Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus

p. 514

Quaestio III. Utrum fides sit circa complexum, an circa incomplexum.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum fides sit circa complexum, an circa incomplexum. Et quod sit circa complexum, videtur:

1. «Credere enim, sicut dicit Augustinus^p514-2, est cogitare cum assensione»; sed assensus rationis non est supra incomplexum, sed supra complexum: videtur ergo, quod fides sit circa complexum, sicut circa proprium obiectum^p514-1.

2. Item, fides credit aliquid, quia verum, et respuit, quia falsum; sed verum et falsum sunt circa complexionem^p514-3: ergo videtur, quod et habitus fidei ipsum complexum sive enuntiabile respiciat ut obiectum.

3. Item, fides est media inter opinionem et scientiam, secundum quod vult Hugo^p514-4; sed tam opinio quam scientia est circa complexum: ergo cum medium suscipiat naturam extremorum, videtur similiter, quod et fides.

p. 515

4. Item, fides est opposita errori; sed nullus errat nisi ex hoc, quod attribuit aliquid alicui, quod non est attribuendum, vel removet quod non est removendum; hoc autem non fit nisi in complexione: ergo omnis error circa complexionem consistit. Si igitur «opposita nata sunt consistere circa idem^p515-1», videtur similiter, quod et fides verum complexum habeat pro obiecto.

5. Item, si ipsum verum incomplexum est obiectum fidei, cum ergo Iudaei credulitatem habeant de incarnatione, Iudaei fidem haberent incarnationis; quod est manifeste falsum, immo errant circa articulum illum; similiter illi qui crederent resurrectionem iam factam, haberent fidem de resurrectione, quos tamen circa resurrectionem constat errare: restat igitur, quod aliquid incomplexum non habet esse ipsius fidei obiectum; et est complexum vel incomplexum: ergo complexum.

Sed contra: 1. Super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo^p515-2: Omnes eundem potum spiritualem biberunt; Glossa Augustini: «Tempora sunt mutata, sed tamen non est fides variata»: si igitur non est fides variata, nec obiectum fidei: cum ergo enuntiabilia, quae creduntur, variata sunt, quia illi credebant, Christum esse passurum, nos, passum esse; illi, incarnandum, nos, incarnatum esse: restat igitur, quod fides non est circa enuntiabile sive circa complexum tanquam circa obiectum.

2. Item, obiectum fidei est Verum increatum, sicut prius^p515-3 fuit ostensum — unde Richardus de sancto Victore dicit, quod «articulus est veritas de Deo» — si ergo Deus est simplicissimus, et in simplici nulla cadit complexio vel compositio; videtur, quod obiectum fidei non sit verum complexum, sed incomplexum.

3. Item, de eodem et circa idem est fides, circa quod est visio futura; sed visio est circa verum incomplexum et per modum incomplexionis^p515-4 — erit enim visio simplex intuitus summae lucis — ergo videtur, quod fides similiter consistat circa verum incomplexum per modum incomplexi.

4. Item, spes et caritas sunt circa res incomplexas et per modum incomplexionis, quia spes exspectat beatitudinem, et caritas amat Deum: ergo cum virtutes theologicae idem habeant pro obiecto secundum rem, videtur, quod et ipsa fides circa verum incomplexum consistat.

5. Item, si fides consistat circa verum complexum; cum tempore passionis paucissimi scirent, Christum pati, et in tempore incarnationis paucissimi scirent, Christum incarnari, paucissimi habuissent fidem; Cornelius etiam fidem non habuisset, qui nesciebat, Christum esse incarnatum nec passum, et tamen de illo legitur, quod eleemosynae eius placuerunt Deo — sine fide autem, ut dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo^p515-5, impossibile est placere Deo — si igitur ista inconvenientia essent, inconveniens est ponere, quod fides consistat circa complexionem.

Conclusio.

Fides proprie consistit circa verum complexum.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hanc quaestionem diversi diversimode senserunt^p515-6.

p. 516

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod fides consistit circa incomplexum, sicut circa proprium obiectum; et isti dixerunt, quod articuli fidei non sunt enuntiabilia, sed res, utpote incarnatio, passio et resurrectio; et ista quidem omni tempore sunt eadem, sicut et ipsa fides. Quod autem actus fidei transit super ipsum credibile sicut super complexum, hoc est propter defectum intellectus, qui non potest totum simplici aspectu intueri, sed primo hoc intuetur et postea illud, componens unum alteri.

Sed quoniam ipse assensus fidei est proprie super complexionem; et ad perfectionem fidei non tantum oportet cogitare de incarnatione, sed etiam oportet credere, incarnationem iam fuisse: ideo dixerunt alii, quod articuli sunt enuntiabilia, et quod fides consistit circa complexum, maxime cum fides quantum ad aliquos articulos simul respiciat increatum et creatum, et de nullo creato possit esse, nisi secundum quod componitur ipsi increato, secundum quod prius^p516-1 habitum est: si ergo intellectus illud non capit nisi per modum complexionis, rationabilius videtur illud ponere et dicere, quod fides sit circa verum complexum sive sub ratione complexi. Et quoniam errans circa verum complexum quantum ad differentiam temporis simpliciter iudicatur haereticus, sicut si aliquis crederet resurrectionem iam factam, vel incarnationem futuram; ideo non solum dixerunt, fidem esse circa verum complexum^p516-2, sed etiam circa verum complexum sub determinata differentia temporis. Et si tu obiicias eis de mutatione fidei propter mutationem istorum enuntiabilium; respondent secundum Nominales, quod enuntiabilia non sunt mutata, quia te esse cursurum, te currere, te cucurrisse, in diversis temporibus prolata, idem significant, et unum est enuntiabile, quia una est res, quam significant, et unum est tempus, pro quo proferuntur; et ideo unum sunt secundum rem et veritatem, quamvis videantur vocaliter esse diversa. — Aliter etiam respondent. Esto quod ista enuntiabilia sint diversa, quia tamen una est Veritas, cui fides assentit principaliter, et ratione cuius ista enuntiabilia credit, quae quidem non mutatur secundum diversitatem temporis, licet ipsa enuntiabilia diversificentur; non propter hoc fides mutatur et diversificatur, immo in diversis temporibus fides non mutata consistit.

Sed quia positio illa Nominalium, quae dicebat, enuntiabilia diversorum temporum esse unum, communiter non approbatur, immo falsa est, sicut in primo libro^p516-3 fuit ostensum; similiter nec alius modus dicendi sufficit, quod ad immutabilitatem fidei sufficiat immutabilitas rationis credendi — si enim articuli sunt enuntiabilia et dicuntur immutabiles propter rationem credendi immutabilem, pari ratione omnes dicerentur unus articulus propter unicam rationem credendi, quae est in eis — ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod cum fidei habitus faciat mentem assentire credibili sive credito; et assensus animi^p516-4 non feratur supra incomplexum, sed supra complexum: ponere oportet, quod ipsum obiectum fidei, secundum quod supra illud fertur fides, habet rationem complexi. Et quia dupliciter contingit, fidem ferri in obiectum suum, scilicet aut implicite, aut explicite; ideo secundum duplicem modum dicitur complexum esse obiectum fidei, sive fides consistere circa complexum. Nam fides quantum ad suam substantiam respicit complexum sive enuntiabile, non concernendo determinatam temporis differentiam, immo aliquod dictum, quod est commune et indifferens ad omne tempus, sicut Christum fuisse passurum. Fides autem explicita respicit complexum sub differentia temporis determinata, sicut nunc oportet credere, incarnationem fuisse, et resurrectionem futuram esse. Sicut ergo explicatio accidit fidei nec mutat essentiam fidei^p516-5; sic et variatio temporis determinati non variat fidem, ut sit alia et alia secundum speciem. — Et hic quidem modus dicendi satis est probabilis. Hunc igitur sustinendo dicere possumus, quod fides proprie consistit circa verum complexum. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de enuntiabilium mutatione, iam patet responsio: quia enuntiabile, quod non concernit determinatam temporis differentiam, in diversis temporibus non mutatur, et hoc est, circa quod habet fides consistere, secundum quod fides; sed illa enuntiabilia solum variantur, quae concernunt determinatam temporis differentiam, et circa hoc consistit fides, secundum quod explicita. Et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides sit alia et alia, sed^p516-6 quod fidei explicatio sit variata in diversis temporibus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est circa Verum increatum, circa quod nulla est complexio; dicendum, quod sicut in primo libro^p516-7 dictum fuit, quamvis Deus sit simplicissimus, tamen circa ipsum vere contingit enuntiare hoc de hoc per modum complexionis, pro eo quod illam complexionem non ponit intellectus circa rem, sed circa se ipsum intelligentem; nec tamen errat, quia non potest simplicitatem divini esse nisi sub tali compositione et collatione capere. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est in fide. — Praeterea, fides non tantum est de Vero increato in se, sed etiam prout comparatur ad veritatem creatam, sicut dictum est supra^p516-8; et illa comparatio sub quadam complexione est, et propterea illa ratio non cogit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de eodem est fides in via et visio in patria; dicendum, quod unum et idem potest apprehendi per modum incomplexi et per modum complexi, sicut patet in apprehensione sensus et intellectus. Sensus enim, dum apprehendit rem albam, apprehendit per modum cuiusdam incomplexionis, quia non novit sensus exterior componere nec dividere^p516-9; sed intellectus, dum illud idem apprehendit, quod sensus apprehendebat, sub modo complexionis accipit, praedicans hoc de hoc, componens hoc illi et dicens, hoc esse album; et

p. 517

ita complexum et incomplexum non faciunt diversitatem a parte rei comprehensae, sed a parte modi comprehendendi, quia unum et idem potest apprehendi sub modo complexionis et incomplexionis^p517-1. Et propterea non sequitur, quod si visio est de eodem, de quo est fides, et visio non est sub ratione complexionis, ergo et fides; immo est ibi figura dictionis, vel etiam accidens, quia proceditur ab unitate rei ad unitatem modi. Et si tu quaeras, quare fides non assentit obiecto suo per modum incomplexi, sicut visio; satis plana est responsio: quia visio patriae uno et simplici aspectu faciet videri et cognosci multa propter perfectionem gloriae^p517-2; non sic autem est de cognitione secundum statum viae, quem quidem statum respicit ipsa fides.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de spe et caritate, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia proprie intellectus est negotiari circa complexum, sed affectus est negotiari circa ipsam rem; et quia res in se ipsa habet rationem incomplexionis, sed prout est in intellectu, habet rationem complexionis^p517-3: hinc est, quod quamvis virtutes respicientes affectum sint circa obiectum suum praeter rationem complexionis, non tamen propter hoc fides^p517-4, quae est regula intellectus. — Nec valet, quod si idem est obiectum virtutum theologicarum, propter hoc, in quantum est fidei, careat complexione, sicut in quantum est aliarum. Complexum enim et incomplexum non dicunt variationem a parte rei, sed solum a parte modi, sicut prius visum est; et quamvis virtutes theologicae habeant idem obiectum secundum rem et substantiam, habent tamen differens secundum rationem et modum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Cornelio, iam patet responsio: quia Cornelius habebat fidem implicitam, et ideo non credebat incarnationem vel passionem^p517-5 sub differentia temporis determinata; et propterea non errabat, sed explicatio fidei sibi deerat, ad quam faciendam misit Dominus Ecclesiae architectum^p517-6.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether faith is concerned with the complex or with the incomplex.

Thirdly it is asked whether faith is concerned with the complex, or with the incomplex. And that it is concerned with the complex seems [to be the case]:

1. «To believe, as Augustine says^p514-2, is to think with assent»; but the assent of reason is not upon the incomplex, but upon the complex: it seems therefore that faith is concerned with the complex, as with its proper object^p514-1.

2. Likewise, faith believes something because [it is] true, and rejects [something] because [it is] false; but the true and the false are concerned with complexity^p514-3: therefore it seems that the habit of faith also regards the complex itself, or the enunciable, as its object.

3. Likewise, faith is a mean between opinion and knowledge, as Hugh holds^p514-4; but both opinion and knowledge are concerned with the complex: therefore, since a mean takes on the nature of the extremes, it seems likewise [to be the case] that faith too [is].

4. Likewise, faith is opposed to error; but no one errs except from this, that he attributes something to something which ought not to be attributed, or removes what ought not to be removed; but this happens only in complexity: therefore every error consists in complexity. If therefore «opposites are by nature apt to be concerned with the same thing^p515-1», it seems likewise that faith too has the true complex for its object.

5. Likewise, if the true incomplex itself is the object of faith, then since the Jews have a credulity concerning the incarnation, the Jews would have faith of the incarnation; which is manifestly false — indeed they err concerning that article; similarly those who would believe the resurrection to have already taken place would have faith of the resurrection, who nevertheless are agreed to err concerning the resurrection: it remains therefore that something incomplex is not the object of faith itself; and it is [either] complex or incomplex: therefore complex.

On the contrary: 1. Upon that [text] of First Corinthians, chapter ten^p515-2: They all drank the same spiritual drink; the Gloss of Augustine: «The times are changed, but yet faith is not varied»: if therefore faith is not varied, neither [is] the object of faith: since therefore the enunciables which are believed are varied — because they believed that Christ was to suffer, [whereas] we [believe] that He has suffered; they [believed He] was to be incarnate, [whereas] we [believe He] has been incarnate: it remains therefore that faith is not concerned with the enunciable or with the complex as with its object.

2. Likewise, the object of faith is the uncreated Truth, as was shown before^p515-3 — whence Richard of Saint Victor says that «an article is a truth about God» — if therefore God is most simple, and in the simple no complexity or composition falls; it seems that the object of faith is not the true complex, but the incomplex.

3. Likewise, faith is concerned with the same thing, and about the same thing, with which the future vision [is concerned]; but vision is concerned with the true incomplex and by way of incomplexity^p515-4 — for vision will be a simple gaze upon the highest light — therefore it seems that faith likewise consists about the true incomplex by way of the incomplex.

4. Likewise, hope and charity are concerned with incomplex things and by way of incomplexity, because hope awaits beatitude, and charity loves God: therefore, since the theological virtues have the same thing for their object as to the reality, it seems that faith too consists about the true incomplex.

5. Likewise, if faith consists about the true complex; then since at the time of the passion very few knew that Christ was suffering, and at the time of the incarnation very few knew that Christ was being incarnate, very few would have had faith; Cornelius too would not have had faith, who did not know that Christ was incarnate nor [that He had] suffered, and yet it is read of him that his alms pleased God — but without faith, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter eleven^p515-5, it is impossible to please God — if therefore these incongruities should follow, it is unfitting to hold that faith consists about complexity.

Conclusion.

Faith properly consists about the true complex.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this question different [authors] have held different views^p515-6.

For some wished to say that faith consists about the incomplex, as about its proper object; and these said that the articles of faith are not enunciables, but realities, such as the incarnation, the passion, and the resurrection; and these indeed are the same at every time, just as faith itself [is]. But that the act of faith passes over upon the very believable as upon the complex — this is on account of a defect of the intellect, which cannot behold the whole by a simple gaze, but first beholds this and afterward that, composing one with the other.

But since the assent of faith itself is properly upon complexity; and for the perfection of faith it is necessary not only to think about the incarnation, but also necessary to believe that the incarnation has already taken place: therefore others said that the articles are enunciables, and that faith consists about the complex, especially since faith, as regards certain articles, regards the uncreated and the created together, and can be of no created thing except insofar as it is composed with the uncreated itself, as was held before^p516-1: if therefore the intellect does not grasp it except by way of complexity, it seems more reasonable to hold and to say that faith is concerned with the true complex, or under the formal character of the complex. And since one who errs concerning the true complex as regards the difference of time is simply judged a heretic — as if someone were to believe the resurrection to have already taken place, or the incarnation to be future — therefore they said not only that faith is concerned with the true complex^p516-2, but also concerned with the true complex under a determinate difference of time. And if you object to them concerning the change of faith on account of the change of these enunciables; they answer, following the Nominalists, that the enunciables are not changed, because that you will run, that you run, that you have run, uttered at different times, signify the same, and are one enunciable, because there is one reality which they signify, and one time for which they are uttered; and therefore they are one as to reality and truth, although they seem to be diverse in vocal expression. — Otherwise too they answer. Granted that these enunciables are diverse, yet because there is one Truth, to which faith principally assents, and by reason of which it believes these enunciables, [a Truth] which indeed is not changed according to the diversity of time, although the enunciables themselves are diversified; on account of this faith is not changed and diversified, but rather at different times faith consists unchanged.

But because that position of the Nominalists, which said that the enunciables of different times are one, is not commonly approved — indeed is false, as was shown in the first book^p516-3; likewise neither does that other mode of speaking suffice, that for the immutability of faith the immutability of the formal ground of believing should suffice — for if the articles are enunciables and are called immutable on account of the immutable formal ground of believing, by parity of reasoning all would be called one article on account of the single formal ground of believing which is in them — therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that since the habit of faith makes the mind assent to the believable or believed; and the assent of the mind^p516-4 is borne not upon the incomplex, but upon the complex: it must be held that the very object of faith, insofar as faith is borne upon it, has the formal character of the complex. And because it happens in two ways that faith is borne into its object, namely either implicitly or explicitly; therefore according to the twofold mode the complex is said to be the object of faith, or faith [is said] to consist about the complex. For faith, as regards its substance, regards the complex or the enunciable, not concerning a determinate difference of time, but rather some statement which is common and indifferent to every time, as that Christ was to suffer. But explicit faith regards the complex under a determinate difference of time, as it is now necessary to believe that the incarnation has taken place, and that the resurrection is to come. As therefore explication is accidental to faith and does not change the essence of faith^p516-5; so too the variation of the determinate time does not vary faith, so that it should be one and another according to species. — And this mode of speaking is sufficiently probable. Therefore, maintaining it, we can say that faith properly consists about the true complex. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected, concerning the change of enunciables, the response is now clear: because an enunciable which does not concern a determinate difference of time is not changed at different times, and this is that about which faith has to consist, insofar as [it is] faith; but only those enunciables are varied which concern a determinate difference of time, and about this faith consists, insofar as [it is] explicit. And from this it cannot be concluded that faith is one and another, but^p516-6 that the explication of faith is varied at different times.

2. To that which is objected, that faith is concerned with the uncreated Truth, about which there is no complexity; it must be said that, as was said in the first book^p516-7, although God is most simple, nevertheless concerning Him it truly happens that one enunciates this of this by way of complexity, for the reason that the intellect does not place that complexity upon the reality, but upon itself in understanding; nor yet does it err, because it cannot grasp the simplicity of the divine being except under such composition and collation. And in this way it is to be understood in faith. — Moreover, faith is not only about the uncreated Truth in itself, but also as it is compared to created truth, as was said above^p516-8; and that comparison is under a certain complexity, and therefore that reason does not compel.

3. To that which is objected, that faith in the way and vision in the fatherland are of the same thing; it must be said that one and the same thing can be apprehended by way of the incomplex and by way of the complex, as is clear in the apprehension of sense and intellect. For sense, when it apprehends a white thing, apprehends by way of a certain incomplexity, because the exterior sense does not know how to compose or divide^p516-9; but the intellect, when it apprehends that same thing which sense was apprehending, takes it under the mode of complexity, predicating this of this, composing this with that and saying that this is white; and

so the complex and the incomplex do not make a diversity on the part of the thing comprehended, but on the part of the mode of comprehending, because one and the same thing can be apprehended under the mode of complexity and of incomplexity^p517-1. And therefore it does not follow that, if vision is of the same thing of which faith is, and vision is not under the formal character of complexity, therefore neither [is] faith; rather there is here a figure of speech, or even an accident, because one proceeds from the unity of the thing to the unity of the mode. And if you ask why faith does not assent to its object by way of the incomplex, as vision [does]; the response is plain enough: because the vision of the fatherland will, by one and a simple gaze, cause many things to be seen and known, on account of the perfection of glory^p517-2; but it is not so concerning cognition according to the state of the way, which state faith itself regards.

4. To that which is objected concerning hope and charity, it must be said that it is not similar: because properly it belongs to the intellect to be occupied about the complex, but to the affection to be occupied about the reality itself; and because the reality in itself has the character of incomplexity, but as it is in the intellect, has the character of complexity^p517-3: hence it is that, although the virtues which regard the affection are concerned with their object apart from the character of complexity, yet not so faith^p517-4, which is the rule of the intellect. — Nor does it hold, that if the object of the theological virtues is the same, on account of this, insofar as it is [the object] of faith, it should lack complexity, just as [it does] insofar as it is [the object] of the others. For the complex and the incomplex do not state a variation on the part of the thing, but only on the part of the mode, as was seen before; and although the theological virtues have the same object as to reality and substance, they nevertheless have a differing [object] according to formal character and mode.

5. To that which is objected concerning Cornelius, the response is now clear: because Cornelius had implicit faith, and therefore did not believe the incarnation or the passion^p517-5 under a determinate difference of time; and therefore he did not err, but the explication of faith was lacking to him, for the making of which the Lord sent the architect of the Church^p517-6.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cod. U subdit Deo.
Codex U adds Deo ["to God"].
De Praedest. Sanct. c. 2. n. 5. — Minorem explicat Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 5. (ubi idem arg.) sic: Sed cogitare est conferre unum alteri, consentire (assentire?) vero sententiam super illud inferre; et hoc non fit super incomplexum. — Pro supra nonnulli codd., ut G K Y aa, substituunt circa.
Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints c. 2, n. 5. — Alexander of Hales explains the minor [premise], Summa, p. III, q. 68, m. 7, a. 5 (where the same argument [occurs]), thus: But to think is to confer one thing with another, while to consent (assent?) is to bring sentence to bear upon it; and this does not happen upon the incomplex. — For supra ["upon"] several codices, such as G K Y aa, substitute circa ["concerning"].
Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1. seqq.; III. de Anima, text. 21. seqq. (c. 6.), et VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.). — Pro complexionem edd. complexum.
Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 1 ff.; On the Soul III, text 21 ff. (c. 6); and Metaphysics VI, text 8 (V, c. 4). — For complexionem ["complexity"] the editions [read] complexum ["the complex"].
Libr. I. de Sacram. p. X. c. 2. Eius verba, quibus Richard. quoque a S. Vict. utitur, Declarat. ad Bernard. (circa finem), vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 1. ad oppos. Ibid. etiam videsis de ratione (ex Aristot. sumta), quae hic in fulcimentum conclus. adducitur. — De minori cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.). — In conclus. pro suscipiat codd. A K Z bb sapiat.
[Hugh of St. Victor,] book I On the Sacraments, p. X, c. 2. His words, which Richard of St. Victor also uses, Declaration to Bernard (near the end), see above d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, arg. 1 ad oppositum. There too you may see concerning the reasoning (taken from Aristotle) which is here adduced in support of the conclusion. — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 26 (c. 33). — In the conclusion, for suscipiat ["takes on"] codices A K Z bb [read] sapiat ["savors of"].
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). De praecedentibus cfr. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 21. seqq. (VIII. c. 10.). — Pro consistere codd. A K fieri.
Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites, and Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7). On the preceding [points] cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 21 ff. (VIII, c. 10). — For consistere ["to be concerned with"] codices A K [read] fieri ["to come to be"].
Vers. 4. — Glossa August. invenitur in Enarrat. Ps. 50, 14. n. 17. et in Ioan. Evang. tr. 45. n. 9. — Paulo inferius post enuntiabilia cod. U adiicit fidei.
Verse 4. — The Gloss of Augustine is found in the Commentary on Psalm 50, 14, n. 17, and in [the tractates] on the Gospel of John, tr. 45, n. 9. — A little below, after enuntiabilia ["enunciables"] codex U adds fidei ["of faith"].
Quaest. praeced. — De definitione articuli vide infra a. 3. q. 1. — Pro Richardus cod. aa Hugo.
The preceding question. — On the definition of article see below a. 3, q. 1. — For Richardus codex aa [reads] Hugo.
Cod. A K V bb est. In fine arg. pro incomplexi cod. Z incomplexionis.
Codices A K V bb [read] est ["is"]. At the end of the argument, for incomplexi ["of the incomplex"] codex Z [reads] incomplexionis ["of incomplexity"].
Vers. 6. — De Cornelio vide Act. 10, 31. seqq. — Paulo superius pro qui nesciebat... nec passum cod. aa quia nesciebat... et passum.
Verse 6. — On Cornelius see Acts 10, 31 ff. — A little above, for qui nesciebat... nec passum ["who did not know... nor [that He had] suffered"] codex aa [reads] quia nesciebat... et passum ["because he did not know... and [that He had] suffered"].
De quo Praepositivus, S. p. III. q. de articulis fidei, tradit haec: Quidam respondent, quod non sunt articuli fidei, ut Christum esse natum... Alii respondent, quod totum hoc est articulus fidei: Christum esse natum, vel nasci, vel nasciturum esse... Alii dicunt, quod nomina non sunt articuli, sed eventus sunt articuli, ut nativitas, passio... Alii dicunt, quod haec sunt articuli fidei, scilicet credere nativitatem, credere passionem, credere unitatem essentiae, credere trinitatem personarum, et his similia. Contra quos sic: credere est motus mentis, quo quis movetur ad credendum; alius est motus mentis istius, alius illius... ergo alius est articulus istius et alius articulus illius... Item secundum istos non est concedendum: iste credit articulos fidei; quia credere passionem est articulus fidei, et iste credit credere passionem; hoc nihil est dicere. Concedunt, quod nemo credit articulos fidei, sed ea quae subsunt articulis, ut nativitatem, passionem... Sunt alii qui fere idem dicunt; dicunt enim, quod fides est de nativitate, fides de passione, fides de Trinitate, fides de unitate et similia sunt articuli fidei. Translatum est enim hoc nomen articulus ab articulis digitorum; sicut enim articuli digitorum sunt quaedam distinctiones digitorum, ita fides de passione, fides de resurrectione quaedam particulae fidei sunt... Penultimae viae, ut diximus, magis consentimus etc. — Pro senserunt codd. A K sentiunt, ex quibus codd. nec non ex cod. bb (H a secunda manu) non ita multo post supplevimus sicut ante et ipsa fides.
Concerning which Praepositinus, Summa, p. III, the question on the articles of faith, hands down this: Some answer that there are not articles of faith, such as that Christ was born... Others answer that this whole is an article of faith: that Christ was born, or is being born, or is to be born... Others say that the names are not articles, but events are the articles, such as the nativity, the passion... Others say that these are articles of faith, namely to believe the nativity, to believe the passion, to believe the unity of essence, to believe the trinity of persons, and the like. Against whom thus: to believe is a motion of the mind, by which one is moved to believing; the motion of the mind of this [object] is one, of that [object] another... therefore the article of this is one and the article of that another... Again, according to these it is not to be granted: this man believes the articles of faith; because to believe the passion is an article of faith, and this man believes to believe the passion; this is to say nothing. They grant that no one believes the articles of faith, but the things which underlie the articles, such as the nativity, the passion... There are others who say almost the same; for they say that faith concerning the nativity, faith concerning the passion, faith concerning the Trinity, faith concerning the unity, and the like, are the articles of faith. For this name "article" is transferred from the articulations [joints] of the fingers; for just as the joints of the fingers are certain distinctions of the fingers, so faith concerning the passion, faith concerning the resurrection, are certain particles of faith... With the penultimate way, as we have said, we more agree, etc. — For senserunt ["have held"] codices A K [read] sentiunt ["hold"], from which codices, and also from codex bb (H by a second hand), not long after we have supplied sicut ante et ipsa fides ["just as before, faith itself also"].
Quaest. praeced. — Pro componitur cod. Z comparatur. Inferius pro videtur illud cod. A videtur idem.
The preceding question. — For componitur ["is composed"] codex Z [reads] comparatur ["is compared"]. Below, for videtur illud codex A [reads] videtur idem.
Non pauci codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 perperam (quia contra mentem huius opinionis) incomplexum.
Not a few codices, and also editions 1, 2, wrongly (because against the mind of this opinion) [read] incomplexum ["the incomplex"].
Dist. 41. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Mox pro immutabilitatem codd. G (H a secunda manu) L (bb a prima manu) immutationem.
[First book,] d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, in the body [of the article]. — Soon, for immutabilitatem ["immutability"] codices G (H by a second hand) L (bb by a first hand) [read] immutationem ["non-change"].
Vat. omittit animi, pro quo edd. 1, 2 cum. Inferius post duplicem codd. A K addunt istum.
The Vatican [edition] omits animi ["of the mind"], for which editions 1, 2 [read] cum ["since"]. Below, after duplicem ["twofold"] codices A K add istum ["that"].
Vide infra d. 25. a. 2. q. 1.
See below d. 25, a. 2, q. 1.
Edd. 1, 2 et complures codd. secundum.
Editions 1, 2 and several codices [read] secundum ["according"].
Dist. 27. p. 1. q. 3; d. 34. q. 1. in corp.; d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro nulla est cod. V nulla consistit, et paulo inferius idem cod. V post circa rem adiicit intellectam.
[First book,] d. 27, p. 1, q. 3; d. 34, q. 1, in the body; d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, for nulla est ["there is no"] codex V [reads] nulla consistit ["none consists"], and a little below the same codex V, after circa rem ["upon the reality"], adds intellectam ["understood"].
Quaest. praeced.
The preceding question.
Nec etiam super se reflectere (I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. ad 4.). Aliter autem se habet sensus communis, de quo vide supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. ad 5.
Nor even to reflect upon itself (First [book of the] Sentences, d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, ad 4). The common sense, however, stands otherwise, concerning which see above d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, ad 5.
Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 152. seqq. et III. text. 21. seqq. (III. c. 3. et 6.) — De fallacia figurae dictionis et accidentis vide supra pag. 151, nota 3. et pag. 179, nota 1.
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 152 ff. and III, text 21 ff. (III, c. 3 and 6). — On the fallacy of figure of speech and of accident see above p. 151, note 3, and p. 179, note 1.
Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad fundam. 6.
Cf. above d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, ad fundamentum 6.
Vide Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.), ubi etiam actuum intellectus et voluntatis diversitas inter se respectu obiecti in eo reponitur, quod bonum et malum sint in rebus, verum autem et falsum in anima. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 562, nota 10. — Superius pro complexum cod. G complexionem.
See Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 8 (V, c. 4), where too the diversity of the acts of intellect and will among themselves with respect to the object is placed in this, that good and evil are in things, but true and false in the soul. Cf. tome I, p. 562, note 10. — Above, for complexum codex G [reads] complexionem.
Cod. A supplet est; sensus completus huius propos. est: non tamen propter hoc etiam fides est circa obiectum incomplexum. — Proxime post pro quae est edd. quia est. Aliquanto inferius pro variationem codd. A K varietatem.
Codex A supplies est ["is"]; the complete sense of this proposition is: yet not on account of this is faith also concerned with the incomplex object. — Immediately after, for quae est the editions [read] quia est. Somewhat below, for variationem ["a variation"] codices A K [read] varietatem ["a variety"].
Pro passionem edd. cum bene multis codd. resurrectionem, cod. bb passionem vel resurrectionem.
For passionem ["the passion"] the editions, with very many codices, [read] resurrectionem ["the resurrection"]; codex bb [reads] passionem vel resurrectionem ["the passion or the resurrection"].
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

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