Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14
Quaestio III. Utrum poenitentia sit virtus theologica, an cardinalis.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit virtus theologica, vel cardinalis. Et quod theologica, videtur:
1. Quia poenitentiae est reconciliare Deo et detestari peccatum, in quantum Dei offensivum: ergo respicit ipsum Deum non tantum ut finem, sed etiam in ratione obiecti; sed omnis talis virtus est theologica7: ergo etc.
2. Item, videtur, quod sit caritas: quia poenitentiae est detestari peccatum, quia peccatum8 sive Dei offensivum; sed non detestatur aliquis separationem ab aliquo, nisi quia diligit coniungi cum eo; sed hoc est caritatis: ergo poenitentia est caritas.
3. Item, eadem vi naturali, qua homo refugit malum, ne fiat, aspernatur, cum factum est; sed caritate refugit homo separari a Deo9: ergo eadem refugit separationem iam factam. Sed hoc est poenitentiae: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Quod sit virtus cardinalis, videtur: quia omnis virtus theologica secundum actum suum transit in Deum ut in obiectum; sed poenitentia non transit in Deum ut in obiectum quantum ad actum poenitendi: ergo etc.
2. Item, quod sit iustitia, videtur: super illud Psalmi10: Sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae; Glossa: « Quid iustius, quam ut suis quisque peccatis potius quam alienis peccatis irascatur, seque puniens per poenitentiam et satisfactionem Deo offerat »?
3. Item, Isidorus11: « Tunc iudicium homo de se sumit, quando per dignam poenitentiam sua prava
facta damnat »; sed iudicium sumere est iustitiae: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Poenitentia non est virtus theologica, sed cardinalis, contenta sub iustitia.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic duplex fuit opinio.
Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod poenitentia non est aliud quam caritas secundum substantiam, differens secundum statum. Dicitur enim caritas, in quantum amat Deum, sed poenitentia, in quantum resurgens, et eius est detestari malum1d in quantum Dei offensivum.
— Sed certe si timor, qui facit declinare a malo, differt a caritate; non video, quare poenitentia non differat. Sed quia « habitus cognoscuntur per actus2d », non quoscumque, sed formales sive elicitos et primos; notandum, quod poenitentiae actus est detestari culpam sive peccatum, quia Dei offensivum, et hoc in reconciliationem sive emendam. Et quia haec ratio est ipsius iustitiae, dico, quod poenitentia est virtus cardinalis, contenta sub iustitia. Sicut enim fortitudo multos habet ramos ab una radice procedentes, ut patientiam, perseverantiam, fiduciam, quae induunt unam rationem3d; sic etiam iustitia, ut puta largitatem, pietatem, humilitatem, obedientiam, poenitentiam, quae forte sunt partes potentiales ipsius virtutis iustitiae, sicut melius patebit infra4d.
Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod virtutes invicem se adiuvant et invicem sibi imperant, sicut patet consideranti motus earum. Aliquis enim obedit ad hoc solum, quod praecipitur; et hoc est obedientiae purae. Aliquis obedit praecepto Domini, quia amat eum; et hoc est obedientiae imperatae a caritate. Aliquis obedit in hoc praecepto continentiae, quia diligit ipsam; et hoc est obedientiae imperatae a continentia. Unde obedire semper ab obedientia elicitur, aliquando per se, aliquando ab aliis imperata5d. — Similiter patet in aliis; quia continere est actus elicitus a castitate. Si quis autem continet amore castitatis, talis actus est elicitus et imperatus a castitate; si quis amore Dei, sic est elicitus a castitate et imperatus a caritate; si propter praeceptum Dei, sic est imperatus ab obedientia6d. — Similiter dicendum, quod poenitentia detestatur peccatum, aut quia Dei offensivum, ut ei reconcilietur et emendet, et hoc facit secundum se; aut quia a Deo separativum, et hoc facit imperata a caritate; aut quia specialis virtutis corruptivum, et hoc facit imperata et adiuta a qualibet speciali virtute. Et sic patet, quod proprie est iustitia, tamen contingit, aliarum virtutum motus sibi commisceri.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod est theologica, quia habet Deum pro obiecto; dicendum, quod falsum est; quia, sicut obedientia proprie respicit Dei mandatum, et latria honorem Deo debitum; sic poenitentia offensam Deo factam et emendam faciendam.
2. Ad aliud patet responsio: quia ille motus est a caritate per modum imperantis, sed a poenitentia per modum elicientis; unde quamvis caritas moveat ad detestandum quod separat a Deo, non tamen elicit, quia est ibi specialis difficultas, sicut in aliis actibus virtutum; unde sicut caritas movet ad omne bonum imperando, sed non eliciendo, immo speciales virtutes sunt necessariae; sic in actu poenitentiae intelligendum.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de virtute naturali, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia virtus naturalis non dicit tantam approximationem ad actum7d, sicut virtus infusa vel acquisita; et ideo magis diversificatur quam naturalis. Et hoc patet, quia plures virtutes sunt in eadem potentia naturali; et ideo non sequitur, quod si naturalis eadem est, quod propter hoc sit eadem virtus moralis8d.
Scholion in articulum unicum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.
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Question III. Whether penance is a theological or a cardinal virtue.
Thirdly it is asked whether it is a theological or a cardinal virtue. And that it is theological, it seems:
1. Because it belongs to penance to reconcile [one] to God and to detest sin, insofar as it is offensive to God: therefore it regards God himself not only as an end, but also under the account of an object; but every such virtue is theological7: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, it seems that it is charity: because it belongs to penance to detest sin, since sin is offensive to God; but no one detests separation from someone unless because he loves to be joined to him; but this belongs to charity: therefore penance is charity.8
3. Likewise, by the same natural power by which a man shuns evil, that it not be done, he spurns it when it has been done; but by charity a man shuns being separated from God9: therefore by the same [power] he shuns a separation already made. But this belongs to penance: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. That it is a cardinal virtue, it seems: because every theological virtue according to its act passes over into God as into an object; but penance does not pass over into God as into an object as regards the act of repenting: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that it is justice, it seems: upon that [text] of the Psalm10: Sacrifice the sacrifice of justice; the Gloss: "What is more just than that each one should be angry at his own sins rather than at the sins of others, and, punishing himself through penance and satisfaction, should offer himself to God?"
3. Likewise, Isidore11: "Then does a man pass judgment upon himself, when through worthy penance he condemns his own depraved
deeds"; but to pass judgment belongs to justice: therefore etc.
Conclusion. Penance is not a theological virtue, but a cardinal one, contained under justice.
I respond: It must be said that here there were two opinions.
For some have wished to say that penance is nothing other than charity according to substance, differing according to state. For it is called charity insofar as it loves God, but penance insofar as [the soul] is rising again, and it belongs to it to detest evil1d insofar as it is offensive to God.
— But surely, if fear, which makes [a man] turn away from evil, differs from charity, I do not see why penance should not differ. But because "habits are known through their acts2d" — not just any acts, but the formal, that is, the elicited and primary ones — it must be noted that the act of penance is to detest fault, that is, sin, because it is offensive to God, and this for reconciliation, that is, amendment. And because this account belongs to justice itself, I say that penance is a cardinal virtue, contained under justice. For just as fortitude has many branches proceeding from one root, such as patience, perseverance, confidence, which put on one account3d; so too justice [has many], such as liberality, piety, humility, obedience, penance, which are perhaps potential parts of the virtue of justice, as will better be made clear below4d.
But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that the virtues aid one another and command one another, as is clear to one considering their motions. For one man obeys only because it is commanded; and this belongs to pure obedience. Another obeys the command of the Lord because he loves him; and this belongs to obedience commanded by charity. Another obeys in this precept of continence because he loves it; and this belongs to obedience commanded by continence. Whence to obey is always elicited from obedience, sometimes of itself, sometimes commanded by others5d. — Likewise it is clear in other cases; for to be continent is an act elicited by chastity. But if someone is continent from love of chastity, such an act is elicited and commanded by chastity; if from love of God, then it is elicited by chastity and commanded by charity; if on account of the precept of God, then it is commanded by obedience6d. — Likewise it must be said that penance detests sin either because it is offensive to God, that [the soul] may be reconciled to him and make amends, and this it does of itself; or because it is separative from God, and this it does as commanded by charity; or because it is destructive of a particular virtue, and this it does as commanded and aided by some particular virtue. And so it is clear that it is properly justice, yet it happens that the motions of the other virtues are mingled with it.
1. To that, then, which is objected first, that it is theological because it has God for its object, it must be said that this is false; because, just as obedience properly regards the command of God, and latria the honor due to God, so penance [regards] the offense done to God and the amendment to be made.
2. To the other [objection] the response is clear: because that motion is from charity by way of commanding, but from penance by way of eliciting; whence, although charity moves [a man] to detest that which separates [him] from God, it nevertheless does not elicit [the act], because there is there a special difficulty, as in the other acts of the virtues; whence, just as charity moves to every good by commanding, but not by eliciting — nay, the special virtues are necessary — so it must be understood in the act of penance.
3. To that which is objected concerning natural virtue, it must be said that it is not similar: because a natural virtue does not bespeak so great an approximation to the act7d as an infused or acquired virtue; and therefore it is more diversified than the natural one. And this is clear, because several virtues are in the same natural potency; and therefore it does not follow that, if the natural [virtue] is the same, on this account it should be the same moral virtue.8d
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — Scholion in articulum unicum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.
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- 7Vers. 11. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1. in corp., et III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1. verba Hieronymi in hunc locum.Verse 11. Cf. below, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and III Sent., d. 36, q. 1, fundamentum 1, the words of Jerome on this place.
- 8Codd. F H Q (bb a secunda manu) addunt: a Deo est separatum. Edd. substituunt est pro sive.Codices F H Q (bb by a second hand) add: is separated from God. The editions substitute est for sive.
- 9Cfr. Rom. 8, 35. seqq.Cf. Romans 8:35 ff.
- 10Psalm. 4, 6. — Glossam exhibet Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc., et sumta est ex August. (in Ps. 4. n. 7.), qui sic prosequitur: seque ipsum puniens mactet Deo.Psalm 4:6. — Peter Lombard presents the Gloss on this place, and it is taken from Augustine (on Psalm 4, n. 7), who continues thus: and, punishing himself, let him sacrifice himself to God.
- 11Libr. II. Sent. c. 13. n. 3.Sentences, book II, c. 13, n. 3.
- 1dEdd. in quantum refugit et detestatur malum. — De differentia timoris et caritatis (1. Ioan. 4, 18: Timor non est in caritate, sed perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem; quoniam timor poenam habet etc.) cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 34. p. II. per totam.The editions [read] insofar as it shuns and detests evil. — On the difference between fear and charity (1 John 4:18: Fear is not in charity, but perfect charity casts out fear; for fear has punishment, etc.) cf. III Sent., d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 34, p. II, throughout.
- 2dSecundum Aristot.; cfr. supra pag. 320, nota 3.According to Aristotle; cf. above, p. 320, note 3.
- 3dQuae virtutes enumerantur a Cicerone ut partes fortitudinis; cfr. tom. III. pag. 561, nota 7.Which virtues are enumerated by Cicero as parts of fortitude; cf. tom. III, p. 561, note 7.
- 4dArt. seq. q. 1. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 2, ubi ex Cicerone, Macrobio etc. partes potentiales (i. e. virtutes annexas, in quibus tota ratio iustitiae non invenitur) iustitiae recensuimus.The following article, q. 1. Cf. tom. III, p. 728, note 2, where, from Cicero, Macrobius, etc., we have reviewed the potential parts of justice (i.e. the annexed virtues, in which the whole account of justice is not found).
- 5dCod. F imperative, quo explicatur lectio non paucorum codd. imperate. Mox pro primo a castitate codd. a continentia.Codex F [reads] imperative, by which the reading of not a few codices, imperate, is explained. Presently, for the first a castitate the codices [read] a continentia.
- 6dCodd. H P Q addunt et elicitus a castitate.Codices H P Q add and elicited by chastity.
- 7dSive tantam determinationem ad specialem actum. — Cod. X distantiam ad actum.That is, so great a determination toward a particular act. — Codex X [reads] distance to the act.
- 8dVide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---