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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 6

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio VI. Utrum actus principalis pietatis consistat in religione respectu Dei, vel in compassione respectu proximi.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de actu et obiecto ipsius doni pietatis, et est quaestio, utrum actus principalis pietatis consistat in religione respectu Dei, vel in compassione respectu proximi. Et quod praecipue consistat in religione respectu Dei, ostenditur:

1. Primo per illud Apostoli ad Titum secundo1: Abnegantes impietatem, sobrie et iuste et pie etc.; ibi Glossa: «Abnegantes, id est fugientes impietatem vanae culturae, sobrie in nobis et iuste ad proximum et pie ad Deum vivamus»: ergo pietas proprie est ordinata respectu Dei.

2. Item, Augustinus2, tractans illud Iob vigesimo octavo: Pietas ipsa est sapientia, abstinere vero a malis intelligentia: «Pietatem hoc loco posuit Dei cultum, quae Graece theosebia dicitur»: ergo etc.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana3: «Pietatis est honorare sancta et non contradicere sacrae Scripturae»: si ergo utrumque horum consistit in cultu Dei, videtur etc.

4. Item, distinguitur peccatum iniquitatis et impietatis, quia iniquitas est in proximum, impietas est in Deum4: si ergo respectu illius est pietas donum, respectu cuius est impietas vitium et peccatum; videtur, quod actus pietatis-doni praecipue attendatur in cultu Dei.

Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Timotheum quarto5: Pietas ad omnia utilis est; ibi dicit Glossa: «Pietas, quae operatur bona fratribus, valet ad promerendum Deum; omnis enim summa disciplinae christianae in misericordia et pietate est»: ergo secundum hanc Glossam pietas ordinat respectu proximi.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana6 dicit, quod donum pietatis correspondet beatitudini mititatis; «opus enim est pietate mitescere»; sed mititas sive mansuetudo attenditur respectu proximi: ergo donum pietatis ad proximum ordinat.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Gregorium7 super Iob in assignatione donorum, ubi dicit, quod pietatis est opera misericordiae exhibere: si igitur hoc attenditur respectu proximi, videtur etc.

4. Item, Tullius in prima Rhetorica8 dicit, quod «pietas est benevolentia in parentes»; aut hoc intelligitur de pietate-dono, aut de pietate-virtute; sed de quocumque horum intelligatur, cum in obiectis conformentur, videtur, quod actus doni pietatis attendatur in comparatione ad proximum.

5. Item, donum pietatis exsequitur ea, ad quae donum scientiae ordinat9; sed donum scientiae ordinat ad bene conversandum respectu proximi: ergo videtur, quod respectu illius attendatur actus pietatis-doni.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quomodo distinguatur pietas a mansuetudine et misericordia in actu suo et obiecto.

Conclusio.

Donum pietatis principaliter attenditur in benevolentia respectu cuiuslibet proximi, quatenus gerit imaginem Dei.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod vocabulum pietatis multipliciter habet accipi, secundum quod innuit Augustinus in principio decimi de Civitate Dei10. Ait enim sic: «Pietas proprie Dei cultus intelligi solet, quam Graeci theosebiam vocant; haec tamen et erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur; more autem vulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur».

Cum igitur pietas sic dicatur multipliciter, videlicet erga Deum et erga parentes et erga quemcumque hominem; secundum quod ordinat erga Deum, non est nomen doni, sed potius est idem quod latria et theosebia sive eusebia, de qua dicit Augustinus11, quod «est sapientia vera». — Secundum autem quod ordinat ad parentes, adhuc etiam non tenet rationem doni, sed potius est species iustitiae-virtutis, pro eo quod ad hoc ordinatur secundum regulam naturalis iuris et secundum obligationem necessitatis. — Secundum autem quod attenditur respectu cuiuscumque proximi, sic pietas est nomen doni.

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Aliter tamen attenditur erga proximum pietas-donum et misericordia-virtus: quia misericordia-virtus respicit conformitatem in natura et necessitatem in indigentia sive miseria12; pietas vero attendit in proximo imaginem divinam. Unde dono pietatis est homo benevolus cuicumque homini, qui habet in se imaginem Dei; ita quod benevolentia illa pro loco et tempore aliquando progreditur in compassionis affectum, aliquando in operis beneficium.

Et sic patet, quis sit actus et obiectum pietatis-doni, quoniam ipsius est facere hominem benevolum respectu cuiuslibet proximi, in quantum gerit imaginem Dei. Et quoniam ad hoc habet dirigi per donum scientiae, quod quidem fundatur super principia fidei et dirigit in conversatione secundum exemplar Christi; hinc est, quod actus pietatis, etsi principaliter consistat erga proximum, nihilominus consistit respectu sacrae Scripturae, ut eam cum benevolentia audiat, et etiam respectu passionis13 Christi, ut eam cum benevolentia ad memoriam reducat. Unde usus doni pietatis attenditur in his tribus in exsequendo, secundum quod et usus doni scientiae, quod est eius directivum, in cognoscendo; principaliter tamen, secundum quod donum est, attenditur in benevolentia respectu proximi, sicut rationes ostendunt, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur.

1. 2. 3. 4. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Glossa, quod pietas ordinat ad Deum; et quod pietas est cultus Dei, et ad alias auctoritates consequentes; breviter dicendum, quod omnes illae auctoritates currunt de pietate secundum alium accipiendi modum, qui secundum Augustinum principalior et magis proprius est modus accipiendi pietatem, sicut ipse dicit in decimo de Civitate Dei14. Nam primo et principaliter debet homo benevolus esse ad Deum, offerendo ei cultum et obsequium principale et praecipuum tanquam ei, ad cuius similitudinem factus est, et quod suae creationis est et conditionis primum et principale principium. — Deinde vero, quia pater terrestris quodam modo imaginem gerit Patris caelestis, et filius genitus imaginem gerit patris et ab eo sumit originem; hinc est, quod est alius modus accipiendi pietatem ab illo descendens, qui quidem est benevolentia in parentes. — Postremo, quia omnis homo gerit imaginem Dei; hinc est, quod est tertius et ultimus modus accipiendi pietatem, secundum quod benevolum et beneficum reddit erga omnem hominem insignitum divina imagine. — Licet autem iste sit ultimus et postremus modus accipiendi pietatem, tamen, sicut explanatum est, quantum ad hunc modum pietas-donum accipitur proprie. — Unde in omnibus illis auctoritatibus et rationibus peccatum est quantum ad processum arguendi ex illius nominis multiplicitate; quae, etsi non sit multiplicitas aequivocationis proprie dictae, est tamen multiplicitas cuiusdam analogiae15.

Ad illud vero quod ultimo quaerebatur de differentia ipsius pietatis-doni ad misericordiam et mansuetudinem; dicendum, quod etsi conveniat cum utroque, quia cum mansuetudine convenit in affectu, cum misericordia convenit in effectu; differt tamen ab utroque16. A mititate enim et a mansuetudine differt: quia mansuetudo est contra irritationem ex illatione alicuius iniuriae17; sed pietas est contra indurationem, qua quis non habet affectionem nec benevolentiam ad eos qui gerunt divinae imaginis insigne. — Similiter a misericordia differt: quia misericordia in proximo considerat conformitatem in natura et similitudinem speciei; pietas vero attendit in homine imaginem Dei. Unde aliqui dixerunt, quod misericordia considerat miseriam in imagine, pietas vero considerat imaginem in misero. Differt etiam, quia misericordia conformatur dictamini iuris naturalis et secundum regulam prudentiae; pietas vero conformatur suasioni iuris divini, et hoc secundum regulam doni scientiae. — Ex his patet, quis sit actus doni pietatis, quod etiam eius obiectum, et qualiter differat ab aliis habitibus.

Et secundum haec tria possent tria problemata formari circa donum pietatis et circa quodlibet aliorum donorum praedictorum; simul etiam cum hoc posset de quolibet quaeri, quem actum habeat in patria. Sed hoc supra18 determinatum fuit in generalitate; alia vero tanguntur implicite causa prolixitatis vitandae; tamen ex his quae breviter tacta sunt, qualitercumque haberi potest veritas praedictorum19.

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English Translation
p. 785

Question VI. Whether the principal act of piety consists in religion with respect to God, or in compassion with respect to neighbor.

Sixthly and lastly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of piety itself, and the question is whether the principal act of piety consists in religion with respect to God, or in compassion with respect to neighbor. And that it consists principally in religion with respect to God, is shown:

1. First, by that [word] of the Apostle to Titus, chapter two1: Renouncing impiety, [let us live] soberly and justly and piously etc.; there the Gloss [says]: "Renouncing, that is, fleeing the impiety of vain worship, let us live soberly in regard to ourselves, and justly toward neighbor, and piously toward God": therefore piety is properly ordered with respect to God.

2. Likewise, Augustine2, treating that [text] of Job, chapter twenty-eight: Piety itself is wisdom, but to abstain from evils is understanding: "By piety in this place he set down the worship of God, which in Greek is called theosebia": therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine3: "It belongs to piety to honor holy things and not to contradict sacred Scripture": if therefore both of these consist in the worship of God, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, the sin of iniquity and of impiety are distinguished, because iniquity is against neighbor, impiety is against God4: if therefore piety is a gift with respect to that [object] with respect to which impiety is a vice and sin; it seems that the act of piety-as-gift is principally attended to in the worship of God.

On the contrary: 1. First to Timothy, chapter four5: Piety is profitable to all things; there the Gloss says: "Piety, which works good things for the brethren, avails to merit God; for the whole sum of Christian discipline is in mercy and piety": therefore according to this Gloss piety is ordered with respect to neighbor.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine6 says that the gift of piety corresponds to the beatitude of meekness; "for it is a work of piety to grow meek"; but meekness or gentleness is attended to with respect to neighbor: therefore the gift of piety is ordered to neighbor.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by Gregory7 on Job in the assignment of the gifts, where he says that it belongs to piety to show works of mercy: if therefore this is attended to with respect to neighbor, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, Tully in the first book of the Rhetoric8 says that "piety is benevolence toward parents"; either this is understood of piety-as-gift, or of piety-as-virtue; but of whichever of these it be understood, since they agree in their objects, it seems that the act of the gift of piety is attended to in comparison to neighbor.

5. Likewise, the gift of piety carries out those things to which the gift of knowledge orders9; but the gift of knowledge orders toward conversing well with respect to neighbor: therefore it seems that the act of piety-as-gift is attended to with respect to that [neighbor].

Beside this it is asked how piety is distinguished from gentleness and mercy in its act and object.

Conclusion.

The gift of piety is principally attended to in benevolence with respect to every neighbor, inasmuch as he bears the image of God.

I respond: It must be said that the word "piety" is to be taken in many ways, according as Augustine intimates at the beginning of the tenth book On the City of God10. For he says thus: "Piety is properly wont to be understood as the worship of God, which the Greeks call theosebia; yet it is also said to be had dutifully toward parents; and by the custom of the common people this name is also frequently [used] in works of mercy."

Since therefore piety is so said in many ways, namely toward God and toward parents and toward any man whatsoever; according as it is ordered toward God, it is not a name of a gift, but rather it is the same as latria and theosebia or eusebia, of which Augustine says11 that "it is true wisdom." — But according as it is ordered toward parents, it still does not hold the character of a gift, but rather is a species of justice-as-virtue, for the reason that it is ordered to this according to the rule of natural law and according to the obligation of necessity. — But according as it is attended to with respect to any neighbor whatsoever, in this way piety is a name of a gift.

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Yet piety-as-gift and mercy-as-virtue are attended to toward neighbor in different ways: because mercy-as-virtue regards conformity in nature and need in indigence or misery12; but piety attends in the neighbor to the divine image. Whence by the gift of piety a man is benevolent toward any man whatsoever who has in himself the image of God; in such a way that that benevolence, according to place and time, sometimes advances into the affection of compassion, sometimes into the benefit of a deed.

And thus it is clear what is the act and object of piety-as-gift, since it belongs to it to make a man benevolent with respect to every neighbor, inasmuch as he bears the image of God. And since for this it has [need] to be directed by the gift of knowledge, which indeed is founded upon the principles of faith and directs in conversation according to the exemplar of Christ; hence it is that the act of piety, even though it principally consists toward neighbor, nonetheless consists with respect to sacred Scripture, that it may hear it with benevolence, and also with respect to the passion13 of Christ, that it may recall it to memory with benevolence. Whence the use of the gift of piety is attended to in these three [things] in carrying out, just as the use of the gift of knowledge, which is its directive, [is attended to] in knowing; yet principally, according as it is a gift, it is attended to in benevolence with respect to neighbor, as the reasons show which are adduced for this part.

1. 2. 3. 4. But to that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the Gloss, that piety is ordered to God; and that piety is the worship of God, and to the other authorities that follow; it must be said briefly that all those authorities run concerning piety according to another mode of taking [it], which according to Augustine is the more principal and more proper mode of taking piety, as he himself says in the tenth book On the City of God14. For first and principally a man ought to be benevolent toward God, offering him worship and homage as principal and chief, as to him to whose likeness he was made, and who is the first and principal principle of his creation and condition. — Then indeed, because the earthly father in a certain way bears the image of the heavenly Father, and the begotten son bears the image of the father and takes his origin from him; hence it is that there is another mode of taking piety descending from that [first], which indeed is benevolence toward parents. — Lastly, because every man bears the image of God; hence it is that there is a third and last mode of taking piety, according as it renders [a man] benevolent and beneficent toward every man marked with the divine image. — Now although this is the last and final mode of taking piety, yet, as has been explained, with respect to this mode piety-as-gift is taken properly. — Whence in all those authorities and reasons there is an error as to the process of arguing from the multiplicity of that name; which, even though it is not the multiplicity of equivocation properly so called, is yet a multiplicity of a certain analogy15.

But to that which was lastly asked concerning the difference of piety-as-gift itself from mercy and gentleness; it must be said that although it agrees with both — because with gentleness it agrees in affection, with mercy it agrees in effect — yet it differs from both16. For it differs from mildness and from gentleness: because gentleness is against the irritation [arising] from the infliction of some injury17; but piety is against the hardening by which one does not have affection nor benevolence toward those who bear the mark of the divine image. — Likewise it differs from mercy: because mercy considers in the neighbor conformity in nature and likeness of species; but piety attends in the man to the image of God. Whence some have said that mercy considers misery in the image, but piety considers the image in the miserable [man]. It differs also, because mercy is conformed to the dictate of natural law and according to the rule of prudence; but piety is conformed to the persuasion of divine law, and this according to the rule of the gift of knowledge. — From these things it is clear what is the act of the gift of piety, what also is its object, and how it differs from the other habits.

And according to these three [things] three problems could be formed concerning the gift of piety and concerning any of the other aforesaid gifts; together also with this it could be asked concerning any [of them] what act it has in the fatherland. But this was determined above18 in general; but the others are touched on implicitly for the sake of avoiding prolixity; yet from these things which have been briefly touched on, the truth of the aforesaid can in some way be had19.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 12. Vulgata post impietatem addit et saecularia desideria. — In Glossa, quae a Lyrano ut interlinearis exhibetur, apud Petr. Lombard. post vanae culturae additum est et ignorantiam et desideria saecularium, quae a mundi huius principe suggeruntur. Cfr. Bernard., Serm. 54. de Divers.
    Verse 12. The Vulgate after impietatem adds et saecularia desideria (and worldly desires). — In the Gloss, which is presented by Lyra as interlinear, in Peter Lombard after vanae culturae there is added et ignorantiam et desideria saecularium, quae a mundi huius principe suggeruntur (and ignorance and the desires of worldly things, which are suggested by the prince of this world). Cf. Bernard, Sermon 54 on Diverse [Subjects].
  2. Enchirid. c. 2. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 771, nota 1. Locus script. est Iob 28, 28.
    [Augustine,] Enchiridion c. 2, n. 1. Cf. above p. 771, note 1. The passage [of] Scripture is Job 28:28.
  3. Libr. II. c. 7. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 776, nota 3. et etiam l. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 4. n. 11: Pietas congruit mitibus; qui enim pie quaerit honorat sanctam Scripturam [Glossa ordinaria in Matth. 5, 3: honorat sancta] et non reprehendit, quod nondum intelligit.
    [Augustine, On Christian Doctrine] book II, c. 7, n. 9. Cf. above p. 776, note 3, and also the book On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, c. 4, n. 11: "Piety befits the meek; for he who piously seeks honors holy Scripture [Ordinary Gloss on Matthew 5:3: honors holy things] and does not reproach what he does not yet understand."
  4. Hieronym., I. Dialog. adversus Pelagianos, n. 28: Omnis impius iniquus est et peccator, nec reciprocatur, ut possimus dicere: omnis peccator et iniquus etiam impius est. Impietas enim proprie ad eos pertinet, qui notitiam Dei non habent, vel cognitam transgressione mutarunt. Peccatum autem et iniquitas pro qualibet vitiorum post peccati et iniquitatis vulnera reripit sanitatem. Cfr. Isidor., X. Etymolog. n. 133.
    Jerome, Dialogue against the Pelagians book I, n. 28: "Every impious man is unjust and a sinner, and it is not convertible, that we could say: every sinner and unjust man is also impious. For impiety properly pertains to those who do not have the knowledge of God, or who have changed it, once known, by transgression. But sin and iniquity, for any of the vices, recovers health after the wounds of sin and iniquity." Cf. Isidore, Etymologies book X, n. 133.
  5. Vers. 8. — Glossa habetur ut ordinaria apud Strab. et Lyranum quoad primam eius propositionem, integra autem apud Petr. Lombardum; delibata est ex Comment. Ambrosio tributo, ubi sic legitur: Pietas, cuius opera multorum precibus adiuvatur ad Dominum promerendum... Omnis enim summa disciplinae nostrae in misericordia et pietate est.
    Verse 8. — The Gloss is found as the ordinary [gloss] in Strabo and Lyra as to its first proposition, but entire in Peter Lombard; it is drawn from the Commentary attributed to Ambrose, where it reads thus: "Piety, whose work is aided by the prayers of many toward meriting the Lord... For the whole sum of our discipline is in mercy and piety."
  6. Libr. II. c. 7. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 776, nota 8. Pro pietate edd. cum aliquot codd. contra textum origin. pietatis.
    [Augustine, On Christian Doctrine] book II, c. 7, n. 9. Cf. above p. 776, note 8. For pietate the editions with some codices, against the original text, [read] pietatis.
  7. Libr. I. Moral. c. 32. n. 44, ubi exponens Iob 1, 1. dicit: Pietas illi die convivium exhibet, quia cordis viscera misericordiae operibus replet.
    [Gregory,] Morals book I, c. 32, n. 44, where, expounding Job 1:1, he says: "Piety furnishes him a daily banquet, because it fills the inward parts of the heart with works of mercy."
  8. B. Albert., hic a. 15, distinctius ait: Tullius ante finem primae Rhetoricae; ex qua formula sequitur, duos Ciceronis de Rhetor. libros communi nomine primae Rhetoricae tunc appellatos fuisse, siquidem definitio pietatis, inde petita et hic allata, invenitur circa finem II. Rhetor., in c. 54, ubi sic legitur: Pietas [est], per quam sanguine coniunctis patriaeque benevolis officium et diligens tribuitur cultus. Cfr. ibid. c. 22. — Edd. in prima Rhetoricae. Mox pro aut hoc codd. U V aut ergo hoc.
    Bl. Albert, here a. 15, says more distinctly: "Tully, before the end of the first Rhetoric"; from which formula it follows that the two books of Cicero On Rhetoric were then called by the common name "the first Rhetoric," since indeed the definition of piety, drawn thence and adduced here, is found near the end of Rhetoric II, in c. 54, where it reads thus: "Piety [is] that by which to those joined by blood and to those well-disposed to the fatherland duty and diligent regard is rendered." Cf. ibid. c. 22. — The editions [read] in prima Rhetoricae. Presently for aut hoc codices U V [read] aut ergo hoc.
  9. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia). — Minor iam probata est supra q. 2. — Inferius post respectu illius cod. A addit actus.
    Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way). — The minor [premise] has already been proved above in q. 2. — Below, after respectu illius codex A adds actus.
  10. Cap. 1. n. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 213, nota 9. et pag. 214, nota 5.
    [On the City of God book X,] c. 1, n. 3. Cf. above p. 213, note 9, and p. 214, note 5.
  11. Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 246, nota 4. et etiam XII. de Trin. c. 14. n. 22. — Inferius pro ordinat cod. M ordinatur.
    [Augustine,] On the Trinity book XIV, c. 1, n. 1. Cf. above p. 246, note 4, and also On the Trinity book XII, c. 14, n. 22. — Below, for ordinat codex M [reads] ordinatur.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 1. — Cod. K necessitatem indigentiae sive miseriam.
    Cf. above d. 33, dub. 1. — Codex K [reads] necessitatem indigentiae sive miseriam (the need of indigence or misery).
  13. In plurimis codd. deest passionis [humanitatis?]; subinde pro ut eam codd. I K L aa ut eum. Paulo superius pro erga cod. A circa, et post nihilominus consistit edd. addunt etiam.
    In very many codices passionis [humanitatis?] is lacking; thereupon for ut eam codices I K L aa [read] ut eum. A little above, for erga codex A [reads] circa, and after nihilominus consistit the editions add etiam.
  14. Cap. 1. n. 3. Verba habes hic in principio corp. — Post pauca pro et quod cod. N et qui. Paulo inferius verbis Patris caelestis cod. A praefigit Dei.
    [On the City of God book X,] c. 1, n. 3. The words you have here at the beginning of the body. — After a little, for et quod codex N [reads] et qui. A little below, to the words Patris caelestis codex A prefixes Dei.
  15. Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 31. (c. 4.): Sunt autem aequivocationum aliae multum distantes, aliae autem habentes quandam similitudinem, aliae vero propinquae aut genere aut similitudine rationis. Cfr. supra pag. 232, nota 7.
    Aristotle, Physics book VII, text 31 (c. 4): "Now of equivocations some are very far apart, but others have a certain likeness, and others indeed are near either in genus or in likeness of account." Cf. above p. 232, note 7.
  16. Vat. hic utraque, licet paulo ante exhibeat utroque. Subinde pro enim codd. vero.
    The Vatican [edition] here [reads] utraque, although a little before it presents utroque. Thereupon for enim codices [read] vero.
  17. Aristot., de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 2: Mansuetudo vero est virtus animosae [partis irascibilis], qua qui praediti sunt, difficulter ira concitantur. Cfr. II. Ethic. c. 7.
    Aristotle, On Virtues and Vices, c. 2: "But gentleness is a virtue of the spirited [part, the irascible], by which those who are endowed with it are with difficulty roused to anger." Cf. Ethics book II, c. 7.
  18. Dist. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. — Mox pro in generalitate cod. W in generali, edd. generaliter.
    D. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. — Presently for in generalitate codex W [reads] in generali, the editions generaliter.
  19. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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