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Dist. 24, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
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# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Haec est laus fidei, si quod creditur non videtur. Sed contra: carere lumine potius est ad vituperium quam ad laudem, secundum illud Psalmip529-4: Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est etc.: ergo videtur, quod privatio visionis potius reddat fidem vituperabilem quam commendabilem. — Item, si in hoc consistit laus fidei, quia credit quod non videt; cum in gloria nihil credatur, nisi illud quod videtur, videtur, quod laudabilior sit fides in via, quam gloria in patriap529-5, quod absurdum est dicere. — Item, si in hoc consistit laus fidei, quia credit quod non videt; sed omnis, qui stulte et falso credit, credit quod non videt: ergo qui stulte credit, laudandus est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod privatio visionis facit ad laudem credulitatis, praesupposita tamen rectitudine in ipsa credulitate; et hoc ex duplici causa: primo, propter humiliationem et captivationem intellectus, quae admodum est laudanda, sicut superbia intellectus admodum est vituperanda; secundo, quia talis credulitas est a mera voluntate, non ab aliqua necessitate. Nullus enim cogitur credere quod non videt; et quia laus et vituperium consistunt circa opera voluntaria: hinc est, quod Augustinusp529-6 dicit, quod laus fidei est credere quod non vides: non propter privationem visionis tantum, sed propter positionem humilitatis et libertatis: humilitatis ex parte intellectus, et libertatis ex parte voluntatis. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur primo.

Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo de gloria, similiter patet responsio: quiap529-7 Augustinus non loquitur de laude quacumque, sed de laude meriti; et haec laus est in statu viae, non patriae, et circa actus viae, non circa actus patriae. — Similiter patet ultimum: quia hoc non dicitur de quacumque credulitate, sed de credulitate recta et vera, non stulta et falsap529-8.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Cum fides sit ex auditu non modo exteriori, sed etiam interiori. Videtur enim hoc inconvenienter dici, quia, cum sensus visus plurimas rerum differentias nobis ostendat et nobilior sitp529-9, videtur, quod magis fides debeat esse ex visu quam ex auditu. — Item, fides Apostolorum fuit ex visu ita, sicut ex auditu: ergo si omnis fides subsequentium derivata fuit a fide Apostolorum, videtur, quod magis debeat dici ex visu quam ex auditu. — Item, cum fides sit habitus infusus, videtur, quod nullo modo habeat ex auditu esse.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Philosophusp529-10, dupliciter contingit aliquid addiscere, videlicet per inventionem et per doctrinam. Et sensus quidem visus maxime deservit illi modo addiscendi, qui est per inventionem; sensus vero auditus illi modo, qui est per doctrinam. Quoniam igitur ea quae fide novimus, non cognoscimus per inventionem, sed magis per doctrinam, per doctrinam, inquam, non solum praedicatoris loquentis per aurem corporis, sed etiam Spiritus sancti loquentis per aurem cordis; hinc est, quod in littera dicitur, quod fides non tantum est ex auditu exteriori, sed etiam interiori. Et quamvis Apostoli multa didicerint videndo Christum, multo tamen plura didicerunt audiendo ipsum quip529-11 loqueretur exterius, et qui lo-

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queretur eis interius per Spiritum sanctum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secundum obiectum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod fides est per infusionem, non per auditum; dicendum, quod fides quantum ad suum formale per infusionem est, sed quantum ad materiale, videlicet quoad notitiam illam, qua cognoscitur, « quid est quod per nomen diciturp530-1 », est per auditum, ita quod unum est per auditum cordis, et aliud per auditum corporis. Ideo generaliter dicit Apostolus, fidem ex auditu esse, magis principaliter ratione auditus interioris quam exterioris. Et sic dicit Gregoriusp530-2, quod in vanum laborat sermo praedicatoris, nisi adsit illustratio doctoris interioris.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Alia sunt quae, nisi intelligamus, non credimus; alia quae, nisi credamus, non intelligimus. Primo videtur, quod ista divisio sit insufficiens, quoniam ipse Augustinus in originalip530-3 addit tertium membrum, videlicet quod « quaedam sunt, quae creduntur et nunquam intelliguntur » : ergo videtur Magister insufficienter ponere divisionem credibilium. — Item, videtur implicare falsum, quod quaedam sunt, quae prius creduntur, quam intelligantur. Si enim « credere est cogitare cum assensionep530-4 », et cogitare est intelligere; videtur, quod omne credere praecedat intelligere. Si tu dicas, quod Augustinus intelligit de intellectu, qui innititur rationi; tunc videtur, quod falsum dicat, quod quaedam sunt, quae prius intelliguntur, quam credantur, quia dicitur Isaiae septimop530-5 secundum aliam translationem: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis: ergo illud intelligere semper sequitur ipsum credere.

Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur, quae sunt illa credibilia, de quibus dicit Augustinus, quod « creduntur et nunquam intelliguntur », cum videamus, quod omnia credibilia per rationes satis probabiles affirmenturp530-6.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod intelligere dicitur dupliciter, secundum quod Magister innuit in litterap530-7. Uno modo intelligere dicitur large nosse, « quid est quod dicitur per nomen » ; et illud intelligere semper praecedit assensum fidei, nec aliquid creditur, quin isto modo prius intelligatur. Alio modo intelligere, hoc est ratione praevia cogitare; iuxta quod dicit Augustinusp530-8: « Quod intelligimus, debemus rationi; quod credimus, auctoritati ». Et de isto intelligit Augustinus, cum dicit, quod quaedam sunt, quae prius creduntur et postea intelliguntur, sicut sunt articuli fidei, qui sunt supra rationem. Quaedam sunt, quae non prius creduntur, quam intelligantur, sicut sunt antecedentia ad fidem, et ea quae sunt de dictamine iuris naturalis, sicut Deum esse, Deum esse bonum. Quaedam sunt, quae creduntur et nunquam intelliguntur, quia non possunt ratione probari, « sicut est historia, humana gesta percurrensp530-9 ». Nemo enim probare potest per rationem, quod Abraham genuit Isaac, sed solum per auctoritatem. — Et sic patet, quod intelligere aliquando praecedit fidem, aliquando sequitur secundum istum modum accipiendip530-10, quamvis secundum primum semper praecedat.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia quaesita. Nam quod primo obiicitur de insufficientia divisionis, dicendum, quod Magister non intendit hic dividere credibilia, sed ostendere, quomodo fides et intellectus circa idem possunt se compati, et qualiter circa idem habeant ordinari. — Ad aliud similiter patet responsio, quia procedit de intelligere, secundum quod primo modo accipitur. — Ultimum similiter patetp530-11.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quid est Deum scire, nisi eum mente conspicere firmiterque percipere? Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia aut loquitur de conspectu mentis, qui est per speciem, aut de eo qui est per speculum et in aenigmatep530-12. Si de eo qui est per speculum, videtur falsum, quia hoc non est scire, sed potius credere. Si de eo qui est per speciem, hoc videtur similiter falsum, quia tunc

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non sciretur Deus nisi in patria; Damascenusp531-1 autem dicit, quod cognitio existendi Deum omnibus est inserta. — Item dicit Augustinus duodecimo de Civitate Deip531-2, quod « quidquid scitur, scientis comprehensione finitur » : ergo si Deus nullo modo scientis comprehensione finitur, videtur, quod nullo modo possit sciri. — Item Dionysiusp531-3 dicit, secundum illud Psalmi, quod Deus posuit tenebras latibulum suum: igitur videtur impossibile Deum mente conspicere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus hic loquitur de cognitione experimentali, quam quis habet de Deo sive in patria, sive in via: in patria quidem perfecte, sed in via imperfecte; neutra tamen habetur nisi a mundis corde. Unde haec scientia sapientia est, quia secum habet iunctum saporem; et per hanc illuminatur intellectus, et stabilitur affectusp531-4. Et ideo dicit, quod Deum scire non est aliud quam mente conspicere firmiterque percipere.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non potest intelligi de cognitione viae nec de cognitione patriaep531-5; dicendum, quod immo de cognitione viae intelligi potest. — Sed cognitio viae multos habet gradus. Cognoscitur enim Deus in vestigio, cognoscitur in imagine, cognoscitur et in effectu gratiae, cognoscitur etiam per intimam unionem Dei et animae, iuxta quod dicit Apostolusp531-6: Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est. Et haec est cognitio excellentissima, quam docet Dionysius, quae quidem est in ecstatico amore et elevat supra cognitionem fidei secundum statum communem; et de hac intelligit hic Augustinus et Magister.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod scire est comprehendere; dicendum, quod Augustinus definit ibi scire, secundum quod competit Deo: et Deus, quidquid scit, scit scientia comprehensionis, quia totam rem plene cognoscit; hoc autem modo non scitur Deus a nobisp531-7.

Ad illud Dionysii similiter patet responsio, quia vult dicere, quod Deus non conspiciatur in via in claritate suae essentiae, sed quod conspicitur in effectu gratiae et experientia suavitatis suae per ipsam anagogicam unitionemp531-8.

English Translation
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# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: This is the praise of faith, if what is believed is not seen. But on the contrary: to lack light is rather for blame than for praise, according to that verse of the Psalmp529-4: Man, when he was in honor, did not understand, he was compared etc.: therefore it seems that the privation of vision rather renders faith blameworthy than commendable. — Likewise, if the praise of faith consists in this, that it believes what it does not see; since in glory nothing is believed except that which is seen, it seems that faith in the way is more praiseworthy than glory in the fatherlandp529-5, which is absurd to say. — Likewise, if the praise of faith consists in this, that it believes what it does not see; but everyone who believes foolishly and falsely believes what he does not see: therefore he who believes foolishly is to be praised.

I respond: It must be said that the privation of vision contributes to the praise of belief, presupposing nevertheless rectitude in the belief itself; and this for a twofold cause: first, on account of the humiliation and captivation of the intellect, which is very much to be praised, as the pride of the intellect is very much to be blamed; secondly, because such belief is from mere will, not from any necessity. For no one is compelled to believe what he does not see; and because praise and blame consist about voluntary works: hence it is that Augustinep529-6 says that the praise of faith is to believe what you do not see: not on account of the privation of vision alone, but on account of the positing of humility and of liberty: of humility on the part of the intellect, and of liberty on the part of the will. — And through this the response to that which is objected first is clear.

To that which is objected secondly concerning glory, the response is likewise clear: becausep529-7 Augustine does not speak of praise of any kind whatever, but of the praise of merit; and this praise is in the state of the way, not of the fatherland, and concerning the acts of the way, not concerning the acts of the fatherland. — Likewise the last point is clear: because this is not said of any belief whatever, but of belief that is right and true, not foolish and falsep529-8.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: Since faith is from hearing, not only exterior, but also interior. For this seems to be said unfittingly, because, since the sense of sight shows us very many differences of things and is noblerp529-9, it seems that faith ought rather to be from sight than from hearing. — Likewise, the faith of the Apostles was from sight just as from hearing: therefore if all the faith of those who came after was derived from the faith of the Apostles, it seems that it ought rather to be said to be from sight than from hearing. — Likewise, since faith is an infused habit, it seems that in no way does it have being from hearing.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Philosopher saysp529-10, a thing happens to be learned in two ways, namely by discovery and by teaching. And the sense of sight indeed serves most that mode of learning which is by discovery; but the sense of hearing serves that mode which is by teaching. Since, therefore, those things which we know by faith we do not know by discovery, but rather by teaching — by teaching, I say, not only of the preacher speaking through the ear of the body, but also of the Holy Spirit speaking through the ear of the heart; hence it is that in the text it is said that faith is not only from exterior hearing, but also interior. And although the Apostles learned much by seeing Christ, nevertheless they learned far more by hearing him whop529-11 would speak exteriorly, and who would

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speak to them interiorly through the Holy Spirit. — And through this the response to the first and second objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that faith is by infusion, not by hearing; it must be said that faith with respect to its formal element is by infusion, but with respect to its material element, namely as to that knowledge by which it is known « what it is that is said by the namep530-1 », it is by hearing, so that the one is by the hearing of the heart, and the other by the hearing of the body. Therefore the Apostle says generally that faith is from hearing, more principally by reason of interior hearing than exterior. And thus Gregory saysp530-2 that the discourse of the preacher labors in vain, unless the illumination of the interior teacher is present.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: Some things are such that, unless we understand them, we do not believe them; others such that, unless we believe, we do not understand. First it seems that this division is insufficient, since Augustine himself in the originalp530-3 adds a third member, namely that « some things are believed and never understood » : therefore it seems that the Master sets down the division of credible things insufficiently. — Likewise, it seems to imply something false, that there are certain things which are first believed before they are understood. For if « to believe is to think with assentp530-4 », and to think is to understand; it seems that all believing precedes understanding. If you say that Augustine understands it of the understanding which relies on reason; then it seems that he says something false, that there are certain things which are first understood before they are believed, because it is said in the seventh chapter of Isaiahp530-5 according to another translation: Unless you believe, you will not understand: therefore that understanding always follows the believing itself.

In connection with this it is also asked, what are those credible things of which Augustine says that they « are believed and never understood », since we see that all credible things are affirmed by sufficiently probable reasonsp530-6.

I respond: It must be said that to understand is spoken of in two ways, according as the Master hints in the textp530-7. In one way to understand is said broadly to know « what it is that is said by the name » ; and that understanding always precedes the assent of faith, nor is anything believed which is not in this way first understood. In another way to understand is to think with a prior reasoning; according to which Augustine saysp530-8: « What we understand we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority ». And of this Augustine understands, when he says that there are certain things which are first believed and afterward understood, as are the articles of faith, which are above reason. There are certain things which are not first believed before they are understood, as are the things antecedent to faith, and those things which are of the dictate of natural law, as that God exists, that God is good. There are certain things which are believed and never understood, because they cannot be proved by reason, « as is history, running through human deedsp530-9 ». For no one can prove by reason that Abraham begot Isaac, but only by authority. — And thus it is clear that to understand sometimes precedes faith, sometimes follows, according to that mode of taking itp530-10, although according to the first it always precedes.

And through this the response to all that was asked is clear. For as to what is objected first concerning the insufficiency of the division, it must be said that the Master does not intend here to divide credible things, but to show how faith and understanding can stand together about the same thing, and how about the same thing they are ordered. — To the other [objection] the response is likewise clear, because it proceeds concerning to understand according as it is taken in the first way. — The last point is likewise clearp530-11.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: What is it to know God, except to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly? For this seems to be false, because either he speaks of the gaze of the mind which is through species, or of that which is through a mirror and in an enigmap530-12. If of that which is through a mirror, it seems false, because this is not to know, but rather to believe. If of that which is through species, this seems likewise false, because then

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God would not be known except in the fatherland; but the Damascenep531-1 says that the knowledge of God's existing is implanted in all. — Likewise Augustine says, in the twelfth book of On the City of Godp531-2, that « whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower » : therefore if God is in no way bounded by the comprehension of the knower, it seems that in no way can he be known. — Likewise Dionysiusp531-3 says, according to that verse of the Psalm, that God set darkness as his hiding-place: therefore it seems impossible to behold God with the mind.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine here speaks of experiential cognition, which one has of God whether in the fatherland or in the way: in the fatherland indeed perfectly, but in the way imperfectly; yet neither is had except by the clean of heart. Hence this knowledge is wisdom, because it has joined with it a savor; and through this the intellect is illumined, and the affection is made stablep531-4. And therefore he says that to know God is nothing other than to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that it cannot be understood of the cognition of the way nor of the cognition of the fatherlandp531-5; it must be said that, on the contrary, it can be understood of the cognition of the way. — But the cognition of the way has many grades. For God is known in his vestige, he is known in his image, he is known also in the effect of grace, he is known too through the intimate union of God and the soul, according to what the Apostle saysp531-6: He who cleaves to God is one spirit. And this is the most excellent cognition, which Dionysius teaches, which indeed is in ecstatic love and elevates above the cognition of faith according to the common state; and of this Augustine and the Master here understand.

To that which is objected, that to know is to comprehend; it must be said that Augustine there defines to know according as it befits God: and God, whatever he knows, knows by the knowledge of comprehension, because he knows the whole thing fully; but in this manner God is not known by usp531-7.

To that of Dionysius the response is likewise clear, because he means to say that God is not beheld in the way in the clarity of his essence, but that he is beheld in the effect of grace and in the experience of his sweetness through the anagogical union itselfp531-8.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Psalm. 48, 13.
    Psalm 48:13.
  2. Cod. aa quam in gloria et in patria.
    Codex aa reads quam in gloria et in patria [than in glory and in the fatherland].
  3. In Ioan. Evang. tr. 79. n. 1, unde et textus huius dubii sumtus est. — De duplici causa, ex qua privatio visionis facit ad laudem credulitatis, cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius pro positionem codd. A K (N a prima manu) U X Y aa rationem.
    On the Gospel of John, tract 79, n. 1, whence also the text of this doubt is taken. — On the twofold cause from which the privation of vision contributes to the praise of belief, cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1 f. — A little below, in place of positionem codices A K (N by the first hand) U X Y aa read rationem.
  4. Codd. A K nam.
    Codices A K read nam [for].
  5. Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. n. 6.
    Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, n. 6.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 162, (III. c. 3.), de Sensu et sens. c. 1, I. Metaph. c. 1. — Paulo inferius pro derivata fuit codd. A K derivata sit.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 162 (III, c. 3), On Sense and the Sensible c. 1, Metaphysics I, c. 1. — A little below, in place of derivata fuit codices A K read derivata sit.
  7. Libr. III. de Anima, text. 8. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 206, nota 2. Quod sensus visus maxime deservit ad addiscendum per inventionem, insinuat Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 1, et I. Metaph. c. 1. — Pro verbo addiscere edd. hic et inferius substituerunt verbum scire.
    Book III of On the Soul, text 8 (c. 4). Cf. vol. II, p. 206, note 2. That the sense of sight serves most for learning by discovery, Aristotle suggests, On Sense and the Sensible c. 1, and Metaphysics I, c. 1. — In place of the word addiscere [to learn] the editions, here and below, substitute the word scire [to know].
  8. Hic et proxime post pro qui codd. A X exhibent quid.
    Here and immediately after, in place of qui codices A X present quid.
  9. De his verbis Aristot. cfr. supra pag. 491, nota 4. — Paulo superius post per infusionem est edd. subiungunt non per auditum. Inferius respicitur Rom. 10, 17.
    On these words of Aristotle cf. above p. 491, note 4. — A little above, after per infusionem est the editions add non per auditum [not by hearing]. Below, Romans 10:17 is referred to.
  10. Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 3: Nisi idem Spiritus cordi adsit audientis, otiosus est sermo doctoris. Nemo ergo docenti homini tribuat quod ex ore docentis intelligit, quia, nisi intus sit qui doceat, doctoris lingua exterius in vacuum laborat. Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 2. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 12; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
    Book II of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 30, n. 3: Unless the same Spirit be present to the heart of the hearer, the discourse of the teacher is idle. Let no one, therefore, attribute to the man teaching what he understands from the mouth of the teacher, because, unless he who teaches be within, the tongue of the teacher labors exteriorly in vain. Cf. above p. 474, note 2. — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 12; St. Thomas, here on the text.
  11. B. Albert., hic a. 10: « Quia [ab Augustino] in originali, scilicet in libro 83 Qq. (q. 48.), ponitur adhuc unum credibile » etc. In textu originali legitur: Alia sunt quae semper creduntur etc.
    Blessed Albert, here a. 10: « Because [by Augustine] in the original, namely in the book of 83 Questions (q. 48), there is set down yet one more credible thing » etc. In the original text is read: There are other things which are always believed, etc.
  12. August., de Praedest. Sanct. c. 2. n. 5. Sicut supra, pag. 474, nota 1, ita et hic pro assensione multi codd. exhibent assertione. — Paulo superius pro falsum, quod Vat. perperam falsum, quoniam [edd. 1, 2 quia].
    Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints c. 2, n. 5. As above, p. 474, note 1, so here too in place of assensione many codices present assertione. — A little above, in place of falsum, quod the Vatican edition wrongly reads falsum, quoniam [editions 1, 2 quia].
  13. Vers. 9; verba sunt secundum translationem factam a Septuaginta interpretibus. In Vulgata legitur: Si non credideritis, non permanebitis.
    Verse 9; the words are according to the translation made by the Septuagint translators. In the Vulgate is read: Unless you believe, you will not remain.
  14. Codd. K N W aa asseruntur; codd. A G T V afferuntur; nonnulli codd. afferantur.
    Codices K N W aa read asseruntur [are asserted]; codices A G T V afferuntur [are brought forward]; some codices afferantur.
  15. Hic c. 3. — De definitione nominali cfr. supra pag. 491, nota 4. Cfr. August., de Praedest. Sanct. c. 2. n. 5.
    Here c. 3. — On the nominal definition cf. above p. 491, note 4. Cf. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints c. 2, n. 5.
  16. De Utilitate credendi, c. 11. n. 25, et I. Retract. c. 14. n. 3. — Post Alio modo cod. Z supplet dicitur. Subinde pro cogitare codd. A K N aa bb cognoscere.
    On the Usefulness of Believing, c. 11, n. 25, and I Retractations, c. 14, n. 3. — After Alio modo codex Z supplies dicitur. Thereupon, in place of cogitare codices A K N aa bb read cognoscere.
  17. August., 83. Qq. q. 48: Sicut est omnis historia, temporalia et humana gesta percurrens.
    Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 48: As is all history, running through temporal and human deeds.
  18. Scil. quatenus importat ratione praevia cogitare.
    Namely, insofar as it implies thinking with a prior reasoning.
  19. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 6; Blessed Albert, here a. 10; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
  20. Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12, ubi Vulgata et codd. Z bb post per speculum omittunt et.
    1 Cor. 13:12, where the Vulgate and codices Z bb omit et [and] after per speculum [through a mirror].
  21. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 1. et 3. — Pro inserta edd. 1, 2 incerta, Vat. certa.
    Book I of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 1 and 3. — In place of inserta [implanted] editions 1, 2 read incerta [uncertain], the Vatican edition certa [certain].
  22. Cap. 18. Vide supra pag. 299, nota 8.
    Chapter 18. See above p. 299, note 8.
  23. De Mystica Theolog. c. 1. § 2. Sententia Davidica, quae affertur, habetur Ps. 17, 12.
    On Mystical Theology c. 1, § 2. The Davidic statement which is brought forward is had in Psalm 17:12.
  24. Cfr. infra d. 35. q. 1; I. Sent. prooem. q. 3. et d. 2. dub. 2. — Paulo superius post sed in via non pauci codd. incongrue subiiciunt quidem, cod. bb autem.
    Cf. below, d. 35, q. 1; I Sentences, prooem. q. 3, and d. 2, doubt 2. — A little above, after sed in via not a few codices incongruously add quidem, codex bb autem.
  25. Edd. intelligi nec cognitione viae nec patriae.
    The editions read intelligi nec cognitione viae nec patriae [understood neither by the cognition of the way nor of the fatherland].
  26. Epist. I. Cor. 6, 17. — De diversis gradibus cognitionis viae cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. et q. 3; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. et ad 6, nec non illud S. Bonav. opusc., quod intitulatur Itinerarium mentis in Deum, ubi isti diversi gradus miro modo explicantur, simulque (in ult. cap.) secundum Dionysium (de Mystica Theolog. c. 1; cfr. de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 13.) excessus mentalis et mysticus describitur.
    1 Cor. 6:17. — On the diverse grades of the cognition of the way cf. I Sentences, d. 3, p. I, q. 2, to 4, and q. 3; II Sentences, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, in the body and to 6, and also that little work of St. Bonaventure entitled The Soul's Journey into God, where these diverse grades are wonderfully explained, and at the same time (in the last chapter), according to Dionysius (On Mystical Theology c. 1; cf. On the Divine Names c. 4, § 13), the mental and mystical excess is described.
  27. Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 1. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro totam rem cod. C totum esse, Vat. totam rationem.
    Cf. above, d. 14, a. 1, q. 2, and I Sentences, d. 3, p. I, q. 1, to 1. — A little before, in place of totam rem codex C reads totum esse, the Vatican edition totam rationem.
  28. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 543, nota 5. et pag. 546, nota 6. nec non Itinerar. mentis in Deum, c. 1. et 7. — In hac ultima propos. codd. minus recte particulam non, e loco suo ante conspicitur sublatam, transposuerunt ante vult dicere (quibus verbis nonnulli codd. adiungunt Dionysius, plurimi codd. perperam Augustinus). Deinde in Vat. legitur sic: sed non vult dicere, quod non conspiciatur in effectu gratiae et experientia suavitatis suae per ipsam unionem. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 11.
    Cf. vol. II, p. 543, note 5, and p. 546, note 6, and also The Soul's Journey into God, c. 1 and 7. — In this last proposition the codices, less correctly, removing the particle non from its place before conspicitur, transposed it before vult dicere (to which words some codices add Dionysius, very many codices wrongly Augustinus). Then in the Vatican edition it is read thus: but he does not mean to say that he is not beheld in the effect of grace and in the experience of his own sweetness through the union itself. — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 11.
← Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 2