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Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 6

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus
p. 631

Quaestio VI. De diligendorum numero et sufficientia.

Sexto quaeritur de diligendorum numero et sufficientia. Dicit enim Augustinus1, quod «quatuor sunt ex caritate diligenda, videlicet Deus et nos ipsi, proximus et corpus nostrum». Et videtur primo, quod ibi sit superfluitas:

1. Quia quae sunt eiusdem speciei et non distinguuntur nisi secundum materiam, non debent facere diversa membra distinctionis2; sed nos et proximus noster sumus eiusdem speciei: ergo non debet homo habens caritatem cum proximo suo pro diversis diligibilibus numerari.

2. Item, sacra Scriptura sufficienter enumerat diligibilia in praeceptis, quae dat; sed non enumerat nisi duo, scilicet Deum et proximum, de quibus dat duo praecepta3: ergo videtur, quod alia membra sint superflua.

3. Item, nihil contingit esse beatum nisi tribus modis, videlicet per essentiam, per primam in­p. 632fluentiam et per redundantiam4: ergo si caritas non se extendit ad diligendum nisi id quod est beatum in actu, vel in potentia; videtur, quod non sint nisi tria diligenda, videlicet Deus, animus et corpus.

Sed quod sit diminutio, videtur:

4. Primo per Ambrosium, qui, secundum quod in sequenti distinctione5 habetur, assignat sex membra in numero diligendorum: ergo si Ambrosius non fuit in enumerando superfluus, videtur, quod Augustinus fuerit diminutus.

5. Item, sicut ex caritate diligendum est corpus nostrum, ita etiam et corpus proximi: ergo sicut animus noster et animus proximi constituunt duo membra diligendorum, ita videtur, quod corpus nostrum et corpus proximi: ergo videtur, quod quinque sunt ex caritate diligenda.

6. Item, sicut ex caritate diligimus quod est supra nos et infra nos et iuxta nos; sic etiam ex caritate diligendum est quod est contra nos, videlicet inimicus, sicut supra6 ostensum est: videtur ergo, quod praedictis membris deficiat unum membrum.

Quaeritur ergo: quare tot sunt ex caritate diligenda, et non plura neque pauciora?

### Conclusio. Ex caritate quatuor sunt diligenda, quorum sufficientia duplici via demonstratur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod numerus diligibilium et sufficientia dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo per comparationem ad ipsam dilectionem; alio modo per comparationem ad ipsum diligentem.

Secundum ipsam dilectionem potest accipi numerus et sufficientia sic. Cum enim dilectio sit appetitus boni, in appetitu autem boni est considerare ipsum bonum desideratum et ipsum qui desiderat et ipsum cui desiderat bonum7; bonum autem desideratum, hoc est summum Bonum, ille qui desiderat est habens caritatem; cui autem desideratur potest esse in quadruplici differentia — quia aut optat summum Bonum ipsi Deo, aut sibi ipsi, aut sibi simili, aut sibi adhaerenti — ideo quatuor sunt ex caritate diligenda, quia numerus diligendorum non accipitur ex parte optantis, vel ex parte boni optati, cum sit unum, sed ex parte eius cui optatur; quod cum sit in quadruplici differentia, quatuor sunt diligendorum membra. Et hoc est quod supra8 dictum est, quod in praedicta divisione sumitur numerus diligendorum secundum dilectionem amicitiae, qua dicitur quis diligere alium, quando vult illi bonum.

Alio modo potest sumi numerus et sufficientia diligendorum ex comparatione ad ipsum diligentem. Nam diligens aut habet respectum ad se, aut ad id quod est supra se, aut ad id quod est iuxta se, aut ad id quod est infra se; et secundum hoc9 quatuor tantummodo diligenda sunt ex caritate. — Et secundum hunc modum assumit Augustinus diligibilium numerum et sufficientiam in libro de Doctrina christiana10, nec tantum assignat numerum, sed etiam ordinem debitum. Ait enim sic: «Quatuor sunt diligenda: unum, quod supra nos est, scilicet Deus; alterum, quod nos sumus; tertium, quod iuxta nos est, scilicet proximus; quartum, quod infra nos est, scilicet corpus». Et quia omnia possunt reduci ad ista quatuor membra; ideo patet diligendorum numerus et sufficientia.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est ibi superfluitas, quia non differimus specie a proximis; dicendum, quod quamvis specie non differamus, tamen ad nos et ad proximos nostros caritas nostra diversimode comparatur secundum rationem diligendi et gradum. Primo enim caritas facit habentem se tendere ad beatitudinem et deinde proximum; illi optat tendere ad idem quasi a latere11.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sacra Scriptura non exprimit nisi duo diligenda; dicendum, quod in sequenti mandato implicat tria diligenda. Nam in hoc quod dicit: Dilige proximum tuum sicut te ipsum, mandat homini, quod diligat se ipsum; et cum ipse sit constitutus ex anima et corpore, includitur ibi dilectio utriusque12.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantummodo tribus modis est quid beatum; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen caritas, quae disponit ad beatitudinem, alio modo respicit suum susceptibile, alio modo respicit illud quod est ei simile: primum ut participans, secundum ut comparticipans; et ideo secundum istam diversam comparationem distingui possunt diversa diligibilia13.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod est ibi p. 633diminutio, quia Ambrosius assignat sex membra; dicendum, quod illa sex membra reducuntur ad ista quatuor. Ambrosius enim distinguit unum istorum membrorum in quatuor, videlicet dilectionem eius quod iuxta nos est, scilicet dilectionem proximi. Nec est ibi contrarietas, quia Ambrosius considerat differentias diligibilium accidentales, Augustinus considerat gradus et differentias magis essentiales; quod melius apparebit inferius14.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de corpore proximi, dicendum, quod tam corpus proximi quam corpus nostrum est infra nos, et ideo continetur sub quarto membro. Nec est simile de animo nostro et animo proximi, quia diversimode habet caritas comparari ad utrumque: ad unum sicut ad intrinsecum, ad aliud sicut ad propinquum. Ad corpora autem comparari habet uniformiter; ad utrumque enim comparatur sicut ad interius. — Aliter volunt15 aliqui dicere, quod dilectio corporis proximi continetur sub dilectione proximi, quia uniformiter comparatur caritas ad utrumque; ad animum autem nostrum et ad corpus comparatur difformiter, quia ad animum comparatur sicut ipsum informans et eidem inhaerens, ad corpus vero sicut eidem dominans et ipsum regens.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ex caritate diligendum est quod est contra nos; dicendum, quod illud continetur sub eo membro, quod est iuxta nos, pro eo quod, etsi inimici sint diligendi, qui sunt contra nos, non tamen sunt diligendi in eo, quod sunt contra nos, hoc est ratione culpae, sed in eo, quod sunt iuxta nos, hoc est secundum conformitatem naturae16.

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English Translation

Question VI. On the number and sufficiency of the things to be loved.

Sixth, the question is raised concerning the number and sufficiency of the things to be loved. For Augustine1 says that «there are four things to be loved out of charity, namely God and we ourselves, our neighbor and our body». And it seems, first, that there is superfluity here:

1. Because things that are of the same species and are not distinguished except according to matter ought not to make different members of a distinction2; but we and our neighbor are of the same species: therefore a man having charity ought not to be counted together with his neighbor as distinct objects to be loved.

2. Likewise, sacred Scripture sufficiently enumerates the things to be loved in the precepts which it gives; but it enumerates only two, namely God and neighbor, concerning which it gives two precepts3: therefore it seems that the other members are superfluous.

3. Likewise, nothing happens to be blessed except in three ways, namely by essence, by first influence, and by redundancy4: therefore if charity does not extend itself to loving anything except what is blessed in act, or in potency; it seems that there are only three things to be loved, namely God, the soul, and the body.

But that there is a deficiency seems [to be the case]:

4. First, through Ambrose, who, as is found in the following distinction5, assigns six members in the number of things to be loved: therefore if Ambrose was not superfluous in his enumeration, it seems that Augustine was deficient.

5. Likewise, just as our body is to be loved out of charity, so also the body of our neighbor: therefore just as our soul and our neighbor's soul constitute two members of the things to be loved, so it seems also our body and our neighbor's body: therefore it seems that there are five things to be loved out of charity.

6. Likewise, just as out of charity we love what is above us and below us and beside us; so also out of charity what is against us is to be loved, namely the enemy, as was shown above6: it seems therefore that one member is lacking from the aforesaid members.

It is asked, therefore: why are there just so many things to be loved out of charity, and neither more nor fewer?

### Conclusion. Out of charity there are four things to be loved, whose sufficiency is demonstrated by a twofold way.

I respond: It must be said that the number and sufficiency of things to be loved can be taken in two ways: in one way by comparison to love itself; in another way by comparison to the lover himself.

According to love itself the number and sufficiency can be taken thus. For since love is an appetite for the good, in the appetite for the good there is to be considered the good itself desired and the one who desires and the one for whom he desires the good7; now the good desired is the supreme Good, the one who desires is the one having charity; the one for whom it is desired can be in a fourfold difference — for he either wishes the supreme Good for God himself, or for himself, or for one like himself, or for one cleaving to himself — therefore there are four things to be loved out of charity, because the number of things to be loved is not taken from the side of the one wishing, nor from the side of the good wished, since it is one, but from the side of the one for whom it is wished; and since this is in a fourfold difference, there are four members of the things to be loved. And this is what was said above8, that in the aforesaid division the number of things to be loved is taken according to the love of friendship, by which one is said to love another, when he wills the good for him.

In another way the number and sufficiency of things to be loved can be taken from the comparison to the lover himself. For the lover has a regard either to himself, or to that which is above himself, or to that which is beside himself, or to that which is below himself; and according to this9 there are only four things to be loved out of charity. — And according to this mode Augustine takes up the number and sufficiency of things to be loved in the book On Christian Doctrine10, nor does he only assign the number, but also the due order. For he says thus: «There are four things to be loved: one, which is above us, namely God; another, which we are; third, which is beside us, namely the neighbor; fourth, which is below us, namely the body». And because all things can be reduced to these four members; therefore the number and sufficiency of things to be loved is clear.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that there is superfluity there, because we do not differ in species from our neighbors; it must be said that although we do not differ in species, nevertheless our charity is compared in different ways to us and to our neighbors according to the ground of loving and the degree. For first charity makes the one having it tend to beatitude and then the neighbor; for him it wishes to tend toward the same [end] as it were from the side11.

2. To that which is objected, that sacred Scripture expresses only two things to be loved; it must be said that in the following commandment it implies three things to be loved. For in this that it says: Love your neighbor as yourself, it commands a man to love himself; and since he is constituted of soul and body, the love of both is included there12.

3. To that which is objected, that something is blessed only in three ways; it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless charity, which disposes to beatitude, regards in one way its subject capable [of it], and in another way regards that which is like it: the first as participating, the second as co-participating; and therefore according to this diverse comparison different objects to be loved can be distinguished13.

4. To that which is objected last, that there is deficiency there, because Ambrose assigns six members; it must be said that those six members are reduced to these four. For Ambrose distinguishes one of these members into four, namely the love of that which is beside us, namely the love of the neighbor. Nor is there any contrariety there, because Ambrose considers the accidental differences of the things to be loved, [whereas] Augustine considers the grades and the differences more essential; which will appear better below14.

5. To that which is objected concerning the body of the neighbor, it must be said that both the body of the neighbor and our body are below us, and therefore is contained under the fourth member. Nor is it the same with our soul and the neighbor's soul, because charity is compared in different ways to each: to the one as to something intrinsic, to the other as to something near. But to bodies it is compared uniformly; for it is compared to each as to something more interior. — Otherwise some wish15 to say that the love of the neighbor's body is contained under the love of the neighbor, because charity is compared uniformly to each; but to our soul and to the body it is compared non-uniformly, because to the soul it is compared as informing it and inhering in it, but to the body as ruling over it and governing it.

6. To that which is objected, that out of charity that which is against us is to be loved; it must be said that this is contained under that member which is beside us, for the reason that, although enemies who are against us are to be loved, nevertheless they are not to be loved in that they are against us, that is by reason of fault, but in that they are beside us, that is according to the conformity of nature16.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Book I, On Christian Doctrine, c. 23, n. 22. See here the text of the Master, c. 1.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.); Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie et c. de Differentia. — Edd. sic: Quia quae sunt eiusdem speciei non distinguuntur nisi secundum numerum et non debent etc.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI, c. 8); Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on Species and the chapter on Difference. — The editions read thus: Because things that are of the same species are not distinguished except according to number and ought not etc.
  3. Matth. 22, 37. seqq. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 2.
    Matt. 22:37 ff. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 2.
  4. Verba qui est ipsa beatitudo desunt in edd.
    The words who is beatitude itself are lacking in the editions.
  5. Cap. 2. Ambrosius falso a Magistro aliisque allegatur pro Origene. — In initio arg. codd. Z aa (K a secunda manu) voculae Sed adiiciunt contra.
    Chapter 2. Ambrose is falsely alleged by the Master and others in place of Origen. — At the beginning of the argument codices Z, aa (K by a second hand) add to the word Sed the word contra.
  6. Quaest. 3. — Maior est secundum August., cuius sententiam videsis hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Question 3. — The major is according to Augustine, whose opinion you may see here in the text of the Master, c. 1.
  7. Secundum Aristot., de quo supra pag. 574, nota 5. — Vat. cui desideratur bonum.
    According to Aristotle, concerning whom [see] above, p. 574, note 5. — The Vatican edition [reads] for whom the good is desired.
  8. Quaest. praeced. ad 1. — Proxime post pro quod codd. F H I L N T U Z bb et edd. 1, 2 quia.
    The preceding question, to [objection] 1. — Immediately after, in place of quod the codices F H I L N T U Z bb and editions 1, 2 [read] quia.
  9. Codd. F G L N T U V Z secundum haec.
    Codices F G L N T U V Z [read] according to these things.
  10. Libr. I. c. 23. n. 22. In fine testimonii post scilicet corpus cod. Z subdit nostrum.
    Book I, c. 23, n. 22. At the end of the testimony, after namely the body, codex Z adds our.
  11. Cfr. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 29. n. 30. — Edd., omissa vocula illi nec facta interpunctione, coniungunt optat tendere cum verbo proximum. Pro illi cod. A illum, cod. U quia illi.
    Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 29, n. 30. — The editions, omitting the little word illi and making no punctuation, join optat tendere with the word proximum. In place of illi codex A [reads] illum, codex U quia illi.
  12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Superius pro sequenti mandato Vat. secundo mandato et subinde pro diligenda cum edd. 1, 2 et nonnullis codd. diligibilia.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — Above, in place of in the following commandment the Vatican edition [reads] in the second commandment, and thereupon, in place of diligenda, with editions 1, 2 and several codices, diligibilia.
  13. Cfr. supra q. 4. ad 4.
    Cf. above, q. 4, to [objection] 4.
  14. Dist. seq. q. 6. et dub. 3. — In initio solut. edd. omittunt ultimo, et deinde pro in quatuor codd. substituunt in quinque; perperam, ut ex dub. 3. seq. dist. patet.
    The following distinction, q. 6, and dubium 3. — At the beginning of the solution the editions omit ultimo, and then in place of into four the codices substitute into five; wrongly, as is clear from dubium 3 of the following distinction.
  15. Cod. A voluerunt.
    Codex A [reads] voluerunt [they wished].
  16. Cfr. supra quaest. 3. — Paulo ante plurimi codd. omittunt sunt post non tamen.
    Cf. above, question 3. — A little before, very many codices omit sunt after non tamen.
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