durandus, loc. cit. n. 6, 7. — Scotus, on this and the following q., IV Sent. d. 14 q. 2 n. 11, and cf. III Sent. d. 27 n. 16, 17. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 17 q. 2 a. 3 quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 3 a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 31. — Petr. of Tarentaise, on this and the following q., IV Sent. d. 17 q. 1 a. 3 quaestiunc. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, below d. 17 a. 1 q. 6, 0. — Durandus, below d. 17 q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q., below d. 17 q. 1.
II. On the following (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. § 4. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. loc. cit. a. 2. — Bl. Albert touches on the matter here a. 30. — Richard of Middleton, below d. 17 a. 1 q. 8. — Durandus, loc. cit. n. 6, 7.
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- 1Vers. 26. — Duas Glossas exhibet Lyranus ut interlineares, quae sunt ex Hieronymo, qui in hunc locum ait: Docet, quid facere debeant, ut convertantur, scilicet ad poenitentiam... Nihil autem dolentius quam unum vel solum perdere filium.[Jeremiah 6,] verse 26. — Lyra gives two Glosses as interlinear, which are from Jerome, who on this passage says: It teaches what they ought to do in order to be converted, namely to penance... But nothing is more grievous than to lose one and only son.
- 2Cap. 26. n. 4. — Inferius pro per codd. F G aa propter. [Libr. XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 26. n. 4.][On the City of God, book XXI,] chapter 26, n. 4. — Below, for per (through), codices F G aa [read] propter (on account of).
- 3Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 326, nota 0. — Post affectio codd. F G addunt est amor. Finem arg., ubi codd. omittunt et, cod. bb sic exhibet: ergo dolor ex amissione Dei est maior omni alio dolore.Book XIV On the City of God, c. 7, n. 2. Cf. above p. 326, note 0. — After affectio (affection) codices F G add est amor (is love). The end of the argument, where the codices omit et (and), codex bb gives thus: therefore the sorrow from the loss of God is greater than every other sorrow.
- 4Scilicet dolor de amissione rei temporalis.Namely, the sorrow over the loss of a temporal thing.
- 5Cod. K (1 a secunda manu) ergo magis dolet de morte separationis a Christo. Mox post proximi ex codd. F G H K L V substituimus et corporis pro et morte sua.Codex K (1, by a second hand): therefore he grieves more over the death of separation from Christ. Soon after proximi (of a neighbor), from codices F G H K L V we have substituted et corporis (and of [his] body) for et morte sua (and his death).
- 6Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1. (c. 5.). — Quod dolor contritionis est admixtus gaudio, ostensum est supra a. I. q. 1. ad 2.Aristotle, III Topics c. 1 (c. 5). — That the sorrow of contrition is mixed with joy was shown above, a. I q. 1, to [objection] 2.
- 7Cod. X addit in se. [Cfr. supra d. 16. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.]Codex X adds in se (in itself).
- 8Codd. T U bene delectationis.Codices T U rightly [read] delectationis (of delight).
- aVide III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 6. et d. 29. q. 2.See III Sent. d. 27 a. 2 q. 6 and d. 29 q. 2.
- bUt ostensum est III. Sent. d. 30. q. 2. — Superius pro aliqua causa codd. F G aliqua parte. Inferius pro ad reconciliationem, quod habet cod. 0, cod. aa in reconciliatione, alii aut cum edd. vel reconciliatione, aut vel reconciliationem. Subinde secuti sumus cod. K (1 a secunda manu), ponentes sine multis doloribus et amissionibus, pro quo codd. F G sine multis doloribus] quos homo habet aliquando causa amissionis (codd. M O quos habent aliqui pro amissione), alii sine multis amissionis (codd. P X amissionibus) doloribus (cod. bb doloribus amissionis), ed. 1 sine multis doloribus de amissione, Vat. sine multis doloribus. Haec sint dicta de amissione.As was shown III Sent. d. 30 q. 2. — Above, for aliqua causa (from some cause) codices F G [read] aliqua parte (in some part). Below, for ad reconciliationem (for reconciliation), which codex 0 has, codex aa [reads] in reconciliatione, others either with the editions vel reconciliatione, or vel reconciliationem. Thereafter we have followed codex K (1, by a second hand), putting sine multis doloribus et amissionibus (without many sorrows and losses), for which codices F G [read] sine multis doloribus] quos homo habet aliquando causa amissionis (codices M O quos habent aliqui pro amissione), others sine multis amissionis (codices P X amissionibus) doloribus (codex bb doloribus amissionis), ed. 1 sine multis doloribus de amissione, the Vatican [edition] sine multis doloribus. Let these things be said concerning loss.
- cVat. supplet culpae, vel poenae. Eadem Vat. aliquanto inferius post praeteritum peccatum cum ed. 1 addit quod fecit.The Vatican [edition] supplies culpae, vel poenae (of fault, or of penalty). The same Vatican [edition] somewhat below, after praeteritum peccatum (past sin), with ed. 1 adds quod fecit (which he committed).
- dCfr. supra pag. 384, nota 1. — Codd. L O R T U sensualitatem, Vat. sentientem vel sensualitatem.Cf. above p. 384, note 1. — Codices L O R T U [read] sensualitatem, the Vatican [edition] sentientem vel sensualitatem.
- eUt ostenditur infra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et 3. — Edd. addunt et.As is shown below d. 17 p. I a. 1 q. 2 and 3. — The editions add et (and).
- fVide infra dub. 10. et supra d. 14. p. II. dub. 7. — Inferius pro obedire plures codd. scribunt obaudire. (Vat. notavit, quod in hac quaest. exciderit arg., cum nullum in serie argg. explicite habeatur, cui haec solutio respondeat. Tamen fortasse non respicitur hic nisi locutio « animus ordinatus » in fundamento. Ex ipsa solutione enim coniicere licet, arg. ultimo solvendum sumtum esse ex hoc principio, quod in animo ordinato inferiores vires subiacent superiori, quod ibi supponitur. Attamen hoc principium si applicatur ad rem propositam, restrictione indiget, quae in solutione ista exhibetur. Cfr. supra d. 15. p. II. dub. 11.)See below dub. 10 and above d. 14 p. II dub. 7. — Below, for obedire (to obey) several codices write obaudire. (The Vatican [edition] noted that in this question an argument has dropped out, since none in the series of arguments is explicitly found to which this solution would respond. Yet perhaps nothing is regarded here except the phrase « ordered soul » in the foundation [i.e. arg. 6]. For from the solution itself one may conjecture that the last argument to be solved is taken from this principle, that in an ordered soul the lower powers are subject to the higher, which is there supposed. But this principle, if applied to the matter proposed, needs the restriction which is set forth in that solution. Cf. above d. 15 p. II dub. 11.)
- gSive negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota i.Or [the] negation. Cf. tom. I p. 87, note i.
- hCfr. supra d. 14. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Inferius pro se affligit codd. 1 K affligitur.Cf. above d. 14 p. I a. 2 q. 2 in the body. — Below, for se affligit (afflicts himself) codices 1 K [read] affligitur (is afflicted).
- iCfr. supra a. I. q. I. in corp.Cf. above a. I q. I in the body.