Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 24
Quaestio II. De definitione articuli, quam ponit Isidorus.
Secundo quaeritur de notificatione Isidorip527-3, quae talis est: «Articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis tendens in ipsam». Contra partem primam definitionis opponitur sic.
1. Nulla veritas est sua perceptio; sed articulus est divina Veritas: ergo haec est falsa: articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis.
2. Item, fides est perceptio divinae Veritatisp527-4: ergo si articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis, fides est articulus.
3. Item, visio gloriae est perceptio divinae Veritatis: ergo videtur, quod visio gloriae sit articulus fidei; quod simpliciter est absurdum.
4. Item, in articulis non tantum exprimitur divina Veritas, sed etiam divina Bonitas et Christi humanitas: ergo non videtur, quod primum membrum definitionis omni articulo generaliterp527-5 conveniat.
Contra secundam partem definitionis opponitur sic.
5. Nihil quod est ipsa divina Veritas, tendit in divinam Veritatem; sed articulus est ipsa Veritas divina: ergo non est tendens in ipsam Veritatem.
6. Item, articulus communis est respectu fidei bonorum et malorum; sed mali, quamvis percipiant primam Veritatem, non tamen tendunt in ipsamp527-6: ergo tendere in divinam Veritatem non est commune omni articulo.
7. Item, aliqui philosophi habuerunt cognitionem de Deo cum quadam dilectione, ergop527-7 habuerunt simul divinae Veritatis perceptionem cum quadam tendentia in ipsam; et tamen nec fidem nec fidei articulos habuerunt: ergo non videtur, quod praedicta notificatio de articulo recte assignetur.
8. Item, cum unius rei una sit definitiop528-1, videtur, quod ad notificationem articuli sufficiat notificatio sive definitio Richardi: superfluit ergo ista Isidori. — Quaeritur ergo, quae sit diversitas inter utramque.
Conclusio.
Definitio articuli ab Isidoro assignata conveniens est, prout est fidei formatae.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ista descriptio in tribus differt a descriptione ipsius Richardi. Nam illa descriptio Richardi est quasi quaedam nominis interpretatio, haec autem est realis notificatio. — Secundo vero differt in hoc quod, cum articulus dupliciter habeat considerari: et prout est in se et prout est apud animamp528-2, notificatio ipsius Richardi respicit ipsum articulum, prout est in se; notificatio ipsius Isidori respicit ipsum articulum, prout est ens apud animam; ideo dicit, ipsum esse perceptionem divinae Veritatis. — Tertia differentia est: quia, cum dupliciter contingat loqui de fide, videlicet de fide in sua generalitate et de fide formata, dupliciter etiam contingat articulum considerari: aut prout est obiectum fidei generaliter, aut prout estp528-3 fidei formatae; Richardus definit articulum, prout est obiectum fidei generaliter, et ideo dicit, quod est «arctans nos ad credendum»; Isidorus autem definit ipsum, prout est obiectum fidei formatae; et ideo dicit, quod est «perceptio veritatis tendens in Deum». Et quoniam fides formata respicit intellectum pariter et affectump528-4, quia intellectum illuminat ad credendum et affectum excitat ad tendendum in Deum; hinc est, quod Isidorus definit articulum primo per comparationem ad actum intellectus, cum dicit: «Articulus est perceptio divinae Veritatis»; secundo per comparationem ad actum affectus, cum subiungit: «tendens in ipsam». Et quiap528-5 ad utrumque actum comparatur in ratione motivi, hinc est, quod praedicta definitio intelligenda est dari secundum praedicationem causalem, ut sit sensus: «articulus est perceptio» etc., id est, articulus est illud quod illuminat nos ad divinam Veritatem percipiendam, et quod excitat nos ad tendendum in ipsam. Unde dicitur perceptio tendens, quia facit nos percipere et tendere, et movet nos ad percipiendum et tendendum. — Et per hoc patet responsio fere ad omnia quae obiiciunturp528-6.
1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod nulla veritas est sua perceptio; patet responsio: quia verum est praedicatione essentialip528-7, sed non est verum praedicatione causali.
2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est perceptio et etiam visio gloriae; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia illud dicitur praedicatione formali, sed illud dicitur praedicatione causali. Fides enim et visio est perceptio sicut habitus perceptivus; sed articulus est perceptio sicut obiectum motivum virtutis percipientis. — Posset etiam dici, quod sicut intellectus aliquando nominat potentiam, aliquando habitum, aliquando actum, aliquando obiectum, sicut manifestum est in diversis auctoritatibusp528-8; sic et perceptionis nomen potest extendi ad habitum, actum et obiectum. Ideo aliter dicitur de fide, aliter de articulo.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod articuli non tantum spectant ad veritatem, sed etiam ad bonitatem, nec tantum ad Veritatem divinam, sed etiam ad humanam; dicendum, quod etsi articulus concernat aliquo modo bonum, concernat etiam aliquid creatum, secundum illud tamen non habet rationem motivi, sed eo ipso, quod habet in se rationem veri et Veri summi, cui fides propter se et super omnia assentit. Et quia definitur hic articulus, in quantum est motivus ipsius fidei, ideo sufficit tangere hic in eius notificatione Veritatem divinam, a qua est tota et principalis ratio movendip528-9.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tendentia, patet responsio: quia praedicatio illa causaliter est intelligenda. Articulus enim terminandop528-10 facit tendere; terminat enim in quantum finis, et movet in quantum obiectum; et ideo facit tendere.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fide malorum, dicendum, quod hic definitur articulus in comparatione ad fidem formatam, licet etiam fides malorum
in Deum actu non tendat, tamen reddit quodam modo habilem ad tendendum, licet semiplenep529-1.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio philosophorum erat perceptio cum tendentia; dicendum, quod non erat illa tendentia, quae est ex fide; nunquam enim per illam cognitionem poterant pervenire ad salutem; ideo, ut verius loquamur, potius iacebant, quam tenderentp529-2.
8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unius unica est definitio; dicendum, quod verum est secundum unicam comparationem et considerationem; sed secundum quod aliquid multipliciter habet considerari, multipliciter habet notificari. Ideo Richardus et Isidorus diversimode notificaverunt, quia diversimode consideraverunt; diversitas autem eorum fuit quantum ad tria, sicut ostensum est suprap529-3.
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Question II. On the definition of the article which Isidore sets down.
Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the notification of Isidorep527-3, which is this: «An article is a perception of divine Truth tending into it.» Against the first part of the definition objection is made thus.
1. No truth is its own perception; but an article is divine Truth: therefore this is false: an article is a perception of divine Truth.
2. Likewise, faith is a perception of divine Truthp527-4: therefore if an article is a perception of divine Truth, faith is an article.
3. Likewise, the vision of glory is a perception of divine Truth: therefore it seems that the vision of glory is an article of faith; which is simply absurd.
4. Likewise, in the articles there is expressed not only divine Truth, but also divine Goodness and the humanity of Christ: therefore it does not seem that the first member of the definition fits every article generallyp527-5.
Against the second part of the definition objection is made thus.
5. Nothing which is divine Truth itself tends into divine Truth; but an article is divine Truth itself: therefore it is not tending into Truth itself.
6. Likewise, an article is common with respect to the faith of the good and of the wicked; but the wicked, although they perceive the first Truth, nevertheless do not tend into itp527-6: therefore to tend into divine Truth is not common to every article.
7. Likewise, certain philosophers had a cognition of God with a certain love, thereforep527-7 they had at once a perception of divine Truth with a certain tending into it; and yet they had neither faith nor the articles of faith: therefore it does not seem that the aforesaid notification is rightly assigned to the article.
8. Likewise, since of one thing there is one definitionp528-1, it seems that for the notification of the article the notification or definition of Richard suffices: therefore this one of Isidore is superfluous. — It is asked, then, what is the difference between the two.
Conclusion.
The definition of the article assigned by Isidore is fitting, insofar as it is of formed faith.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that this description differs in three [respects] from the description of Richard himself. For that description of Richard is, as it were, a certain interpretation of the name, but this one is a real notification. — Secondly it differs in this, that since an article can be considered in two ways: both as it is in itself and as it is with respect to the soulp528-2, the notification of Richard regards the article itself as it is in itself; the notification of Isidore regards the article itself as it is a being with respect to the soul; therefore he says that it is a perception of divine Truth. — The third difference is: that, since one can speak of faith in two ways, namely of faith in its generality and of formed faith, the article too can be considered in two ways: either as it is the object of faith generally, or as it isp528-3 [the object] of formed faith; Richard defines the article as it is the object of faith generally, and therefore says that it is «constraining us to believe»; but Isidore defines it as it is the object of formed faith; and therefore says that it is a «perception of truth tending into God.» And since formed faith regards alike the intellect and the affectp528-4, because it illuminates the intellect to believe and excites the affect to tend into God; hence it is that Isidore defines the article first by comparison to the act of the intellect, when he says: «An article is a perception of divine Truth»; secondly by comparison to the act of the affect, when he subjoins: «tending into it.» And sincep528-5 it is compared to each act under the account of a moving cause, hence it is that the aforesaid definition is to be understood as given according to a causal predication, so that the sense is: «an article is a perception» etc., that is, an article is that which illuminates us to perceive divine Truth, and which excites us to tend into it. Hence it is called a tending perception, because it makes us perceive and tend, and moves us to perceiving and tending. — And by this the answer is evident to almost all the things which are objectedp528-6.
1. For to that which is objected first, that no truth is its own perception; the answer is evident: because it is true by essential predicationp528-7, but it is not true by causal predication.
2. 3. To that which is objected, that faith is a perception and also the vision of glory; it must be said that it is not similar: because that is said by formal predication, but this is said by causal predication. For faith and vision are perception as a perceptive habit; but an article is perception as a moving object of the perceiving power. — It could also be said that, just as intellect sometimes names a potency, sometimes a habit, sometimes an act, sometimes an object, as is manifest in various authoritiesp528-8; so too the name of perception can be extended to habit, act, and object. Therefore it is said in one way of faith, in another of the article.
4. To that which is objected, that the articles regard not only truth, but also goodness, and not only divine Truth, but also human; it must be said that even if an article concerns in some way the good, and concerns also something created, nevertheless according to that it does not have the account of a moving [cause], but by this very thing, that it has in itself the account of the true and of the highest True, to which faith assents for its own sake and above all things. And since an article is here defined insofar as it is moving of faith itself, therefore it suffices here in its notification to touch upon divine Truth, from which is the whole and principal ground of movingp528-9.
5. To that which is objected concerning the tending, the answer is evident: because that predication is to be understood causally. For an article by terminatingp528-10 makes [one] tend; for it terminates insofar as it is an end, and moves insofar as it is an object; and therefore it makes [one] tend.
6. To that which is objected concerning the faith of the wicked, it must be said that here the article is defined in comparison to formed faith, although even the faith of the wicked,
though it does not actually tend into God, nevertheless renders [one] in a certain way fit for tending, although half-fullyp529-1.
7. To that which is objected, that the cognition of the philosophers was a perception with a tending; it must be said that it was not that tending which is from faith; for never through that cognition could they attain to salvation; therefore, to speak more truly, they rather lay prostrate than tendedp529-2.
8. To that which is objected, that of one [thing] there is one definition; it must be said that this is true according to a single comparison and consideration; but according as a thing can be considered in many ways, it can be notified in many ways. Therefore Richard and Isidore notified it in diverse ways, because they considered it in diverse ways; and their diversity was in three [respects], as has been shown abovep529-3.
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- Auctorem definitionis hic allatae invenire nequivimus. Dum Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 69. m. 1. hanc articuli definitionem Hugoni tribuit, B. Albert., hic a. 1. ait: «Isidorus autem dicitur sic definire: Articulus est perceptio etc. Quidam etiam magistrorum Hugoni attribuunt istam: ‹Articulus est natura cum gratia›, quae tamen, ut proponitur, in libro suo non invenitur (sententialiter continetur, ut ipse B. Albert. in fine art. dicit, in I. de Sacram. p. X. c. 5.).» P. Nicolai in ed. Comment. S. Thomae in lib. Sent., hic d. 25. a. 1, observat: «Quod Isidori nomine subiungitur, ut et paulo post ex Hugone, apud neutrum occurrit». Si rem spectas, non verba, ista definitio insinuata videtur a Praepositivo, qui, ut ex nota 6. supra pag. 515 adiecta liquet, illi sententiae adhaerebat, quae vult, articulos fidei esse credere nativitatem etc. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 75. seq. Guliel. Paris., de Fide c. 2. ait: Manifestum igitur est, certas esse et determinatas numero apprehensiones de his quae pertinent ad fundamentum religionis. Quare et ipsa apprehensa. Haec autem sunt quae vocantur articuli fidei.We were unable to find the author of the definition here adduced. While Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 69, m. 1, ascribes this definition of the article to Hugh, B. Albert, here a. 1, says: «Isidore, however, is said to define thus: An article is a perception, etc. Certain of the masters also attribute this one to Hugh: ‹An article is nature with grace›, which, however, as it is set forth, is not found in his book (it is contained as to its sense, as B. Albert himself says at the end of the article, in I, de Sacramentis p. X, c. 5).» P. Nicolai, in his edition of the Commentary of St. Thomas on the Sentences, here d. 25, a. 1, observes: «What is subjoined under the name of Isidore, as also a little after from Hugh, occurs in neither.» If you regard the matter, not the words, this definition seems to have been suggested by Praepositinus, who, as is clear from note 6 added above on p. 515, adhered to that opinion which holds that the articles of faith are to believe the nativity, etc. Cf. Anselm, Monologion c. 75 f. William of Paris, de Fide c. 2, says: It is therefore manifest that there are certain apprehensions, determinate in number, concerning those things which pertain to the foundation of religion. Wherefore the things apprehended themselves [are so]. And these are what are called the articles of faith.
- Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1.Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1.
- Codd. A K naturaliter.Codices A K [read] naturally.
- Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 4, et Comment. a. 2. q. 1. ac dub. 3. — Pro primam veritatem cod. U divinam veritatem.See above, the Master's text, d. XXIII, c. 4, and the Commentary, a. 2, q. 1, and dub. 3. — For first truth codex U [reads] divine truth.
- Edd. ergo si.The editions [read] therefore if.
- Cfr. supra pag. 501, nota 2. — De definitione articuli a Richardo data vide quaest. praeced.Cf. above, p. 501, note 2. — On the definition of the article given by Richard, see the preceding question.
- De duplici consideratione entis, prout est in anima (mente seu ratione) et extra animam, cfr. Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.) — Pro prout est [codd. K Z subdunt ens] in se complures codd. prout est in re, Vat. hic et paulo post prout est in se et in re.On the twofold consideration of being, as it is in the soul (mind or reason) and outside the soul, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 8 (V, c. 4). — For as it is [codices K Z subjoin being] in itself several codices [read] as it is in the thing, the Vatican [edition] here and a little after [reads] as it is in itself and in the thing.
- Edd. cum nonnullis codd. repetunt obiectum. Paulo superius pro etiam contingat edd. etiam contingit.The editions, with some codices, repeat object. A little above, for also can it [be] the editions [read] also it does [happen].
- Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. — Subinde pro quia intellectum edd. et intellectum.See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2. — Thereupon, for because the intellect the editions [read] and the intellect.
- Simul audi: articulus, vel etiam Veritas divina. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. et ad 1. — De praedicatione causali August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34. dicit: Talibus locutionibus etiam abundat nostra consuetudo, cum dicimus laetum diem, quia nos laetos facit, et pigrum frigus, quia nos pigros facit etc.Understand together: the article, or also divine Truth. Cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, in the body and ad 1. — On causal predication Augustine, I. de Genesi contra Manichaeos c. 22, n. 34, says: Our usage also abounds in such locutions, as when we say a glad day, because it makes us glad, and a sluggish cold, because it makes us sluggish, etc.
- Complures codd. et edd. abunde ad omnia obiecta, quae obiiciuntur, nonnulli codd. ad omnia obiecta tantum.Several codices and editions [read] abundantly to all the objections which are objected, some codices [read] only to all the objections.
- Cfr. supra pag. 171, nota 1.Cf. above, p. 171, note 1.
- Vide supra pag. 214, nota 1.See above, p. 214, note 1.
- Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Codd. G I L V omittunt movendi, cui verbo cod. N adiicit vel credendi. Edd. 1, 2 pro movendi substituerunt fidei, Vat. fidei, et credendi.Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2. — Codices G I L V omit of moving, to which word codex N adds or of believing. Editions 1, 2 substitute of faith for of moving, the Vatican [edition reads] of faith, and of believing.
- Codd. A K determinando, et subinde cod. A etiam determinat pro terminat.Codices A K [read] by determining, and thereupon codex A also [reads] determines for terminates.
- Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.Cf. above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1.
- Cfr. Rom. 1, 21. seqq. — Edd. tendebant.Cf. Romans 1, 21 ff. — The editions [read] they were tending.
- Hic in corp. quaest. — In initio solut. pro quod unius edd. cum aliquot codd. quod unius rei. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.Here in the body of the question. — At the beginning of the solution, for that of one the editions, with several codices, [read] that of one thing. — See the scholion to the preceding question.