Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum fides sit circa verum creatum et increatum, an circa increatum tantum tanquam obiectum proprium.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum fides sit circa verum creatum et increatum, an circa increatum tantum tanquam circa obiectum proprium. Et quod solum sit circa verum increatum, videtur:

1. Primo per hoc, quod fides est virtus theologica. Omnis enim virtus theologica habet idem pro obiecto et fine: si ergo finis virtutum^p512-1 non est quid creatum, sed increatum, videtur etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per hoc, quod^p512-2 est virtus una: quia unica virtus unum debet habere obiectum: si ergo fides virtus una est, et creatum et increatum sunt diversa omnino; igitur si fides habet esse circa Verum increatum, non habet esse circa verum creatum sicut circa obiectum.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per hoc, quod fides est virtus evacuanda per obiecti sui praesentiam et apertam notitiam; sed sola visio Veri increati est illa, quae virtutem fidei evacuat — fides enim non evacuatur in vias^p512-3 — ergo videtur, quod fides solum sit in Verum increatum tanquam in obiectum.

4. Item, fides est virtus, qua assentitur ipsi credito propter se et super omnia; sed nulli vero est propter se et super omnia assentiendum, nisi quod est summum Verum et Verum increatum: ergo solummodo circa illud consistit fidei obiectum.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem articuli a Richardo datam^p512-4, qua dicit, quod «articulus est indivisibilis veritas de Deo, arctans nos ad credendum»: ergo si articulus est fidei obiectum, videtur, quod fides solum sit circa verum increatum et circa Deum.

Sed contra: 1. Circa veritatem in Symbolo contentam^p512-5 consistit fides tanquam circa obiectum proprium; sed in Symbolo non solum sunt articuli spectantes ad Deitatem, immo etiam spectantes ad humanitatem: ergo si humanitas est quid creatum, fides non solum consistit circa Veritatem increatam, verum etiam circa creatam.

2. Item, tantae amplitudinis est fides, sicut et caritas, vel maioris; sed caritas non tantummodo diligit Bonum increatum, sed etiam creatum, quia non tantummodo diligit Deum, sed etiam proximum^p512-6: ergo fides non tantum est in Verum increatum sicut in obiectum, verum etiam in verum creatum.

3. Item, nullum verum futurum est verum increatum, quia Verum increatum est verum aeternum; sed fides nostra est circa verum futurum, quia credimus «carnis resurrectionem^p512-7», quae nec est nec fuit, sed futura est: ergo videtur, quod fides non tantum sit circa Verum increatum, sed etiam circa creatum.

4. Item, si quis pertinaciter assereret, esse falsum quod sacra Scriptura dicit esse verum, esset haereticus: ergo videtur, quod obiectum fidei extendatur ad omnia quae in sacra Scriptura scribuntur; sed in sacra Scriptura multo plura scribuntur de temporalibus quam de aeternis, de creatis quam de increatis, sicut quod Abraham genuit Isaac^p512-8, et con-

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similia: ergo videtur, quod obiectum fidei magis consistat in vero creato quam in increato.

5. Item, illuminatio fidei sequitur, vel concomitatur illuminationem prophetiae; sed prophetia maxime et praecipue consistit circa verum creatum, cum sit praenuntiatio futurorum^p513-1: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod et ipsa fides.

Conclusio.

Fidei obiectum proprie dictum sive formale, quod habet rationem motivi, est Verum increatum; obiectum vero communiter dictum est verum tum increatum, cui assentitur propter se, tum creatum, cui assentitur propter aliud et quod habet rationem materialis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod obiectum alicuius habitus cognitivi dupliciter habet determinari: aut communiter, aut proprie, sive per se et per accidens. Illud autem vocatur obiectum commune, quod habet^p513-2 communem acceptionem; et obiectum per accidens, quod quidem habet rationem materialis; illud autem dicitur obiectum proprie et per se, quod quidem habet rationem motivi^p513-3.

Secundum hanc duplicem acceptionem dupliciter contingit loqui de obiecto fidei. Nam uno modo potest dici obiectum fidei, circa quod ipsa fides versatur, tanquam circa illud quod credit esse verum, sive illi assentiat propter se, sive propter aliud. Et hoc modo non tantummodo est circa Verum increatum, verum etiam circa verum creatum, quia fides non tantum credit ipsi divinae Veritati in se, sed etiam in his quae sibi ab ea dictantur, quae sunt multa vera creata. — Si autem loquamur de obiecto fidei secundum propriam acceptionem, prout dicitur obiectum, quod habet rationem motivi; sic obiectum fidei est Verum increatum. — Et sicut contingit intelligere in visu, quod lucidum dupliciter movet visum, vel prout est absolutum, vel prout est terrenae materiae incorporatum^p513-4; sic ipsa divina Veritas dupliciter movet ipsum intellectum per fidem illuminatum: vel per se, sicut in articulis spectantibus ad ipsum Deum secundum Divinitatem, vel ut est unita creaturae, sicut in illis articulis respicientibus ipsum Deum in sua humanitate assumta, vel in operatione ab ipso creata, sicut in creatione, reparatione et glorificatione. — Concedendum igitur est, quod obiectum fidei proprium, secundum quod habet rationem motivi, est Verum increatum; et quia hoc probant rationes ad primam partem inductae, ideo concedendae sunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte opposita: 1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod quidam articuli respiciunt humanitatem, sicut quidam Divinitatem; iam patet responsio, quia illi articuli, qui sunt de humanitate et circa humanitatem, enuntiantur de divina persona, circa quam consistit Veritas increata, et ex illa parte habent rationem movendi^p513-5. Nam ex illa parte, qua consistunt circa veritatem creatam, habent solum rationem materialis. Unde sicut una est persona in duabus naturis, creata videlicet et increata; sic una est Veritas movens, quae tenet rationem obiecti, sive in articulis, qui respiciunt Divinitatem, sive in his qui respiciunt humanitatem, quae quidem est Veritas increata.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad tot se extendit fides, ad quot se extendit caritas; dicendum, quod etsi caritas videatur esse circa Bonum increatum et circa bonum creatum tanquam circa obiectum proprium, tamen obiectum eius proprium, sicut infra^p513-6 manifestabitur, non est nisi circa Bonum increatum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est de vero futuro; dicendum, quod resurrectio carnis futura non est obiectum fidei proprium, nisi in quantum comparatur ad divinam virtutem et iustitiam, quae corpora resuscitabit, ut retributio fiat secundum merita; et sic ratione Veri increati implicati^p513-7 habet rationem obiecti; quod quidem Verum increatum, quantum est de se, abstrahit a ratione praeteriti et futuri, licet praeteritio et futuritio notetur circa eius effectum, qui, quantum est de se, habet solum rationem materialis in comparatione ad fidei assensum, secundum quod in praecedentibus fuit tactum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haereticus iudicaretur qui pertinaciter negaret quae in sacra Scriptura dicuntur; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur, teneant rationem obiecti proprii et motivi respectu ipsius fidei; sed hoc est, quia consequuntur ad eius obiectum proprium. Quia enim sacra Scriptura edita est ab ipsa Veritate increata et a Spiritu sancto^p513-8; qui contradiceret sacrae Scripturae contradiceret ei

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cui fides assentit propter se, videlicet ipsi summae Veritati. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides circa verum creatum habeat versari sicut circa obiectum proprium.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de illuminatione prophetica, dicendum, quod prophetia non habet pro principali obiecto et motivo ea quae propheta praenuntiat, sed solum habet pro obiecto materiali, circa quod ipsa prophetia versatur. Unde Propheta non assentit ei quod praenuntiat, propter se, sed propter Veritatem ipsum illuminantem et erudientem; et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides sit circa vera creata, nisi tanquam circa obiecta materialia. — Posset tamen dici, quod non est simile de fide et prophetia, quia fides in suo obiecto, cui assentit, requirit aliquid, quod habeat rationem motivi; sed prophetia nihil tale requirit in prophetato, sed totam rationem suae cognitionis sumit ab inspirante. Ideo non sequitur, quodsi prophetia est de aliquo, quod de illo debeat esse fides sicut de obiecto.

Scholion

I. Observandus est modus loquendi hic a S. Bonav. usurpatus. Obiectum proprium fidei significat id quod vulgo dicitur obiectum formale; sed hoc iterum sumitur dupliciter, scilicet vel ut habet rationem motivi et est «obiectum proprie et per se» (obiectum formale quo), vel ut id, circa quod fides versatur assentiendo ei per se. Quod distinctius Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 2.) sic exprimit: «Obiectum per se (iterum) dicitur dupliciter: vel formaliter, id est illud, ad quod actus terminatur primo et per se, vel materialiter, ad quod terminatur per se, sed non primo». — Vera autem creata semper habent rationem obiecti materialis (ad I.), et eadem, quatenus ut conclusiones consequuntur ad obiectum primum et respectu articulorum fidei vel antecedunt, vel comitantur vel sequuntur, sunt obiectum per accidens. Similiter hic S. Thom. (hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) distinguit triplex alicuius potentiae obiectum: formale, materiale, accidentale, ut S. Bonav. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. (ubi et de obiecto fidei per accidens); qui etiam eodem modo (ibi ad 3.) solvit 1. arg. ad oppos. — De hac (2.) quaestione praeter citatos locos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 6. — S. Thom., S. III. q. 1. a. 1; de Verit. q. 14. a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

II. In seq. (3.) quaestione de opinionibus in corp. memoratis sic loquitur Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 3.): «Quidam, ut cancellarius Parisiensis, dixerunt, quod res, et non enuntiabilia, sunt articuli, de quibus est fides; quia res arctat semper et per se ex natura propria ad credendum, enuntiabilia per accidens ex divulgatione. — Alii vero, ut magister Altissiodorensis [Autissiod.], quod enuntiabilia determinata, et non res, sunt articuli, et quamvis variata sint enuntiabilia, non tamen articuli, quia tria enuntiabilia secundum tres differentias temporum non sunt nisi unus articulus, sicut tres voces unum nomen: albus, alba, album. — Alii dicunt melius, quod res non sunt articuli nisi materialiter, sed enuntiabilia indeterminata, quae se habent communiter ad quamlibet temporis differentiam, ut Christum incarnari aut incarnandum fuisse; enuntiabilia vero determinata non sunt articuli nisi per accidens, quia credere sub hac vel illa differentia accidit saluti... Est ergo fides simpliciter de vero complexo; sed tamen complexio duplex est: quaedam indeterminata, ut Christum incarnari, quaedam determinata, ut Christum incarnatum esse. Fides ergo per se est de vero complexo primo modo, sed per accidens de vero complexo secundo modo». — Idem sentit S. Bonav., et etiam S. Thom., qui in Comment. de patronis primae opinionis dicit, quod «propriam vocem ignoraverunt», sed in Summa mitius de his iudicat et distinguens dicit, quod ex parte ipsius rei creditae obiectum fidei est aliquid incomplexum, sed ex parte credentis aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Consentiunt B. Albert. et Richard. a Med. — De hac (3.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 5. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether faith is concerned with created and uncreated truth, or with uncreated truth alone as its proper object.

Secondly it is asked whether faith is concerned with created and uncreated truth, or with the uncreated alone as its proper object. And that it is concerned solely with uncreated truth, seems [to be the case]:

1. First, through this, that faith is a theological virtue. For every theological virtue has the same thing for its object and its end: if therefore the end of the virtues^p512-1 is not something created, but uncreated, it seems [to follow] etc.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through this, that^p512-2 it is one virtue: because a single virtue ought to have one object: if therefore faith is one virtue, and the created and the uncreated are altogether diverse; therefore if faith has being concerned with the uncreated Truth, it does not have being concerned with created truth as with [its] object.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through this, that faith is a virtue to be done away with through the presence of its object and open knowledge; but the vision of the uncreated True alone is that which does away with the virtue of faith — for faith is not done away with for [those] on the way^p512-3 — therefore it seems that faith is solely concerned with the uncreated Truth as with [its] object.

4. Likewise, faith is a virtue by which assent is given to the very thing believed for its own sake and above all things; but to no truth is assent to be given for its own sake and above all things except that which is the highest True and the uncreated True: therefore the object of faith consists in that alone.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through the definition of the article given by Richard^p512-4, by which he says that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, constraining us to believe": therefore if the article is the object of faith, it seems that faith is concerned solely with uncreated truth and with God.

On the contrary: 1. Faith consists in the truth contained in the Symbol^p512-5 as in its proper object; but in the Symbol there are not only articles pertaining to the Deity, but indeed also pertaining to the humanity: therefore if the humanity is something created, faith does not consist solely in the uncreated Truth, but also in created [truth].

2. Likewise, faith is of as great a breadth as charity, or greater; but charity loves not only the uncreated Good, but also the created, because it loves not only God, but also the neighbor^p512-6: therefore faith is not only in the uncreated Truth as in [its] object, but also in created truth.

3. Likewise, no future truth is uncreated truth, because the uncreated True is eternal truth; but our faith is concerned with future truth, because we believe "the resurrection of the flesh^p512-7," which neither is nor was, but is to come: therefore it seems that faith is not only concerned with the uncreated Truth, but also with the created.

4. Likewise, if someone pertinaciously were to assert that what sacred Scripture says to be true is false, he would be a heretic: therefore it seems that the object of faith extends to all things which are written in sacred Scripture; but in sacred Scripture many more things are written about temporal than about eternal matters, about created than about uncreated, such as that Abraham begot Isaac^p512-8, and the

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like: therefore it seems that the object of faith consists more in created than in uncreated truth.

5. Likewise, the illumination of faith follows, or accompanies, the illumination of prophecy; but prophecy consists chiefly and principally about created truth, since it is the foretelling of things to come^p513-1: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] of faith itself.

Conclusion.

The object of faith properly so called, or formal, which has the character of a motive, is the uncreated True; but the object commonly so called is truth both uncreated, to which assent is given for its own sake, and created, to which assent is given for the sake of another and which has the character of the material.

I respond: It must be said that the object of any cognitive habit has to be determined in two ways: either commonly, or properly, that is, per se and per accidens. Now that is called the common object which has^p513-2 a common acceptation; and the object per accidens [is that] which indeed has the character of the material; but that is called the object properly and per se which indeed has the character of a motive^p513-3.

According to this twofold acceptation it happens that one speaks of the object of faith in two ways. For in one way that can be called the object of faith about which faith itself is occupied, as about that which it believes to be true, whether it assents to it for its own sake or for the sake of another. And in this way it is concerned not only with the uncreated Truth, but also with created truth, because faith does not only believe the divine Truth itself in itself, but also in those things which are dictated to it by it, which are many created truths. — But if we speak of the object of faith according to the proper acceptation, inasmuch as that is called the object which has the character of a motive; thus the object of faith is the uncreated Truth. — And just as it happens to be understood in sight that the luminous moves sight in two ways, either as it is absolute, or as it is incorporated into earthly matter^p513-4; so the divine Truth itself moves in two ways the very intellect illumined through faith: either per se, as in the articles pertaining to God himself according to the Divinity, or as it is united to a creature, as in those articles regarding God himself in his assumed humanity, or in an operation created by him, as in creation, reparation, and glorification. — It must therefore be granted that the proper object of faith, according as it has the character of a motive, is the uncreated Truth; and because the reasonings adduced for the first part prove this, therefore they are to be granted.

To the arguments for the opposite part: 1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that certain articles regard the humanity, as certain regard the Divinity; the response is now plain, because those articles which are about the humanity and concerning the humanity are predicated of the divine person, about which the uncreated Truth consists, and from that side they have the character of moving^p513-5. For from that side by which they consist about created truth, they have only the character of the material. Hence just as there is one person in two natures, namely created and uncreated; so there is one moving Truth, which holds the character of object, whether in the articles which regard the Divinity, or in those which regard the humanity, which indeed is the uncreated Truth.

2. To that which is objected, that faith extends to as many things as charity extends to; it must be said that although charity may seem to be concerned with the uncreated Good and with the created good as with its proper object, nevertheless its proper object, as will be shown below^p513-6, is nothing but the uncreated Good.

3. To that which is objected, that faith is about the future true; it must be said that the future resurrection of the flesh is not the proper object of faith, except inasmuch as it is compared to the divine power and justice, which will raise up the bodies, so that retribution may be made according to merits; and thus by reason of the uncreated True implicated^p513-7 it has the character of object; which uncreated True indeed, so far as concerns itself, abstracts from the character of past and future, although pastness and futureness are noted about its effect, which, so far as concerns itself, has only the character of the material in comparison to the assent of faith, according as was touched upon in the foregoing.

4. To that which is objected, that one would be judged a heretic who pertinaciously denied what is said in sacred Scripture; it must be said that this is not because all things which are contained in sacred Scripture hold the character of proper object and motive with respect to faith itself; but this is because they follow upon its proper object. For since sacred Scripture was set forth by the uncreated Truth itself and by the Holy Spirit^p513-8; he who would contradict sacred Scripture would contradict him

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to whom faith assents for his own sake, namely the highest Truth itself. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that faith has to be occupied about created truth as about its proper object.

5. To that which is objected concerning prophetic illumination, it must be said that prophecy does not have for its principal object and motive those things which the prophet foretells, but has them only for the material object, about which prophecy itself is occupied. Hence the Prophet does not assent to that which he foretells for its own sake, but for the sake of the Truth illumining and instructing him; and from this it cannot be concluded that faith is concerned with created truths, except as with material objects. — It could nevertheless be said that the case is not alike for faith and prophecy, because faith in its object, to which it assents, requires something that has the character of a motive; but prophecy requires nothing of the kind in the thing prophesied, but takes the whole ground of its cognition from the one inspiring it. Therefore it does not follow that, if prophecy is about something, that there must be faith about it as about an object.

Scholion

I. The manner of speaking here employed by St. Bonaventure is to be observed. The proper object of faith signifies that which is commonly called the formal object; but this in turn is taken in two ways, namely either as it has the character of a motive and is "the object properly and per se" (the formal object quo), or as that about which faith is occupied by assenting to it per se. Which Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 2) expresses more distinctly thus: "The object per se (again) is said in two ways: either formally, that is, that at which the act is terminated first and per se, or materially, at which it is terminated per se but not first." — Now created truths always have the character of material object (to I), and the same, inasmuch as, as conclusions, they follow upon the first object and, with respect to the articles of faith, either precede, or accompany, or follow [them], are object per accidens. Similarly here St. Thomas (here a. 1, quaestiuncula 1) distinguishes a threefold object of any power: formal, material, accidental, as St. Bonaventure above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3 (where also concerning the object of faith per accidens); who also in the same manner (there, to 3) solves the first argument to the opposite. — On this (second) question, besides the cited places: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 7, a. 6. — St. Thomas, Summa III, q. 1, a. 1; On Truth q. 14, a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

II. On the following (third) question, concerning the opinions recalled in the body [of the text], Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 3) speaks thus: "Some, like the chancellor of Paris, said that things, and not enunciables, are the articles about which faith is concerned; because a thing always and per se by its proper nature constrains to belief, [whereas] enunciables [do so] per accidens by [their] divulgation. — Others, however, like Master William of Auxerre [Autissiodorensis], [say] that determinate enunciables, and not things, are the articles, and although the enunciables be varied, yet not the articles, because three enunciables according to the three differences of times are not but one article, just as three utterances [are] one name: albus, alba, album. — Others say better, that things are not articles except materially, but indeterminate enunciables, which stand commonly toward any difference of time, as that Christ is incarnated or was to be incarnated; but determinate enunciables are not articles except per accidens, because to believe under this or that difference happens to salvation... Faith therefore is simply about the complex true; but nevertheless the complexity is twofold: a certain indeterminate, as that Christ is incarnated, [and] a certain determinate, as that Christ has been incarnated. Faith therefore per se is about the complex true in the first way, but per accidens about the complex true in the second way." — St. Bonaventure thinks the same, and also St. Thomas, who in the Commentary says of the patrons of the first opinion that "they were ignorant of the proper term," but in the Summa judges more mildly concerning these and, distinguishing, says that on the side of the believed thing itself the object of faith is something incomplex, but on the side of the believer something complex by way of an enunciable. Blessed Albert and Richard of Mediavilla agree. — On this (third) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 5. — St. Thomas, here a. 1, quaestiuncula 2; Summa loc. cit. a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Scil. theologicarum. — Paulo ante pro idem Vat. non apte Deum, edd. 1, 2 et cod. V fidem.
That is, of the theological [virtues]. — Shortly before, for idem the Vatican [edition] inaptly [reads] Deum; editions 1, 2 and codex V [read] fidem.
Supple: fides. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Subinde pro unum edd. et nonnulli codd. unicum.
Supply: faith. Cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — Thereupon, for unum the editions and several codices [read] unicum.
Vide infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. — Cod. bb non evacuatur nisi in ea, plures codd. non evacuatur in ea. Paulo ante pro virtutem fidei edd. nec non pauci codd. veritatem fidei; perperam.
See below d. 31, a. 2, q. 1. — Codex bb [reads] non evacuatur nisi in ea ["is not done away with except in it"], several codices non evacuatur in ea ["is not done away with in it"]. Shortly before, for virtutem fidei ["the virtue of faith"] the editions and not a few codices [read] veritatem fidei ["the truth of faith"]; wrongly.
De qua fusius infra a. 3. q. 1. — Subinde pro qua dicit codd. A Z quae dicit [cod. A dixit].
Concerning which [definition] more fully below a. 3, q. 1. — Thereupon, for qua dicit codices A Z [read] quae dicit [codex A dixit].
Ex codd. A K L N P Q (aa a secunda manu) bb supplevimus contentam.
From codices A K L N P Q (aa by a second hand) bb we have supplied contentam ["contained"].
Vide infra d. 28. q. 6.
See below d. 28, q. 6.
Symbol. Apostolorum.
The Apostles' Symbol [Creed].
Gen. 21, 3; Matth. 1, 2.
Genesis 21:3; Matthew 1:2.
Cassiodor., Praefat. in Psalter. c. 1: «Prophetia est aspiratio divina, quae eventus rerum aut per facta aut per dicta quorundam immobili veritate pronuntiat». Gregor., I. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 1. n. 1: Cum ideo prophetia dicta sit, quod futura praedicat, quando de praeterito vel praesenti loquitur, rationem sui nominis amittit etc.
Cassiodorus, Preface on the Psalter c. 1: "Prophecy is a divine inspiration, which announces the outcomes of things, either through the deeds or through the words of certain persons, with unmovable truth." Gregory, [Book] I of the Homilies on Ezekiel, homily 1, n. 1: Since prophecy is so called because it foretells things to come, when it speaks of the past or the present, it loses the ground of its name, etc.
Exceptis codd. A U, edd. et codd. secundum pro quod habet; superius pro et per cod. aa aut per, cod. bb sive per. — De absolutum edd. abstractum.
Excepting codices A U, the editions and codices [read] secundum for quod habet; above, for et per codex aa [reads] aut per, codex bb sive per. — On absolutum the editions [read] abstractum.
Ita codd., edd. motivi.
Thus the codices; the editions [read] motivi.
Scil. in coloribus. II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 2: Sicut lux incorporata est principium coloris in ipso corpore terminato, qui quidem color est accidens et passibilis qualitas et sensu percipitur; sic etiam lux in corpore luminoso est principium cuiusdam fulgoris, qui ad modum coloris est accidens.
That is, in colors. Sentences Book II, d. 13, a. 2, q. 2: Just as light incorporated is the principle of color in the bounded body itself, which color indeed is an accident and a passible quality and is perceived by the senses; so also light in a luminous body is the principle of a certain radiance, which after the manner of color is an accident.
Dist. 27. a. 1. q. 2.
Distinction 27, a. 1, q. 2.
Edd. implicari.
The editions [read] implicari.
Vide supra pag. 505, nota 7. De propositione praecedenti cfr. infra a. 3. q. 1, d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.
See above p. 505, note 7. On the preceding proposition cf. below a. 3, q. 1, [and] d. 23, a. 1, q. 1.
Cfr. supra pag. 479, nota 8.
Cf. above p. 479, note 8.

← Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 1 Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 3→