Bonaventure

ARTICULUS I. De comparatione donorum ad virtutes.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum dona et virtutes inter se differant.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum dona et virtutes ad invicem differant. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Gregorii in Moralibus¹ super illud Iob primo: Nati sunt ei septem filii et tres filiae; dicit, quod «per filios intelliguntur dona, per filias intelliguntur virtutes»; igitur virtutes ponunt in numerum cum donis: ergo habent ab eis diversificari.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione sic: quaecumque habent alias et alias differentias dividentes, necesse est, ipsa ad invicem differre²; sed divisio virtutum alia est quam divisio donorum, et per alias differentias — virtutes enim dividuntur per theologicas et cardinales, quod nequaquam est circa dona reperire — ergo necesse est, habitus donorum ab habitibus virtutum differre.

3. Item, sicut se habet intellectus ad fidem, sic se habent alia dona ad alias virtutes; sed donum intellectus differt a virtute fidei, quia credere est assentire sine ratione³, intelligere vero cum ratione; constat autem, quod alius habitus est, qui est sine ratione, et qui est per rationem: si ergo intellectus dividitur a virtute fidei, videtur, quod alii donorum habitus differant ab ipsis virtutibus.

4. Item, habitus timoris nullo modo potest esse in genere virtutis — timor enim Domini non potest esse virtus cardinalis, nec theologica, cum illae sint tantum tres secundum sententiam Apostoli⁴ — et tamen timor est donum: ergo aliquod donum non est virtus. Sed qua ratione primum donum distinguitur a virtute, eadem ratione et dona sequentia: ergo videtur, quod inter dona et virtutes sit essentialis differentia.

Contra hoc arguitur: 1. Primo auctoritate. Super illud Iob primo⁵: Nati sunt ei septem filii; ibi Gregorius: «Cum Spiritus sanctus mentem fecundat, nascuntur in ea septem virtutes, scilicet sapientia et intellectus, consilium, fortitudo» etc.: ergo secundum Gregorium dona sunt virtutes. — Rursus, super illud Iacobi primo⁶: Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum etc.; Glossa: «Datum optimum quoad naturalia, donum perfectum quoad gratuita»; sed virtutes sunt gratuitae: ergo virtutes sunt dona. Ex prima ergo auctoritate habetur, quod dona sunt virtutes; ex sequenti, quod virtutes

sunt dona: cum ergo illa quae de se mutuo praedicantur, sint eadem, non diversa; videtur, quod virtutes et dona non habeant differentiam.

2. Item, hoc videtur per definitionem doni et virtutis: quia «donum, secundum quod vult Philosophus⁷, est datio irreddibilis»; «virtus autem, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nemo male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur»; sed utraque istarum definitionum convenit cuilibet dono et cuilibet virtuti; «quorum autem definitiones sunt eaedem, et ipsa sunt eadem»: ergo videtur, quod virtutes et dona habeant identitatem omnimodam.

3. Item, eodem vitio male operamur et sumus expediti ad male operandum: cum ergo virtus sit potentior vitio⁸, idem est habitus et eadem est virtus, per quam in operibus rectificamur et expedimur. Cum igitur virtutes sint ad rectificandum, et dona ad expediendum; videtur, quod non sit aliqua diversitas donorum et virtutum.

4. Item, ab eadem virtute per essentiam est currere et expedite currere: cum ergo virtus gratuita sit potentior quam virtus naturalis⁹, videtur multo fortius, quod eodem habitu anima rectificetur et expediatur. Sed primum est per virtutes, secundum per dona: ergo etc.

5. Item, per habitus virtutum sufficienter anima perficitur et ordinatur ad omne bonum — ordinatur enim homo per virtutes ad Deum et ad proximum et ad se ipsum, et hoc secundum omnem vim animae, sicut in praecedentibus¹⁰ fuit ostensum — videtur ergo, quod aut dona sint virtutes, aut, habitis virtutibus, dona superfluant; quodsi non superfluunt: ergo ad invicem non differunt.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de differentia virtutum, donorum, beatitudinum et fructuum, quomodo differant ad invicem secundum rem; et quare etiam sic nominentur.

CONCLUSIO.

Dona et virtutes differunt ad invicem secundum rem, et etiam secundum modum nominandi recte distinguuntur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod inter virtutes et dona assignatur communiter differentia. Omnes enim communiter dicunt, quod aliquo modo differant dona a virtutibus; et hoc indicant differentiae diversae, in quas habent dividi habitus virtutis et doni. — In modo autem assignandi differentiam diversificati sunt doctores. Cum enim huiusmodi habitus quadruplicem habeant comparationem, inveniuntur assignari differentiae donorum et virtutum secundum viam quadrimembrem¹¹. Habent enim comparari huiusmodi habitus ad propria subiecta et ad sua opposita et ad fines proximos et ad actus proprios.

Secundum primam comparationem tentaverunt aliqui assignare differentiam sic dicentes, quod cum liberum arbitrium sit principium meriti, omnes habitus, secundum quos meremur, sunt in libero arbitrio collocandi. Sed cum liberum arbitrium sit facultas rationis et voluntatis¹², habet perfici habitibus duplicis generis: habitibus, inquam, virtutum perficitur, in quantum est facultas voluntatis; habitibus vero donorum, in quantum est facultas rationis. Et quod illud sit verum, nituntur persuadere per ipsam donorum differentiam, quae pro magna parte respiciunt actum cognoscendi; species vero virtutum e contrario magis ad affectum habent referri.

Secundus autem modus assignandi differentiam attenditur per comparationem istorum habituum ad sua opposita. Habitus enim virtutis et doni opponuntur ipsis vitiis et defectibus per peccatum introductis. Peccatum autem duo mala facit: primum est, quod tollit rectitudinem iustitiae; secundum est, quod debilitat vigorem naturae et eam dicitur vulnerare¹³. Unde sicut in morbo duo sunt, videlicet ipsa humorum inaequalitas et symptomata quaedam sive sequelae ipsius morbi; sic intelligendum est in morbo spirituali. Cum ergo duo sint in ipso morbo spirituali, videlicet ipse morbus inordinans et symptoma concomitans, ipsa culpa et eius sequela, ipsum telum et vulnus ex telo derelictum; habitus virtutum sunt contra ipsos morbos peccatorum, sed dona sunt contra sequelas ipsorum, ita quod per virtutes expelluntur tela, et per dona expelluntur vulnera sive symptomata derelicta. — Et hic modus dicendi confirmatur per Gregorium in Moralibus¹⁴, ubi assignat opposita donorum dicens, quod «contra stultitiam est sapientia, contra hebetudinem intellectus, contra praecipitationem est consilium, contra pusillanimitatem fortitudo», et sic de aliis consequentibus. Haec

autem non sunt peccata, sed magis symptomata quaedam ex peccatis derelicta. Et quoniam, sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁵, «aliud est extrahere telum, aliud sanare vulnus»; hinc est, quod habitus virtutum et donorum ab invicem differunt ratione eorum, contra quae sunt.

Tertius autem modus assignandi differentiam attenditur per comparationem ad fines proximos. Habitus enim gratuiti nobis dantur, ut conformemur Christo; Christus autem omnimodam perfectionem habuit et in agendo et in patiendo: et ideo sunt aliqui habitus nobis dati, quibus conformamur Christo in agendo; et hi sunt habitus virtutum, qui sunt ad recte operandum et ad hoc finaliter ordinantur, ut per illos habitus sic ordinantes ad rectam operationem in agendis conformemur Christo. — Sunt etiam¹⁶ et alii habitus dati nobis, ut conformemur ei in patiendo; et huiusmodi habitus sunt dona, per quae Christus erat dispositus ad sustinendam rectissime passionem ad gloriam Dei et nostram utilitatem; et per habitus huiusmodi donorum debemus sibi conformari in patiendo.

Quartus autem modus assignandi differentiam attenditur penes comparationem ad actus proprios. Sunt enim quidam actus primi, et quidam medii, et quidam ultimi sive perfecti; sicut verbi gratia possumus videre in actu cognoscendi, quod primus est credere, secundus intelligere, tertius vero mundo corde videre¹⁷. Et secundum istam trifariam differentiam actus sunt in nobis tres differentiae habituum gratuitorum, videlicet virtutum, donorum et beatitudinum; ita quod virtutes sunt ad actus primos, ut patet, quia fides est ad credendum; dona ad actus medios, quia, secundum quod patet, donum intellectus est ad intelligendum; beatitudines vero ad actus ultimos, ut patet, quia munditia cordis est ad Deum videndum. Et quoniam in primis actibus potentiae rectificantur, in secundis expediuntur et in tertiis et ultimis perficiuntur¹⁸; hinc est, quod habitus virtutum sunt ad agendum recte, habitus donorum ad agendum expedite, habitus beatitudinum ad agendum sive patiendum perfecte.

Postquam autem illi habitus sunt in anima, est consequenter in ea status quidam quietationis et delectationis. In hac autem delectatione duo concurrunt, videlicet quaedam spiritualis refectio et ipsius refectionis spiritualis perceptio. Ideo ad ista tria genera habituum adduntur fructus¹⁹ et spirituales sensus, qui non dicunt novos habitus, sed habituum praecedentium exprimunt perfectum statum et usum. — Rursus, quoniam ad haec omnia habenda per nos non sufficimus, data sunt nobis adminicula Sacramentorum, in quibus secundum diversitatem suorum effectuum gratia datur ad inchoationem, profectum et consummationem omnium habituum praedictorum, licet illa gratia principaliter habeat respectum ad morbum curandum.

Sic igitur patet, quod quadruplex est modus assignandi differentiam inter virtutes et dona. — Verumtamen primus modus non est per propria, immo magis per appropriata. Per propria, inquam, non est, quia si quis velit dicere, quod omnia dona sunt in ratione, et omnes virtutes in voluntate; manifestam habet instantiam in donis quantum ad timorem, fortitudinem et pietatem, quae sunt a parte affectus, in virtutibus quantum ad fidem et prudentiam, quae sunt ex parte intellectus²⁰. Ideo illa differentia aut falsa est, aut nulla, aut est per appropriationem quandam, in hoc videlicet, quod plura dona sunt ex parte rationis quam voluntatis; econtra vero est in virtutibus.

Secundus vero modus assignandi differentiam per comparationem ad opposita abundat a primo, quia revera est per propria. In hoc tamen deficit, quia non est per priora, sed magis per posteriora. Cum enim habitus donorum et virtutum opponantur vitiis, sicut habitus ad privationes, et habitus naturaliter prius sit quam privatio²¹: non distinguuntur habitus secundum privationes, sed magis e converso secundum rem et naturam; possunt tamen distingui secundum cognitionem nostram imperfectam, quae ut frequenter est per posteriora.

Tertius autem modus assignandi differentiam abundat a primo et secundo, quia est per propria et per priora; in hoc tamen deficit, quod non est illa differentia secundum omnem statum, quia nec secundum statum naturae institutae nec secundum statum gloriae, in quibus fuerunt et erunt dona et virtutes²²; et tamen nec ordinabantur nec ordinabuntur ad patiendum. Nihilominus tamen illa differentia recte assignatur secundum statum, in quo nunc sumus.

Quartus autem modus assignandi differentiam per comparationem ad actus est verus et proprius et abundat ab omnibus praedictis, quia est per propria et per priora secundum rationem cognoscendi, et per ea quae omni statui sunt communia. In omni enim statu competit homini, ut operetur recte et expedite et perfecte. Et quod iste modus assignandi differentiam sit recte sumtus, satis manifestatur, quia secundum quod praetactum est, non solummodo secundum istam viam assignatur differentia donorum ad virtutes, sed etiam apparet differentia omnium eorum, quae computantur inter munera gratiae, videlicet virtutum et donorum, beatitudinum, fructuum, sensuum spiritualium et Sacramentorum. Nam primae tres differentiae nominant habitus, duae vero sequentes nominant status et usus, sexta vero differentia nominat praedictorum adminicula et adiumenta²³.

Ex his patet non solummodo differentia praedictorum secundum rem, sed etiam secundum nominandi rationem. Nam habitus rectificantes recte dicuntur virtutes, pro eo quod virtus de ratione sui nominis dicit, quod ad agendum erigit et vigorat²⁴. Habitus vero expedientes recte dicuntur dona, pro eo quod dicunt quandam ulteriorem abundantiam bonitatis ad agendum, ac per hoc magis attestantur divinae liberalitati; et propter hoc recte censentur nomine doni. — Habitus vero perficientes recte dicuntur beatitudines, pro eo quod tales habitus faciunt hominem proximum Deo et conformem ipsi gloriae summae et beatitudini, in qua est reperire summam perfectionem. — Status autem, in quo est refectio, recte dicitur fructus; fructus enim a frui dictum est²⁵. — Usus vero, secundum quem illa perceptio suscipitur, recte dicitur sensus spiritualis; quoniam sensus est cognoscere rem ut praesentem²⁶. — Postremo, adminicula omnium istorum, in quibus datur gratia animam sanctificans et a peccatis curans et ad omnem sanctitatis perfectionem adiuvans, rectissime dicuntur Sacramenta. — Patet igitur ex praedictis, quod inter virtutes et dona est differentia. Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritates Sanctorum, quod dona sunt virtutes, et virtutes sunt dona; dicendum, quod contingit, nomina extendi et proprie accipi; et nos loquimur hic de virtutibus, secundum quod proprie accipiuntur et dividuntur per tres theologicas et

cardinales quatuor, et de donis, secundum quod dividuntur per septem differentias, quas assignat Isaias²⁷. Auctoritates vero Glossarum et Sanctorum loquuntur de dono, secundum quod nomen doni ampliatur et large accipitur, et similiter de virtutibus, ut virtus dicatur omnis habitus, qui expedit ad bonum, donum vero omne quod divinitus gratis datur. Et sic concedi potest, quod idem sit virtus et donum; hoc autem modo non quaerimus de differentia donorum et virtutum, quia de re quaerimus, non de nomine.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de convenientia definitionum doni et virtutis, dicendum, quod illae notificationes²⁸ large datae sunt secundum generalem rationem illorum nominum. Attamen in definitione virtutis potest fieri vis in hoc quod dicitur: «qua recte vivitur». Nam sicut prius tactum est, in hoc differt a donis, quia habitus illi sunt ad rectificandum, habitus vero donorum ad expediendum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per idem peccatum obliquamur et sumus proni ad peccatum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia facilius est male facere et declinare a bono, quam bene facere et in bonum expediri²⁹; sicut facilius est aliquem vulnerare quam vulneratum sanare; et ideo plures habitus sunt necessarii ad perfecte sanandum et reparandum quam ad deordinandum.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eiusdem virtutis naturalis est currere et expedite currere; dicendum, quod verum est, loquendo de potentia prima; verumtamen facilitas superaddita potentiae primae non est eadem cum ipsa, sicut patet de naturali potentia et impotentia, quae dicuntur dispositiones et qualitates superadditae supra radicem potentiae naturalis³⁰. Praeterea, non est simile, quia multo difficilius est rectificari et expediri et habilitari in his operibus, quae sunt supra naturam, quam in his quae subiacent potentiae naturali.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus virtutum sufficienter ordinant animam ad Deum secundum omnem eius comparationem; dicendum, quod licet ordinent sufficienter quantum ad ea quae sunt rectitudinis et necessitatis, utpote quantum ad illos actus primos, in quibus primaria rectitudo consistit; tamen ultra hoc liberalitas benignitatis divinae³¹ providit homini et contulit habitus, per quos expediretur non solum ad opera necessaria rectitudinis, sed etiam perfectionis et supererogationis. Unde si obiiciat, quod idem est habilitare potentiam et eam expedire, et ita quod eadem sit virtus, quae facit rectum et expeditum; dicendum, quod illud est verum respectu operis eiusdem generis; sed respectu operis alterius et alterius gradus et rationis non habet veritatem. Magis autem dicuntur dona expedire quam virtutes, quia, etsi virtutes expediant ad actus proprios, adhuc tamen remanent symptomata, per quae homo impeditur in bene agendo et ratione quorum adhuc ineptus est ad opera maioris excellentiae, nisi ad haec iuvaretur per habitus donorum.

Ad illud vero quod ultimo quaerebatur, iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.

Article I. On the comparison of the gifts to the virtues.

Question I. Whether the gifts and the virtues differ among themselves.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the gifts and the virtues differ from one another. And that they do, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Gregory in the Morals¹ on that text of Job, chapter one: There were born to him seven sons and three daughters; he says that «by the sons are understood the gifts, by the daughters are understood the virtues»; therefore the virtues are placed in number with the gifts: therefore they must be distinguished from them.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by reason thus: whatever things have differing dividing differences must necessarily differ from one another²; but the division of the virtues is other than the division of the gifts, and through other differences — for the virtues are divided into theological and cardinal, which is nowise to be found among the gifts — therefore the habits of the gifts must necessarily differ from the habits of the virtues.

3. Likewise, as the intellect stands to faith, so do the other gifts stand to the other virtues; but the gift of intellect differs from the virtue of faith, since to believe is to assent without reasoning³, but to understand is with reasoning; and it is established that a habit which is without reasoning, and one which is through reasoning, are different: if therefore intellect is divided from the virtue of faith, it seems that the other habits of the gifts differ from the virtues themselves.

4. Likewise, the habit of fear can in no way be in the genus of virtue — for the fear of the Lord cannot be a cardinal virtue, nor a theological one, since those are only three according to the judgment of the Apostle⁴ — and yet fear is a gift: therefore some gift is not a virtue. But by the same reasoning whereby the first gift is distinguished from a virtue, by the same reasoning also the gifts that follow: therefore it seems that between the gifts and the virtues there is an essential difference.

On the contrary, it is argued thus: 1. First, by authority. On that text of Job, chapter one⁵: There were born to him seven sons; there Gregory says: «When the Holy Spirit makes the mind fruitful, there are born in it seven virtues, namely wisdom and understanding, counsel, fortitude» etc.: therefore according to Gregory the gifts are virtues. — Again, on that text of James, chapter one⁶: Every best gift and every perfect gift etc.; the Gloss: «The best gift as to natural things, the perfect gift as to gratuitous things»; but the virtues are gratuitous: therefore the virtues are gifts. From the first authority, then, it is had that the gifts are virtues; from the second, that the virtues

are gifts: since therefore those things which are mutually predicated of one another are the same, not diverse; it seems that the virtues and the gifts have no difference.

2. Likewise, this is seen through the definition of gift and of virtue: for «a gift, according to what the Philosopher holds⁷, is a giving that is not to be returned»; «but a virtue, according to what Augustine says, is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses ill, which God works in us without us»; but each of these definitions fits any gift and any virtue; «and things whose definitions are the same are themselves the same»: therefore it seems that the virtues and the gifts have an altogether complete identity.

3. Likewise, by the same vice we act ill and are made apt for acting ill: since therefore virtue is more powerful than vice⁸, the habit is the same and the virtue is the same by which in our works we are set right and made apt. Since therefore the virtues are for setting right, and the gifts for making apt; it seems that there is no diversity of gifts and virtues.

4. Likewise, it belongs to the same virtue by essence to run and to run readily: since therefore a gratuitous virtue is more powerful than a natural virtue⁹, it seems far more that by the same habit the soul is set right and made apt. But the first is through the virtues, the second through the gifts: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, through the habits of the virtues the soul is sufficiently perfected and ordered to every good — for a man is ordered through the virtues to God and to neighbor and to himself, and this according to every power of the soul, as was shown in the foregoing¹⁰ — it seems therefore that either the gifts are virtues, or else, the virtues being had, the gifts are superfluous; but if they are not superfluous, then they do not differ from one another.

Along with this it is asked concerning the difference of the virtues, the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits, in what way they differ from one another in reality; and also why they are so named.

Conclusion

The gifts and the virtues differ from one another in reality, and they are also rightly distinguished according to the manner of naming.

I respond: It must be said that between the virtues and the gifts a difference is commonly assigned. For all commonly say that the gifts differ in some way from the virtues; and this is shown by the diverse differences into which the habits of virtue and of gift are divided. — But in the manner of assigning the difference the doctors have varied. For since habits of this kind have a fourfold comparison, the differences of the gifts and the virtues are found to be assigned by a fourfold path¹¹. For such habits can be compared to their proper subjects, and to their opposites, and to their proximate ends, and to their proper acts.

According to the first comparison some have attempted to assign the difference, saying thus: that since free choice is the principle of merit, all the habits according to which we merit are to be located in free choice. But since free choice is a faculty of reason and of will¹², it is to be perfected by habits of a twofold kind: by habits, I say, of the virtues it is perfected insofar as it is a faculty of will; but by habits of the gifts insofar as it is a faculty of reason. And that this is true they strive to persuade through the very difference of the gifts, which for a great part regard the act of knowing; whereas the species of the virtues on the contrary have rather to be referred to affection.

But the second manner of assigning the difference is attended to through the comparison of these habits to their opposites. For the habit of virtue and of gift are opposed to the very vices and defects introduced through sin. Now sin does two evils: the first is that it takes away the rectitude of justice; the second is that it weakens the vigor of nature and is said to wound it¹³. Hence just as in a disease there are two things, namely the inequality of the humors itself and certain symptoms or sequels of the disease; so it must be understood in a spiritual disease. Since therefore there are two things in the spiritual disease itself, namely the disordering disease itself and the accompanying symptom, the fault itself and its sequel, the dart itself and the wound left from the dart; the habits of the virtues are against the diseases of sins themselves, but the gifts are against the sequels of them, so that through the virtues the darts are expelled, and through the gifts the wounds or symptoms left behind are expelled. — And this manner of speaking is confirmed by Gregory in the Morals¹⁴, where he assigns the opposites of the gifts, saying that «against folly is wisdom, against dullness understanding, against rashness is counsel, against pusillanimity fortitude», and so of the others that follow. These,

however, are not sins, but rather certain symptoms left behind from sins. And since, as Augustine says¹⁵, «it is one thing to draw out the dart, another to heal the wound»; hence it is that the habits of the virtues and of the gifts differ from one another by reason of the things against which they are.

But the third manner of assigning the difference is attended to through the comparison to proximate ends. For the gratuitous habits are given to us that we may be conformed to Christ; but Christ had every kind of perfection both in acting and in suffering: and therefore there are certain habits given to us by which we are conformed to Christ in acting; and these are the habits of the virtues, which are for acting rightly and are finally ordered to this, that through those habits so ordering us to right operation we may in our actions be conformed to Christ. — There are also¹⁶ other habits given to us, that we may be conformed to him in suffering; and habits of this kind are the gifts, by which Christ was disposed to sustain most rightly his passion for the glory of God and our profit; and through habits of this kind, the gifts, we ought to be conformed to him in suffering.

But the fourth manner of assigning the difference is attended to by way of the comparison to proper acts. For there are certain first acts, and certain middle ones, and certain final or perfect ones; as for example we can see in the act of knowing, that the first is to believe, the second to understand, the third to see with a clean heart¹⁷. And according to this threefold difference of acts there are in us three differences of gratuitous habits, namely of the virtues, of the gifts, and of the beatitudes; so that the virtues are for first acts, as is plain, since faith is for believing; the gifts for middle acts, since, as is plain, the gift of understanding is for understanding; but the beatitudes for final acts, as is plain, since cleanness of heart is for seeing God. And since in the first acts the powers are set right, in the second they are made apt, and in the third and final ones they are perfected¹⁸; hence it is that the habits of the virtues are for acting rightly, the habits of the gifts for acting readily, the habits of the beatitudes for acting or suffering perfectly.

But after those habits are in the soul, there is consequently in it a certain state of quieting and of delight. And in this delight two things concur, namely a certain spiritual refreshment and the perception of that spiritual refreshment. Therefore to those three kinds of habits are added the fruits¹⁹ and the spiritual senses, which do not name new habits, but express the perfect state and use of the preceding habits. — Again, since to have all these things we are not sufficient of ourselves, there have been given to us the supports of the Sacraments, in which according to the diversity of their effects grace is given for the beginning, the progress, and the consummation of all the aforesaid habits, although that grace principally has respect to the curing of the disease.

Thus therefore it is plain that the manner of assigning the difference between the virtues and the gifts is fourfold. — Nevertheless the first manner is not through what is proper, but rather through what is appropriated. It is not through what is proper, I say, because if anyone should wish to say that all the gifts are in reason, and all the virtues in will; he has a manifest instance against him among the gifts as regards fear, fortitude, and piety, which are on the side of affection, and among the virtues as regards faith and prudence, which are on the side of intellect²⁰. Therefore that difference is either false, or null, or is through a certain appropriation, namely in this, that more gifts are on the side of reason than of will; and conversely it is so among the virtues.

But the second manner of assigning the difference through comparison to opposites surpasses the first, because in truth it is through what is proper. In this, however, it falls short, because it is not through what is prior, but rather through what is posterior. For since the habits of the gifts and the virtues are opposed to vices, as habits to privations, and a habit is naturally prior to a privation²¹: the habits are not distinguished according to the privations, but rather conversely the privations according to the reality and nature of the habits; they can however be distinguished according to our imperfect knowledge, which is as a rule through what is posterior.

But the third manner of assigning the difference surpasses the first and second, because it is through what is proper and through what is prior; in this, however, it falls short, that this difference is not according to every state, since neither according to the state of nature as instituted nor according to the state of glory, in which the gifts and the virtues both were and will be²²; and yet they were not nor will be ordered to suffering. Nevertheless that difference is rightly assigned according to the state in which we now are.

But the fourth manner of assigning the difference through comparison to acts is true and proper and surpasses all the aforesaid, because it is through what is proper and through what is prior according to the reason of knowing, and through those things which are common to every state. For in every state it befits a man to act rightly and readily and perfectly. And that this manner of assigning the difference is rightly taken is sufficiently manifest, because, according to what was touched on before, not only is the difference of the gifts from the virtues assigned according to this path, but there also appears the difference of all those things which are counted among the gifts of grace, namely of the virtues and the gifts, the beatitudes, the fruits, the spiritual senses, and the Sacraments. For the first three differences name habits, but the two following name states and uses, while the sixth difference names the supports and aids of the aforesaid²³.

From these things is plain not only the difference of the aforesaid in reality, but also according to the reason of naming. For habits that set right are rightly called virtues, for this reason, that virtue by the meaning of its name says that it raises up and strengthens for acting²⁴. But habits that make apt are rightly called gifts, for this reason, that they say a certain further abundance of goodness for acting, and through this they more attest to the divine liberality; and on account of this they are rightly reckoned by the name of gift. — But habits that perfect are rightly called beatitudes, for this reason, that such habits make a man near to God and conformed to that supreme glory and beatitude in which the highest perfection is to be found. — But the state in which there is refreshment is rightly called fruit; for «fruit» is said from «to enjoy» (frui)²⁵. — But the use according to which that perception is received is rightly called spiritual sense; since to sense is to know a thing as present²⁶. — Lastly, the supports of all these things, in which is given the grace that sanctifies the soul and cures it of sins and aids it to every perfection of holiness, are most rightly called Sacraments. — It is plain therefore from the aforesaid that between the virtues and the gifts there is a difference. Hence the reasons showing this are to be granted.

To the arguments:

To 1. As to what is first objected to the contrary through the authorities of the Saints, that the gifts are virtues, and the virtues are gifts; it must be said that it happens that names are extended and taken properly; and we here speak of the virtues according as they are properly taken and divided into the three theological and the four cardinal, and of the gifts according as they are divided into the seven differences which Isaiah assigns²⁷. But the authorities of the Glosses and of the Saints speak of gift according as the name of gift is amplified and broadly taken, and likewise of the virtues, so that any habit which makes apt for the good is called a virtue, and any thing which is divinely and gratuitously given is called a gift. And thus it can be granted that virtue and gift are the same; but in this manner we are not asking about the difference of the gifts and the virtues, because we are asking about the reality, not about the name.

To 2. As to what is objected concerning the agreement of the definitions of gift and of virtue, it must be said that those descriptions²⁸ are broadly given according to the general meaning of those names. Nevertheless in the definition of virtue stress can be laid on this which is said: «by which one lives rightly». For as was touched on before, in this it differs from the gifts, because those habits are for setting right, but the habits of the gifts for making apt.

To 3. As to what is objected, that by the same sin we are bent aside and are prone to sin; it must be said that it is not alike: because it is easier to do evil and to turn aside from the good than to do well and to be made apt for good²⁹; just as it is easier to wound someone than to heal one wounded; and therefore more habits are necessary for perfectly healing and repairing than for disordering.

To 4. As to what is objected, that it belongs to the same natural virtue to run and to run readily; it must be said that this is true, speaking of the first power; but nevertheless the readiness superadded to the first power is not the same as it, as is plain of natural power and impotence, which are called dispositions and qualities superadded above the root of the natural power³⁰. Moreover, it is not alike, because it is far more difficult to be set right and made apt and habituated in those works which are above nature, than in those which lie subject to the natural power.

To 5. As to what is objected, that the habits of the virtues sufficiently order the soul to God according to its every comparison; it must be said that although they order it sufficiently as to those things which are of rectitude and of necessity, as for instance as to those first acts in which the primary rectitude consists; yet beyond this the liberality of the divine benignity³¹ has provided for man and has conferred habits by which he is made apt not only for the necessary works of rectitude, but also of perfection and supererogation. Hence if anyone object that to make a power apt and to make it ready are the same, and so that it is the same virtue which makes a thing right and ready; it must be said that this is true with respect to a work of the same genus; but with respect to a work of another genus and another grade and reason it does not hold true. But the gifts are said to make apt rather than the virtues, because, although the virtues make apt for their proper acts, there still remain symptoms by which a man is impeded in acting well and by reason of which he is still unfit for works of greater excellence, unless he were helped in these by the habits of the gifts.

As to what was lastly asked, the response is now plain through the things that have been said.