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Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 573

ARTICULUS I.

Qualiter peccatum habeat fieri et esse in parte superiori rationis.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod in superiori parte rationis secundum se, hoc est absque instinctu partis inferioris, non possit esse peccatum.

1. Primo per illud Augustini contra Manichaeos1, ubi sic ait: «Ratio nostra deduci ad consensum peccati non potest, nisi cum delectatio fuerit mota in illa parte animi, quae debet obtemperare rationi tanquam rectori viro suo»: ergo nunquam peccat ratio superior, nisi peccatum praecedat in parte inferiori.

2. Item, Philosophus in tertio de Anima2: «Intellectus semper est rectus, phantasia autem recta et non recta»: ergo intellectus, quantum est de se, nunquam errat: ergo nec superior portio deviat a veritate iustitiae, nisi inclinetur per sensualitatem et inferiorem portionem.

3. Item, peccatum est per conversionem ad bonum commutabile3; sed superior portio rationis dicitur, in quantum convertitur ad aeterna; inferior, in quantum convertitur ad temporalia: ergo imposp. 574sibile est, peccatum esse vel fieri in nobis ex actu partis rationis superioris absque actu inferioris.

4. Item, ratio superior dicitur, in quantum legibus aeternis intendit; sed impossibile est, aliquem peccare, nisi declinando a legibus aeternis4: ergo impossibile est, peccatum in superiori parte rationis esse secundum se.

5. Item, mulier est media inter sensualitatem et rationem superiorem5; sed sensualitas semper movet ad bonum ut nunc, quantum est de se: ergo ratio superior, quantum est de se, semper movet ad bonum simpliciter. Sed virtus, quae movet ad bonum simpliciter, in movendo non peccat: ergo in superiori parte rationis, quantum est de se, peccatum esse non potest.

6. Item, anima, quando convertitur ad Deum, purgatur, melioratur et perficitur6; sed superior portio rationis attenditur, in quantum convertitur ad Deum: ergo cum peccatum foedet et obnubilet, peccatum in superiori parte rationis secundum se esse non potest.

Sed contra: 1. Ieremiae secundo7: Filii Mempheos et Taphnes constupraverunt te usque ad verticem: si ergo vertex, secundum quod Sancti exponunt, dicitur ibi apex mentis sive superior portio rationis; videtur, quod et illa habeat per peccatum constuprari et foedari.

2. Item, Augustinus, duodecimo, de Trinitate8: «Vir manducat, quando superior portio rationis consentit illecebrae»; sed eius est peccare, cuius est consentire: si igitur hoc est superioris partis, patet etc.

3. Item, contingit, aliquem peccare peccato infidelitatis discredendo aliquos articulos, qui sunt respectu divinitatis; sed ad illos articulos solum superior rationis portio se extendit9: ergo in illo genere peccandi portio superior proprie culpam committit.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium constat esse vertibile; sed liberum arbitrium maxime consistit in superiori portione rationis, cum ibi maxime sit iudicium et imperium10: ergo videtur, quod in superiori portione rationis etiam secundum se sit vertibilitas ad malum: ergo et peccatum.

5. Item, superior portio rationis est illa quae discernit11 et iudicat tam de agendis quam de credendis; sed iudicium creaturae, quantum est de se, absque gratia deficit ab his quae sunt fidei catholicae: ergo per se potest errare et ab illis declinare; et si hoc, potest per se peccare.

6. Item, Angelus, cum peccavit primo peccato, appetiit aequiparari Deo in potentia, et mulier similiter in sapientia12; sed hoc est appetibile solum partis superioris; ergo videtur, quod tam peccatum hominis quam Angeli inceperit a parte rationis superiori: ergo in superiori parte rationis secundum se peccatum habet fieri et esse.

CONCLUSIO.

Licet peccatum carnale non possit esse in superiori parte rationis absque inferiori, tamen peccatum spirituale potest fieri et esse in superiori parte rationis secundum se.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod superior portio rationis non est aliud quam synderesis, et quod ipsa superior portio, quantum est de se, semper est recta et fortis, nisi incurvetur et emolliatur per portionem inferiorem; et ideo dixerunt, peccatum in ea non esse secundum se, sed si peccat, hoc solum dicunt esse consentiendo inferiori parti, sive non compescendo eius deordinationem.

Sed haec positio tripliciter deviat a veritate. Primo in hoc quod dicit, quod idem est superior portio rationis et synderesis; quod plane falsum est, cum superior portio rationis et inferior pertineant ad arbitrii libertatem, sicut dicit Augustinus13, et ideo nominant potentiam deliberativam; synderesis autem potentiam naturalem nominat, quae semper uniformiter ad bonum inclinat. — Secundo vero a veritate deviat in hoc quod dicit, in synderesi aliquo modo esse peccatum; hoc enim plane falsum est, sicut infra14 manifestabitur, et Glossa dicit expresse, Ezechielis primo. — Tertio vero a veritate deviat in hoc quod dicit, quod in superiori parte rationis secundum se culpa non potest esse15, nisi p. 575ab inferiori procedat et tribuatur sibi occasio. Hoc enim contra rationem est, cum in illa portione consistat arbitrii libertas, et ita per naturam insit ei ad malum vertibilitas, et ita possibilitas ad peccandum. — Est etiam hoc contra experimentum, quia ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum leges aeternas, sed etiam habet iudicare secundum lumen proprium, et secundum lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum. Et quamvis aspiciendo ad leges aeternas non peccet iudicando, tamen secundum ea quae percipit a sensibus, vel etiam secundum lumen sibi16 datum et innatum, potest deficere et errare, maxime in statu naturae lapsae. Esto enim, quod sibi proponatur credibile et aliquis articulus fidei, utpote articulus de Trinitate et Unitate, cum iste non solum repugnet sensui et imaginationi, sed etiam discrepet a naturali iudicio rationis: si noster intellectus secundum lumen proprium, vel17 aspiciendo ad partes inferiores iudicaret, deficeret et discrederet et peccaret.

Et propter hoc est alius modus dicendi, quod duplex est genus peccati: quaedam enim sunt peccata carnalia, quaedam vero spiritualia. Si loquamur de peccatis carnalibus, sic fatendum est, quod non contingit esse peccatum in superiori parte rationis absque inferiori. Si autem de peccatis spiritualibus fiat sermo, tunc concedendum est, quod peccatum habet fieri et esse, licet non semper fiat, in superiori parte rationis18 secundum se; et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium. Nam Augustinus in proposita auctoritate loquitur de progressu in perpetratione19 peccatorum carnalium.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus semper est rectus; dicendum, quod verbum Philosophi intelligendum est in his, ad quae movet potentia intellectiva per modum naturae; in his vero, ad quae movet per modum deliberationis, non hap. 576bet veritatem; unde idem vocat ipse intellectum quod nos vocamus conscientiam naturalem20.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est per conversionem ad bonum commutabile; responderi potest dupliciter: primo, quod non solum est peccatum, quando fit conversio ad id quod secundum veritatem est bonum commutabile, sed etiam quando fit conversio ad id quod est bonum incommutabile, et appetitur ut commutabile. — Aliter potest dici, quod superior portio, etsi differat ab inferiori in hoc, quod ipsa convertitur ad superna, nihilominus tamen habet converti ad inferiora, prout disponit et regit inferiores potentias: et sic potest deordinari male eas regendo, sive frena laxando, sive suo imperio eas incurvando.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio superior intendit legibus aeternis; dicendum, quod iste est actus nobilissimus superioris partis; sed non semper hunc actum exercet21, immo etiam intendit sibi et ad se convertitur, et sic potest nimie ad se converti, ac per hoc a Deo averti et deviare a legibus aeternis.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sensualitas inclinat ad bonum ut nunc; dicendum, quod sensualitas non semper movetur inordinate; et praeterea, esto quod semper inordinate moveretur, non tamen ex hoc concluditur, quod superior portio rationis semper ordinate moveatur; alia enim vis assignatur, secundum quam semper ordinate movetur, utpote synderesis, quae est scintilla conscientiae.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod superior portio rationis dicitur, in quantum convertitur22; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, in quantum actu convertitur, sed in quantum est nata converti. Praeterea, inordinate converti potius est averti quam converti. Cum autem dicitur, quod conversio ad Deum purgat, illuminat et perficit; hoc intelligitur de ordinata conversione, quam non est semper necessarium invenire in actione superioris portionis.

SCHOLION.

I. Quaestionibus sex S. Doctor discutit dubium, in quibus potentiis animae et quomodo peccatum esse possit; alii commentatores Lombardi eandem rem plerumque paucioribus quaestionibus absolvunt, ast in solutione satis conveniunt. Communiter utuntur etiam modo metaphorico loquendi, quem ex S. Augustino sumsit Magister (hic c. 7. seq.), dum superiorem partem rationis vocant virum, inferiorem vero mulierem, sensualitatemque serpentem. — Pro faciliore intelligentia harum quaestionum haec praenotamus ex S. Thoma (hic q. 3. a. 1.): «Actus appetitivarum virtutum motus vocantur, non autem proprie actus apprehensivarum. Est autem in nobis triplex appetitus, scilicet naturalis, sensitivus et rationalis. Naturalis quidem appetitus, puta cibi, est, quem non imaginatio gignit, sed ipsa qualitatum naturalium dispositio, quibus naturales vires suas actiones exercent. Hic autem motus in nullo rationi subiacet nec obedit; unde nec in eo peccatum esse potest; et ideo hic praetermittitur. Appetitus autem sensitivus est, qui ex praecedenti imaginatione, vel sensu consequitur, et hic vocatur motus sensualitatis. Appetitus autem rationalis est, qui consequitur apprehensionem rationis: et hic dicitur motus rationis, qui est actus voluntatis. Sed rationis apprehensio dupliciter esse potest: una simplex et absoluta, quando scilicet statim sine discussione apprehensum diiudicat; et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas, quae dicitur non deliberata. Alia est inquisitiva… et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas deliberata. Ratio ergo inferior… utroque modo motum voluntatis circa terrena elicere potest… Ratio autem superior quia per se rebus terrenis non intendit, sed solum secundum quod regulatur rationibus aeternis, non sequitur ipsam aliquis motus nisi deliberatus, respectu scilicet horum terrenorum».

II. In solutione duarum huius articuli quaest. non est differentia opinionum inter principales Scholasticos nisi quoad I. conclusionem I. quaestionis, cum Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 2. 3.) probabile esse cum quibusdam putet, non semper, sed ut plurimum, peccata carnalia ex sensualitate, vel ratione inferiore oriri, quia homo, non incitatus aliqua passione, actum gulae vel luxuriae eligere possit. Hoc autem S. Bonav. non concedere videtur nisi respectu inferioris partis rationis (infra a. 2. q. 1.).

III. De hac et sequente quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 6. (quoad peccatum veniale). — Scot., II. Sent. d. 42. q. unica n. 13. seqq., et Report. ibid. q. 1. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 3. 5; S. I. II. q. 74. a. 5. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 12.; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 93. m. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 5. — Ægid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 1. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 6. q. 32. (de motibus primis). — De his et 4. seqq. qq. Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6, et Biel, q. unica.

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English Translation
p. 573

ARTICLE I.

In what manner sin has to come about and to be in the superior part of reason.

QUESTION I.

Whether in the superior part of reason there has to be sin in itself.

About the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that in the superior part of reason in itself — that is, apart from the instinct of the inferior part — there cannot be sin.

1. First, through that saying of Augustine against the Manichees1, where he speaks thus: «Our reason cannot be led to consent to sin unless delight has first been stirred in that part of the soul which ought to obey reason as its governing husband»: therefore the superior reason never sins unless sin precedes in the inferior part.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third book On the Soul2: «The intellect is always right, but imagination is right and not right»: therefore the intellect, so far as it is of itself, never errs: therefore neither does the superior portion deviate from the truth of justice unless it be inclined through sensuality and the inferior portion.

3. Likewise, sin is through conversion to a changeable good3; but the superior portion of reason is so called insofar as it is turned to eternal things; the inferior, insofar as it is turned to temporal things: therefore it is imposp. 574sible that sin be or come about in us from an act of the superior part of reason without an act of the inferior.

4. Likewise, the superior reason is so called insofar as it attends to the eternal laws; but it is impossible for anyone to sin except by turning away from the eternal laws4: therefore it is impossible that there be sin in the superior part of reason in itself.

5. Likewise, the woman is the mean between sensuality and the superior reason5; but sensuality always moves toward the good as for now, so far as it is of itself: therefore the superior reason, so far as it is of itself, always moves toward the good simply. But a power which moves toward the good simply does not sin in moving: therefore in the superior part of reason, so far as it is of itself, there cannot be sin.

6. Likewise, the soul, when it is turned to God, is purged, bettered, and perfected6; but the superior portion of reason is regarded insofar as it is turned to God: therefore, since sin defiles and beclouds, there cannot be sin in the superior part of reason in itself.

On the contrary: 1. In Jeremiah, chapter two7: The sons of Memphis and Taphnes have defiled thee even to the crown of the head: if therefore the crown, according as the Saints expound it, is there called the apex of the mind or the superior portion of reason; it seems that this too is defiled and befouled through sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the twelfth book, On the Trinity8: «The man eats, when the superior portion of reason consents to the enticement»; but to sin belongs to him to whom it belongs to consent: if therefore this belongs to the superior part, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, it happens that someone sins by the sin of unbelief in disbelieving certain articles which are in respect of the divinity; but to those articles only the superior portion of reason extends itself9: therefore in that kind of sinning the superior portion properly commits fault.

4. Likewise, free choice is agreed to be capable of turning; but free choice consists chiefly in the superior portion of reason, since there are chiefly judgment and command10: therefore it seems that in the superior portion of reason also in itself there is turnability toward evil: therefore also sin.

5. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is that which discerns11 and judges both about things to be done and things to be believed; but the judgment of a creature, so far as it is of itself, without grace fails of those things which are of the catholic faith: therefore of itself it can err and turn away from them; and if this, it can sin of itself.

6. Likewise, the Angel, when he sinned by the first sin, desired to be made equal to God in power, and the woman likewise in wisdom12; but this is desirable only by the superior part; therefore it seems that both the sin of man and that of the Angel began from the superior part of reason: therefore in the superior part of reason in itself sin has to come about and to be.

CONCLUSION.

Although carnal sin cannot be in the superior part of reason without the inferior, nevertheless spiritual sin can come about and be in the superior part of reason in itself.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that the superior portion of reason is nothing other than synderesis, and that the superior portion itself, so far as it is of itself, is always right and strong, unless it be bent and softened through the inferior portion; and therefore they said that there is no sin in it in itself, but if it sins, this they say to be only by consenting to the inferior part, or by not restraining its disorder.

But this position deviates from the truth in three ways. First in this, that it says that the superior portion of reason and synderesis are the same; which is plainly false, since the superior portion of reason and the inferior pertain to the liberty of choice, as Augustine says13, and therefore they name the deliberative power; but synderesis names the natural power, which always uniformly inclines toward the good. — Secondly it deviates from the truth in this, that it says there is in some way sin in synderesis; for this is plainly false, as will be shown below14, and the Gloss says expressly, on the first chapter of Ezekiel. — Thirdly it deviates from the truth in this, that it says that in the superior part of reason in itself there cannot be fault15, unless p. 575it proceed from the inferior and the occasion be attributed to it. For this is contrary to reason, since in that portion consists the liberty of choice, and so by nature there is in it a turnability toward evil, and thus a possibility of sinning. — This is also contrary to experience, because the superior reason has to judge not only according to the eternal laws, but also has to judge according to its own light, and according to the light acquired for it from the inferior. And although in looking to the eternal laws it does not sin in judging, nevertheless according to those things which it perceives from the senses, or also according to the light given and innate to it16, it can fail and err, especially in the state of fallen nature. For grant that there be set before it something credible and some article of faith — for instance the article concerning the Trinity and the Unity, since this not only is repugnant to sense and imagination, but also disagrees with the natural judgment of reason: if our intellect were to judge according to its own light, or17 by looking to the inferior parts, it would fail and disbelieve and sin.

And on account of this there is another manner of speaking, namely that there is a twofold genus of sin: for some sins are carnal, but some spiritual. If we speak of carnal sins, then it must be granted that sin does not happen to be in the superior part of reason without the inferior. But if the discourse be of spiritual sins, then it must be conceded that sin has to come about and to be — although it does not always come about — in the superior part of reason18 in itself; and the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

To 1. And through this the reply is evident to that which is first objected to the contrary. For Augustine in the cited authority speaks of the progress in the perpetration19 of carnal sins.

To 2. To that which is objected, that the intellect is always right; it must be said that the word of the Philosopher is to be understood in those things toward which the intellective power moves by the mode of nature; but in those things toward which it moves by the mode of deliberation, it does not p. 576hold true; whence he calls "intellect" the same thing which we call the natural conscience20.

To 3. To that which is objected, that sin is through conversion to a changeable good; it can be answered in two ways: first, that there is sin not only when the conversion is to that which according to truth is a changeable good, but also when the conversion is to that which is an unchangeable good, and it is desired as changeable. — Otherwise it can be said that the superior portion, although it differs from the inferior in this, that it itself is turned to the supernal things, nonetheless still has to be turned to the inferior things, insofar as it disposes and rules the inferior powers: and thus it can be disordered by ruling them badly, whether by loosening the reins, or by bending them to its command.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the superior reason attends to the eternal laws; it must be said that this is the noblest act of the superior part; but it does not always exercise this act21, indeed it also attends to itself and is turned to itself, and thus it can be turned to itself excessively, and through this be turned away from God and deviate from the eternal laws.

To 5. To that which is objected, that sensuality inclines toward the good as for now; it must be said that sensuality is not always moved inordinately; and besides, granted that it were always moved inordinately, yet it is not concluded from this that the superior portion of reason is always moved ordinately; for another power is assigned according to which it is always moved ordinately, namely synderesis, which is the spark of conscience.

To 6. To that which is objected, that the superior portion of reason is so called insofar as it is turned22; it must be said that this is not true insofar as it is actually turned, but insofar as it is born to be turned. Moreover, to be turned inordinately is rather to be turned away than to be turned. And when it is said that conversion to God purges, illumines, and perfects; this is understood of ordered conversion, which it is not always necessary to find in the action of the superior portion.

SCHOLION.

I. In six questions the holy Doctor discusses the doubtful matter of in which powers of the soul, and how, sin can be; other commentators on Lombard for the most part dispatch the same matter in fewer questions, but agree well enough in the solution. They also commonly use the metaphorical manner of speaking which the Master took from St. Augustine (here c. 7 ff.), when they call the superior part of reason the man, the inferior the woman, and sensuality the serpent. — For the easier understanding of these questions we note beforehand these things from St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 1): «The acts of the appetitive powers are called motions, but not properly the acts of the apprehensive powers. Now there is in us a threefold appetite, namely the natural, the sensitive, and the rational. The natural appetite, such as for food, is that which imagination does not beget, but the very disposition of the natural qualities by which the natural powers exercise their actions. Now this motion in no way is subject to reason nor obeys it; whence neither can there be sin in it; and therefore it is here passed over. But the sensitive appetite is that which follows from a preceding imagination, or sense, and this is called the motion of sensuality. But the rational appetite is that which follows the apprehension of reason: and this is called the motion of reason, which is the act of the will. But the apprehension of reason can be twofold: one simple and absolute, namely when it at once without discussion adjudges what is apprehended; and the will, which is called non-deliberate, follows such an apprehension. The other is inquisitive… and the deliberate will follows such an apprehension. Reason therefore as inferior… can elicit the motion of the will about earthly things in either mode… But the superior reason, because of itself it does not attend to earthly things, but only insofar as it is regulated by the eternal grounds, no motion follows it except a deliberate one, in respect, that is, of these earthly things».

II. In the solution of the two questions of this article there is no difference of opinion among the principal Scholastics except as to the first conclusion of the first question, since Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 2, 3) holds it probable, with certain men, that carnal sins arise from sensuality, or from the inferior reason, not always, but for the most part, because a man, not incited by any passion, can choose an act of gluttony or lust. But St. Bonaventure seems not to concede this except in respect of the inferior part of reason (below, a. 2, q. 1).

III. On this and the following question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 108, m. 6 (as to venial sin). — Scotus, II Sent. d. 42, q. unica, n. 13 ff., and Reportata ibid. q. 1, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 3, 5; Summa I-II, q. 74, a. 5, 9, 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12; Summa p. II, tr. 15, q. 93, m. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 5. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 1, 4. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 6, q. 32 (on the first motions). — On these and the four following questions, Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6, and Biel, q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 12.
    Book II of On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 14, n. 20. See here the text of the Master, c. 12.
  2. Text. 51 (c. 10.): Intellectus igitur omnis (πᾶς) rectus est, appetitus autem et imaginatio recta et non recta.
    Text 51 (c. 10): Every intellect therefore (πᾶς) is right, but appetite and imagination are right and not right.
  3. Secundum August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53, et de Vera Relig. c. 12. n. 23. Cfr. infra d. 38. dub. 6, et d. 42. a. 3. q. 2.
    According to Augustine, On Free Choice II, c. 19, n. 53, and On True Religion c. 12, n. 23. Cf. below, d. 38, dub. 6, and d. 42, a. 3, q. 2.
  4. Ambros., libr. de Paradiso, c. 8. n. 39, peccatum definit praevaricationem legis divinae et caelestium inobedientiam praeceptorum.
    Ambrose, in the book On Paradise, c. 8, n. 39, defines sin as the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience of the heavenly precepts.
  5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7, ubi per mulierem significatur ratio inferior.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7, where by the woman is signified the inferior reason.
  6. Cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 10. et c. 13. n. 21. — Pro melioratur cod. V (F a secunda manu) illuminatur; lectio haud incongrua, cum et infra in solutione huius obiect. hoc verbum ab omnibus codd. et edd. exhibeatur nec non supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. in fine, ubi de triplici actu hierarchico Angelorum agitur, et etiam in p. I. huius d. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.
    Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 7, n. 10, and c. 13, n. 21. — For melioratur (is bettered) cod. V (F in a second hand) [reads] illuminatur (is illumined); a reading not incongruous, since both below in the solution of this objection this word is exhibited by all the codices and editions, and likewise above at d. 10, a. 2, q. 2, at the end, where the threefold hierarchical act of the Angels is treated, and also in Part I of this distinction, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.
  7. Vers. 16. Vide infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. arg. 2. ad opp., ubi verba Glossae super hunc locum afferuntur.
    Verse 16. See below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, arg. 2 to the contrary, where the words of the Gloss on this place are adduced.
  8. Cap. 12. n. 17. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 10. seq.
    Chapter 12, n. 17. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 10 f.
  9. In cod. F subiungitur: Augustinus, XIII. de Trinitate [c. 1. n. 2. seqq.] dicit, quod ad superiorem portionem rationis spectat quod dicitur: In principio erat Verbum usque in verbum Verbum caro factum est.
    In cod. F there is added: Augustine, On the Trinity XIII [c. 1, n. 2 ff.], says that to the superior portion of reason pertains that which is said: In the beginning was the Word up to the word the Word was made flesh.
  10. Quod exponitur d. 25. p. 1. q. 2. seqq.
    Which is expounded at d. 25, p. 1, q. 2 ff.
  11. Plures codd., inter quos F I T Y aa, decernit; cod. ee determinat.
    Several codices, among them F I T Y aa, [read] decernit (decides); cod. ee [reads] determinat (determines).
  12. Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 22. a. 1. q. 1.
    Cf. above, d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 22, a. 1, q. 1.
  13. Libr. XII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3. et c. 12. n. 17. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. 8. 11. — Paulo superius voci synderesis cod. X praefigit ipsa. Mox pro et ideo nominant nonnulli codd., ut aa cc, cum ed. 1 et ideo nominat.
    Book XII of On the Trinity, c. 3, n. 3, and c. 12, n. 17. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, 8, 11. — A little above, to the word synderesis cod. X prefixes ipsa. Soon, for et ideo nominant (and therefore they name) some codices, such as aa cc, with ed. 1 [read] et ideo nominat (and therefore he names).
  14. Dist. 39. a. 2. q. 3, ubi et Glossa (sumta ex Hieronymo, in Ezech. 1,7.) super Ezechielem 1,10. affertur, quae synderesim aquilae comparat et exponit, istam aliis potentiis non se immiscere, sed ipsas errantes corrigere.
    Distinction 39, a. 2, q. 3, where also the Gloss (taken from Jerome, on Ezekiel 1:7) on Ezekiel 1:10 is adduced, which compares synderesis to the eagle and expounds that it does not mingle itself with the other powers, but corrects them when they err.
  15. Cod. B culpa non est nec esse potest.
    Cod. B [reads] fault is not nor can be.
  16. Vat. fidei, quae lectio parum congruit, quare lectionem codd. F Q Y aa bb ee recepimus. Cod. K fidei sibi.
    The Vatican edition [reads] fidei (of faith), which reading agrees little, wherefore we have received the reading of codices F Q Y aa bb ee. Cod. K [reads] fidei sibi.
  17. Pro vel, quod ex cod. aa (F a secunda manu) restituimus, alii codd. cum Vat. et ceteris edd. falso habent nihil; aliter proxime post pro partes inferiores legendum esset partes superiores.
    For vel (or), which we have restored from cod. aa (F in a second hand), the other codices, with the Vatican edition and the rest of the editions, wrongly have nihil (nothing); otherwise just after, for partes inferiores (inferior parts) one would have to read partes superiores (superior parts).
  18. Cod. A hic addit: quia in ea est liberi arbitrii libertas, et ita per naturam vertibilitas ad malum, et sic possibilitas ad peccandum in superiori parte rationis absque inferiori.
    Cod. A here adds: because in it is the liberty of free choice, and so by nature turnability toward evil, and thus a possibility of sinning in the superior part of reason without the inferior.
  19. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 in perpetrationem.
    The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] in perpetrationem (unto the perpetration).
  20. Cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Vat., pro idem substituto ibidem, post vocat ipse cum edd. 2, 3, 4 interiicit secundum veritatem.
    Cf. below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1 f. — The Vatican edition, with ibidem substituted for idem, after vocat ipse inserts, with editions 2, 3, 4, secundum veritatem (according to truth).
  21. Cod. aa: sed non semper homo illum actum exercet nec [pro] semper.
    Cod. aa: but a man does not always exercise that act, nor [for] semper (always).
  22. Nimirum, ut in codd. L O (F a secunda manu) bb, adiicitur ad Deum.
    Namely, as in codices L O (F in a second hand) bb, there is added ad Deum (to God). ---
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