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Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
p. 385

Quaestio II. Quid sit contritio in genere moris.

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit contritio in genere moris. Et quod sit actus virtutis, videtur:

1. Quia omnis actus difficilis et meritorius est actus virtutis, vel doni, vel beatitudinis; sed contritio est huiusmodi et non est doni nec beatitudinis: ergo est virtutis.

2. Item, omnis actus meritorius specialis, qui egreditur a potentia determinata, est virtutis specialis; sed contritio est huiusmodi: ergo contritio est virtutis specialis1.

3. Item, poenitentia est dolor et amaritudo mentis; sed constat, illud esse dictum per causam,

p. 386

quia poenitentia, ut dicit Ambrosius2, facit dolere: ergo si contritio est dolor, contritio est actus virtutis poenitentiae: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Contritio est dolor; sed dolor est passio, et passio non est actus virtutis nec gratiae: ergo nec contritio. Quod dolor sit passio, patet, quia dolor opponitur delectationi3.

2. Item, contritio est expulsiva peccati; sed peccatum expellere est ipsius gratiae: ergo contritio est gratiae actus. Si tu dicas, hoc esse virtutis4; contra: aut hoc est virtutis per gratiam, aut e converso. Constat, quod virtutis ratione gratiae, quae est vita, et ideo expellit mortem: cum ergo contritio per se sit expulsiva peccati, patet, quod contritio est actus gratiae.

3. Item, contritione omnia peccata expelluntur; sed omne tale est commune ad omnem animae potentiam et habitum: ergo contritio non est actus virtutis, aut si est, non est virtutis specialis.

Conclusio. Contritio est motus specialis virtutis, scilicet poenitentiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex fuit opinio: quaedam, quod contritio est motus liberi arbitrii informati gratia, non virtute, propter quod est expulsiva peccati; alia, quod motus omnium virtutum, quia contra omnia peccata; tertia, quod motus virtutis specialis, scilicet poenitentiae. Et habent istae tres opiniones ortum ab opinionibus de poenitentia: quidam dicebant, quod poenitentia esset gratia; quidam, quod virtus generalis; quidam, quod specialis. Sed cum supra5 ostensum sit, ipsam esse virtutem specialem, cuius motus est peccatum detestari commissum ad emendam; et hoc est conteri: dicendum, quod contritio est motus specialis virtutis, scilicet poenitentiae.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est passio; dicendum, quod dolor dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dissensus voluntatis rationalis, alio modo passio redundans in sentientem6. Primo modo est motus voluntatis, et sic contritio est dolor per essentiam; alio modo passio, et sic contritio est dolor per concomitantiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod delere culpam est gratiae; dicendum, quod etsi delere culpam sit gratiae, tamen in adulto, qui praeparat se per usum liberi arbitrii, infunditur gratia, ut in tali usu est7; deletio culpae in illo fit per gratiam, ut induit rationem virtutis, et ideo per poenitentiam, quae concernit gratiam et habitum virtutis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia expellit; dicendum, quod expellit per modum detestantis; et unius virtutis est omne malum detestari sub ea ratione, qua est Dei offensivum, et quia commissum est contra Deum; et sic contritio detestatur et expellit et est virtus poenitentiae. Unde sicut obedientia opera omnium virtutum respicit sub ratione mandati, nec propter hoc est virtus generalis, quia licet illa differant per essentiam, tamen ratio formalis est una secundum speciem; sic et in proposito. — Et est simile de visu, qui videt hominem et plantam, quae non tantum differunt specie, sed etiam genere; videt tamen, quia sunt colorata; videt etiam album et nigrum, quae sunt obiecta per se et differunt specie; et tamen ipse non differt, quia videt per naturam lucis8: sic contritio detestatur superbiam et luxuriam in quantum malum contra Deum perpetratum ab ipso qui conteritur. Et si tu obiicias, quod contritio est vis concupiscibilis, et poenitentia est in irascibili; supra9 solutum est. Nam dolor et odium cum insurrectione consistit in irascibili; nihilominus tamen cum illo est dolor quidam in concupiscibili, et iste est imperatus a poenitentia et coniunctus cum illo dolore; et sic non est contrarium praedictis, quia utrumque concurrit ad contritionem, sed primus dolor est praecipuus et principalis10.

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English Translation

Question II. What contrition is in the moral genus.

Secondly it is asked what contrition is in the moral genus. And that it is the act of a virtue seems to be the case:

1. Because every act that is difficult and meritorious is the act either of a virtue, or of a gift, or of beatitude; but contrition is of this kind and is not of a gift nor of beatitude: therefore it is of a virtue.

2. Likewise, every special meritorious act, which issues from a determinate power, is the act of a special virtue; but contrition is of this kind: therefore contrition is the act of a special virtue1.

3. Likewise, penitence is grief and bitterness of mind; but it is agreed that this is said by way of cause,

quia penitence, as Ambrose says2, causes one to grieve: therefore, if contrition is grief, contrition is the act of the virtue of penitence: therefore, and so on.

On the contrary: 1. Contrition is grief; but grief is a passion, and a passion is not the act of a virtue nor of grace: therefore neither is contrition. That grief is a passion is plain, because grief is opposed to delight3.

2. Likewise, contrition is expulsive of sin; but to expel sin belongs to grace itself: therefore contrition is an act of grace. And if you say that this belongs to a virtue4; on the contrary: either this belongs to a virtue through grace, or the reverse. It is agreed that it belongs to a virtue by reason of grace, which is life, and therefore expels death: since, then, contrition is of itself expulsive of sin, it is plain that contrition is an act of grace.

3. Likewise, by contrition all sins are expelled; but everything of this kind is common to every power and habit of the soul: therefore contrition is not the act of a virtue, or if it is, it is not the act of a special virtue.

Conclusion. Contrition is the motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this there were three opinions: one, that contrition is a motion of free choice informed by grace, not by virtue, on account of which it is expulsive of sin; another, that it is a motion of all the virtues, because it is against all sins; the third, that it is a motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence. And these three opinions take their origin from the opinions about penitence: for some said that penitence was grace; some, that it was a general virtue; some, that it was a special one. But since it was shown above5 that it is a special virtue, whose motion is to detest the sin committed in order to amend it — and this is to be contrite — it must be said that contrition is the motion of a special virtue, namely of penitence.

1. To that which is objected, that it is a passion; it must be said that grief is spoken of in two ways: in one way, as the dissent of the rational will, in another way, as a passion overflowing into the sentient being6. In the first way it is a motion of the will, and thus contrition is grief by essence; in the other way it is a passion, and thus contrition is grief by concomitance.

2. To that which is objected, that to blot out fault belongs to grace; it must be said that although to blot out fault belongs to grace, nevertheless in an adult, who prepares himself through the use of free choice, grace is infused, as it is in such a use7; the blotting out of fault in him comes about through grace, inasmuch as it puts on the character of a virtue, and therefore through penitence, which has to do with grace and the habit of virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that it expels all things; it must be said that it expels by way of detesting; and it belongs to one virtue to detest every evil under that account by which it is offensive to God, and because it was committed against God; and thus contrition detests and expels and is the virtue of penitence. Hence, just as obedience regards the works of all the virtues under the account of a command, and is not for that reason a general virtue — because, although they differ by essence, nevertheless the formal account is one according to species — so also in the case proposed. — And it is similar with sight, which sees a man and a plant, which differ not only in species but even in genus; yet it sees them, because they are colored; it sees also white and black, which are objects in themselves and differ in species; and yet it does not itself differ, because it sees by the nature of light8: thus contrition detests pride and lust insofar as they are an evil perpetrated against God by the one who is contrite. And if you object that contrition is a power of the concupiscible part, and penitence is in the irascible; it was resolved above9. For grief and hatred with an uprising consist in the irascible; nevertheless together with that there is a certain grief in the concupiscible, and this is commanded by penitence and joined with that grief; and thus it is not contrary to the things said before, because both concur in contrition, but the first grief is the chief and principal one10.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Pro specialis Vat. perperam substituit ter spiritualis.
    For specialis (special) the Vatican edition wrongly substitutes, three times, spiritualis (spiritual).
  2. 2
    Cfr. supra pag. 384, nota 1.
    Cf. above, p. 384, note 1.
  3. 3
    Vide supra pag. 318, nota 7.
    See above, p. 318, note 7.
  4. 4
    Cfr. supra pag. 318, nota 4.
    Cf. above, p. 318, note 4.
  5. 5
    Dist. 14. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. — Ibid. q. 1. exposita invenitur praeced. propositio. — Superius pro esset gratia codd. erat gratia. Inferius pro et hoc est conteri Vat. et haec est arbor (?), ed. 1 et hoc est confiteri.
    Distinction 14, part I, article 1, question 2. — In the same place, question 1, the preceding proposition is found expounded. — Above, for esset gratia (it would be grace) the codices read erat gratia (it was grace). Below, for et hoc est conteri (and this is to be contrite) the Vatican edition reads et haec est arbor (?), edition 1 et hoc est confiteri (and this is to confess).
  6. 6
    Cfr. supra pag. 384, nota 1. — Codd. L OR T (?) sensualitatem, Vat. sentientem vel sensualitatem.
    Cf. above, p. 384, note 1. — Codices L, OR, T (?) read sensualitatem (the sensuality), the Vatican edition sentientem (the sentient being) or sensualitatem (the sensuality).
  7. 7
    Ut ostenditur infra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et 3. — Edd. addunt et.
    As is shown below, distinction 17, part I, article 1, questions 2 and 3. — The editions add et (and).
  8. 8
    Vide III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. — Post ipse cod. X addit in se.
    See III Sentences, distinction 23, article 1, question 3, in the body. — After ipse (it itself) codex X adds in se (in itself).
  9. 9
    Dist. 14. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. — Pro in irascibili cod. II irascibilis (vis).
    Distinction 14, part I, article 2, question 1. Cf. also III Sentences, distinction 26, article 2, question 5. — For in irascibili (in the irascible) codex II reads irascibilis (the irascible [power]).
  10. 10
    Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
Cited by

2 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether the expulsion of fault necessarily precedes contrition
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 17
supra d. 16. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2.
On the Sacrament of penance with respect to its signification
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 22
supra d. 16. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.

4 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

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