Bonaventure

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod velle malum malum est, sed intelligere malum non est malum. Quaeritur, unde hoc sit. Et videtur, quod similiter sit in actu intelligendi et in actu volendi. Actus enim recipit denominationem ab obiecto¹: ergo sicut velle malum est malum, ita et intelligere. — Item, intelligere dicit motum a rebus ad animam, et velle dicit motum ab anima ad res²: ergo videtur, quod plus pendeat actus intelligendi a re intelp. 916lecta, quam actus volendi a re volita: ergo si malitia est a volito et intellecto, potius debet depravari actus intelligendi quam actus volendi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod a malitia existente in obiecto magis depravatur actus volendi quam actus intelligendi. — Et ratio huius dupliciter sumitur: Ratio 1. tum ex parte virtutis³, quia tanta est vis amoris, ut transformet amantem in amatum; unde qui diligit iustitiam iustus fit, et qui diligit iniquitatem iniquus fit; et propterea dicitur de malis, quod facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt⁴. Non sic est de actu intelligendi; nam etsi aliquo modo conformet, non tamen transformat. Hoc autem contingit propter maiorem vim unionis, quae consistit in ipso amore; sicut enim dicit Dionysius⁵: « Amorem dicimus vim unitivam »; propterea dicitur primae ad Corinthios sexto: Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus fit. — Ratio 2. Alia est ratio ex parte obiecti. Bonum enim, in quantum bonum, est obiectum affectus, non intellectus. Intelligentiae autem et memoriae obiectum est verum sub ratione veri, vel bonum sub ratione veri; et hinc est, quod intellectus, quando intelligit falsum, est falsus; non tamen, quando intelligit bonum, est bonus⁶. Affectus vero non dicitur esse falsus, quia velit falsum, quamvis dicatur esse malus, quia velit malum, vel bonus, cum vult bonum; virtus enim a proprio obiecto denominari habet.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad utramque obiectionem. Istud autem melius infra patebit distinctione quadragesima prima⁷, ubi inquirit Magister, utrum peccatum omne habeat esse a voluntate.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod superior scintilla rationis bonum vult et malum semper odit. Sed contra: impossibile est, simul et semel voluntatem moveri motibus contrariis, vel etiam disparatis⁸; sed homo aliquando vult malum; ergo non videtur, quod illa hora velit bonum: falsum igitur dicit, cum ait, quod illa scintilla semper vult bonum. Si tu dicas, quod voluntas naturalis et deliberativa sunt diversae potentiae, et ita simul possunt moveri diversis motibus; contra: in littera praecedenti habetur et etiam consequenti⁹, quod illa voluntas, quae vult bonum, gratia adveniente liberatur et adiuvatur. Si ergo voluntas, quae a gratia liberatur et adiuvatur, haec est, in qua habet consistere peccatum; videtur, quod eadem sit potentia voluntatis, qua homo naturaliter vult bonum, et qua aliquando vult malum. — Si tu dicas, quod eadem est voluntas, tamen disposita diversis habitibus, et secundum illorum habituum diversitatem potest habere diversos motus; obiicitur contra hoc, quod¹⁰ illa potentia est unica et simplex: ergo quando convertit se ad actum unius habitus, non potest se convertere simul et semel ad actum alterius habitus, et ita non movetur simul et semel bene et male. Non ergo semper vult bonum. — Quodsi hoc concedatur, est ratio in contrarium, quod nulla virtus destituitur sua naturali et propria operatione¹¹, et maxime virtus naturalis, cuius est moveri uniformiter. Ergo videtur, quod actus voluntatis naturalis, qui est appetere bonum, simul stet cum actu voluntatis deliberativae, qui est velle malum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Magister in littera¹², duo sunt hic modi dicendi. — Solutio 1. Quidam enim dicunt, quod actus, quo voluntas naturaliter vult bonum, non est diversus vel distinctus ab eo quo voluntas vult deliberative malum; sed sicut malo culpae in actu exteriori substernitur bonum naturae, unde unus et idem actus est bonus bonitate naturae, et malus malitia moris¹³; sic dicunt intelligi et in voluntate, quod voluntas naturaliter vult bonum, in quantum vult actum substratum; vult nihilominus malum, in quantum illum actum deformat. — Non probatur. Sed illud non sufficit dicere, quoniam, cum Ambrosius¹⁴ dicit, quod homo vult naturaliter bonum, non intelligit de bono naturae tantum, quod quidem est actus voluntatis, sed etiam moris. Vult enim iustitiam et odit iniustitiam naturali voluntate.

Solutio 2. Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quem Magister primo ponit in littera, quod duo sunt motus: et alius est motus, quo voluntas appetit naturaliter bonum, et alius, quo voluntas deliberative vult malum. — Quaestio connexa. Utrum autem possint esse simul, hoc Magister non determinat. Et circa hoc duplex est opinio doctorum. Opinio 1. Quidam enim dicunt, quod possunt esse simul, pro eo quod actus deliberativus non excludit actum naturalem, et unus istorum actuum est voluntatis, ut movetur naturaliter, et alter, ut movetur deliberative. — Opponitur. Sed quoniam voluntas naturalis et deliberativa, secundum quodp. 917ostensum fuit¹⁵, una est potentia, et eadem potentia, quando plene movetur in bonum vel in malum, non potest simul et semel moveri motu opposito et etiam disparato propter simplicitatem potentiae: Opinio 2. ideo dixerunt alii, quod motus voluntatis naturalis non est semper actualiter in bonum. Et quod dicit Magister in littera, quod semper vult bonum, hoc intelligitur habitualiter¹⁶; impeditur autem et suffocatur per malitiam voluntatis deliberativae, ut non exeat in actum; sicut est in damnatis, in quibus synderesis non instigat ad aliquod bonum et iustum. — Indicium auctoris. Quidquid autem sit de hoc, utrum simul possit esse motus voluntatis, ut est natura, cum motu voluntatis, ut est deliberativa; hoc tamen verum est, quod voluntas naturalis, quae bonum appetit, non est semper in suo actu, quia non semper cogitat de bono; et cum etiam cogitat, frequenter nullo modo afficitur; et ideo littera illa exponenda est¹⁷, quod hoc quod dico semper dicat continuitatem quantum ad habitum volendi, non quantum ad actum. — Et quod obiicit, quod virtus non privatur propria operatione; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de operatione substantiali, quae respicit esse rei; de operatione vero consequenti, quae est respectu alicuius extrinseci, non semper habet veritatem, quod non privetur actione. Fere enim omnes virtutes videmus in suis actibus recipere interpolationem; nec tamen ex hoc dicimus, eas esse otiosas, vel propria operatione privari, dum in actus proprios sunt natae exire pro loco et tempore¹⁸.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ante gratiam licet homo naturaliter velit bonum, non tamen oportet concedi, habere bonam voluntatem. Et videtur, quod immo, quia veriori¹⁹ modo inest alicui quod inest ei naturaliter, quam quod inest accidentaliter: ergo sicut sequitur, si deliberative vult bonum, quod habeat bonam voluntatem, ita sequitur, quodsi naturaliter vult bonum, quod habeat bonam voluntatem. — Item, « quod naturale est non assuescit in contrarium²⁰ »: ergo si homo naturaliter vult bonum, nunquam assuescit velle malum: falsum ergo dicit, cum ait, quod homo naturaliter velit bonum; aut si dicit verum, videtur, quod per hoc, quod homo naturaliter vult bonum, quod sit simpliciter bonus.

Respondeo: Notandum. Dicendum, quod bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in appetitu naturali et consummatur in virtute deliberativa; nec est voluntas simpliciter bona et recta, nisi sit recta, in quantum movetur deliberative, et in quantum movetur naturaliter. Et ideo sicut illud argumentum non valet, immo est ibi quid et simpliciter²¹: iste est castus naturaliter, ergo est castus; ita illud non sequitur: iste vult bonum naturaliter, ergo habet bonam voluntatem.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veriori modo inest quod inest naturaliter etc.; dicendum, quod ista comparatio veritatem habet, quando illud quod inest accidentaliter, non praesupponit illud quod inest naturaliter; cum autem praesupponit, tunc non habet veritatem. Sicut enim « melius est bene vivere quam vivere²² », et bene vivere praesupponit vivere; sic melior est voluntas, quae recte movetur et naturaliter et deliberative, quam naturaliter tantum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod naturale non assuescit in contrarium; dicendum, quod illud verum est de eo quod simpliciter est naturale, videlicet de eo quod a natura inchoatur et consummatur; sed hoc non est verum in eo quod inchoatur a natura et consummatur ab assuetudine, vel etiam a gratia; et tale est velle bonum. — Et per hoc patent quae dicuntur in littera in hac parte.

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Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says, that to will evil is evil, but to understand evil is not evil. It is asked whence this is so. And it seems that it is the same in the act of understanding and in the act of willing. For the act receives its denomination from its object¹: therefore just as to will evil is evil, so also is to understand it. — Likewise, to understand denotes a motion from things to the soul, and to will denotes a motion from the soul to things²: therefore it seems that the act of understanding depends more upon the thing understood than the act of willing upon the thing willed: therefore if malice is from the thing willed and understood, the act of understanding ought rather to be depraved than the act of willing.

I respond: It must be said that by a malice existing in the object the act of willing is more depraved than the act of understanding. — And the reason for this is taken in two ways: First reason. both on the part of the power³, because so great is the force of love that it transforms the lover into the beloved; whence he who loves justice becomes just, and he who loves iniquity becomes iniquitous; and on this account it is said of the wicked, that they became abominable, like the things which they loved⁴. It is not so with the act of understanding; for although it conforms in some manner, yet it does not transform. And this comes about on account of the greater force of union, which consists in love itself; for as Dionysius says⁵: « We call love a unitive force »; on this account it is said in First Corinthians, chapter six: He who cleaves to God becomes one spirit. — Second reason. The other reason is on the part of the object. For the good, insofar as it is good, is the object of the affection, not of the intellect. But the object of the intelligence and the memory is the true under the aspect of the true, or the good under the aspect of the true; and hence it is that the intellect, when it understands the false, is false; yet not, when it understands the good, is it good⁶. But the affection is not said to be false because it wills the false, although it is said to be evil because it wills evil, or good when it wills the good; for a power takes its denomination from its proper object.

And by this the response to both objections is clear. But this will appear better below in the forty-first distinction⁷, where the Master inquires whether all sin has its being from the will.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the higher spark of reason always wills the good and always hates evil. But on the contrary: it is impossible for the will to be moved at one and the same time by contrary, or even disparate, motions⁸; but man sometimes wills evil; therefore it does not seem that at that hour he wills the good: he therefore says something false, when he asserts that that spark always wills the good. If you say that the natural and the deliberative will are diverse powers, and so can be moved at once by diverse motions; on the contrary: it is held in the preceding text and also in the following⁹, that the will which wills the good, when grace comes, is freed and helped. If therefore the will which is freed and helped by grace is the one in which sin must consist; it seems that it is the same power of the will, by which man naturally wills the good, and by which he sometimes wills evil. — If you say that it is the same will, yet disposed by diverse habits, and according to the diversity of those habits can have diverse motions; it is objected against this, that¹⁰ that power is one and simple: therefore when it turns itself to the act of one habit, it cannot turn itself at one and the same time to the act of another habit, and so it is not moved at one and the same time both well and ill. Therefore it does not always will the good. — But if this be granted, there is a reason to the contrary, that no virtue is deprived of its natural and proper operation¹¹, and especially a natural virtue, whose nature it is to be moved uniformly. Therefore it seems that the act of the natural will, which is to seek the good, stands together with the act of the deliberative will, which is to will evil.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the text¹², there are here two ways of speaking. — First solution. For some say that the act by which the will naturally wills the good is not diverse or distinct from that by which the will wills evil deliberatively; but just as to the evil of fault in the exterior act there is subjected the good of nature, whence one and the same act is good by the goodness of nature, and evil by the malice of morals¹³; so they say it is to be understood also in the will, that the will naturally wills the good, insofar as it wills the underlying act; it nonetheless wills evil, insofar as it deforms that act. — It is not proven. But it does not suffice to say this, because, when Ambrose¹⁴ says that man naturally wills the good, he does not understand it of the good of nature only, which indeed is an act of the will, but also of morals. For he wills justice and hates injustice by a natural willing.

Second solution. And therefore there is another way of speaking, which the Master first sets down in the text, that there are two motions: and one is the motion by which the will naturally seeks the good, and another by which the will deliberatively wills evil. — Connected question. But whether they can be at once, the Master does not determine. And concerning this there is a twofold opinion of the doctors. First opinion. For some say that they can be at once, on the ground that the deliberative act does not exclude the natural act, and one of these acts belongs to the will as it is moved naturally, and the other as it is moved deliberatively. — It is objected. But since the natural and the deliberative will, according asp. 917it has been shown¹⁵, is one power, and the same power, when it is fully moved toward the good or toward evil, cannot be moved at one and the same time by an opposite and even disparate motion on account of the simplicity of the power: Second opinion. therefore others have said that the motion of the natural will is not always actually toward the good. And as for what the Master says in the text, that it always wills the good, this is understood habitually¹⁶; but it is impeded and suffocated by the malice of the deliberative will, so that it does not go forth into act; as is the case in the damned, in whom the synderesis does not instigate toward any good and just thing. — The author's judgment. But whatever may be the case about this, whether the motion of the will as it is nature can be at once with the motion of the will as it is deliberative; this nevertheless is true, that the natural will, which seeks the good, is not always in its act, because it does not always think about the good; and even when it thinks, it is frequently in no way affected; and therefore that text is to be expounded¹⁷ thus, that this which I say always denotes a continuity as to the habit of willing, not as to the act. — And as to what is objected, that a virtue is not deprived of its proper operation; it must be said that this is understood of the substantial operation, which regards the being of the thing; but of the consequent operation, which is in respect of something extrinsic, it is not always true that it is not deprived of action. For we see almost all the virtues receive interruption in their acts; nor yet on this account do we say that they are idle, or deprived of their proper operation, since they are by nature apt to go forth into their proper acts in their place and time¹⁸.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: Before grace, although man naturally wills the good, yet it need not be granted that he has a good will. And it seems that on the contrary he does, because what belongs to someone naturally belongs to him in a truer manner¹⁹ than what belongs accidentally: therefore just as it follows, if he deliberatively wills the good, that he has a good will, so it follows that if he naturally wills the good, he has a good will. — Likewise, « what is natural is not accustomed to the contrary²⁰ »: therefore if man naturally wills the good, he is never accustomed to will evil: he therefore says something false, when he asserts that man naturally wills the good; or if he speaks truly, it seems that, through this, that man naturally wills the good, he is simply good.

I respond: To be noted. It must be said that the goodness of the will is begun in the natural appetite and consummated in the deliberative virtue; nor is the will simply good and right, unless it is right insofar as it is moved deliberatively, and insofar as it is moved naturally. And therefore just as that argument is not valid, but rather there is in it a qualified and a simple²¹: this man is chaste naturally, therefore he is chaste; so this does not follow: this man wills the good naturally, therefore he has a good will.

To that which is objected, that what belongs naturally belongs in a truer manner, etc.; it must be said that this comparison holds true when that which belongs accidentally does not presuppose that which belongs naturally; but when it does presuppose it, then it does not hold true. For as « it is better to live well than to live²² », and to live well presupposes to live; so better is the will which is rightly moved both naturally and deliberatively, than naturally only.

To that which is objected, that what is natural is not accustomed to the contrary; it must be said that this is true of that which is simply natural, namely of that which is begun and consummated by nature; but this is not true in that which is begun by nature and consummated by custom, or even by grace; and such is to will the good. — And by this are made clear the things which are said in the text on this point.

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