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Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 39

Textus Latinus
p. 913

Quaestio III. Utrum synderesis possit depravari per peccatum.

Tertio quaeritur de synderesi quantum ad abusum. Et est quaestio, utrum synderesis possit depravari per peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Glossa super primum Ezechielis1: Facies aquilae a dextris ipsorum quatuor; ibi Glossa, loquens de conscientia et synderesi, dicit sic: «Hanc saepe praecipitari videmus et suum locum amittere, cum quidam sine pudore peccant, quibus merito dicitur: Frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi»; si igitur praecipitium non est nisi per culpam, patet etc.

2. Item, super illud Ieremiae secundo2: Filii Mempheos etc.; Glossa: «Malignus spiritus de membris inferioribus usque ad verticem pertingit, quando castam celsitudinem mentis diffidentiae morbus corrumpit»; sed casta celsitudo mentis est ipsa synderesis: ergo contingit per peccatum corrumpi.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Poena et culpa habent fieri circa idem; sed secundum actum3 synderesis, qui est peccato remurmurare, contingit esse animae punitionem: ergo secundum illum actum contingit esse peccati perpetrationem.

4. Item, synderesis consequitur conscientiam tanquam suum naturale iudicatorium4; sed conscientia potest esse recta et erronea: ergo videtur necessario, quod synderesis aliquando moveatur recte, aliquando moveatur oblique. Si igitur inordinatio reperta in actu motivae est culpa, videtur etc.

5. Item, «opposita sunt nata fieri circa idem5»; sed donum sapientiae et beatitudo luctus consistit circa synderesim, cum donum sapientiae consistat circa animae supremum, et synderesis postulet pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus. Si igitur dono sapientiae et beatitudini luctus culpa opponitur, videtur, quod culpa habeat esse circa illam potentiam.

6. Item, synderesis aut est de bonis maximis, aut de bonis mediis, aut de bonis minimis6. Si de maximis: ergo est gratia, vel virtus; quorum utrumque est falsum, cum synderesis simul maneat cum peccato. Si est de bonis mediis; sed his contingit male uti: ergo synderesi contingit male uti. Sed malus usus est culpa: ergo circa actum synderesis contingit esse culpam. De minimis non est dubium, quod non est, cum minima sint bona corporis.

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Sed contra: 1. Glossa super Ezechielis primum7: «Synderesim proprie aquilae deputant, non se miscentem tribus, sed ipsa errantia corrigentem». Si ergo non se commiscet tribus, sed potius corrigit; videtur, quod secundum actum eius non consistat peccatum.

2. Item, Ambrosius dicit, et Magister adducit in littera, super illud ad Romanos septimo8: Quod nolo illud facio; ibi dicit, quod homo semper naturaliter vult bonum: ergo cum illa voluntas non sit aliud quam synderesis, synderesis semper vult bonum; et si semper vult bonum: ergo nunquam peccat.

3. Item, vis illa, quae secundum motum suum directe repugnat peccato, non depravatur peccato9; sed actus synderesis semper contra culpam remurmurat, etiam in pessimis peccatoribus: ergo videtur, quod non habeat depravari et deordinari per culpam.

4. Item, quando tota natura per morbum corrumpitur, non est ulterius possibilitas ad sanitatem: ergo si tota rectitudo animae auferretur per culpam, iam non esset ultra spes redeundi ad gratiam; sed constat, quod spes est redeundi, quia de nemine desperandum est, dum est in via10: ergo videtur, quod aliqua rectitudo remaneat. Sed rectitudo, quae maximae est adhaerentiae, est rectitudo voluntatis per modum naturae, et haec est synderesis: ergo non videtur, quod depravari possit per culpam.

Conclusio

Synderesis per peccatum non potest depravari in se, sed tantum praecipitari quoad dominium regendi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum illos qui dicunt, synderesim non esse aliud quam superiorem portionem rationis, circa actum ipsius contingit esse peccatum11. Dicunt enim, quod ipsa superior portio rationis habet dupliciter moveri: aut secundum quod ad Deum convertitur et regitur et dirigitur secundum leges aeternas, et sic in ea peccatum non habet esse; aut prout convertitur ad inferiores vires, et sic ab eis sumit occasionem deviandi et potest per peccatum depravari. Et ponunt exemplum in peccato Arii, qui erravit circa Trinitatem et Unitatem, et ita secundum superiorem portionem rationis vel secundum synderesim. Et hoc dicunt quod Glossa praedicta super primum Ezechielis vult dicere. Nam primo dicit, quod «aliis peccantibus non se immiscet»; postea dicit, quod «praecipitatur et locum suum perdit»; et utrumque dicunt habere veritatem secundum diversas comparationes superioris portionis sive ipsius synderesis.

— Sed quoniam, sicut dicunt Sancti et Glossae manifeste, synderesis, quantum est de se, semper habet ad bonum stimulare et peccato remurmurare, quamdiu sumus in statu viae; ideo dixerunt alii aliter, scilicet quod synderesis nominat ipsam voluntatem, secundum quod habet naturaliter moveri. Et quoniam peccatum non habet esse circa actum voluntatis, ut natura est vel ut movetur naturaliter, sed solum ut movetur deliberative12; hinc est, quod synderesis per peccatum non habet depravari. Quia tamen ipsa habet alias regere et dirigere et dominium regendi potest perdere: hinc est, quod contingit, eam per culpam praecipitari. Praesidentia enim dominii a duobus pendet, videlicet a rectitudine praesidentis, et ab obtemperantia famulantis; et quamvis synderesis, quantum est de se, semper sit recta, quia tamen ratio et voluntas frequenter ei obviant — ratio per erroris excaecationem, et voluntas per impietatis obstinationem — hinc est, quod synderesis praecipitari dicitur, pro eo quod effectus eius et praesidentia in vires alias deliberativas propter earum repugnantiam repellitur et cassatur. — Et ponitur exemplum in milite, qui, quantum est de se, semper bene sedet super equum, equo tamen ruente, praecipitari dicitur. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

Hic autem modus dicendi tanquam rationabilior a pluribus13 sustinetur. Et ideo rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur de Glossa, quod synderesim praecipitari videmus; iam patet responsio. Non enim sequitur, si praecipitatur, quod propter hoc per peccatum depravetur, quia praecipitium eius non tantum attenditur circa actum proprium, sed etiam circa actum aliarum virtutum, quibus praesidere debet ipsa synderesis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod morbus diffidentiae corrumpit mentis celsitudinem, et quod anima constupratur usque ad verticem; dicendum, quod vertex et celsitudo mentis non vocatur ibi14 synderesis, sed superior portio rationis.

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Superior autem portio rationis non nominat ipsam potentiam animae, in quantum movetur naturaliter, sed in quantum movetur deliberative. Et hoc modo circa ipsam habet peccatum consistere, maxime illud quod attenditur secundum actum rationis, qui est sursum, sicut est peccatum infidelitatis et desperationis, et alia peccata, quae directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena et culpa habent fieri circa idem; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem loquendo praecise, pro eo quod pro peccato voluntatis totum corpus habet puniri. Verum est tamen, quod sicut voluntas est principium peccandi, ita et principaliter punitur; unde et vermis conscientiae plus est afflictivus voluntatis, prout est deliberativa, quam prout est natura quaedam, propter mutuam repugnantiam. — Utrum autem sola voluntas sit subiectum poenae, vel aliquid aliud, hoc infra15 suo loco manifestabitur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conscientia, quae est iudicatorium praecedens synderesim, est recta et non recta, ergo et synderesis; dicendum, quod non sequitur, pro eo quod ipsa conscientia non tantum consistit in universali, immo etiam descendit ad particulare; non tantummodo movetur motu simplici, immo etiam collativo. Nec mirum, quia consistit in ratione, cuius quidem rationis est unum ab altero discernere et unum ad alterum conferre. Et ideo, licet conscientia, prout stat in universali et movetur aspectu simplici, sit semper recta; prout autem descendit ad particularia et confert, potest fieri erronea, propter hoc quod intermiscet se actus16 rationis deliberativae.

Et hoc patet sic. Conscientia enim Iudaeorum ex ipso primo naturali dictamine dictabat, quod Deo est obediendum; et ipsi postmodum assumunt, quod Deus praecipit nunc circumcisionem et ciborum discretionem; et ex hoc formatur conscientia eorum in particulari, ut se circumcidant et a cibis abstineant. Error autem iste non venit ex primo principio, quod quidem verum fuit, sed venit ex assumptione, quae17 quidem non fuit conscientiae, prout est naturale iudicatorium, sed potius rationis erroneae, quae quidem spectat ad liberum arbitrium. Synderesis autem, quantum est de se, movetur motu simplici in remurmurando contra malum et instigando ad bonum. Praeterea, movetur contra malum non hoc vel illud, sed in universali; vel si aliquo modo inclinetur synderesis ad detestandum hoc malum vel illud, hoc non est, in quantum hoc, sed in quantum malum; et hinc est, quod synderesis non obliquatur, sicut conscientia errat.

Alia etiam posset reddi ratio, quia synderesis nominat ipsam potentiam naturalem, ut est naturaliter habilitata; conscientia autem nominat habitum non tantum naturalem, sed etiam acquisitum; et quia natura, quantum est de se, semper recte movetur, quod autem acquiritur, potest habere et rationem rectitudinis et obliquitatis: hinc est, quod synderesi semper existente recta, conscientia potest esse et recta et erronea.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum sapientiae est circa synderesim; dicendum, quod falsum est; omnia enim dona et omnes virtutes et beatitudines respiciunt voluntatem, secundum quod deliberativa est. Quod autem dicitur synderesis postulare pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus, hoc intelligitur causaliter, quia nos instigat ad gemitum pro malis, quibus immersi sumus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonis mediocribus contingit male uti; dicendum, quod illud verum est de his quae moventur ad nutum liberi arbitrii, secundum cuius actum proprie attenditur usus et abusus; synderesis autem, cum sit potentia naturalis et naturaliter moveatur, non subest imperio liberi arbitrii: et ideo non sequitur, quod liberum arbitrium possit ea abuti. Praeterea, esto quod posset18 illa abuti, adhuc non sequitur, quod propter hoc in ipsa esset peccatum; quamvis enim liberum arbitrium abutatur oculo, cum intuetur ad concupiscendum, tamen peccatum non dicitur esse in oculo: peccatum enim non est in eo quo quis abutitur, sed potius in abutente.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether synderesis can be depraved by sin.

Third, an inquiry is made concerning synderesis with respect to its abuse. And the question is whether synderesis can be depraved by sin. And it seems that it can, thus.

1. The Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel1: The face of an eagle on the right side of those four; there the Gloss, speaking of conscience and synderesis, says thus: «We often see this one cast down and lose its place, when certain men sin without shame, to whom it is deservedly said: Thou hast had a harlot's forehead»; if then a casting-down is only through fault, it is evident, etc.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Jeremiah, chapter two2: The children of Memphis, etc.; the Gloss: «The malignant spirit reaches from the lower members up to the crown of the head, when the disease of diffidence corrupts the chaste loftiness of the mind»; but the chaste loftiness of the mind is synderesis itself: therefore it happens that it is corrupted through sin.

3. Likewise, this seems to be the case by reason. Punishment and fault must come to be about the same thing; but according to the act3 of synderesis, which is to murmur against sin, there comes to be a punishment of the soul: therefore according to that act there comes to be the perpetration of sin.

4. Likewise, synderesis follows upon conscience as its natural tribunal4; but conscience can be right and erroneous: therefore it seems necessary that synderesis sometimes be moved rightly, sometimes be moved obliquely. If then the disorder found in the act of the motive power is a fault, it seems, etc.

5. Likewise, «opposites are by nature apt to come to be about the same thing5»; but the gift of wisdom and the beatitude of mourning are about synderesis, since the gift of wisdom is about the highest part of the soul, and synderesis asks for us with unutterable groanings. If then a fault is opposed to the gift of wisdom and to the beatitude of mourning, it seems that the fault has its being about that power.

6. Likewise, synderesis is either about the greatest goods, or about middle goods, or about the least goods6. If about the greatest: then it is grace, or virtue; both of which are false, since synderesis remains together with sin. If it is about middle goods; but these one can misuse: therefore one can misuse synderesis. But misuse is a fault: therefore about the act of synderesis there can be a fault. About the least goods there is no doubt that it is not, since the least goods are goods of the body.

On the contrary: 1. The Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel7: «They properly assign synderesis to the eagle, as not mingling itself with the three, but correcting their errors». If then it does not mingle itself with the three, but rather corrects them; it seems that according to its act sin does not consist.

2. Likewise, Ambrose says, and the Master adduces in the text, on that passage to the Romans, chapter seven8: What I will not, that I do; there he says that man always naturally wills the good: therefore since that will is nothing other than synderesis, synderesis always wills the good; and if it always wills the good: therefore it never sins.

3. Likewise, that power which according to its motion directly resists sin is not depraved by sin9; but the act of synderesis always murmurs against fault, even in the worst sinners: therefore it seems that it cannot be depraved and disordered through fault.

4. Likewise, when the whole nature is corrupted through disease, there is no further possibility of health: therefore if the whole rectitude of the soul were taken away through fault, there would no longer be hope of returning to grace; but it is established that there is hope of returning, since no one is to be despaired of while he is on the way10: therefore it seems that some rectitude remains. But the rectitude which is of the greatest adherence is the rectitude of the will by way of nature, and this is synderesis: therefore it does not seem that it can be depraved through fault.

Conclusion

Synderesis cannot be depraved in itself through sin, but only cast down as regards its dominion of ruling.

I respond: It must be said that, according to those who say that synderesis is nothing other than the superior portion of reason, there can be sin about its act11. For they say that this superior portion of reason can be moved in two ways: either insofar as it is turned to God and is ruled and directed according to the eternal laws, and thus in it sin cannot be; or insofar as it is turned to the lower powers, and thus from them it takes occasion of deviating and can be depraved through sin. And they put forward the example of the sin of Arius, who erred concerning the Trinity and the Unity, and so according to the superior portion of reason or according to synderesis. And they say that this is what the aforesaid Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel means to say. For first it says that «it does not mingle itself with the others when they sin»; afterward it says that «it is cast down and loses its place»; and they say that both hold true according to the diverse comparisons of the superior portion or of synderesis itself.

— But since, as the Saints and the Glosses manifestly say, synderesis, as far as it is of itself, always has it to spur toward the good and to murmur against sin, so long as we are in the state of the wayfarer; therefore others said otherwise, namely that synderesis names the will itself, insofar as it has it to be moved naturally. And since sin cannot be about the act of the will, as it is nature or as it is moved naturally, but only as it is moved deliberatively12; hence it is that synderesis cannot be depraved through sin. Yet because it has it to rule and direct the others, and can lose the dominion of ruling: hence it is that it happens that it is cast down through fault. For the presidency of dominion depends on two things, namely on the rectitude of the one presiding, and on the compliance of the one serving; and although synderesis, as far as it is of itself, is always right, yet because reason and will frequently oppose it — reason through the blinding of error, and will through the obstinacy of impiety — hence it is that synderesis is said to be cast down, in that its effect and presidency over the other deliberative powers is, on account of their resistance, repelled and made void. — And an example is put forward in a soldier, who, as far as he is of himself, always sits well upon his horse, yet when the horse falls is said to be cast down. So too it must be understood in the matter at hand.

Now this way of speaking is, as the more reasonable, upheld by the more numerous13. And therefore the arguments which are brought in for this side must be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the Gloss, that we see synderesis cast down; the response is already evident. For it does not follow, if it is cast down, that on account of this it is depraved through sin, since its casting-down is regarded not only about its own act, but also about the act of the other virtues, over which synderesis itself ought to preside.

2. To that which is objected, that the disease of diffidence corrupts the loftiness of the mind, and that the soul is defiled up to the crown of the head; it must be said that the crown and loftiness of the mind is not there14 called synderesis, but the superior portion of reason.

The superior portion of reason, however, does not name the power of the soul itself insofar as it is moved naturally, but insofar as it is moved deliberatively. And in this way sin can consist about it, especially that which is regarded according to the act of reason which is on high, such as is the sin of infidelity and despair, and the other sins which are directly opposed to the theological virtues.

3. To that which is objected, that punishment and fault must come to be about the same thing; it must be said that this does not hold true, speaking precisely, in that for the sin of the will the whole body is to be punished. Yet it is true that, as the will is the principle of sinning, so also it is principally punished; whence also the worm of conscience is more afflictive of the will, as it is deliberative, than as it is a certain nature, on account of their mutual resistance. — But whether the will alone is the subject of punishment, or something else, this will be made manifest below15 in its proper place.

4. To that which is objected, that conscience, which is the tribunal preceding synderesis, is right and not right, therefore synderesis also; it must be said that it does not follow, in that conscience itself not only consists in the universal, but indeed also descends to the particular; it is not only moved by a simple motion, but indeed also by a collative one. Nor is it any wonder, since it consists in reason, of which reason it belongs to discern one thing from another and to compare one thing to another. And therefore, although conscience, as it stands in the universal and is moved by a simple gaze, is always right; yet as it descends to particulars and compares, it can become erroneous, on account of the fact that the act16 of deliberative reason mingles itself in.

And this is evident thus. For the conscience of the Jews, from the very first natural dictate, dictated that God is to be obeyed; and they afterward assume that God now commands circumcision and the distinction of foods; and from this their conscience is formed in particular, that they circumcise themselves and abstain from foods. But this error does not come from the first principle, which indeed was true, but comes from the assumption, which17 indeed was not of conscience, as it is a natural tribunal, but rather of erroneous reason, which indeed pertains to free choice. But synderesis, as far as it is of itself, is moved by a simple motion in murmuring against evil and instigating toward the good. Furthermore, it is moved against evil not this or that, but in the universal; or if synderesis is in some way inclined to detest this or that evil, this is not insofar as it is this, but insofar as it is evil; and hence it is that synderesis is not bent awry, as conscience errs.

Another reason too could be given, namely that synderesis names the natural power itself, as it is naturally enabled; whereas conscience names a habit not only natural, but also acquired; and because nature, as far as it is of itself, is always rightly moved, but what is acquired can have both the account of rectitude and that of obliquity: hence it is that, while synderesis always remains right, conscience can be both right and erroneous.

5. To that which is objected, that the gift of wisdom is about synderesis; it must be said that it is false; for all gifts and all virtues and beatitudes regard the will, insofar as it is deliberative. But that synderesis is said to ask for us with unutterable groanings, this is understood causally, since it instigates us to groaning over the evils in which we are immersed.

6. To that which is objected, that one can misuse middling goods; it must be said that this is true of those things which are moved at the beck of free choice, according to whose act use and abuse are properly regarded; but synderesis, since it is a natural power and is moved naturally, is not subject to the command of free choice: and therefore it does not follow that free choice can abuse it. Furthermore, granted that it could18 abuse it, still it does not follow that on account of this there would be sin in it; for although free choice abuses the eye, when it gazes in order to lust, yet sin is not said to be in the eye: for sin is not in that which one abuses, but rather in the one abusing.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 10. — Ipsa verba Hieronymi in Ezech. I, 7. seq., ex quo Glossa sumta est, haec sunt: Et tamen hanc quoque ipsam conscientiam... cernimus praecipitari apud quosdam et suum locum amittere, qui ne pudorem quidem et verecundiam habent in delictis et merentur audire: Facies meretricis facta est tibi, noluisti erubescere (Ier. 3, 3.).
    Verse 10. — The very words of Jerome on Ezekiel I, 7 ff., from which the Gloss is taken, are these: And yet we see this same conscience also cast down in certain men and losing its place, men who have not even shame and modesty in their misdeeds and deserve to hear: Thou hast had a harlot's forehead, thou wouldst not blush (Jer. 3, 3.).
  2. Vers. 16. — Glossa habetur in Rabani Comment. in hunc loc., ubi prius Hieronymi in eundem Ieremiae loc. expositione iuxta litteram et intelligentiam spiritualem allata, Rabanus tropologicam expositionem addens ait: Malignus enim spiritus quasi ab inferioribus membris usque ad summa pertingit, quando activam vitam polluetis, castam celsitudinem fidei diffidentiae morbo corruperit. — Mox post contingit cod. O et edd. 3, 4 subiiciunt eam, Vat. addit ea.
    Verse 16. — The Gloss is found in Rabanus' Commentary on this passage, where, after first adducing Jerome's exposition on the same passage of Jeremiah according to the letter and the spiritual understanding, Rabanus, adding a tropological exposition, says: For the malignant spirit reaches as it were from the lower members up to the highest, when it corrupts the chaste loftiness of faith by the disease of diffidence as you pollute the active life. — Soon after contingit cod. O and edd. 3, 4 append eam, the Vatican edition adds ea.
  3. Codd. CFHIKRST ee etc. cum edd. 2, 3 statum. Iidem codd., excepto ee, pro synderesis hoc loco genitivum Graecum syndereseos exhibent. Subinde voci peccato cod. K praefigit in.
    Codd. CFHIKRST ee etc. with edd. 2, 3 read statum. The same codices, except ee, in this place exhibit for synderesis the Greek genitive syndereseos. Thereupon cod. K prefixes in to the word peccato.
  4. Cfr. supra q. 1.
    Cf. above, q. 1.
  5. Secundum Aristot.; cfr. supra pag. 192, nota 4. — In minori respicitur illud Matth. 5, 5: Beati qui lugent etc. Seq. loc. Script. est Rom. 8, 26. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bis pro luctus substituit lucis.
    According to Aristotle; cf. above, p. 192, note 4. — In the minor premise that passage of Matthew 5, 5 is regarded: Blessed are they that mourn, etc. The following scriptural passage is Rom. 8, 26. — The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 twice substitutes lucis for luctus.
  6. De hac divisione bonorum, quae ex August. sumta est, et de conclusionibus inde hic factis vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 3.
    Concerning this division of goods, which is taken from Augustine, and concerning the conclusions here drawn from it, see above the text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 3.
  7. Vers. 10. — De Glossa vide supra pag. 909, nota 1.
    Verse 10. — Concerning the Gloss see above, p. 909, note 1.
  8. Vers. 16. et 20. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Verses 16 and 20. — See here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 182, nota 9. et pag. 314, nota 7.
    Cf. above, p. 182, note 9, and p. 314, note 7.
  10. Cfr. dictum August., supra pag. 832, nota 7. allatum. — Paulo superius pro auferretur in edd. et nonnullis codd. legitur aufertur.
    Cf. the saying of Augustine adduced above, p. 832, note 7. — A little above, for auferretur in the editions and several codices is read aufertur.
  11. De hac opinione vide supra d. 24. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi complura argg. ad eam impugnandam adducuntur. Ibid. etiam plura exponuntur quae in seqq. tanguntur.
    Concerning this opinion see above, d. 24, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the corpus, where several arguments are adduced to impugn it. There also several things are expounded which are touched on in what follows.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., et August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51: Si enim non receditur ab eo modo, quo naturaliter factus est... ea quae debet, facit etc. — Paulo inferius pro Quia tamen Vat. Quia tantum, edd. 2, 3 Quia cum.
    Cf. above, d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, in the corpus, and Augustine, On Free Choice, Bk. III, c. 18, n. 51: For if there is no withdrawal from that mode in which it was made naturally... it does the things it ought, etc. — A little below, for Quia tamen the Vatican edition reads Quia tantum, edd. 2, 3 Quia cum.
  13. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 99. m. 2. a. 2. asserit, sic dixisse antiquos magistros Praepositivum et Antissiodorensem. — Paulo superius pro ruente cod. M habet corruente.
    Blessed Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 2, a. 2, asserts that the ancient masters Praepositivus and [William] of Auxerre spoke thus. — A little above, for ruente cod. M has corruente.
  14. Edd. hic. — Circa finem solut. pro qui est sursum cod. T quae est sursum.
    The editions read hic. — Near the end of the solution, for qui est sursum cod. T reads quae est sursum.
  15. Dist. 41. a. 2. q. 3.
    Distinction 41, a. 2, q. 3.
  16. Vat. actibus.
    The Vatican edition reads actibus.
  17. Codd. CFKLORSTVY ce et alii nec non edd. 1, 2 quod. Paulo superius post Error edd., excepta 1, omittunt autem. Aliquanto inferius verbo instigando codd. CLRS ce etc. atque ed. 1 praemittunt in.
    Codd. CFKLORSTVY ce and others, as well as edd. 1, 2, read quod. A little above, after Error, the editions, except 1, omit autem. Somewhat below, the codices CLRS ce etc. and ed. 1 prefix in to the word instigando.
  18. Ut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro ut est codd. CKOPQRSTW ce et est, cod. L (Q a secunda manu) et ut est, cod. bb et ed. 1 prout est.
    As was shown above, a. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for ut est the codices CKOPQRSTW ce read et est, cod. L (Q by a second hand) et ut est, cod. bb and ed. 1 prout est. ---
← Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 2Dist. 39, Dubia→