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Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 576

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia contingit circa aliquem articulum fidei ex surreptione dubitare; et constat, ibi esse peccatum, cum sit motus ad illicitum; constat etiam, esse in superiori parte, cum sit circa1 articulos fidei respectu aeternorum; constat etiam, esse veniale, cum sit ex surreptione: ergo etc.

2. Item, tunc peccat superior portio rationis, et vir comedit, quando est plenus consensus, et praebentur arma iniquitatis peccato2; sed contingit, aliquem plene consentire in verbum otiosum et mendacium iocosum, et haec non sunt nisi peccata venialia: ergo etc.

3. Item, superior portio rationis est corrupta, sicut et inferior, cum originale omnes vires animae inficiat et debilitet3: ergo si peccatum veniale potest esse in aliis viribus, quae subsunt libero arbitrio, propter corruptionem, quam accepit ex originali, eadem ratione et in parte superiori.

4. Item, contingit, quod aliquis in convertendo se ad Deum per amorem est negligens; sed non magis tenetur homo ad hoc mandatum quam ad alia: ergo si negligentia in aliorum mandatorum observatione est venialis, ergo et negligentia in amando Deum est venialis. Sed hoc est in superiori parte rationis: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus dicit et Magister in littera4 recitat, quod, quando «superior pars rationis consentit illecebrae, tunc est peccatum damnabile et mortale»: ergo videtur, quod quandocumque peccatum superiorem partem attingit, statim sit mortale.

2. Item, penes superiorem partem rationis residet regula directionis in toto regno animae; sed facta obliquatione in regula, iam non remanet aliqua rectitudo nec species rectitudinis: igitur cum superior portio rationis peccat, deordinatur tota anima; ergo si plena deordinatio non est absque mortali peccato, videtur etc.

3. Item, nulla creatura est excellentior anima quantum ad superiorem portionem, sicut Augustinus in multis locis5 innuit et dicit expresse; sed Angelus propter suam dignitatem non potest peccare nisi mortaliter: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod nec peccatum veniale possit esse in superiori parte.

4. Item, «nihil est adeo veniale, quod non fiat6 peccatum mortale, dum placet»; sed complacentia tunc vere dicitur, quando superior pars rationis ad culpam incurvatur; hoc autem est, cum ipsa peccat: ergo non videtur, quod aliquod peccatum possit in ea esse, quin sit mortale.

p. 577

CONCLUSIO.

Probabilius est, quod peccatum veniale in ratione superiori possit esse.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod in superiori portione rationis non potest esse nisi mortale peccatum, et hoc propter elongationem sui a carne et a sensualitate, in qua consistit initium suggestionis malae, et ex cuius pronitate habet esse peccatum veniale secundum statum7 naturae lapsae. Et hi dixerunt, quod cum sint tres gradus in potentiis animae, correspondentes serpenti, mulieri et viro, videlicet sensualitas, portio inferior et superior; sensualitatis est tantum peccare venialiter, superioris partis tantum mortaliter, inferioris partis utroque modo. Cum enim sit media inter utramque, naturam sapit utriusque.

Sed quia planum est, in superiori portione rationis posse esse aliquo modo motus inordinatos ex surreptione; planum est etiam, in ea esse corruptionem aliquam ex originalis contractione: ideo aliis videtur probabilius et melius, quod peccatum veniale in ratione superiori habeat esse. Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

Ad argumenta pro opposito:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quando superior pars rationis comedit8, damnabile est et mortale peccatum; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de pleno consensu, et hoc respectu illius peccati, cuius actus est in prohibitione, sicut est de peccato fornicationis.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod penes superiorem partem residet regula directionis; dicendum, quod regula directionis non tollitur per qualecumque peccatum, sed per illud quod inducit divinum contemptum et aversionem a Deo; hoc autem non est in quolibet peccato superioris partis, utpote in illo quod ex surreptione committitur.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla creatura est superior anima secundum mentem; dicendum, quod etsi nulla sit superior secundum ordinem efficientis et finis, est tamen aliqua maioris dignitatis et excellentis naturae, et propter hoc minorem habet excusationem. — Praeterea, nulla natura rationalis in statu innocentiae potest peccare venialiter, ut supra9 ostensum est; nulla autem natura rationalis lapsa de culpa potest consequi veniam, nisi homo propter fragilitatem carnis; et ideo non valet illud quod obiicit de Angelo.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod complacentia facit de veniali mortale; dicendum, quod complacentia non dicit ibi quamcumque inclinationem, sed plenum consensum et deliberatum cum quadam plena quietatione; et ita ex hoc non concluditur, quod omnis deordinatio superioris partis cedat in genus10 peccati mortalis.

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English Translation
p. 576

QUESTION II.

Whether in the superior portion of reason there can be venial sin.

Secondly it is asked whether in the superior portion of reason there can be venial sin. And that there can be, it seems:

1. Because it happens that someone doubts about some article of faith by surprise; and it is agreed that there is sin there, since it is a motion toward the illicit; it is agreed also that it is in the superior part, since it is about1 the articles of faith in respect of eternal things; it is agreed also that it is venial, since it is from surprise: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the superior portion of reason then sins, and the man eats, when there is full consent, and the weapons of iniquity are furnished to sin2; but it happens that someone fully consents to an idle word and a jesting lie, and these are nothing but venial sins: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is corrupted, just as the inferior, since the original [sin] infects and weakens all the powers of the soul3: therefore if venial sin can be in the other powers which are subject to free choice, on account of the corruption which it received from the original [sin], by the same reasoning also in the superior part.

4. Likewise, it happens that someone is negligent in turning himself to God through love; but a man is not bound more to this commandment than to the others: therefore if negligence in the observance of the other commandments is venial, then also negligence in loving God is venial. But this is in the superior part of reason: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine says, and the Master in the text4 recites, that, when «the superior part of reason consents to the enticement, then there is damnable and mortal sin»: therefore it seems that whenever sin reaches the superior part, it is straightway mortal.

2. Likewise, with the superior part of reason resides the rule of direction in the whole kingdom of the soul; but once a deflection has been made in the rule, there now remains no rectitude nor semblance of rectitude: therefore when the superior portion of reason sins, the whole soul is disordered; therefore if a full disorder is not without mortal sin, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, no creature is more excellent than the soul as to its superior portion, as Augustine in many places5 suggests and says expressly; but the Angel on account of its dignity cannot sin except mortally: therefore it seems by parity of reasoning that neither can venial sin be in the superior part.

4. Likewise, «nothing is so venial that it does not become6 mortal sin while it pleases»; but complacency is then truly so called when the superior part of reason is bent to fault; and this is when it itself sins: therefore it does not seem that any sin can be in it without being mortal.

p. 577

CONCLUSION.

It is more probable that venial sin can be in the superior reason.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that in the superior portion of reason there can be only mortal sin, and this on account of its remoteness from the flesh and from sensuality, in which consists the beginning of evil suggestion, and from whose proneness venial sin has its being according to the state7 of fallen nature. And these said that, since there are three grades in the powers of the soul, corresponding to the serpent, the woman, and the man, namely sensuality, the inferior portion, and the superior; it belongs to sensuality to sin only venially, to the superior part only mortally, to the inferior part in both modes. For since it is the mean between both, it tastes of the nature of each.

But since it is plain that in the superior portion of reason there can in some way be disordered motions from surprise; and it is plain also that there is in it some corruption from the contraction of the original [sin]: therefore to others it seems more probable and better that venial sin has its being in the superior reason. Hence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

To the arguments for the opposite:

To 1. To that, then, which is objected, that when the superior part of reason eats8, the sin is damnable and mortal; it must be said that this is understood of full consent, and this in respect of that sin whose act lies in a prohibition, as is the case with the sin of fornication.

To 2. To that which is objected, that with the superior part resides the rule of direction; it must be said that the rule of direction is not taken away by just any sin, but by that which induces divine contempt and turning away from God; but this is not in every sin of the superior part, such as in that which is committed from surprise.

To 3. To that which is objected, that no creature is superior to the soul according to mind; it must be said that, although none is superior according to the order of efficient [cause] and end, there is nevertheless something of greater dignity and of more excellent nature, and on account of this it has less excuse. — Moreover, no rational nature in the state of innocence can sin venially, as was shown above9; but no fallen rational nature can obtain pardon from fault, unless a man on account of the frailty of the flesh; and therefore that which it objects about the Angel does not hold.

To 4. To that which is objected last, that complacency makes a mortal [sin] out of a venial one; it must be said that complacency does not there mean any inclination whatever, but full consent and deliberate, with a certain full repose; and so from this it is not concluded that every disorder of the superior part passes over into the genus10 of mortal sin.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. et ed. 4 addit aut contra; ac subinde cum eisdem sociis post fidei subiicit et.
    The Vatican edition, with one or another codex and ed. 4, adds aut contra (or against); and thereupon, with the same companions, after fidei (of faith) it subjoins et (and).
  2. Rom. 6, 13: Sed neque exhibeatis membra vestra arma iniquitatis peccato etc. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 11.
    Romans 6:13: But neither yield ye your members as weapons of iniquity unto sin, etc. — Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 11.
  3. Vide supra d. 22. a. I. q. I. in corp. et infra d. 31. a. I. q. 2. seq. — Contra meliores codd., ut C L O R S T bb, Vat. debilitet. Paulo inferius pro quam accepit, quae est lectio multorum codd. et ed. 2, Vat. quam accipit, codd. F V quae accidit. Cod. V subinde voci originali addit peccato.
    See above, d. 22, a. I, q. I, in the body, and below, d. 31, a. I, q. 2 f. — Against the better codices, such as C L O R S T bb, the Vatican edition [reads] debilitet (weakens). A little below, for quam accepit (which it received), which is the reading of many codices and ed. 2, the Vatican edition [reads] quam accipit (which it receives), codices F V quae accidit (which befalls). Cod. V thereupon adds to the word originali the word peccato (sin).
  4. Hic c. 11, quod est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. — In fine arg. ante mortale cum codd. F H W X V etc. contra Vat. aliasque edd. posuimus sit pro fit.
    Here c. 11, which is from Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17. — At the end of the argument, before mortale (mortal), with codices F H W X V etc., against the Vatican and the other editions, we have placed sit (be) for fit (becomes).
  5. Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 14. n. 20: Sic enim [mens] ordinata est naturarum ordine, non locorum, ut supra illam non sit nisi ille. Cfr. ibid. XV. c. 1. n. 1; VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 25, et supra pag. 48, nota 3. De minori, quam cod. L cum propos. praeced. coniungit, substituens quod pro sed, vide supra d. 7. p. 1. a. I. q. I. et d. 21. a. 3. q. 1. seq.
    Book XIV of On the Trinity, c. 14, n. 20: For thus [the mind] is ordered by the order of natures, not of places, that there be nothing above it save He. Cf. ibid. XV, c. 1, n. 1; VII of On Genesis to the Letter, c. 19, n. 25, and above p. 48, note 3. On the minor [premise], which cod. L joins with the preceding proposition, substituting quod for sed, see above, d. 7, p. 1, a. I, q. I, and d. 21, a. 3, q. 1 f.
  6. De hac propositione, quae tum in Glossa, 1. Cor. 11, 29 tum in Iure can. 3. d. 25 (ubi in nota adiecta citatur hom. 24. in Ioan.), tum a Scholasticis Augustino tribuitur, cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 12. In libro de Sancta Virginit. c. 30. n. 30 Augustinus ait: Eadem ipsa [parva peccata] fiunt magna et gravia, si eis superbia incrementum et pondus adiecerit.
    On this proposition, which is attributed to Augustine both in the Gloss, 1 Corinthians 11:29, and in the Canon Law 3, d. 25 (where in an added note hom. 24 On John is cited), and also by the Scholastics, cf. here the text of the Master, c. 12. In the book On Holy Virginity, c. 30, n. 30, Augustine says: Those very same [small sins] become great and grave, if pride add to them increase and weight.
  7. Cod. cc et ed. 1 hic interserunt tamen.
    Cod. cc and ed. 1 here insert tamen (nevertheless).
  8. Cod. aa quod cum superior pars consentit.
    Cod. aa [reads] quod cum superior pars consentit (that when the superior part consents).
  9. Dist. 21. a. 3. q. 1. — De praeced. ratione cfr. supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 16. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro excellentis Vat. et edd. 3, 4 excellentioris.
    Distinction 21, a. 3, q. 1. — On the preceding reasoning cf. above, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, for excellentis (of more excellent) the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 [read] excellentioris (of a more excellent).
  10. Ita cod. aa, alii non bene in genere, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 cadat in genus. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Thus cod. aa; others, not well, [read] in genere (in the genus), the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 cadat in genus (passes over into the genus). — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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