Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16
Articulus I. De contritione quantum ad quidditatem.
Quaestio I. Quid sit contritio quoad suam substantiam.
Circa primum proceditur sic. Magistri1 dicunt, quod contritio est dolor voluntarie pro peccatis assumtus; et quod ita sit, videtur:
1. Quia, sicut dicit Ambrosius2 « poenitentia est commissa deflere »; et iterum: « Poenitentia est dolor et amaritudo mentis pro peccatis, quae quisque commisit »; sed hoc non est confessio neque satisfactio: ergo contritio.
2. Item, Augustinus3: « Dolendum est et dolore purgandum »; sed contritio est illud in poenitentia, quod peccata depurgat: ergo contritio est dolor.
3. Item, ratione videtur: quia primum, quod est in poenitentia, est dissentire a peccato facto; sed quod factum est necesse est esse factum; sed cum aliquid displicet alicui vehementer, quod tamen non potest facere, quin fuerit, generat dolorem: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Sicut vere poenitentem necesse est dolere, ita etiam pudere4: ergo pudor est de poenitentia; et non est confessio nec satisfactio: ergo contritio, et sic etc.
2. Item, in poenitentia non tantum est dolere, verum etiam gaudere — unde in praecedenti distinctione5: « Doleat et de dolore gaudeat » — ergo quemadmodum contritio dicitur dolor, ita etiam debet dici gaudium.
3. Item, videtur, quod non sit dolor: quia, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo quarto de Civitate Dei6 « dolor est dissensus ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt »; sed contritio est dissensus a peccatis, quae nobis volentibus accidunt: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod peccata prius sunt placita et volita, post autem displicent et non sunt volita, et pro illo tempore est dolor; contra: dolor est ex coniunctione disconvenientis, ergo ab oppositis ex dissensu a disconvenienti non est dolor, sed gaudium: ergo si peccata displicent, et per contritionem dissentit quis a peccatis; videtur, quod non dolor, sed gaudium est contritio.
4. Item, contritus dolet de peccato facto, aut ergo quia vult, ipsum non esse factum, aut quia vult. Si quia vult; cum factum sit, tunc evenit quod vult. Si quia non vult; sed omnis voluntas est indiscreta, quae appetit impossibile et refugit necessarium: ergo cum voluntas contriti non sit talis, patet etc. — Si dicas quod verum est de voluntate absoluta, sed non de velleitate, et talis est contritio; contra: contritus habet voluntatem a virtute et gratia informatam7; sed omnis talis consistit in pleno consensu: ergo voluntas contriti non est velleitas, sed plena voluntas; et ita nulla est illa responsio.
5. Item, differt dolor et timor, quia dolor est affectio de praesenti malo, sed timor de futuro8; sed peccatum est praeteritum, et de eo est contritio: ergo non est dolor. Si dicas, quod non est praesens secundum affectum9, sed secundum aspectum; similiter et futurum est praesens secundum aspectum: ergo sicut est dolor de praeterito, ita etiam de futuro.
Item, cum contritio sit dolor, ut quid magis denominatur nomine contritionis quam doloris?
Conclusio. Contritio est dolor per essentiam, quatenus dolor sumitur pro dissensu voluntatis, non pro passione sensibili.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut peccatum perpetratur per consensum, sic econtra deletur et destruitur per dissensum voluntatis rationalis; et quia dissensus ab ea re, quam impossibile est non esse, generat dolorem, sicut dicit Augustinus10: ideo dicendum, quod contritio est dolor per essentiam. — Sed attendendum, quod dolor dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ipse dissensus voluntatis, alio modo passio resultans in sentientem ex illo dissensu, per
quam prorumpit homo in lacrymas11; et ille dissensus est de essentia contritionis, sed illa passio est effectus eius.
1. 2. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod sit pudor et gaudium, sicut et dolor; dicendum, quod pudor consequitur ad illum dissensum, secundum quod dissentit a peccato tanquam a turpi. Consequitur etiam gaudium, secundum quod ex illo dissensu sentit se elongari a peccato12; immediatius autem consequitur passio, quae est dolor. Nam ipse dissensus vehemens a re, quam nolumus esse, et tamen est, immediate dolorem generat, quia dissensus; sed quia a turpi, pudorem; et quia ab illo elongat, gaudium.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum nobis volentibus accidit; dicendum13, quod peccatum est voluntarium quoad delectationem, sed non voluntarium ratione malitiae et deformitatis et poenae. Sed illud non solvit, quia dolor non tantum est de deformitate, immo etiam de delectatione. — Ideo dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod doleat, sufficit, quod illud de quo dolet, sit nolitum pro tempore, in quo dolet; tamen non oportet, quod omni14 tempore. Et quod in contrarium adducit, quod dissensus a re disconvenienti generat gaudium; verum est, quando est tantum dissensus, ut puta, cum refugit, ne faciat peccatum, non dolet, sed gaudet; sed quando est dissensus cum coniunctione, tunc est dolor; et ita est in contritione, quia nollet peccasse, et tamen necessarium est, ipsum peccasse.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contritus vult impossibile; dicendum, quod velleitate vult, non voluntate absoluta; sicut aliquis ex pietate de illo qui mortuus est, vellet, quod viveret15.
Et quod obiicit, quod virtus est in pleno consensu; dicendum, quod consensus semiplenus aut est propter defectum voluntatis, sicut piger vult et non vult16, non est gratiae, sed pigritiae; et talis velleitas aut est propter defectum voliti, quia non est natum eligi, cum sit impossibile, et talis bene est a virtute, ut patet in pietate; et hic est plenus consensus a parte voluntatis, quia reflectitur voluntas supra se et vult, se sic velle.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dolor est de praesenti; dicendum, sicut dictum fuit17, quod est de praesenti secundum aspectum. — Quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non sufficit, quod sit praesens secundum aspectum; respondent aliqui, quod est praesens secundum reputationem, quia pro tali reputat se vere contritus, ac si esset infectus peccato prius facto. — Sed illud non solvit, quia, esto quod constaret sibi de iustitia praesenti, tamen adhuc doleret de praeterito18. — Ideo dicunt alii, quod est praesens secundum effectum, quia remanent reliquiae. — Sed tunc esto, quod nullae reliquiae remanerent, adhuc tamen doleret homo de malo, quod fecit.
Ideo dicendum, quod ad dolorem faciendum sufficit, quod res, quae displicet voluntati, sit praesens aspectui, non secundum coniecturam, sed secundum certitudinem, quia ita est et non potest aliter esse; et tunc est dolor, sive illud, de quo gemitus19 est, sit praesens, sive praeteritum, sive futurum. Unde cum dicitur mihi certitudinaliter, quod aliquis, quem diligo, morietur, generat in me dolorem; multo magis de praeterito, in quo est perfecta certitudo.
Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare magis denominatur nomine contritionis; et quae convenientia doloris ad contritionem? dicunt aliqui, quod ideo hoc nomine censetur, quia, sicut unguentum sanativum conficitur ex multis herbis in mortario contritis, sic unguentum compunctionis conficitur ex herbis peccatorum, quae natae sunt in terra nostra, dum conteruntur in mortariolo conscientiae; ita videtur Bernardus super Cantica20 dicere. — Sed tunc ab hac contritione non diceretur homo contritus, sed conterens.
Ideo addendum, quod in hac contritione tria sunt attendenda: quod conteritur, a quo conteritur, et ad quid contritio terminatur. Quod conteritur est cor peccatoris, quod est tanquam vas fictile repletum veneno peccati, iuxta illud Deuteronomii trigesimo secundo21: Fel draconum vinum eorum etc. — A quo conteritur est duplex mola: una superius sursum elevans, et haec est spes
veniae ex consideratione misericordiae; alia mola, deorsum deprimens, est timor poenae, veniens ex consideratione divinae iustitiae. Et de his molis dicitur Deuteronomii vigesimo quarto: Non accipies loco pignoris inferiorem et superiorem molam. — Istud vas hic conteritur, quia durum est, ut emollescat — cor enim durum male habebit in novissimo — vel melius, ut peccati delectatio totaliter effundatur. Ideo dicitur contritio, non fractio, « quia fractio est in maiores partes », contritio in minores; et quando in maiores partes est fractio, sapor aliquo modo remanet; ut autem non remaneat nec sapor nec veritas, ideo in partes minimas conteritur. — Et haec delectatio totaliter removetur per poenam aeternam et removetur per gratiam; et ideo utrobique contritio, et in poena aeterna, secundum illud Ecclesiastici vigesimo septimo: Conteretur cum delinquente delictum; et per gratiam, Psalmo: Cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despicies; sed aliter: quia ibi conteritur in pulverem, non ut aliud vas fiat, quia de impiis dicitur: Non sic impii, non sic, sed tanquam pulvis etc.; sed in contritione gratiae est contritio ad generandum vas novum et solidum per humorem gratiae et lacrymarum; et ideo recte dicitur contritio, non attritio, quia partium tritarum est unio, ut fiat vas in honorem, secundum illud de Paulo: Vas electionis est mihi, Actuum nono; et secundae ad Timotheum secundo: Si quis emundaverit se ab his, erit vas etc. Et sic patet ratio dicti.
I. De nomine contritionis vide hic q. incid. et dub. 3. De distinctione inter contritionem proprie dictam et attritionem cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. dub. 1, d. 14. p. II. dub. 1, sed praecipue infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. Quomodo attritio fiat contritio, docetur infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. De attritione naturali vide II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 6. — Ut autem plura, quae in hac et seq. dist. occurrunt, recte intelligantur, hic observamus, antiquos Scholasticos de contritione passim loqui non eadem prorsus ratione, qua rem considerant recentiores; et haec differentia est duplex. Primo quidem in definitione contritionis et attritionis illi non tam motivorum differentiam ut recentes theologi, considerabant, quam informationem a gratia habituali procedentem, vel eiusdem defectum. Hinc omnem actum doloris tempore gratiae infusionem praecedentem vocabant attritionem, cum sit informis; econtra quemcumque actum formatum dicebant esse contritionem. Hoc explicite cum Alexandro Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 3. a. 3.) docet S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 28. a. 8.): « Omnis dolor de peccato in habente gratiam est contritio », sicut omnis actus fidei gratiae habituali coniunctus est formatus. — Secundo, supponebant communiter, habitum gratiae non dari adultis sine actu istius contritionis, non quidem tempore gratiae infusionem praecedente (quod, ista definitione supposita, est impossibile), sed in eodem instanti cum infusione gratiae formato. Et de hoc actu ac de ordine naturae, quem habet respectu infusionis gratiae et expulsionis culpae, subtiliter disputabant, ut patet infra d. 17. p. 1. a. 2. Quare autem iste actus contritionis in adultis sit semper connexus cum iustificatione, docet S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 28. a. 3. ad 10.), quia scil. « in hoc ostenditur perfectior communicatio divinae bonitatis, quod simul facit in homine actum iustitiae, quam si faceret habitum tantum ». Cfr. Bonav., loc. cit. a. 1. q. 3, et de actibus praeparatoriis tempore iustificationem praecedentibus ibid. q. 2. a. 2. q. 3.
II. Quaestionis 1. conclusio manifesta est. — De gaudio quod arg. 2. ad oppos. in contritione esse dicitur, cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. et dub. 10. — De hac et pluribus seqq. qq. plurimi commentatores Lombardi agunt infra d. 17. De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. n. 6; cfr. d. 14. q. 2. — S. Thom., d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6-9. — Petr. a Tar., d. 17. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., d. 17. q. 1. n. 7. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. d. 17. q. 4.
III. Quaestionis 2. conclusio rite sequitur ex doctrina de virtute poenitentiae, supra d. 14. p. I. a. 1. exposita. — De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3. et a. 1. § 2. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 14. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2.
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Article I. On contrition with respect to its quiddity.
Question I. What contrition is according to its substance.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus. The Masters1 say that contrition is a sorrow voluntarily taken up for sins; and that it is so, it seems:
1. Because, as Ambrose says2, "penitence is to bewail things committed"; and again: "Penitence is a sorrow and bitterness of mind for the sins which each one has committed"; but this is neither confession nor satisfaction: therefore [it is] contrition.
2. Likewise, Augustine3: "One must grieve and be purged by grief"; but contrition is that in penitence which purges away sins: therefore contrition is a sorrow.
3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because the first thing which is in penitence is to dissent from the sin committed; but what has been done is necessarily done; but when something displeases someone vehemently, which nevertheless he cannot bring about that it should not have been, it generates sorrow: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. Just as it is necessary for one truly penitent to grieve, so also to feel shame4: therefore shame belongs to penitence; and it is neither confession nor satisfaction: therefore [it is] contrition, and so etc.
2. Likewise, in penitence there is not only grieving, but also rejoicing — whence in the preceding distinction5: "Let him grieve and rejoice over the grief" — therefore just as contrition is called sorrow, so also it ought to be called joy.
3. Likewise, it seems that it is not sorrow: because, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the City of God6, "sorrow is a dissent from those things which befall us unwillingly"; but contrition is a dissent from sins, which befell us willingly: therefore etc. If you say that sins were first pleasing and willed, but afterward displease and are not willed, and for that time there is sorrow; on the contrary: sorrow is from the conjunction of something disagreeing, therefore from opposites, from a dissent from what disagrees there is not sorrow, but joy: therefore if sins displease, and through contrition one dissents from sins; it seems that contrition is not sorrow, but joy.
4. Likewise, the contrite one grieves over the sin committed, either therefore because he wills it not to have been done, or because he wills [it]. If because he wills [it]; since it has been done, then what he wills comes about. If because he does not will [it]; but every will which seeks the impossible and shuns the necessary is indiscreet: therefore since the will of the contrite one is not such, it is clear etc. — If you say that this is true of an absolute will, but not of a velleity, and such is contrition; on the contrary: the contrite one has a will informed by virtue and grace7; but every such [will] consists in full consent: therefore the will of the contrite one is not a velleity, but a full will; and so that reply is null.
5. Likewise, sorrow and fear differ, because sorrow is an affection concerning a present evil, but fear concerning a future one8; but the sin is past, and contrition is over it: therefore it is not sorrow. If you say that it is not present according to affection9, but according to regard; likewise the future too is present according to regard: therefore just as there is sorrow over the past, so also over the future.
Likewise, since contrition is sorrow, why is it rather named by the name of contrition than of sorrow?
Conclusion. Contrition is sorrow by essence, insofar as sorrow is taken for the dissent of the will, not for a sensible passion.
I respond: It must be said that, just as sin is perpetrated through consent, so on the contrary it is deleted and destroyed through the dissent of the rational will; and since dissent from a thing which it is impossible should not be generates sorrow, as Augustine says10: therefore it must be said that contrition is sorrow by essence. — But it must be noted that sorrow is said in two ways: in one way [it is] the dissent of the will itself, in another way the passion resulting in the one perceiving from that dissent, through
which a man bursts into tears11; and that dissent is of the essence of contrition, but that passion is its effect.
1. 2. As to what is objected, then, that there is shame and joy, just as also sorrow; it must be said that shame follows upon that dissent, insofar as he dissents from the sin as from something base. Joy too follows, insofar as from that dissent he perceives himself to be removed from the sin12; but the passion which is sorrow follows more immediately. For the vehement dissent itself from a thing which we do not will to be, and yet is, immediately generates sorrow, because [it is] dissent; but because [it is] from something base, [it generates] shame; and because it removes from it, joy.
3. To that which is objected, that the sin befell us willingly; it must be said13 that sin is voluntary as to the delight, but not voluntary by reason of the malice and the deformity and the penalty. But that does not solve [it], because sorrow is not only concerning the deformity, but also concerning the delight. — Therefore it must be said that for him to grieve it suffices that that over which he grieves be unwilled for the time in which he grieves; yet it is not necessary that [it be unwilled] at every time14. And as to what it adduces to the contrary, that dissent from a disagreeing thing generates joy; it is true, when there is only dissent, as for instance when he shuns lest he commit a sin, he does not grieve, but rejoices; but when there is dissent with conjunction, then there is sorrow; and so it is in contrition, because he would not have wished to sin, and yet it is necessary that he sinned.
4. To that which is objected, that the contrite one wills the impossible; it must be said that he wills by velleity, not by absolute will; just as someone out of piety, concerning him who has died, would wish that he were alive15.
And as to what it objects, that virtue is in full consent; it must be said that semifull consent is either on account of a defect of the will, as the slothful man wills and does not will16, [and such] is not of grace, but of sloth; and such a velleity is either on account of a defect of the thing willed, because it is not apt to be chosen, since it is impossible, and such [consent] is well from virtue, as is clear in piety; and this is full consent on the part of the will, because the will is reflected upon itself and wills that it so will.
5. To that which is objected, that sorrow is concerning the present; it must be said, as was said17, that it is concerning the present according to regard. — As to what is objected to the contrary, that it does not suffice that it be present according to regard; some reply that it is present according to reputation, because for such [present] the truly contrite one reckons himself, as if he were infected with the sin previously committed. — But that does not solve [it], because, granted that it were established to him concerning his present justice, nevertheless he would still grieve over the past18. — Therefore others say that it is present according to effect, because remnants remain. — But then, granted that no remnants remained, nevertheless a man would still grieve over the evil which he did.
Therefore it must be said that for making sorrow it suffices that the thing which displeases the will be present to regard, not according to conjecture, but according to certitude, because it is so and cannot be otherwise; and then there is sorrow, whether that over which there is groaning19 be present, or past, or future. Whence when it is told me with certitude that someone whom I love will die, it generates sorrow in me; much more concerning the past, in which there is perfect certitude.
To that which is asked: why is it rather named by the name of contrition; and what is the suitability of sorrow to contrition? some say that it is reckoned by this name because, just as a healing ointment is made from many herbs ground in a mortar, so the ointment of compunction is made from the herbs of sins, which were born in our land, while they are ground in the little mortar of conscience; thus Bernard seems to say upon the Canticle20. — But then from this [grinding] a man would not be called contrite, but grinding.
Therefore it must be added that in this contrition three things are to be attended to: what is ground, by what it is ground, and to what the contrition is terminated. What is ground is the heart of the sinner, which is as an earthen vessel filled with the venom of sin, according to that of Deuteronomy the thirty-second21: Their wine is the gall of dragons etc. — That by which it is ground is a twofold millstone: one raising upward from above, and this is the hope
of pardon from the consideration of mercy; the other millstone, pressing downward, is the fear of penalty, coming from the consideration of divine justice. And concerning these millstones it is said in Deuteronomy the twenty-fourth: You shall not take the lower and the upper millstone in pledge. — This vessel is here ground, because it is hard, that it may be softened — for the hard heart will fare ill in the last day — or better, that the delight of sin may be totally poured out. Therefore it is called contrition, not fracture, "because fracture is into larger parts," contrition into smaller; and when the fracture is into larger parts, the flavor in some way remains; but that neither flavor nor truth may remain, therefore it is ground into the smallest parts. — And this delight is totally removed through eternal penalty and is removed through grace; and therefore in both ways [there is] contrition, both in eternal penalty, according to that of Ecclesiasticus the twenty-seventh: The offense shall be ground together with the offender; and through grace, in the Psalm: A contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise; but otherwise: because there [in eternal penalty] it is ground into dust, not that another vessel may be made, because of the impious it is said: Not so the impious, not so, but like dust etc.; but in the contrition of grace there is contrition for generating a new and solid vessel through the moisture of grace and of tears; and therefore it is rightly called contrition, not attrition, because of the ground parts there is a union, that a vessel may be made unto honor, according to that of Paul: He is a vessel of election to me, Acts the ninth; and to the Second to Timothy the second: If anyone shall cleanse himself from these, he shall be a vessel etc. And thus the reason of the saying is clear.
I. Concerning the name of contrition see here the incidental question and dub. 3. Concerning the distinction between contrition properly so called and attrition cf. above d. 4. p. I. dub. 1, d. 14. p. II. dub. 1, but especially below d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. How attrition becomes contrition is taught below d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. Concerning natural attrition see II Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. ad 6. — But that the many things which occur in this and the following distinction may be rightly understood, here we observe that the ancient Scholastics speak of contrition variously, not by exactly the same account by which the more recent [theologians] consider the matter; and this difference is twofold. First indeed, in the definition of contrition and attrition those [ancients] considered not so much the difference of motives, as the more recent theologians [do], as the information proceeding from habitual grace, or the defect of the same. Hence they called every act of sorrow preceding the infusion of grace in time attrition, since it is unformed; on the contrary, whatever formed act they called contrition. This St. Thomas (On Truth q. 28. a. 8.) teaches explicitly with Alexander of Hales (Summa p. IV. q. 17. m. 3. a. 3.): "Every sorrow concerning sin in one having grace is contrition," just as every act of faith joined to habitual grace is formed. — Second, they commonly supposed that the habit of grace is not given to adults without an act of this contrition, not indeed at a time preceding the infusion of grace (which, that definition being supposed, is impossible), but in the same instant with the infusion of grace, [the act being] formed. And concerning this act and concerning the order of nature which it has with respect to the infusion of grace and the expulsion of guilt, they disputed subtly, as is clear below d. 17. p. 1. a. 2. But why this act of contrition in adults is always connected with justification, St. Thomas teaches (On Truth q. 28. a. 3. ad 10.), namely because "in this is shown a more perfect communication of divine goodness, that it makes at once in man an act of justice, than if it made a habit only." Cf. Bonaventure, loc. cit. a. 1. q. 3, and concerning the preparatory acts preceding justification in time, ibid. q. 2. a. 2. q. 3.
II. The conclusion of the 1st question is manifest. — Concerning the joy which the 2nd argument to the contrary says to be in contrition, cf. also below a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. and dub. 10. — Concerning this and many of the following questions very many commentators of Lombard treat below d. 17. On the same question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1. n. 6; cf. d. 14. q. 2. — St. Thomas, d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 1; Suppl. q. 1. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 6-9. — Peter of Tarentaise, d. 17. q. 1. a. 1. subquestion 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Durandus, d. 17. q. 1. n. 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, d. 17. q. 4.
III. The conclusion of the 2nd question rightly follows from the doctrine concerning the virtue of penitence, set forth above d. 14. p. I. a. 1. — On the same question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 3. and a. 1. § 2. — Scotus, IV Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 14. ff. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. subquestion 2; Suppl. q. 1. a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. subquestion 2.
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- 1Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. IV. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 1, iam referebat: « Contritio est, ut dicunt magistri, idem quod et dolor de peccatis ». Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Contritio est dolor pro peccatis assumtus cum proposito confitendi et satisfaciendi.William of Auxerre, Summa p. IV. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 1, already reported: "Contrition is, as the Masters say, the same as sorrow for sins." Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Contrition is a sorrow taken up for sins with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.
- 2Serm. 25. (9. de s. Quadragesima) n. 1. Ibid. habetur etiam seq. definitio. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIV. c. 2, et Comment. p. I. dub. 4.Sermon 25 (9th on holy Lent) n. 1. There the following definition is also had. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. XIV. c. 2, and the Commentary p. I. dub. 4.
- 3De Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 14. n. 29. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.On True and False Penitence (among the works of Augustine), c. 14. n. 29. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
- 4Bernard., Serm. in Cant. 16. n. 4: Cogitantem, quod patrem offenderim, est certe quod pudeat... Pudet indigna gessisse genere meo, pudet, tanto patre vixisse degenerem.Bernard, Sermon on the Canticle 16. n. 4: For one thinking that I have offended the Father, there is certainly that which should shame... It shames [me] to have done unworthy things to my race, it shames [me] to have lived degenerate from so great a Father.
- 5Scilicet d. XIV. lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa finem.Namely d. XIV, the text of the Master, c. 2, near the end.
- 6Cap. 15. n. 2: Animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his... acciderunt.Chapter 15. n. 2: The sorrow of the soul, which is called sadness, is a dissent from those things... [which] have befallen.
- 7Cod. O informativa.Codex O [reads] informativa [informing].
- 8Vide tom. III. pag. 569, nota 4. verba Damasceni.See vol. III. p. 569, note 4, the words of Damascene.
- 9Ita codd. et ed. 1, Vat. effectum; cfr. infra a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.Thus the codices and ed. 1; the Vatican [edition reads] effectum [effect]; cf. below a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.
- 10Vide supra nota 6.See above note 6.
- 11Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22: Passio est sensibilis motus appetitivae virtutis ex imaginatione boni vel mali. Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2. — Post sentientem Vat. addit vel sensualitatem.Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II. c. 22: A passion is a sensible movement of the appetitive power from the imagination of good or evil. Cf. Augustine, On the City of God XIV. c. 15. n. 2. — After sentientem the Vatican [edition] adds vel sensualitatem [or sensuality].
- 12Cfr. infra dub. 10. et supra d. II. p. II. dub. 7. — Circa finem solut. pro pudorem codd. H aa pudor est.Cf. below dub. 10, and above d. II. p. II. dub. 7. — Near the end of the solution, for pudorem codices H aa [read] pudor est [there is shame].
- 13Videtur esse legendum (ut ex subnexis colligitur) aliqui dicunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Aliter dicunt aliqui, quod cum perpetratione peccati multa accidunt peccantibus nolentibus, ut offensa Dei, laesio naturalium, privatio gratuitorum et alia huiusmodi, de quibus dolendum est. Unde Augustinus: Dolendum est, non solum quia peccavit, sed quia virtute se privavit (cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.).It seems that one should read (as is gathered from what is appended) some say. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 17. m. 1. a. 1. § 1: Some say otherwise, that with the perpetration of sin many things befall sinners unwillingly, such as the offense of God, the injury of natural [goods], the privation of gratuitous [goods], and others of this kind, over which one must grieve. Whence Augustine: One must grieve, not only because he sinned, but because he deprived himself of virtue (cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.).
- 14Plurimi codd. pro omni, qui etiam post tamen perperam omittunt non.Very many codices [read thus] for omni, which also after tamen wrongly omit non.
- 15Cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2. et dub. 4. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. ad 3: Voluntas conditionata, quae et velleitas dicitur, esse potest de impossibilibus.Cf. I Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2. and dub. 4. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 1. ad 3: A conditioned will, which is also called velleity, can be concerning impossible things.
- 16Prov. 13, 4.Proverbs 13, 4.
- 17In ipsa obiectione.In the objection itself.
- 18Cod. bb doleret homo de malo praeterito, quod fecit. Superius pro tali cod. R talis. Inferius post Sed tunc multi codd. et ed. 1 addunt adhuc, incongrue.Codex bb [reads] a man would grieve over the past evil which he did. Above, for tali codex R [reads] talis. Below, after Sed tunc many codices and ed. 1 add adhuc, incongruously.
- 19Ita plurimi codd., edd. genitus; cod. Y certus; lectio nostra convenit modo loquendi Magistri. Inferius verbo morietur edd. cum pluribus codd. praemittunt cras.Thus very many codices; the editions [read] genitus; codex Y certus; our reading agrees with the Master's manner of speaking. Below, before the word morietur the editions with several codices place cras [tomorrow].
- 20Serm. 10. n. 5: Est ergo unguentum, quod sibi conficit anima multis irretita criminibus, si, cum incipit cogitare vias suas, colligat, congerat conteratque in mortariolo conscientiae multas ac varias species peccatorum suorum et intra aestuantis pectoris ollam simul omnia coquat igne quodam poenitentiae et doloris etc.Sermon 10. n. 5: There is therefore an ointment which the soul, ensnared by many crimes, makes for itself, if, when it begins to think upon its ways, it gathers, heaps up, and grinds in the little mortar of conscience the many and various kinds of its sins, and within the pot of the seething breast cooks them all together with a certain fire of penitence and of sorrow etc.
- 21Vers. 33. — Mox pro A quo codd. Quo.Verse 33. — Presently, for A quo the codices [read] Quo.