Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

← Back to Distinction 23

Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus

p. 487

Articulus II. De fide informi.

Consequenter quaeritur de fide informi, circa quam quaeruntur quinque.

Primo quaeritur de eius genere.

Secundo quaeritur de eius origine.

Tertio quaeritur de eius subiecto.

Quarto quaeritur de eius duratione.

Quinto et ultimo quaeritur de eius informatione.

Quaestio I. Utrum fides informis sit in genere virtutis, an non.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de fide informi quantum ad genus suum, utrum videlicet sit in genere virtutis, an non. Et quod sit in genere virtutis, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicit Augustinus in libro, qui intitulatur ab aliquibus de Vera Innocentia^p487-1: « Cum ceterae virtutes possint bonis et malis esse communes, sola dilectio est propria et specialis

p. 488

virtus piorum atque Sanctorum »; ergo fides virtus est communis bonis et malis; sed in malis non reperitur nisi fides informis: ergo fides informis est virtus.

2. Item, secundum quod vult Philosophus^p488-1, circa difficilia et ardua necessaria est ipsi menti rationali ars et virtus: ergo cum articuli fidei difficiles sint ad credendum, ad hoc quod facile credantur, necessaria est ars, vel virtus; sed fides informis facit, articulos facile credi, sicut patet in multis peccatoribus: ergo fides informis vel est ars, vel virtus; sed non est ars nec scientia: ergo videtur, quod sit virtus.

3. Item, maioris difficultatis est credere articulos fidei, quam continere ab actu libidinis, quoniam illud potest ratio non elevata; hoc autem, scilicet credere, non potest, nisi super se elevetur; sed continere, caritate circumscripta, est actus virtutis: ergo et credere. Sed illud credere est fidei informis: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod directe opponitur vitio et peccato virtus est^p488-2; sed habitus fidei informis directe opponitur ipsi haeresi et infidelitati, quae sunt vitia et peccata, nec potest cum eis stare: ergo necesse est, fidem informem esse virtutem.

5. Item, humilitas, qua quis humiliat se vel affectum suum sub mandatis divinae Maiestatis, habet rationem virtutis: ergo pari ratione et illa humilitas, qua quis se humiliat sub regulis divinae Veritatis, etiam praeter caritatem habet rationem virtutis; sed fides informis est huiusmodi, per quam captivatur intellectus in obsequium Christi^p488-3 ad assentiendum ei in omnibus articulis: ergo fides informis est in genere virtutis.

Sed contra: 1. Iacobi secundo^p488-4: Fides sine operibus mortua est; sed nihil, quod est mortuum, habet in se rationem virtutis: si ergo fides sine gratia et caritate caret operibus fructuosis et sic mortua est, iam ergo non habet rationem virtutis.

2. Item, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habitum est supra in secundo libro, distinctione vigesima septima^p488-5: « Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nemo male utitur »; sed fide informi non recte vivitur, et multi male utuntur: ergo fides informis sub genere virtutis non continetur.

3. Item, omnis virtus aut est cardinalis, aut theologica^p488-6: si ergo fides informis est virtus, aut est cardinalis, aut theologica; sed non est theologica, cum non tendat in Deum, non est cardinalis, cum non sit circa bonum creatum: ergo non est in genere virtutis.

4. Item, quando unus haereticus credit decem articulos et alios discredit, quamvis illi articuli sint supra rationem, tamen fides, qua credit illos, non dicitur virtus esse^p488-7: ergo si eadem fide, qua creduntur decem articuli, possunt etiam omnes credi, videtur, quod fides informis in malis Christianis nullo modo teneat rationem virtutis.

5. Item, cum discipulus credit et assentit magistro in his quae sibi non videntur et sunt supra suum intellectum, quamvis assentiat in his quae sunt supra se, non tamen illa credulitas dicitur esse virtus: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod homo non indigeat aliqua virtute ad hoc, quod ipsi^p488-8 primae Veritati assentiat; sed fides informis nihil aliud facit, nisi quod facit assentire primae Veritati propter se et super omnia: ergo videtur, quod fides informis non sit virtus.

Conclusio

Fides informis est in genere virtutis communiter dictae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod virtus dupliciter consuevit accipi, cum dicimus, aliquem habitum esse virtutem, proprie videlicet et communiter. Proprie namque dicitur virtus recta ratio perducens in finem^p488-9; et hoc modo virtus est principium operis meritorii et dicitur solummodo de habitu gratia informato, sine quo non contingit pervenire ad finem gloriae. Alio modo dicitur virtus communiter habitus rectificans potentiam aliqua rectitudine iustitiae et vigorans eam circa opus difficile, quamvis non perducat eam in finem^p488-10. Et hoc modo accipiendo virtutem, habitus politici informes dicuntur esse virtutes; hoc etiam modo fides informis, quae quidem est in malis Christianis, habet esse in genere virtutis. — Per illum enim habitum quodam modo rectificatur intellectus hominis, dum captivatur in obsequium Christi ad assentiendum primae Veritati propter se et super omnia; vigoratur etiam, ut cre-

p. 489

dat vera non apparentia et vitet erronea et phantastica; sicut apparet in multis Christianis carentibus caritate, qui libenter et humiliter audiunt verba spectantia ad doctrinam fidei et constanter et viriliter abhorrent haereticam pravitatem. Et sic concedi potest, quod fides informis sit in genere virtutis, secundum quod nomen virtutis accipitur large et extenditur ad habitum rectificantem et vigorantem potentiam in his actibus, circa quos consistit via iustitiae^p489-1. — Et quia hoc modo procedunt rationes ad partem primam, ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides sine operibus mortua est; dicendum, quod non dicitur mortua, quia careat^p489-2 omni utilitate et efficacia, sed quia caret vita gratuita, quae est vita perfecta; et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod non sit simpliciter virtus, sed quod non sit virtus proprie dicta.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est bona qualitas mentis etc.; dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi definit virtutem proprie dictam, scilicet virtutem gratuitam; et hoc modo concedendum est, fidem informem non contineri sub virtutis genere. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, nullo modo eam contineri^p489-3, secundum quod virtus large accipitur: immo est ibi locus sophisticus consequentis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus aut est cardinalis, aut theologica; dicendum, quod illa divisio est virtutis formatae, secundum quod proprie accipitur virtus cardinalis et theologica: et sic fides informis non continetur sub genere virtutis. — Posset tamen dici, quod sicut fides^p489-4 habet rationem virtutis incompletae, sic habet rationem virtutis theologicae, quia quodam modo in Deum dirigit, licet semiplene.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de haeretico, qui credit decem articulos; dicendum, quod etsi haereticus habeat aliquam illuminationem respectu illorum articulorum verorum, quos credit, et aliquam habilitatem ad illos credendos; illa tamen habilitas et credulitas non debet dici virtus, quia nec potentiam rectificat nec vigorat: non rectificat potentiam, quia non captivatur intellectus eius plene in obsequium Veritatis summae; non vigorat, quia per illam non respuit falsitatem oppositam veritati. Et haec duo requirebantur ad hoc, quod habitus sortiretur nomen et rationem virtutis. — Non sic autem est de fide informi, quae est in malis Christianis, quia ipsi assentiunt et adhaerent primae Veritati propter se et super omnia, ita quod in illo habitu est rectificatio et vigor, et ex hoc quaedam perfectio^p489-5. Unde sola illa fides informis est in genere virtutis, qua creduntur omnes articuli vel explicite, vel implicite, qua etiam respuuntur omnes errores. Haec enim sola est, quae habet in se quandam perfectionem rectitudinis et vigoris.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de discipulo assentiente magistro, quod non indiget habitu virtutis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia credulitas illa, qua discipulus assentit magistro, ita potest esse via in falsitatem, sicut in veritatem, pro eo quod magister eius potest vera et falsa asserere. Non sic autem est de credulitate, qua quis assentit primae Veritati, quae nullo modo potest esse via nisi in veritatem et rectitudinem. Et propter hoc, quia de se est^p489-6 rectificativa mentis; et credulitas, qua Christianus assentit Deo, est via salutis, ita quod nullo modo de se ordinatur ad oppositum: ideo magis sortitur rationem virtutis quam illa credulitas, qua discipulus assentit magistro, quae quidem potest esse erroris occasio.

Scholion

I. Haec et duae seqq. quaestiones intime cohaerent; conclusiones confirmantur doctrina in Concilio Vatic. (c. 3. de Fide) exposita, ubi dicitur: « Hanc fidem... Ecclesia catholica profitetur virtutem esse supernaturalem ». Et inferius: « Quare fides ipsa in se, etiam si per caritatem non operetur, donum Dei est, et actus eius est opus ad salutem pertinens, quo homo liberam praestat ipsi Deo obedientiam, gratiae eius, cui resistere posset, consentiendo et cooperando ». Et in can. 5. (de Fide) anathemati subiiciuntur qui dicunt: « Ad solam fidem vivam, quae per caritatem operatur, gratiam Dei necessariam esse ». Non nisi in modo loquendi antiqui doctores a recentioribus recedunt, cum passim, Augustini vestigia secuti, per nomen virtutis non nisi virtutem perfectam et aeterna retributione dignam intelligunt; secundum quem sensum cum Magistro aliisque S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 4. a. 5.) dicit: « Fides autem informis non est virtus »; sed simul haec verba ita explicat, sicut S. Bonav. in hac quaestione. Hic autem etiam bene distinguit duplicem effectum huius virtutis, quod scilicet intellectum rectificat respectu Dei per debitam subiectionem, et vigorat tum ad vera non apparentia credenda, tum ad falsitatem apparentem respuendam.

De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 3. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 14. seq. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. 3; S. loc. cit.; de Verit. q. 14. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

II. Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem notandum est id quod in Concilio Arausic. II. (an. 529) can. 5. contra Semipelagianos, initium fidei et pium affectum naturalibus viribus attribuentes, decretum est quoad « initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum », scilicet quod fides, etiam sic considerata, est « per gratiae donum, id est per inspirationem Spiritus sancti corrigentem voluntatem ab infidelitate ad fidem » etc. Eo magis quoad intellectum in ipso formali actu fidei tenendum est, « quod nemo evangelicae praedicationi consentire potest, sicut oportet ad salutem consequendam, absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus sancti » (Vatic. c. 3.). — Non defuerunt Scholastici, praesertim ex schola Scoti, qui illum pium affectum voluntatis voluerunt esse quidem supernaturalem, sed secundum modum, non secundum substantiam, quod communius non approbatur, nec principiis S. Bonaventurae est conforme. — Notanda est hic duplex distinctio inter obiectum materiale fidei et formale, inter fidem simpliciter acquisitam virtutisque expertem et infusam. Idem docet S. Thomas. — Quoad solutionem ad 1. cfr. infra d. 24. dub. 2.

De eadem 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 6. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. ad 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 2.

III. In responsione ad 3. quaestionem communiter docetur, in daemonibus esse fidem informem in sensu largiore, ita ut includat intellectus assensum ad non apparentia, per evidentiam probationis extortum. Ad rem non inepte Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. m. 7. ad 2.) distinguit sentire veritatem, assentire veritati, consentire veritati et subiungit: « Fides daemonis in suo credere habet sentire, sed non assentire, vel consentire; fides informis habet sentire et assentire; fides vero formata habet sentire, assentire et consentire » etc.

De eadem 3. quaestione praeter Alexandrum: S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. II. II. q. 5. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

English Translation

Article II. On unformed faith.

Consequently, inquiry is made concerning unformed faith, about which five things are asked.

First, inquiry is made concerning its genus.

Second, inquiry is made concerning its origin.

Third, inquiry is made concerning its subject.

Fourth, inquiry is made concerning its duration.

Fifth and last, inquiry is made concerning its taking-of-form.

Question I. Whether unformed faith is in the genus of virtue, or not.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and inquiry is made concerning unformed faith as regards its genus, namely whether it is in the genus of virtue, or not. And that it is in the genus of virtue seems so:

1. First, from what Augustine says in the book which is entitled by some On True Innocence^p487-1: "Whereas the other virtues can be common to the good and the wicked, love alone is the proper and special

virtue of the godly and of the Saints"; therefore faith is a virtue common to the good and the wicked; but in the wicked nothing is found except unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is a virtue.

2. Likewise, according to what the Philosopher holds^p488-1, for things difficult and arduous art and virtue are necessary to the rational mind itself: therefore, since the articles of faith are difficult to believe, that they may be believed easily, art or virtue is necessary; but unformed faith makes the articles to be believed easily, as is evident in many sinners: therefore unformed faith is either art or virtue; but it is not art nor science: therefore it seems that it is a virtue.

3. Likewise, it is of greater difficulty to believe the articles of faith than to refrain from the act of lust, since the latter unraised reason can do; but the former, namely to believe, it cannot do unless it be raised above itself; but to refrain, charity being set aside, is an act of virtue: therefore also to believe. But that believing belongs to unformed faith: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that which is directly opposed to vice and sin is a virtue^p488-2; but the habit of unformed faith is directly opposed to heresy and unbelief themselves, which are vices and sins, nor can it stand together with them: therefore it is necessary that unformed faith be a virtue.

5. Likewise, the humility by which one humbles himself or his affection under the commands of the divine Majesty has the character of a virtue: therefore by like reasoning that humility too, by which one humbles himself under the rules of the divine Truth, even apart from charity has the character of a virtue; but unformed faith is of this sort, by which the intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ^p488-3 so as to assent to him in all the articles: therefore unformed faith is in the genus of virtue.

On the contrary: 1. James, chapter two^p488-4: Faith without works is dead; but nothing that is dead has in itself the character of a virtue: if therefore faith without grace and charity lacks fruitful works and is thus dead, then it no longer has the character of a virtue.

2. Likewise, as Augustine says, and as was treated above in the second book, distinction twenty-seven^p488-5: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses ill"; but by unformed faith one does not live rightly, and many use it ill: therefore unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue.

3. Likewise, every virtue is either cardinal or theological^p488-6: if therefore unformed faith is a virtue, it is either cardinal or theological; but it is not theological, since it does not tend toward God, nor is it cardinal, since it is not concerned with a created good: therefore it is not in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, when one heretic believes ten articles and disbelieves others, although those articles are above reason, nevertheless the faith by which he believes them is not said to be a virtue^p488-7: therefore if by the same faith by which ten articles are believed all can also be believed, it seems that unformed faith in wicked Christians in no way holds the character of a virtue.

5. Likewise, when a disciple believes and assents to a master in those things which are not seen by him and are above his understanding, although he assents in things which are above himself, nevertheless that believing is not said to be a virtue: therefore by like reasoning it seems that a man does not need any virtue for assenting to^p488-8 the first Truth itself; but unformed faith does nothing other than make one assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things: therefore it seems that unformed faith is not a virtue.

Conclusion

Unformed faith is in the genus of virtue commonly so called.

I respond: It must be said that virtue is wont to be taken in two ways, when we say that some habit is a virtue, namely properly and commonly. For properly virtue is called a right reason leading to the end^p488-9; and in this way virtue is the principle of a meritorious work and is said only of a habit informed by grace, without which one cannot attain to the end of glory. In another way virtue is called commonly a habit rectifying a power by some rectitude of justice and strengthening it about a difficult work, although it does not lead it to the end^p488-10. And taking virtue in this way, unformed political habits are said to be virtues; in this way too unformed faith, which indeed is in wicked Christians, has its being in the genus of virtue. — For through that habit the intellect of man is in a certain way rectified, while it is taken captive into the obedience of Christ so as to assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things; it is also strengthened, that it may be-

lieve true things not apparent and shun things erroneous and fantastic; as appears in many Christians lacking charity, who willingly and humbly hear the words pertaining to the doctrine of faith and steadfastly and manfully abhor heretical depravity. And thus it can be granted that unformed faith is in the genus of virtue, insofar as the name of virtue is taken broadly and is extended to a habit rectifying and strengthening a power in those acts about which the way of justice consists^p489-1. — And since the arguments for the first part proceed in this way, they are therefore to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that faith without works is dead; it must be said that it is not called dead because it lacks^p489-2 all usefulness and efficacy, but because it lacks the gratuitous life, which is the perfect life; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that it is not a virtue simply, but that it is not a virtue properly so called.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue is a good quality of the mind etc.; it must be said that Augustine there defines virtue properly so called, namely gratuitous virtue; and in this way it is to be granted that unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue. From this, however, it does not follow that it is in no way contained^p489-3, insofar as virtue is taken broadly: rather there is here the sophism of the consequent.

3. To that which is objected, that every virtue is either cardinal or theological; it must be said that that division is of formed virtue, insofar as cardinal and theological virtue is taken properly: and thus unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue. — Yet it could be said that, just as faith^p489-4 has the character of an incomplete virtue, so it has the character of a theological virtue, since in a certain way it directs toward God, though only half-fully.

4. To that which is objected concerning the heretic who believes ten articles; it must be said that even if the heretic has some illumination with respect to those true articles which he believes, and some aptitude for believing them; nevertheless that aptitude and believing ought not to be called a virtue, because it neither rectifies the power nor strengthens it: it does not rectify the power, because his intellect is not taken captive fully into the obedience of the highest Truth; it does not strengthen, because through it he does not reject the falsehood opposed to truth. And these two things were required for a habit to obtain the name and character of a virtue. — But it is not so with unformed faith, which is in wicked Christians, because they assent and adhere to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things, so that in that habit there is rectification and strength, and from this a certain perfection^p489-5. Hence that unformed faith alone is in the genus of virtue, by which all the articles are believed either explicitly or implicitly, by which also all errors are rejected. For this alone is that which has in itself a certain perfection of rectitude and strength.

5. To that which is objected concerning the disciple assenting to a master, that he does not need a habit of virtue; it must be said that it is not similar, because that believing by which a disciple assents to a master can be a way into falsehood just as into truth, for the reason that his master can assert both true and false things. But it is not so with the believing by which one assents to the first Truth, which can in no way be a way except into truth and rectitude. And on account of this, because in itself it is^p489-6 rectifying of the mind; and the believing by which a Christian assents to God is the way of salvation, so that in no way is it of itself ordered to the opposite: therefore it obtains the character of a virtue more than that believing by which a disciple assents to a master, which indeed can be an occasion of error.

Scholion

I. This and the two following questions cohere intimately; the conclusions are confirmed by the doctrine set forth in the Vatican Council (c. 3. On Faith), where it is said: "This faith... the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue." And below: "Wherefore faith itself in itself, even if it does not work through charity, is a gift of God, and its act is a work pertaining to salvation, by which a man renders to God himself a free obedience, by consenting and cooperating with his grace, which he could resist." And in canon 5 (On Faith) those are subjected to anathema who say: "That for faith alive alone, which works through charity, the grace of God is necessary." The ancient doctors depart from the more recent only in their manner of speaking, since, following everywhere the footsteps of Augustine, by the name of virtue they understand only a perfect virtue and one worthy of eternal reward; according to which sense, with the Master and others, St. Thomas (S. II. II. q. 4. a. 5.) says: "But unformed faith is not a virtue"; yet he at the same time explains these words just as St. Bonaventure does in this question. And here too he well distinguishes the twofold effect of this virtue, namely that it rectifies the intellect with respect to God by due subjection, and strengthens it both for believing true things not apparent and for rejecting apparent falsehood.

On this first question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 64. m. 3. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 14 ff. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. 3; S. loc. cit.; On Truth q. 14. a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. 2.

II. As regards the following (2.) question, it must be noted what was decreed in the Council of Orange II (a.D. 529) canon 5, against the Semipelagians who attributed the beginning of faith and the pious affect to natural powers, concerning "the beginning of faith and the very affect of believing," namely that faith, even thus considered, is "through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting the will from unbelief to faith" etc. So much the more, as regards the intellect in the formal act of faith itself, must it be held "that no one can consent to the evangelical preaching, as is required for attaining salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit" (Vatican c. 3.). — Nor were there lacking Scholastics, especially from the school of Scotus, who wished that pious affect of the will to be indeed supernatural, but according to mode, not according to substance, which is more commonly not approved, nor is it conformable to the principles of St. Bonaventure. — There is to be noted here a twofold distinction between the material object of faith and the formal, between faith simply acquired and devoid of virtue and infused faith. St. Thomas teaches the same. — As regards the solution to 1, cf. below d. 24. dub. 2.

On the same second question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 6. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. ad 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 7. q. 2.

III. In the response to the third question it is commonly taught that there is in the demons an unformed faith in the broader sense, such that it includes the intellect's assent to things not apparent, extorted by the evidence of proof. To the point Alex. of Hales (loc. cit. m. 7. ad 2.) not unfittingly distinguishes to perceive the truth, to assent to the truth, to consent to the truth, and adds: "The faith of the demon in its believing has perceiving, but not assenting or consenting; unformed faith has perceiving and assenting; but formed faith has perceiving, assenting, and consenting" etc.

On the same third question, besides Alexander: St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. II. II. q. 5. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 6. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

Apparatus Criticus

Ab aliis: Prosperi Aquil. sententiae ex Augusti delibatae (quarum prima incipit: Innocentia vera est etc.). Sententia hic allata est n. 7. estque formata ex dict. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 103. serm. I. n. 9. In textu origin. pro sola dilectio habetur dilectio Dei et proximi.
By others: Prosper of Aquitaine, Sentences gleaned from Augustine (of which the first begins: True innocence is etc.). The sentence cited here is n. 7, and is formed from the saying of Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 103, sermon I, n. 9. In the original text, for love alone there is found the love of God and of neighbor.
Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3: Praeterea voluptati repugnare difficilius est quam irae, ut Heraclitus inquit; at circa id quod difficilius est, semper et ars et virtus versatur etc. — Infra codd. A K bis faciliter pro facile.
Bk. II Ethics c. 3: "Moreover it is more difficult to resist pleasure than anger, as Heraclitus says; but art and virtue are always concerned with that which is more difficult" etc. — Below, codd. A K twice have faciliter for facile.
Vide Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 16. (IX. c. 4.) et VII. Ethic. c. 1.
See Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 16 (IX, c. 4) and Ethics VII, c. 1.
Epist. II. Cor. 10, 3.
Epistle II Cor. 10:3.
Vers. 26. — Minor illustratur illis verbis August., Enarrat. in Ps. 57. n. 20: Quare autem non dixit viventes, sed tanquam viventes, nisi quia falsa est haec vita impiorum? Neque enim vivunt, sed vivere sibi videntur. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 213, nota 5.
Verse 26. — The minor is illustrated by those words of Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 57, n. 20: "But why did he not say 'living,' but 'as if living,' except because this life of the wicked is false? For neither do they live, but they seem to themselves to live." Cf. also above p. 213, note 5.
In lit. Magistri, c. 5, et in Comment. dub. 3.
In the text of the Master, c. 5, and in the Commentary dub. 3.
Vide infra d. 33. q. 1.
See below d. 33. q. 1.
Siquidem haereticus infidelis est i. e. virtute fidei privatus. — Paulo ante post decem articulos edd. subdunt fidei.
Since indeed the heretic is an unbeliever, i.e. deprived of the virtue of faith. — A little before, after ten articles the editions add of faith.
Edd. ipse.
The editions read ipse ["he himself"].
August., I. Soliloq. c. 6. n. 13: Haec est vere perfecta virtus: ratio perveniens ad finem suum, quam beata vita consequitur. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — Paulo inferius post pervenire cod. U interiicit aliquem.
Augustine, I Soliloquies c. 6. n. 13: "This is truly perfect virtue: reason arriving at its end, which the blessed life follows." Cf. II Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — A little below, after pervenire cod. U inserts aliquem.
Praeter verba Aristot., paulo superius nota 1 allata, cfr. etiam pag. 388, nota 2. De habitibus politicis vide infra d. 33. dub. 5. — Paulo superius post potentiam cod. F addit vel animam. Pro potentiam aliqua rectitudine cod. V potentiam aliquam ratione.
Besides the words of Aristotle cited a little above in note 1, cf. also p. 388, note 2. On political habits see below d. 33. dub. 5. — A little above, after potentiam cod. F adds vel animam. For potentiam aliqua rectitudine cod. V reads potentiam aliquam ratione.
Cfr. infra d. 33. dub. 1.
Cf. below d. 33. dub. 1.
Codd. A L U V aa bb caret. Subinde pro utilitate cod. A virtute, et pro quae est codd. A K id est.
Codd. A L U V aa bb read caret. Then for utilitate cod. A has virtute, and for quae est codd. A K id est.
Edd. supplent sub virtutis genere. — De sophismate consequentis vide supra pag. 92, nota 2.
The editions supply under the genus of virtue. — On the sophism of the consequent see above p. 92, note 2.
Edd. cum nonnullis codd. clarius fides informis. Inferius incompletae scribi posset etiam incomplete.
The editions, with some codices, more clearly read unformed faith. Below, incompletae could also be written incomplete.
Virtus enim, secundum Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 17. (c. 3.), est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — Pro perfectio cod. K rectitudo.
For virtue, according to Aristotle, Physics VII, text 17 (c. 3), is a disposition of the perfected toward the best. Cf. II Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — For perfectio cod. K reads rectitudo.
Edd. 1. 2 de se non est, quam falsam lectionem Vat., absque tamen auctoritate codd., correxit, post quia addendo: credulitas illa, qua discipulus assentit magistro. Pro quia codd. A U quod. Mox pro Christianus cod. A quis.
Editions 1 and 2 read de se non est, which false reading the Vatican edition, yet without the authority of the codices, corrected by adding after quia: that believing, by which a disciple assents to a master. For quia codd. A U read quod. Soon after, for Christianus cod. A reads quis.

← Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 5 Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 2→