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Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum pars inferior possit peccare mortaliter absque superiori.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum pars inferior possit peccare mortaliter absque superiori. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera1: « Si peccatum diu in cogitatione delectationis teneatur, etsi voluntas perficiendi desit, mortale est ». Sed tunc vir non dicitur comedere, nisi quando adest voluntas perficiendi: ergo sola muliere comedente, contingit peccare mortaliter.

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2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera, capitulo illo2: Nec sane etc., quod si sola mulier comedat, totus homo damnatur: sed hoc non est nisi propter peccatum mortale: ergo sola muliere comedente, contingit peccare mortaliter.

3. Item, superior portio rationis dicitur, in quantum nata est aspicere superiora; sed contingit aliquod3 peccatum committere, ita quod nihil cogitemus de legibus aeternis: ergo contingit, aliquem peccare mortaliter solo actu inferioris partis, nihil faciente actu superioris.

4. Item, frequenter offendit quis proximum, nihil cogitans de offensa Dei; sed inferior portio est, secundum quam ordinamur ad proximum, superior, secundum quam ordinamur ad Deum: ergo contingit peccare mortaliter ex actu inferioris partis sine actu superioris.

5. Item, magis prona est ad peccatum inferior portio quam superior, cum ex coniunctione ad sensualitatem mollior sit, et ob hoc mulier nuncupetur: ergo si superior portio rationis potest peccare per se ipsam, multo fortius videtur, quod inferior.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus, duodecimo de Trinitate, et habetur in littera, capitulo illo4: Nec sane etc., ubi dicitur, quod, « cum mens sola cogitatione oblectatur, de talibus cogitationibus venia petenda est pectusque percutiendum et dicendum: Dimitte nobis debita » etc; sed talis est poenitentia venialium: ergo quamdiu mulier comedit absque viro, peccatum est solum veniale.

2. Item5, impossibile est, inferiorem portionem damnari absque superiori; sed superior portio nunquam damnatur sine culpa: ergo impossibile est, inferiorem portionem absque superiori peccare mortaliter.

3. Item, impossibile est, esse peccatum mortale sine consensu; sed consensus residet penes iudicem et arbitrum principalem — haec autem est superior portio rationis, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera6 — ergo etc.

4. Item, impossibile est, aliquem peccare mortaliter sine aversione7; sed eius est averti, cuius est converti, hoc autem est superioris partis: ergo inferiorem portionem absque superiori impossibile est peccare mortaliter.

5. Item, nunquam meretur aliquis in cogitatione boni, nisi proponat illud facere vel complere, si possit8: ergo similiter nunquam aliquis demeretur demerito mortalis peccati in cogitatione mali, nisi proponat illud perficere, si possit; hoc autem non est sine superiori portione rationis: ergo etc.

6. Item, quando aliquod peccatum est veniale, consentire in illud non facit peccatum mortale; sed delectatio carnalis citra consensum est veniale: ergo consentire in delectationem, ita quod non consentiatur in opus, non erit mortale. Si ergo consensus in opus est superioris partis, sicut dicit Augustinus9, nunquam est peccatum mortale in inferiori parte absque superiori. — Quod autem consensus in veniale non faciat mortale, probatur per hoc, quod consensus in verbum otiosum et mendacium iocosum non est mortalis, sed venialis. — Si autem tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia delectatio carnalis via est ad mortale peccatum; tunc ego quaero, quare potius consensus in delectationem attribuitur inferiori parti quam superiori? Et quare consensus in opus potius appropriatur superiori? Cum enim inferioris partis ita bene sit regere membra, sicut et affectiones et alia; videtur, quod ita bene sit in potestate inferioris partis praebere arma iniquitatis peccato10, sicut etiam in delectationem consentire.

Ideo est quaestio, quae differentia sit inter peccare et comedere; et utrum comedere sit idem quod consentire; et quando dicatur mulier comedere, et quando vir; et quando mulier comedendo peccat mortaliter, et quando venialiter. — Non enim videtur illud verbum Augustini11 de comestione viri esse generaliter verum, quod tunc comedit vir, quando praebet arma iniquitatis peccato. Multa enim sunt peccata, quae consummantur in sola cogitatione interna; et tunc comedit, et nulla membra corporis praebentur arma iniquitatis, cum illud peccatum non habeat exerceri per membra corporis.

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Conclusio

Inferior rationis portio non potest mortaliter peccare absque superiori portione rationis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod etsi possibile sit, mulierem comedere absque viro, non tamen est possibile, mulierem peccare mortaliter absque viro, sive inferiorem portionem absque superiori; et hoc patet sic.

Aliud enim est peccatum mortale committere, et aliud cibum vetitum degustare. — Peccatum enim mortale dicit deordinationem a Deo, quae est cum consensu et contemptu; inordinatio autem talis est per aversionem12, et haec est superioris partis. Eius enim est averti, cuius est converti. Consentire autem ad illam potentiam spectat, apud quam residet iudiciaria potestas et regiminis auctoritas. Haec autem est superior portio rationis13; et ideo impossibile est, aliquod peccatum mortale esse in nobis, quod superiori portioni non imputetur, et in quo ipsa non deordinetur, propter naturam peccati mortalis, quae exigit, ibi esse et contemptum aversionis et consensum deliberationis, quorum utrumque est superioris partis. — Est etiam ratio ex istarum potentiarum connexione, quoniam inter superiorem portionem et inferiorem lex coniugii est14, et ideo una tenetur alteram regere et reprimere. Non sic autem est inter sensualitatem et inferiorem portionem; et propter hoc, cum inferior portio deordinatur, negligentiae viri, qui debuit eam reprimere, imputatur, et pariter cum illa culpabilis iudicatur. Sic igitur patet, quod impossibile est, inferiorem portionem rationis absque superiori peccare mortaliter.

Possibile tamen est, unam earum absque altera comedere; et hoc, quia comestio dicit conversionem ad delectationem secundum actum proprium mulieris, aut viri. Contingit autem, rationalem potentiam converti ad delectationem a sensualitate oblatam secundum actum inferioris portionis, ita tamen, quod non convertitur secundum actum superioris; et ita contingit, mulierem comedere, viro non degustante.

Et hoc patet, si attendamus progressum tentationis et delectationis. Primo enim delectabile offertur sive percipitur; secundo vero delectatio advertitur; tertio vero in id, ad quod trahit delectatio, consentitur vel dissentitur. Delectabile percipere est sensualitatis, delectationem advertere est inferioris partis rationis, quae interiores motus et affectus habet diiudicare et cognoscere; hoc enim non est potentiae15 sensitivae. Definire autem, an hoc sit amplectendum vel respuendum, hoc est superioris partis, in qua residet auctoritas iudiciariae potestatis. — Contingit igitur delectari ad apprehensionem delectabilis ante adversionem delectationis; et hoc est sensualitatis et absque dubio est veniale peccatum. Contingit iterum delectari post apprehensionem delectabilis et perceptionem delectationis ante plenum consensum deliberationis; et hoc est inferioris partis et aliquando mortale, aliquando veniale; et tunc dicitur comedere sola mulier. Contingit iterum tertio delectari post apprehensionem delectabilis et adversionem delectationis et post plenum consensum deliberationis; et tunc dicitur comedere vir, et tunc est mortale peccatum in his generibus peccatorum, quorum actus sunt in prohibitione, propter plenum consensum et deordinationem. — Unde cum tentatio inchoat16 a sensualitate, planum est esse veniale; cum consummatur in superiori parte rationis, planum est esse mortale; cum vero sola mulier comedit, potest esse mortale vel veniale; et ideo dubium est discernere, quando sit mortale vel veniale.

Potest tamen discerni hoc modo: quia cum percipitur delectatio, aut statim repellitur, aut retinetur. Si statim repellitur, tunc leve est peccatum. Si vero tenetur, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut quia placet ipsa delectatio et operis consummatio, ita quod est voluntas delectandi in cogitatione et etiam in opere, si facultas adesset; et tunc est17 ibi plenus consensus et peccatum mortale, simul concurrente viri et mulieris comestione. Aut placet delectatio, sed tamen displicet peccati consummatio; et tunc est consensus semiplenus, et tunc dicitur manducare mulier; nihilominus tamen peccat mortaliter, cum in illam consentit delectationem. Aut utrumque displicet, scilicet ipsa interior delectatio et operis consummatio; et tunc aut advertit periculum, aut non advertit. Si non advertit periculum delectationis nec repellit eam, peccat, sed non mortaliter; gravius tamen peccat, quam si statim et18 viriliter repulisset. Aut advertit periculum et delectationem illam non repellit, sed mentem in talibus cogitationibus revolvi sinit; et tunc dicunt magistri, quod peccat mortaliter, quia, quamvis non sit ibi19 consensus verus, est tamen ibi consensus interpretativus; et comedit sola mulier, nihilominus tamen peccatum illud imputatur viro, quia, cum eam compescere debuisset et teneretur, non tamen compescuit20.

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Hoc tamen, quod nunc ultimo dictum est, non est usquequaque certum. Negant enim aliqui, esse mortale in negligentia reprimendi, ubi est displicentia, quantumcumque quis periculum advertat. — Sed tamen securior via tenenda est, quidquid sit rei veritas. Et si cui21 hoc contingat, sanum est consilium, quod de ipso ut de mortali poeniteat; in dubiis enim securior via eligenda est. — Et nota, quod non de quacumque delectatione loquimur, utpote de illa, qua quis delectatur cogitando de pulcritudine mulieris, sed de illa, quae surgit ex cogitatione illius operis nefarii.

Et sic patet, quod mulierem contingit comedere sine viro, pro eo quod vir solum dicitur comedere, quando plenus consensus adest; et tunc dicuntur arma iniquitatis praeberi peccato, quia totus homo ibi ad peccatum incurvatur, sive sit peccatum carnis, sive spiritus. Peccare autem non potest22 mortaliter absque viro, quia non potest esse peccatum sine viri consensu vero, vel interpretativo. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod inferior portio absque superiori non potest peccare mortaliter, licet duae ultimae non cogant. Illae enim ostendunt, quod mulier non potest comedere sine viro, per hoc quod consensum in delectationem dicunt non esse peccatum; quod absque dubio falsum est, sicut dicit Augustinus in littera23.

Nec valet quod obiicit de consensu in bonum24, vel de consensu in verbum otiosum. Primum non valet, quia plura requiruntur ad bonum consummandum quam ad malum perpetrandum; unius enim circumstantiae defectus operationem deformat25. Secundum non valet, quia nullum est ibi periculum in delectatione veniali, cuius actus est venialis; ibi autem periculum est, cum delectatio via est perducens ad peccatum mortale.

Ad illa vero quae ultimo quaerebantur, iam patet responsio ex praedictis, videlicet quae differentia sit inter comestionem et culpae mortalis commissionem. Patet etiam, quando vir dicitur comedere, et quando mulier. Patet enim, quando mulier in comedendo peccat mortaliter, et quando peccat venialiter. Patet etiam, quare26 consensus in delectationem attribuitur mulieri, et consensus in opus viro, quia consensus in operis perpetrationem est plenarius consensus; consensus vero in delectationem absque opere, est consensus semiplenus. Si autem peccatum consisteret in sola delectatione, tunc consensus in delectationem posset esse plenarius consensus; et tunc non tantum esset superioris partis, sed etiam inferioris; unde non tantum dicitur vir consentire, quia movet exteriora membra, sed quia movetur voluntate plenaria. Et hanc circumloquitur Augustinus in eo quod dicit, virum comedere, cum arma iniquitatis peccato praebet.

Ad argumenta: Ad 1, 2. Ad rationes autem, quae adducuntur ad oppositum, quibus ostenditur, quod mulier27 sine viro mortaliter peccare potest; plana est responsio. Nam primae duae auctoritates loquuntur de comestione, non de culpae commissione.

Ad 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur tertio loco28, quod superior portio rationis habet converti ad superiora; dicendum, quod non solum actus eius est ad superna, sed etiam actus eius est discernere et sententiare de his quae fiunt in regno animae, et compescere vires inferiores; et ideo, cum non compescit, imputatur sibi.

Ad 4, 5. Ad duo sequentia similiter patet responsio. Illis enim duabus rationibus ostenditur, quod peccatum potest esse in inferiori portione rationis absque proprio actu rationis superioris29. Et hoc quidem verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod peccatum possit esse in inferiori parte rationis absque superiori, quia ipsa negligentia cohibendi inferiorem partem in sui motus deordinatione reddit ipsam culpabilem, ut saepe dictum est30.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the lower part can sin mortally apart from the higher.

Secondly it is asked whether the lower part can sin mortally apart from the higher. And that it can, it seems.

1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text1: "If a sin be held long in the thought of delight, even if the will to carry it out be lacking, it is mortal." But the man is not said to eat except when the will to carry it out is present: therefore, the woman alone eating, it happens that one sins mortally.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is contained in the text, in that chapter2: Nor indeed etc., that if the woman alone eats, the whole man is damned: but this is only on account of mortal sin: therefore, the woman alone eating, it happens that one sins mortally.

3. Likewise, the higher portion of reason is so called insofar as it is born to look upon higher things; but it happens that one commits some3 sin in such a way that we think nothing of the eternal laws: therefore it happens that someone sins mortally by the act of the lower part alone, the act of the higher doing nothing.

4. Likewise, often one offends his neighbor while thinking nothing of an offense against God; but the lower portion is that according to which we are ordered to our neighbor, the higher that according to which we are ordered to God: therefore it happens that one sins mortally by an act of the lower part without an act of the higher.

5. Likewise, the lower portion is more prone to sin than the higher, since by its conjunction to sensuality it is softer, and for this reason it is called the woman: therefore, if the higher portion of reason can sin through itself, much more it seems that the lower can.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity, and it is contained in the text, in that chapter4: Nor indeed etc., where it is said that, "when the mind is delighted by thought alone, of such thoughts pardon must be sought and the breast struck and one must say: Forgive us our debts" etc; but such is the penance of venial sins: therefore, so long as the woman eats apart from the man, the sin is only venial.

2. Likewise5, it is impossible that the lower portion be damned apart from the higher; but the higher portion is never damned without fault: therefore it is impossible that the lower portion sin mortally apart from the higher.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that there be mortal sin without consent; but consent resides with the judge and the principal arbiter — and this is the higher portion of reason, as Augustine says, and it is contained in the text6 — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible that anyone sin mortally without an aversion7; but it belongs to that one to be turned away whose it is to be turned toward, and this belongs to the higher part: therefore it is impossible for the lower portion to sin mortally apart from the higher.

5. Likewise, no one ever merits in the thought of good unless he proposes to do or accomplish it, if he can8: therefore likewise no one ever demerits with the demerit of mortal sin in the thought of evil, unless he proposes to carry it out, if he can; but this is not without the higher portion of reason: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when some sin is venial, to consent to it does not make a mortal sin; but carnal delight short of consent is venial: therefore to consent to the delight, in such a way that there be no consent to the deed, will not be mortal. If therefore consent to the deed belongs to the higher part, as Augustine says9, there is never mortal sin in the lower part apart from the higher. — And that consent to a venial sin does not make it mortal is proved by this, that consent to an idle word and a jesting lie is not mortal, but venial. — But if you should say that it is not similar, because carnal delight is a way to mortal sin; then I ask, why rather is consent to the delight attributed to the lower part than to the higher? And why is consent to the deed rather appropriated to the higher? For since it belongs to the lower part to govern the members as well as the affections and other things; it seems that it is just as much in the power of the lower part to furnish weapons of iniquity to sin10, as also to consent to the delight.

Therefore the question is, what difference there is between sinning and eating; and whether to eat is the same as to consent; and when the woman is said to eat, and when the man; and when the woman in eating sins mortally, and when venially. — For that saying of Augustine11 about the man's eating does not seem to be generally true, that the man eats then, when he furnishes weapons of iniquity to sin. For there are many sins that are consummated in interior thought alone; and then he eats, and no members of the body are furnished as weapons of iniquity, since that sin is not to be carried out through the members of the body.

Conclusion

The lower portion of reason cannot sin mortally apart from the higher portion of reason.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, although it is possible for the woman to eat apart from the man, it is nevertheless not possible for the woman to sin mortally apart from the man, that is, for the lower portion apart from the higher; and this is shown thus.

For it is one thing to commit a mortal sin, and another to taste forbidden food. — For mortal sin means a turning-away from God, which is with consent and contempt; but such a disorder is through an aversion12, and this belongs to the higher part. For it belongs to that one to be turned away whose it is to be turned toward. But to consent pertains to that power with which the judiciary power and the authority of governance reside. And this is the higher portion of reason13; and therefore it is impossible that any mortal sin be in us that is not imputed to the higher portion, and in which it is not itself disordered, on account of the nature of mortal sin, which requires that there be both the contempt of aversion and the consent of deliberation, each of which belongs to the higher part. — There is also a reason from the connection of these powers, since between the higher portion and the lower there is a law of marriage14, and therefore the one is bound to govern and restrain the other. But it is not so between sensuality and the lower portion; and for this reason, when the lower portion is disordered, it is imputed to the negligence of the man, who ought to have restrained it, and it is judged culpable together with that one. So therefore it is clear that it is impossible for the lower portion of reason to sin mortally apart from the higher.

It is nevertheless possible for one of them to eat apart from the other; and this, because eating means a turning toward the delight according to the proper act of the woman, or of the man. But it happens that the rational power is turned toward the delight offered by sensuality according to the act of the lower portion, yet in such a way that it is not turned according to the act of the higher; and so it happens that the woman eats, while the man does not taste.

And this is clear if we attend to the progress of temptation and delight. For first the delightful thing is offered or perceived; secondly the delight is noticed; thirdly there is consent or dissent to that to which the delight draws. To perceive the delightful thing belongs to sensuality, to notice the delight belongs to the lower part of reason, which has to judge and know the interior motions and affections; for this does not belong to the sensitive15 power. But to define whether this is to be embraced or rejected, this belongs to the higher part, in which the authority of the judiciary power resides. — It happens therefore that one is delighted at the apprehension of the delightful thing before the noticing of the delight; and this belongs to sensuality and is without doubt a venial sin. It happens again that one is delighted after the apprehension of the delightful thing and the perception of the delight, before the full consent of deliberation; and this belongs to the lower part and is sometimes mortal, sometimes venial; and then the woman alone is said to eat. It happens again, thirdly, that one is delighted after the apprehension of the delightful thing and the noticing of the delight and after the full consent of deliberation; and then the man is said to eat, and then it is a mortal sin in those kinds of sins whose acts are under prohibition, on account of the full consent and disorder. — Hence, when the temptation begins16 from sensuality, it is plainly venial; when it is consummated in the higher part of reason, it is plainly mortal; but when the woman alone eats, it can be mortal or venial; and therefore it is doubtful to discern when it is mortal or venial.

It can nevertheless be discerned in this way: that when the delight is perceived, either it is at once repelled, or it is retained. If it is at once repelled, then the sin is light. But if it is held, this can be in three ways: either because the delight itself and the consummation of the deed are pleasing, in such a way that there is a will to take delight in thought and also in deed, if the opportunity were present; and then there is17 full consent there and mortal sin, the eating of man and woman concurring together. Or the delight is pleasing, yet the consummation of the sin is displeasing; and then the consent is half-full, and then the woman is said to eat; nevertheless she sins mortally, since she consents to that delight. Or both are displeasing, namely the interior delight itself and the consummation of the deed; and then either he notices the danger, or he does not notice it. If he does not notice the danger of the delight nor repel it, he sins, but not mortally; yet he sins more gravely than if he had at once and18 manfully repelled it. Or he notices the danger and does not repel that delight, but lets the mind dwell in such thoughts; and then the masters say that he sins mortally, because, although there is no true consent there19, there is nevertheless interpretative consent there; and the woman alone eats, yet nevertheless that sin is imputed to the man, because, when he ought to have checked her and was bound to, he nevertheless did not check her20.

This, however, which has just now lastly been said, is not altogether certain. For some deny that there is anything mortal in the negligence of restraining, where there is displeasure, however much one notices the danger. — But nevertheless the safer way is to be held, whatever the truth of the matter may be. And if this should befall anyone21, it is sound counsel that he do penance for it as for a mortal sin; for in doubtful matters the safer way is to be chosen. — And note that we are not speaking of just any delight, such as that by which one is delighted in thinking of the beauty of a woman, but of that which arises from the thought of that nefarious deed.

And so it is clear that the woman happens to eat apart from the man, for the reason that the man alone is said to eat when full consent is present; and then the weapons of iniquity are said to be furnished to sin, because the whole man is there bent down to sin, whether it be a sin of the flesh or of the spirit. But she cannot22 sin mortally apart from the man, because there cannot be sin without the true or interpretative consent of the man. — Therefore the reasons are to be granted that show that the lower portion cannot sin mortally apart from the higher, although the last two do not compel. For they show that the woman cannot eat without the man, by this, that they say that consent to the delight is not a sin; which is without doubt false, as Augustine says in the text23.

Nor is what he objects about consent to a good thing24, or about consent to an idle word, valid. The first is not valid, because more is required for accomplishing a good than for perpetrating an evil; for the defect of one circumstance deforms the operation25. The second is not valid, because there is no danger in venial delight, whose act is venial; but there is danger there, when the delight is a way leading to mortal sin.

But to those things that were lastly asked, the response is already clear from what has been said, namely what difference there is between eating and the commission of mortal fault. It is also clear when the man is said to eat, and when the woman. For it is clear when the woman in eating sins mortally, and when she sins venially. It is also clear why26 consent to the delight is attributed to the woman, and consent to the deed to the man, because consent to the perpetration of the deed is full consent; but consent to the delight without the deed is half-full consent. But if the sin consisted in the delight alone, then consent to the delight could be full consent; and then it would belong not only to the higher part, but also to the lower; whence the man is not only said to consent because he moves the exterior members, but because he is moved by the full will. And Augustine circumlocutes this in what he says, that the man eats when he furnishes weapons of iniquity to sin.

To the arguments: To 1 and 2. As to the reasons that are adduced to the opposite, by which it is shown that the woman27 can sin mortally without the man; the response is plain. For the first two authorities speak of eating, not of the commission of fault.

To 3. As to that which is objected in the third place28, that the higher portion of reason has to be turned toward higher things; it must be said that not only is its act directed to the supernal things, but its act is also to discern and pass sentence concerning those things that are done in the kingdom of the soul, and to check the lower powers; and therefore, when it does not check, it is imputed to it.

To 4 and 5. To the two following the response is likewise clear. For by those two reasons it is shown that sin can be in the lower portion of reason apart from a proper act of the higher reason29. And this indeed is true; but nevertheless from this it does not follow that sin can be in the lower part of reason apart from the higher, because the very negligence of restraining the lower part in the disorder of its motion renders it culpable, as has often been said30.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo superius cod. bb post immo addit etiam.
    Cf. above, d. 22, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — A little above, codex bb after immo adds etiam.
  2. Cap. 12, et sumtum est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17.
    Chapter 12, and it is taken from Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17.
  3. Cod. aa voci carnalis praemittit peccati.
    Codex aa prefixes peccati to the word carnalis.
  4. Cap. 12. circa medium, et est etiam ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18. — In minori pro propter, quod in plurimis codd. et in ed. 1 legitur, Vat. per.
    Chapter 12, near the middle, and it is also from Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 18. — In the minor premise, for propter, which is read in very many codices and in ed. 1, the Vatican edition has per.
  5. Cod. F aliquem, et dein cogitet pro cogitemus; codd. X Z ee ante aliquod interserunt aliquem.
    Codex F reads aliquem, and then cogitet for cogitemus; codices X Z ee insert aliquem before aliquod.
  6. Est cap. 12. August. verba habentur XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18. — Textus s. Scripturae est Matth. 6, 12. — Verbis Augustini hic allatis cod. F addit: sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. cap. 71, ubi dicit: « De quotidianis [autem brevibus] levibusque peccatis, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur [quotidiana], oratio fidelium satisfacit. Eorum enim est dicere: Pater noster, qui es in caelis » etc: Tamen potest dici ad istud: quod Augustinus in 12. de Trin. aliter et aliter sumit istum consensum post et ante, quia cum dicit, quod pro tali peccato dicendum est: Dimitte nobis etc., loquitur ante deliberationem animae, quia tunc est venialis; quando autem dicit, quod propter talem consensum totus homo damnatur, loquitur post deliberationem; quod patet, quia dicit, quod vir debuit cohibere mulierem; et ideo intelligitur ex hoc iam huiusmodi cogitationem ad virum pervenisse, ad quem pertinet deliberatio et iudicium faciendorum, et tunc est mortale.
    It is chapter 12. Augustine's words are found in On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 18. — The text of Holy Scripture is Matthew 6:12. — To Augustine's words adduced here codex F adds: as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chapter 71, where he says: "For the daily, brief and light sins, without which this [daily] life is not led, the prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction. For it belongs to them to say: Our Father, who art in heaven" etc: Yet it can be said to this: that Augustine in book 12 of On the Trinity takes this consent variously, after and before, because when he says that for such a sin one must say Forgive us etc., he is speaking before the deliberation of the soul, since then it is venial; but when he says that on account of such consent the whole man is damned, he is speaking after the deliberation; which is clear, because he says that the man ought to have restrained the woman; and therefore it is understood from this that such a thought has already come to the man, to whom belong the deliberation and judgment of things to be done, and then it is mortal.
  7. Nonnulli codd. cum Vat. hic adiungunt et contemptum, ed. 3 omittit aversionem et.
    Some codices with the Vatican edition here add et contemptum; ed. 3 omits aversionem et.
  8. Cod. X addit ut dicit Augustinus.
    Codex X adds as Augustine says.
  9. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 8.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 8.
  10. Codd. F T et nonnulli alii possibile. Immediate ante pro hoc enim Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 hoc autem. Proxime post pro an hoc plures codd., ut F V W Y aa bb, utrum hoc. Dein post primum contingit ed. 1 autem pro igitur, cod. aa nec autem nec igitur.
    Codices F T and some others read possibile. Immediately before, for hoc enim the Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 reads hoc autem. Just after, for an hoc several codices, such as F V W Y aa bb, read utrum hoc. Then after the first contingit, ed. 1 reads autem for igitur, codex aa neither autem nor igitur.
  11. Cap. 12, et est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. Cfr. etiam in eodem cap. Magistri alium textum Augustini, sumtum ex II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. seq. — Pro arbitrum principalem plures codd., inter quos F K aa bb cc ee, et ed. 1 arbitrium principale.
    Chapter 12, and it is from Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17. Cf. also in the same chapter of the Master another text of Augustine, taken from On Genesis against the Manichees II, c. 14, n. 20 ff. — For arbitrum principalem several codices, among them F K aa bb cc ee, and ed. 1 read arbitrium principale.
  12. Cap. 12. et est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. seq.
    Chapter 12, and it is from Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17 ff.
  13. Codd. I bb inchoatur. Post pauca pro in superiori parte rationis plures codd., inter quos H K T aa ee, cum ed. 1 in superioris rationis parte.
    Codices I bb read inchoatur. A little after, for in superiori parte rationis several codices, among them H K T aa ee, with ed. 1 read in superioris rationis parte.
  14. Codd. H T esset.
    Codices H T read esset.
  15. Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt et. Subinde post periculum cod. O repetit delectationis.
    Codex cc and ed. 1 omit et. Thereupon after periculum codex O repeats delectationis.
  16. Codd. H I T illud.
    Codices H I T read illud.
  17. Cod. aa non eam compescit.
    Codex aa reads non eam compescit.
  18. Cod. aa alicui. Paulo inferius pro eligenda est ed. 1 tenenda est, et post pauca quae consurgit pro quae surgit.
    Codex aa reads alicui. A little below, for eligenda est ed. 1 reads tenenda est, and after a little quae consurgit for quae surgit.
  19. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 dicitur.
    The Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 reads dicitur.
  20. Cap. 11.
    Chapter 11.
  21. Respicitur fundam. 5. Plures codd. et edd. 3, 4 nec non Vat., hoc non attendentes, pro voce bonum substituerunt mendacium; perperam, cum lectio sic mutata neque subnexis verbis respondeat neque praecedentibus, nempe illis: licet duae ultimae non cogant. Aliquanto inferius in resp. ad secund. obiect. aliqui codd. cum Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt perducens.
    Reference is made to the fifth foundation. Several codices and edd. 3, 4, as well as the Vatican edition, not attending to this, substituted mendacium for the word bonum; wrongly, since the reading thus altered corresponds neither to the words appended nor to those preceding, namely those: although the last two do not compel. Somewhat below in the reply to the second objection some codices with the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 omit perducens.
  22. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6; Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 30.
    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 6; Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 30.
  23. Plures codd., inter quos F K Q cc, et ed. 1 quando.
    Several codices, among them F K Q cc, and ed. 1 read quando.
  24. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 quod comedens mulier.
    The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads quod comedens mulier.
  25. In pluribus codd. nec non in primis edd. deest loco. Mox pro superna codd. F bb superiora; dein pro discernere multi codd. decernere.
    In several codices and in the first editions loco is lacking. Soon for superna codices F bb read superiora; then for discernere many codices read decernere.
  26. In praestantioribus codd. ut in ed. 1 non bene omittitur superioris, et in edd. 2, 3 desiderantur verba quod peccatum potest usque ad sequitur.
    In the better codices, as in ed. 1, superioris is not well omitted, and in edd. 2, 3 the words quod peccatum potest down to sequitur are lacking.
  27. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
  28. Respicitur fundamentum tertium. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 12.
    Reference is made to the third foundation. — See here the text of the Master, c. 12.
  29. Respiciuntur fundamenta quartum et quintum.
    Reference is made to the fourth and fifth foundations.
  30. Ut supra in corp. dictum est circa finem responsionis.
    As was said above in the body, near the end of the response. ---
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