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Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 577

ARTICULUS II.

Qualiter peccatum habeat fieri in inferiori parte rationis.

Circa secundum principale, scilicet quo quaeritur, quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in inferiori parte rationis, quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum aliquod peccatum habeat esse in inferiori parte1 absque sensualitate.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum mortale possit esse in ea parte rationis, superiori non peccante.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum aliquod peccatum habeat esse in inferiori parte rationis absque sensualitate.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod nullum peccatum possit esse in inferiori parte rationis absque sensualitate:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini contra Manichaeos2, ubi ait sic: «In unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur nunc, cum ad peccatum quisque dilabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus: serpente, muliere et viro»: ergo si peccatum illud incepit a serpente, et sensualitas est serpens, ut ipse dicit, omne peccatum incipit a sensualitate.

2. Item, sicut omnem consensum praecedit delectatio, ita omnem delectationem praecedit aliqua suggestio; sed nullum peccatum rationis est absque aliqua delectatione: ergo nec delectatio sine suggestione; suggestio autem non est nisi partis sensibilis3 vel serpentis: ergo nullum peccatum est in p. 578inferiori parte rationis, quod non incipiat a sensualitate.

3. Item, inferior ratio non peccat, nisi quia appetit bonum ut nunc; sed vis, quae appetit bonum ut nunc, est sensualitas: ergo non peccat nisi praevia sensualitate.

4. Item, «nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu4»: ergo pari ratione nihil est in ratione, quod prius non fuerit in sensualitate: ergo si ratio deordinatur, necesse fuit, sensualitatem prius deordinari.

5. Item, omnia peccata actualia ortum habent a peccato originali, et potissime a concupiscentia, quae ex originali peccato nobis inolevit; sed tam originale peccatum quam concupiscentia inest animae ex coniunctione sui ad carnem5; vis autem, secundum quam anima coniungitur carni, est ipsa sensualitas: ergo omne peccatum animae incipit a sensualitate: ergo absque ea in inferiori parte rationis peccatum non potest fieri.

Sed contra: 1. Magis est coniuncta superior portio inferiori, quam ipsa inferior portio sensualitati, cum ratio superior et inferior spectent ad eandem potentiam et naturam. Si ergo peccatum potest fieri in superiori parte rationis absque inferiori, sicut supra6 probatum est, videtur multo fortius, quod possit fieri in inferiori absque sensualitate.

2. Item, possibile est, inferiorem partem rationis peccare peccato spirituali, appetendo aliquod spirituale bonum; sed sensualitas non appetit nisi bonum sensuale: ergo potest peccare inferior portio absque sensualitate.

3. Item, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior7: ergo si sensualitas potest de se moveri inordinate ad aliquod appetibile sine viribus superioribus, multo fortius superior potentia, utpote rationis pars inferior, inordinate moveri potest absque sensualitate.

4. Item, in diabolo non est sensualitas, cum non habeat coniungi cum carne; sed constat, quod ipse habet peccare non solum in Deum, sed etiam in hominem. Si ergo peccatum in creaturam attenditur secundum aspectum rationis, quem vocamus inferiorem partem rationis; videtur, quod absque sensualitate contingat illam portionem peccare.

Item, quaeritur iuxta hoc: quid est inferiorem portionem rationis comedere? Et quando delectatio transit a sensualitate in rationem? Si tu dicas, quod hoc est, quando ratio advertit et percipit, se delectari; tunc duplex est inconveniens: unum, quia frequenter homo consummat peccatum et nihil cogitat nisi de appetibili, nec advertit, se delectari vel tristari; et ita videtur, quod aliquis possit peccare mortaliter, ita quod inferior portio non comedat. Aliud etiam inconveniens concluditur, quia, cum percipere delectationem non sit malum nec peccati augmentativum, iam videtur, quod perceptio rationis post suggestionem sensualitatis culpam non aggravaret; quod plane et manifeste falsum nemo esse dubitat.

CONCLUSIO.

Inferior rationis portio aliquo genere peccati peccare potest absque suggestione sensualitatis; tamen in genere peccati carnalis vix, aut nunquam peccat sine sensualitatis motu.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut innuit Magister in fine huius distinctionis8, sensualitas dupliciter potest accipi. Aliquando accipitur pro vi, quae appetit bonum ut nunc; et haec non solummodo est in parte sensibili, immo etiam in rationali. Et sine motu sensualitatis hoc modo dictae nunquam contingit esse peccatum in inferiori parte rationis; semper enim, cum quis peccat, bonum ut nunc exoptat. — Alio modo dicitur sensualitas vis animae sensibilis, qua intenditur in corporis sensus, sicut habitum est supra9. Et sine hac contingit esse peccatum in inferiori parte quantum ad peccata spiritualia; quantum autem ad carnalia vix, aut nunquam. In carnalibus enim10 corruptio venit ex foeditate carnis et concupiscentia partis sensibilis; et ita in eis peccatum incipit a serpente sive a sensualitate et pervenit ad mulierem.

Tunc autem dicitur esse in sensualitate, quando quis ex apprehensione delectabilis oblectatur et inclinatur ante adversionem11 et perceptionem suae delectationis; hoc enim ex surreptione est, nec dicitur ratio aliquo modo propter illam delectationem de vetito cibo gustasse. Sed tunc ratio comedit, et peccatum in ea esse incipit, quando post delectationis adversionem et perceptionem, sensualitati delectanti condelectatur et in delectatione persistit. Ex tunc enim, scilicet post delectationis adversionem, p. 579ratio comedere dicitur, et peccatum transire a sensualitate in ipsam; quoniam, etsi iudicare de delectabili et in eo delectari, hoc sit partis sensibilis, percipere tamen ipsam delectationem interiorem, hoc est partis rationalis. Et ideo ratio comedere dicitur, si post talem perceptionem parti sensibili condelectetur.

Sic igitur concedo, quod aliquo genere peccati peccare potest inferior rationis portio absque suggestione sensualitatis, sicut rationes ad secundam partem inductae ostendunt. Aliquo vero genere peccati vix, aut nunquam peccat, utpote carnalis12, nisi motus sensualitatis praecedat et trahat. Et quantum ad hoc peccati genus loquitur Augustinus contra Manichaeos.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum, quod obiicitur in contrarium.

Ad 2, 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnem delectationem praecedit suggestio; dicendum, quod si suggestio large accipitur ad omnem apprehensionem boni ut nunc sub ratione appetibilis, sic verum est, quod praecedit omnem delectationem. Si vero accipiatur stricte pro illo motu serpentino partis sensibilis, sic non habet veritatem in omnibus peccatis, sed solum in peccatis carnis. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quo dicitur, quod sensualitas est vis appetitiva boni ut nunc; ibi enim accipitur sensualitas large; et sic, ut praeostensum est, absque ea non potest esse peccatum in inferiori portione rationis, quamvis esse possit absque sensualitate dicta proprie, saltem peccatum spirituale.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu; dicendum, quod verum est vel in se, vel in suo simili13. Multa tamen fingit homo, quae nunquam vidit; multa etiam, postquam vidit, cogitat, ita quod illa cogitatio non excitatur a potentia sensitiva movente. Ita etiam intelligi potest de ratione et sensualitate.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia peccata habent ortum ab originali concupiscentia; dicendum, quod etsi omne peccatum quodam modo ex originali ortum habeat, et originale ex carne; non tamen oportet, omne peccatum tanquam ex proximo movente ortum habere ex carne vel sensualitate, pro eo quod originale peccatum non tantum inficit partem sensibilem, immo inficit partem rationalem et corrumpit. Unde concupiscentia respersa est in omnibus viribus animae; et ideo, sive sensualitas sit praeambula, sive non, omnia mala nostra dicuntur provenire ex concupiscentia.

SCHOLION

I. De termino sensualitatis observat S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), «quod differt sensualitas et sensibilitas. Sensibilitas enim omnes vires sensitivae partis comprehendit, tam apprehensivas de foris, quam apprehensivas de intus, quam etiam appetitivas. Sensualitas autem magis proprie illam tantum partem nominat, per quam movetur animal in aliquod appetendum vel fugiendum». Et ibid. ad 2. dicit: «Ad sensualitatem aliquid pertinet dupliciter: vel sicut existens de essentia eius, et sic videtur tantum appetitivam partem continere; vel sicut praeambulum ad ipsam, sicut ratio ad libertatem pertinet». — Paulo aliter S. Bonav. de sensualitate (non de sensibilitate) loquitur, hic dub. 3, cum asserat, quod sensualitas «simul comprehendit sensibiles cognitivas et motivas, sicut et arbitrii libertas». Eadem differentia inter utrumque Doctorem occurrit quoad arbitrii libertatem, de quo vide infra d. 23. p. I. q. 3. 4. De sensualitate diffuse disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 68. m. 1-4.

II. De hac quaest. explicite tractant Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 3.

III. Quoad sequentem quaest. omnes in conclusionibus consentiunt. Durand. (hic q. 6.) addit distinctionem inter delectationem, quae sequitur actum simplicem cogitationis de obiecto pravo, et aliam, quae sequitur actum reflexum, et quae potest esse tum de obiecto principali, tum de secundario, scilicet de cogitatione obiecti; et haec non semper est proprie delectatio morosa et peccatum mortale, immo potest esse sine peccato. — Attentione dignum est quod circa finem responsionis dicitur de consensu interpretativo in proprio sensu, ad quem requiritur, quod quis, postquam periculum satis advertit, delectationem non repellit. — De eadem quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 109. m. 9. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 74. a. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 13. a. 4, q. 74. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 93. m. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 2.

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English Translation
p. 577

ARTICLE II.

In what manner sin comes to be in the inferior part of reason.

Concerning the second principal [point], namely that in which it is asked in what manner sin comes to be and to exist in the inferior part of reason, two [questions] are raised.

First it is asked whether any sin has its being in the inferior part1 without sensuality.

Secondly it is asked whether mortal sin can be in that part of reason, the superior part not sinning.

QUESTION I.

Whether any sin has its being in the inferior part of reason without sensuality.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that no sin can be in the inferior part of reason without sensuality:

1. First by the authority of Augustine Against the Manichees2, where he says thus: «In each one of us nothing else is now done, when anyone slips into sin, than was done then in those three: the serpent, the woman, and the man»: therefore if that sin began from the serpent, and sensuality is the serpent, as he himself says, every sin begins from sensuality.

2. Likewise, just as delectation precedes every consent, so some suggestion precedes every delectation; but no sin of reason is without some delectation: therefore neither is delectation without suggestion; but suggestion belongs only to the sensible part3 or to the serpent: therefore no sin is in the p. 578inferior part of reason which does not begin from sensuality.

3. Likewise, the inferior reason does not sin except because it desires the good as now; but the power which desires the good as now is sensuality: therefore it does not sin except by sensuality going before.

4. Likewise, «there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense4»: therefore by parity of reasoning there is nothing in reason which was not first in sensuality: therefore if reason is disordered, it was necessary that sensuality be disordered first.

5. Likewise, all actual sins have their origin from original sin, and especially from concupiscence, which has grown ingrained in us from original sin; but both original sin and concupiscence are in the soul from its conjunction to the flesh5; but the power according to which the soul is conjoined to the flesh is sensuality itself: therefore every sin of the soul begins from sensuality: therefore without it sin cannot come to be in the inferior part of reason.

On the contrary: 1. The superior portion is more conjoined to the inferior than the inferior portion itself is to sensuality, since the superior and inferior reason pertain to the same power and nature. If therefore sin can come to be in the superior part of reason without the inferior, as was proved above6, it seems much more strongly that it can come to be in the inferior without sensuality.

2. Likewise, it is possible for the inferior part of reason to sin by a spiritual sin, by desiring some spiritual good; but sensuality desires nothing but a sensible good: therefore the inferior portion can sin without sensuality.

3. Likewise, whatever the inferior power can do, the superior power can do7: therefore if sensuality can of itself be moved inordinately toward some object of desire without the superior powers, much more strongly can the superior power, namely the inferior part of reason, be moved inordinately without sensuality.

4. Likewise, in the devil there is no sensuality, since he is not [meant] to be conjoined with flesh; but it is agreed that he can sin not only against God, but also against man. If therefore sin against a creature is regarded according to the aspect of reason which we call the inferior part of reason, it seems that without sensuality it happens that that portion sins.

Likewise, in connection with this it is asked: what is it for the inferior portion of reason to eat? And when does delectation pass over from sensuality into reason? If you say that this is when reason notices and perceives that it is being delighted; then there is a twofold incongruity: one, because frequently a man consummates sin and thinks of nothing but the object of desire, nor notices that he is being delighted or saddened; and so it seems that someone could sin mortally in such a way that the inferior portion does not eat. Another incongruity is also concluded, because, since to perceive delectation is not evil nor augmentative of sin, it now seems that the perception of reason after the suggestion of sensuality would not aggravate the fault; which no one doubts to be plainly and manifestly false.

CONCLUSION.

The inferior portion of reason can sin by some genus of sin without the suggestion of sensuality; yet in the genus of carnal sin it scarcely, or never, sins without a motion of sensuality.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as the Master intimates at the end of this distinction8, sensuality can be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the power which desires the good as now; and this is not only in the sensible part, but also in the rational. And without a motion of sensuality so understood it never happens that there is sin in the inferior part of reason; for always, when someone sins, he longs for the good as now. — In another way sensuality is called the power of the sensible soul by which one is bent toward the senses of the body, as was treated above9. And without this it happens that there is sin in the inferior part as regards spiritual sins; but as regards carnal [sins] scarcely, or never. For in carnal [sins]10 corruption comes from the foulness of the flesh and the concupiscence of the sensible part; and so in them sin begins from the serpent, that is from sensuality, and reaches the woman.

But it is then said to be in sensuality, when someone is delighted from the apprehension of something delectable and is inclined [to it] before the noticing11 and perception of his delectation; for this is from a stealthy onset, nor is reason said in any way, on account of that delectation, to have tasted of the forbidden food. But then reason eats, and sin begins to be in it, when after the noticing and perception of the delectation it takes delight together with the delighting sensuality and persists in the delectation. For from then, namely after the noticing of the delectation, p. 579reason is said to eat, and sin to pass over from sensuality into it; because, although to judge concerning something delectable and to be delighted in it belongs to the sensible part, yet to perceive that interior delectation belongs to the rational part. And therefore reason is said to eat, if after such perception it takes delight together with the sensible part.

Thus therefore I concede that the inferior portion of reason can sin by some genus of sin without the suggestion of sensuality, as the reasons adduced for the second part show. But by some genus of sin it scarcely, or never, sins, namely the carnal12, unless a motion of sensuality precede and draw it. And it is with regard to this genus of sin that Augustine speaks Against the Manichees.

To the arguments:

To 1. And by this the response to the first, which is objected to the contrary, is clear.

To 2 and 3. To that which is objected, that suggestion precedes every delectation; it must be said that if suggestion is taken broadly for every apprehension of the good as now under the aspect of the desirable, thus it is true that it precedes every delectation. But if it is taken strictly for that serpentine motion of the sensible part, thus it does not hold true in all sins, but only in sins of the flesh. — And by this the response to the following [objection] is clear, by which it is said that sensuality is the appetitive power of the good as now; for there sensuality is taken broadly; and thus, as was shown before, without it there cannot be sin in the inferior portion of reason, although there can be [sin] without sensuality properly so called, at least spiritual sin.

To 4. To that which is objected, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense; it must be said that this is true either in itself or in its likeness13. Yet a man imagines many things which he never saw; many things also, after he has seen them, he thinks of, in such a way that that thinking is not excited by a moving sensitive power. So too it can be understood concerning reason and sensuality.

To 5. To that which is objected, that all sins have their origin from original concupiscence; it must be said that, although every sin in some manner has its origin from the original [sin], and the original from the flesh; nevertheless it is not necessary that every sin have its origin from the flesh or sensuality as from a proximate mover, for the reason that original sin not only infects the sensible part, but rather infects and corrupts the rational part. Hence concupiscence is sprinkled throughout all the powers of the soul; and therefore, whether sensuality be the forerunner or not, all our evils are said to come from concupiscence.

Scholion

I. Concerning the term sensuality St. Thomas observes (here q. 2, a. 1) «that sensuality and sensibility differ. For sensibility comprehends all the powers of the sensitive part, both those apprehending from without and those apprehending from within, and also the appetitive [powers]. But sensuality more properly names only that part by which the animal is moved toward something to be desired or to be fled». And in the same place, ad 2, he says: «Something pertains to sensuality in two ways: either as existing from its essence, and thus it seems to contain only the appetitive part; or as a forerunner to it, as reason pertains to liberty». — A little differently does St. Bonaventure speak concerning sensuality (not concerning sensibility), here, dub. 3, when he asserts that sensuality «comprehends at once the sensible cognitive and motive [powers], just as the liberty of choice does». The same difference between the two Doctors occurs as to the liberty of choice, on which see below, d. 23, p. I, q. 3, 4. Alexander of Hales disputes at length concerning sensuality, S. p. II, q. 68, m. 1–4.

II. This question is explicitly treated by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 3.

III. As to the following question, all agree in their conclusions. Durandus (here q. 6) adds a distinction between the delectation which follows a simple act of thinking about an evil object, and another which follows a reflex act, and which can be either about the principal object or about the secondary, namely about the thinking of the object; and this is not always properly a morose delectation and a mortal sin, but rather can be without sin. — Worthy of attention is what is said toward the end of the response about interpretative consent in the proper sense, for which it is required that someone, after he has sufficiently noticed the danger, does not repel the delectation. — On the same question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 109, m. 9. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III, q. 74, a. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 4; S. I-II, q. 13, a. 4, q. 74, a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 13; S. p. II, tr. 13, q. 93, m. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Nempe, ut cod. bb supplet, rationis.
    Namely, as cod. bb supplies, rationis (of reason).
  2. Libr. II. c. 14. n. 21. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 12. — In textu allegato multi codd. cum primis edd. omittunt aliud. Paulo post pro sensualitas plures codd., ut H T V W aa, cum ed. 2 perperam substituunt peccatum.
    Book II [of On Genesis Against the Manichees], c. 14, n. 21. See here the text of the Master, c. 12. — In the quoted text many codices, with the first editions, omit aliud (else). A little after, for sensualitas (sensuality) several codices, such as H T V W aa, with ed. 2 wrongly substitute peccatum (sin).
  3. Vat. et aliae edd. sensualis contra antiquiores codd. Utraque lectio defendi potest; cfr. pag. seq., nota 5.
    The Vatican edition and the other editions [read] sensualis (of the sensual) against the older codices. Either reading can be defended; cf. the following page, note 5.
  4. Secundum Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 39. (c. 8.), et de Sensu et sens. c. 6. Cfr. supra p. I. huius dist. a. 2. q. 4. et infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.
    According to Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 39 (c. 8), and On Sense and the Sensed c. 6. Cf. above, p. I of this distinction, a. 2, q. 4, and below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2.
  5. Cfr. infra d. 31. a. I. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. below, d. 31, a. I, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 1.
  6. Art. praeced. q. 1. — De maiori vide huius dist. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
    The preceding article, q. 1. — On the major [premise] see this distinction, p. I, a. 2, q. 2.
  7. Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4. hoc explicat respectu virtutum intellectualium.
    Boethius, On the Consolation [of Philosophy] V, prose 4, explains this with respect to the intellectual powers.
  8. Cap. 12. — Paulo inferius pro in parte sensibili Vat. et edd. 3, 4 in parte sensuali, quae permutatio vocis sensualis cum voce sensibilis in subsequentibus saepius occurrit in edd. et etiam in nonnullis codd. Secuti sumus semper antiquiores codd., quando utuntur voce sensibilis.
    Chapter 12. — A little below, for in parte sensibili (in the sensible part) the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 [read] in parte sensuali (in the sensual part), which interchange of the word sensualis with the word sensibilis recurs rather often in what follows in the editions and also in some codices. We have always followed the older codices, when they use the word sensibilis.
  9. Hic p. I. a. 2. q. 2, d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. seq., ibid. dub. 4. nec non infra dub. 3. huius dist.
    Here, p. I, a. 2, q. 2; d. 21, a. 2, q. 1 f., ibid. dub. 4; and also below, dub. 3, of this distinction.
  10. Plures codd., ut F aa, cum primis edd. autem.
    Several codices, such as F aa, with the first editions [read] autem (however).
  11. Sive animadversionem. Nam secundum Forcellini (Totius latin. Lexicon) «adverso idem est quod adverto, itaque adversare animo idem est quod advertere, versare animo, animadvertere». Et «adversio animi hoc est animadversio». — Paulo inferius pro nec dicitur ratio cod. cc cum ed. 1 nec dicitur rationalis.
    Or animadversionem (advertence). For according to Forcellini (Lexicon of the whole Latin tongue) «adverso is the same as adverto, and so adversare animo is the same as advertere, versare animo, animadvertere». And «adversio animi is this animadversio». — A little below, for nec dicitur ratio (nor is reason said) cod. cc with ed. 1 [reads] nec dicitur rationalis (nor is it said rational).
  12. Cod. aa voci carnalis praemittit peccati.
    Cod. aa prefixes peccati (of sin) to the word carnalis (carnal).
  13. Sicut v. g. in effectu est similitudo suae causae, et in creatura similitudo Dei. Haec responsio iuvat ad explicanda ea quae infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. in fine de eadem re proponuntur.
    As for example in an effect there is a likeness of its cause, and in a creature a likeness of God. This response helps to explain those things which are proposed below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, at the end, on the same matter. ---
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