Dist. 35, Dubia
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 35
# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod sapientia est rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia; quoniam, sicut dicit Philosophus1, « scientiae secantur in res », hoc est, dividuntur secundum diversitatem subiectorum; sed res divinae et humanae, creatae et increatae summa diversitate differunt: ergo nulla scientia, nulla sapientia simul potest esse de utrisque. — Item, res humanae in comparatione rerum divinarum quasi nihil sunt, sicut nec finitum est aliquo modo comparabile infinito2: ergo sicut punctus nihil addit supra lineam, sic cognitio rerum humanarum nihil addit supra cognitionem rerum divinarum: ergo videtur, quod cognitio rerum humanarum non sit de integritate ipsius sapientiae: non ergo debet poni in eius definitione.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sapientiae nomen, secundum quod accipitur pro cognitione, dupliciter consuevit accipi a philosophis, sicut et nomen iustitiae dupliciter accipitur. Est enim iustitia specialis et iustitia generalis; iustitia specialis est virtus cardinalis, distincta ab aliis; iustitia vero generalis complectitur generaliter omnes virtutes3. Sic et sapientia proprie dicta dicitur « cognitio causarum altissimarum », sapientia vero communiter dicta comprehendit et includit cognitionem omnium. — Et hoc modo dicit Philosophus4, quod sapiens de qualibet re, sicut est, inquirit cognoscere rationem; et hoc modo sapientia includit in se diversas scientias et non solum illas, quae sunt de creaturis, verum etiam illas, quae sunt de Creatore et creaturis. Et quoniam « nomine hominis potest intelligi omnis creatura », cum ipse cum omnibus communicet, sicut dicit Gregorius5; hinc est, quod definiens sapientiam dicit ipsam esse scientiam rerum divinarum et humanarum, id est ceterarum rerum creatarum, in quibus manifestatur summa sapientia Dei6. — Et per hoc patet explicatio notificationis et dissolutio primae obiectionis.
Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod scientia rerum humanarum nihil addit supra cognitionem rerum divinarum; dicendum, quod licet res divinae excedant humanas in infinitum, quia illae sunt infinitae, et istae finitae; cognitio tamen non excedit cognitionem in infinitum, pro eo quod utraque cognitio est finita, sive qua cognoscimus divina, sive qua cognoscimus humana. Non enim cognoscimus divina secundum suam immensitatem; nec quamdiu sumus in via, attingimus ad conspiciendam ipsam Veritatem in se; et ideo necesse est, eam in suis effectibus cognoscere7. Et propterea cognitio rerum humanarum magna pars est nostrae notitiae, quamdiu sumus in statu viae; et pro tanto ponitur in definitione sapientiae.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Huic scientiae illud tantum tribuo, quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quoniam, cum dicit, fidem generari ex scientia, aut intelligit quantum ad habitum, aut quantum ad actum. Quantum ad habitum non habet veritatem, quia habitus fidei non generatur ex habitu scientiae: quantum ad actum non, quia actus fidei praecedit actum scientiae8: ergo nullo modo habet veritatem. — Item, scientia versatur circa temporalia9; fides autem est de aeternis: ergo videtur, quod donum scientiae nihil faciat ad ipsam fidem.
Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur de diversitate illorum quatuor actuum, quos enumerat.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod licet fides habeat ipsam summam Veritatem pro principali obiecto, cui credit et assentit; illud tamen, quod credit, videt per speculum creaturae10; et propterea, etsi speculum creaturae non sit eius principale obiectum, cognitio tamen aeternorum in subiecta creatura et mundanae creaturae, et intelligentia Scripturae plurimum confert ad ipsius fidei promotionem sive in alio, sive
in se: in se quidem quantum ad profectum; in aliis autem non solum quantum ad profectum, sed etiam quantum ad inchoationem; homo enim magnae scientiae et litteraturae facilius persuadet et melius instruit venientes ad fidem quam ignorans, sicut de beato Paulo manifestum est. — Unde quia scientia ista valet ad fidei introductionem et introductae provectionem et provectae defensionem et defensae confirmationem11; hinc est, quod quatuor actus assignat ei Augustinus respectu ipsius fidei, dicens, quod per « donum scientiae fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur »; ita quod primus actus respicit incipientes, duo intermedii proficientes secundum progressum in bono et pugnam contra malum, quartus et ultimus iam perfectos.
Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod scientia non generat fidem nec quantum ad habitum nec quantum ad actum; dicendum, quod immo; sed generari aliquem habitum ab alio potest intelligi dupliciter: vel respectu eiusdem subiecti, vel respectu alterius; et respectu alterius dupliciter: vel effective, vel dispositive. Cum ergo dicitur, quod scientia generat fidem; hoc non intelligitur respectu eiusdem subiecti, sed respectu alterius; nec intelligitur effective, sed tantum dispositive12.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est de aeternis, scientia de temporalibus; dicendum, quod illud non cogit, quia temporalia bene manuducunt ad aeterna, quamdiu sumus in via13.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Scientia est abstinere a malis. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia diversorum donorum diversi sunt actus: cum ergo hoc sit ipsius timoris14, non videtur, quod sit ipsius scientiae. — Item, abstinere a malis respicit affectum; sed scientia respicit intellectum: ergo abstinere a malis non est actus ipsius.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum scientia non solum sit ad declinandum a malo, sed etiam ad faciendum bonum15, propter quid magis describitur per actum declinandi a malis quam per actum exercendi in bonis?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, secundum quod Magister exponit infra16, abstinere a malis non solum intelligitur privative: non facere malum, sed a malis abstinere, hoc est « prudenter conversari in medio nationis pravae et perversae ». Unde aliter et aliter abstinere a malis est ipsius timoris et ipsius scientiae. Timor enim reprimit interiora incentiva, scientia vero docet praecavere exteriora pericula et occasiones et ea quae sunt ad malum inclinantia, in quibus magna est difficultas.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, quoniam abstinere a malis17 aliter est timoris; praeterea, non est scientiae ut exsequentis, sed tantum ut dirigentis18; postremo, non est ipsius scientiae privative tantum, sed etiam positive, sicut supra fuit tactum. Ideo patent illa tria obiecta, quae procedunt secundum haec.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Aperte monstratum est, in quo differant spiritus sapientiae et spiritus scientiae, cum sapientia divinis, et scientia humanis attributa sit rebus. Videtur enim, quod ista nulla sit differentia, pro eo quod eadem virtus, scilicet caritas, simul habet versari circa Deum et proximum; et similiter eadem fides19: ergo nulla videtur per hoc assignari donorum differentia. — Item, intelligentia, quae est donum unum, sicut dicit infra20, simul est de aeternis et temporalibus: ergo videtur, quod Magister sibi ipsi contradicat.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod negotiari circa temporalia et aeterna potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum rationes easdem, vel secundum rationes alias et alias. Quando est secundum rationes easdem; tunc non est nisi diversitas materialis, et unus formalis habitus potest esse respectu utrorumque21. Quando vero est secundum rationes alias et alias; tunc non solummodo est diversitas materialis, immo etiam est diversitas formalis; et sic est in proposito reperire, sicut colligi potest ex his quae dicta sunt in praehabitarum quaestionum determinatione22: et propterea Magister differentiam satis recte assignat. Et haec de donis dicta sufficiant.
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# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about that which he says, namely that wisdom is the knowledge of human and divine things; for, as the Philosopher says1, « the sciences are cut up according to things », that is, they are divided according to the diversity of their subjects; but divine and human things, created and uncreated, differ by the greatest diversity: therefore there can be no science, no wisdom, at once concerning both. — Likewise, human things in comparison to divine things are as it were nothing, just as the finite is in no way comparable to the infinite2: therefore, just as a point adds nothing to a line, so the knowledge of human things adds nothing to the knowledge of divine things: therefore it seems that the knowledge of human things does not belong to the integrity of wisdom itself: therefore it ought not to be placed in its definition.
I respond: It must be said that the name of wisdom, insofar as it is taken for knowledge, has customarily been taken in two ways by the philosophers, just as the name of justice too is taken in two ways. For there is special justice and general justice; special justice is a cardinal virtue, distinct from the others; but general justice embraces generally all the virtues3. So too wisdom, in its proper sense, is called « the knowledge of the highest causes », but wisdom in its common sense comprehends and includes the knowledge of all things. — And in this way the Philosopher says4 that the wise man seeks to know the account of any thing whatever, as it is; and in this way wisdom includes within itself the diverse sciences, and not only those which are concerning creatures, but also those which are concerning the Creator and creatures. And since « by the name of man every creature can be understood », since he shares in common with all things, as Gregory says5; hence it is that, in defining wisdom, he says that it is the knowledge of divine and human things, that is, of the other created things, in which the supreme wisdom of God is manifested6. — And by this the explanation of the description and the resolution of the first objection is clear.
But to that which is objected, that the knowledge of human things adds nothing to the knowledge of divine things; it must be said that, although divine things exceed human things infinitely, because the former are infinite and the latter finite; yet the knowledge does not exceed the knowledge infinitely, for the reason that each knowledge is finite, both that by which we know divine things and that by which we know human things. For we do not know divine things according to their immensity; nor, so long as we are on the way, do we attain to beholding Truth itself in itself; and therefore it is necessary to know it in its effects7. And therefore the knowledge of human things is a great part of our cognizance, so long as we are in the state of the way; and to that extent it is placed in the definition of wisdom.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: To this knowledge I attribute only that by which the most salutary faith is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened. For he seems to say something false, since, when he says that faith is generated from knowledge, he understands it either as to habit or as to act. As to habit it does not hold true, because the habit of faith is not generated from the habit of knowledge: as to act not either, because the act of faith precedes the act of knowledge8: therefore in no way does it hold true. — Likewise, knowledge is occupied about temporal things9; but faith is concerning eternal things: therefore it seems that the gift of knowledge does nothing toward faith itself.
Alongside this it is also asked about the diversity of those four acts which he enumerates.
I respond: It must be said that, although faith has supreme Truth itself for its principal object, to which it believes and assents; yet that which it believes, it sees through the mirror of the creature10; and therefore, even though the mirror of the creature is not its principal object, nevertheless the knowledge of eternal things in the subject creature and of the worldly creature, and the understanding of Scripture, contributes very much to the promotion of faith itself, whether in another or
in oneself: in oneself indeed as to progress; but in others not only as to progress, but also as to inception; for a man of great knowledge and learning more easily persuades and better instructs those coming to the faith than one who is ignorant, as is evident from blessed Paul. — Whence, because this knowledge avails for the introduction of faith, and for the advancement of faith once introduced, and for the defense of faith once advanced, and for the confirmation of faith once defended11; hence it is that Augustine assigns to it four acts with respect to faith itself, saying that through the « gift of knowledge the most salutary faith is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened »; so that the first act regards beginners, the two intermediate ones the proficient according to progress in good and the fight against evil, and the fourth and last the now perfect.
To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that knowledge does not generate faith, neither as to habit nor as to act; it must be said that on the contrary it does; but for some habit to be generated by another can be understood in two ways: either with respect to the same subject, or with respect to another; and with respect to another in two ways: either effectively or dispositively. When, therefore, it is said that knowledge generates faith; this is not understood with respect to the same subject, but with respect to another; nor is it understood effectively, but only dispositively12.
To that which is objected, that faith is concerning eternal things, knowledge concerning temporal things; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion], because temporal things lead well by the hand to eternal things, so long as we are on the way13.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Knowledge is to abstain from evils. For he seems to say something false, because the acts of diverse gifts are diverse: since, then, this belongs to fear itself14, it does not seem that it belongs to knowledge itself. — Likewise, to abstain from evils regards the affection; but knowledge regards the intellect: therefore to abstain from evils is not its act.
Alongside this it is asked: since knowledge is not only for turning away from evil, but also for doing good15, why is it described rather by the act of turning away from evils than by the act of being engaged in good things?
I respond: It must be said that, according as the Master expounds below16, to abstain from evils is not understood only privatively: not to do evil, but to abstain from evils, that is, « to conduct oneself prudently in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation ». Whence to abstain from evils belongs in one way and another to fear itself and to knowledge itself. For fear represses the inner incitements, but knowledge teaches one to guard against outward dangers and occasions and those things which incline toward evil, in which [matters] there is great difficulty.
And by this the response to the objections is clear, since to abstain from evils17 belongs in one way to fear; moreover, it does not belong to knowledge as carrying out, but only as directing18; lastly, it does not belong to knowledge itself only privatively, but also positively, as was touched on above. Thus those three objections are clear, which proceed according to these [points].
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: It has been openly shown in what the spirit of wisdom and the spirit of knowledge differ, since wisdom is attributed to divine things, and knowledge to human things. For it seems that there is no difference here, for the reason that the same virtue, namely charity, has at once to be occupied about God and neighbor; and likewise the same faith19: therefore no difference of gifts seems to be assigned by this. — Likewise, understanding, which is one gift, as he says below20, is at once concerning eternal and temporal things: therefore it seems that the Master contradicts himself.
I respond: It must be said that to be engaged about temporal and eternal things can be in two ways: either according to the same accounts, or according to differing accounts. When it is according to the same accounts; then there is only material diversity, and one formal habit can be with respect to both21. But when it is according to differing accounts; then there is not only material diversity, but rather also formal diversity; and so it is to be found in the matter at hand, as can be gathered from those things which were said in the determination of the questions previously treated22: and therefore the Master assigns the difference quite rightly. And let these things said concerning the gifts suffice.
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- Libr. III. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 8.) Cfr. tom. I. pag. 6, nota 3. — Cod. Z secantur scientiae quemadmodum et res. Mox pro subiectorum Vat. obiectorum.[Aristotle,] On the Soul, bk. 3, text 38 (ch. 8). Cf. vol. 1, p. 6, note 3. — Codex Z reads the sciences are cut up just as things [are]. Soon, for of the subjects the Vatican [edition reads] of the objects.
- Cfr. supra pag. 9, nota 1. — De proportione lineae ad punctum cfr. supra pag. 280, nota 3.Cf. above, p. 9, note 1. — On the proportion of a line to a point cf. above, p. 280, note 3.
- Vide supra d. 33. dub. 1. — De definitione sapientiae, quae hic sequitur, cfr. supra pag. 771, nota 3.See above, d. 33, doubt 1. — On the definition of wisdom which follows here, cf. above, p. 771, note 3.
- Libr. I. Metaph. c. 1. de discrimine expertorum et sapientum loquens dicit, quod experti « sciunt quidem quod est, propter quid autem nesciunt; illi [sapientes] vero propter quid et causas cognoscunt ». Et c. 2. dicit, quod « opinamur sapientem maxime omnia, ut possibile est, scire » (i. e. per causas cognoscere). Cfr. supra q. 1. — Mox pro rationem cod. A rationes, et deinde pro diversas cod. M divinas, edd. duas.In bk. 1 of the Metaphysics, ch. 1, speaking of the distinction between the experienced and the wise, he says that the experienced « do indeed know that [a thing] is, but they do not know the why; whereas they [the wise] know the why and the causes ». And in ch. 2 he says that « we hold that the wise man knows all things, so far as is possible » (i.e. to know through causes). Cf. above, q. 1. — Soon, for the account codex A [reads] the accounts, and then for diverse codex M [reads] divine, the editions two.
- Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 29. n. 2. — Paulo inferius ceterarum accipiendum est pro cunctarum: cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 1.[Gregory,] bk. 2 of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 29, n. 2. — A little below, of the other things is to be taken for of all things: cf. above, p. 680, note 1.
- Cfr. Sap. 13, 1. seqq.; Rom. 1, 19. 20; supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. [quomodo differat Deum videre per speciem et per speculum].Cf. Wisdom 13:1 ff.; Rom. 1:19–20; above, d. 31, art. 2, q. 1, reply to 3 [how it differs to see God through species and through a mirror].
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. seq. De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. et circa lit.Cf. Sentences bk. 1, d. 3, pt. 1, q. 1 f. On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 1; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, art. 1, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, art. 1, sub-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here, art. 2, q. 1, and on the letter.
- Vide supra pag. 530, nota 5.See above, p. 530, note 5.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq.Cf. here, the letter of the Master, ch. 1 f.
- Respicitur I. Cor. 13, 12. Cfr. supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius post aeternorum cod. A interiicit est, ubi respicitur Rom. 1, 20.Reference is made to 1 Cor. 13:12. Cf. above, d. 24, art. 1, q. 2. — A little below, after of eternal things codex A inserts is, where reference is made to Rom. 1:20.
- Vide tom. I. Prooem. q. 2.See vol. 1, Prologue, q. 2.
- Cfr. supra q. 2. ad 1. et d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.Cf. above, q. 2, reply to 1, and d. 34, pt. 1, art. 1, q. 2, reply to 1.
- De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Rich. a Med., hic circa lit.On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 4; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the letter.
- Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4, et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Edd. sit doni timoris, cod. E ipsius doni timoris.Cf. above, the letter of the Master, d. 34, ch. 4, and in the same place the Commentary, pt. 2, art. 1, q. 1. — The editions read belongs to the gift of fear, codex E to the gift of fear itself.
- Respicitur illud Ps. 36, 27: Declina a malo et fac bonum.Reference is made to that of Ps. 36:27: Turn away from evil and do good.
- Hic c. 1. — Pro infra edd. in littera.Here, ch. 1. — For below the editions [read] in the letter.
- Codd. K P R S hic interserunt aliter est scientiae.Codices K, P, R, S here insert in another way it belongs to knowledge.
- Cfr. supra q. 2. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4, et S. Thom., hic circa lit.Cf. above, q. 2. — On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 4, and St. Thomas, here, on the letter.
- Hic c. 2. d. 23. a. 1.Here, ch. 2; d. 23, art. 1.
- Vide supra q. 3. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 2.See above, q. 3, and d. 27, art. 1, q. 2.
- Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — In edd. desiderantur verba et unus formalis... utrorumque (cod. K utriusque).Cf. above, d. 23, art. 1, q. 3. — In the editions the words and one formal... [with respect to] both are wanting (codex K reads of each).
- Supra q. 1-3. — Ultimum solut. enuntiatum Et haec etc. deest in edd. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 3.Above, q. 1–3. — The last clause of the solution, And let these things etc., is lacking in the editions. — On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here, art. 3.