← Back to Distinction 24

Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 583

ARTICULUS III.

Quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in sensualitate.

Consequenter circa tertium, quo quaeritur, quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in sensualitate, duo quaeruntur.

Primo enim quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum veniale.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse mortale.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum in sensualitate possit esse veniale peccatum.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod in sensualitate possit esse veniale peccatum:

1. Primo per illud Augustini, duodecimo de Trinitate, quod recitat Magister in littera1: «Si in motu sensuali tantum peccati illecebra teneatur, veniale est».

2. Item, super illud Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto2: Septies in die etc., Glossa: «Per necessitatem et fragilitatem carnis singulis diebus vel inviti, vel volentes peccamus». Si ergo peccamus inviti voluntate rationali, illud peccatum non est in voluntate, sed solum in sensualitate.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Motus ad illicitum est inordinatus, et ita reprehensibilis et malus; sed primi motus sunt huiusmodi: ergo primi motus sunt peccata. Sed primi motus sunt in sensualitate: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne quod est ordinabile secundum regulam iustitiae, quando deordinatur, habet in se culpam; sed sensualitas ordinabilis est secundum regulam iustitiae, et contingit, eam deordinari3 in motibus suis: videtur ergo, quod ipsa efficiatur culpabilis.

Contra: 1. Augustinus quinto de Civitate Dei4 distinguit triplex genus causae: quaedam est, quae tantum facit, et haec est Deus; quaedam, quae tantum fit, ut natura; quaedam, quae facit et fit, ut arbitrii libertas sive voluntas. Et in prima causa non potest esse peccatum propter sui dignitatem; in secunda non potest esse peccatum propter sui arctationem: cum ergo sensualitatis sit potius moveri quam movere, agi quam agere, videtur, quod in ea peccatum non possit esse.

2. Item, in culpis differimus a brutis: ergo impossibile est, in nobis esse peccatum secundum id, secundum quod communicamus cum brutis; hoc autem est sensualitas5: ergo etc.

3. Item, stulti et furiosi habent usum sensualitatis, et tamen in nullo suo actu peccant: ergo peccatum nunquam est in nobis ex deordinatione sensualitatis: ergo nullum peccatum in sensualitate ponendum est.

4. Item, in ea sola potentia nata est esse culpa6, secundum quam homo capax est laudis et vituperii; sed quantum ad partem sensibilem homo nec est dignus laude nec vituperio: ergo secundum illam non potest inesse culpa.

Conclusio.

Veniale peccatum, quatenus habet rationem culpae, est in libero arbitrio; quatenus habet rationem vitii, ponitur esse in sensualitate.

Respondeo: Ad huius intelligentiam notandum est, quod cum quaeritur, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in sensualitate, respondetur communiter, quod sensualitas dupliciter potest considerari: aut in se, aut prout est ordinabilis a ratione et sub ratione. Si in se consideretur, hoc modo habet usum in furiosis, et hoc modo dicit Augustinus7, quod in ea communicamus cum brutis. Et sic non potest in ea esse peccatum, sicut rationes ad secundam partem ostendunt. — Alio modo est loqui de sensualitate, secundum quod ipsa ordinabilis est ad rationem et sub ratione; et hoc modo habet regulari secundum legem8 iustitiae. Et sic, quando movetur ad illicitum, ipsa eius deordinatio habet esse peccatum; et sic communiter tenetur, quod etsi in sensualitate secundum se considerata peccatum esse non possit, potest tamen in ea esse peccatum, ut est ad rationem ordinata. Et per hoc declarari9 possunt argumenta ad utramque partem inducta.

Verumtamen adhuc restat quaestio, qualiter in sensualitate possit esse peccatum et culpa, cum nullo modo ponatur in ea esse virtus vel gratia; et propterea perscrutari volentibus hanc quaestionem interius10, duplex apparebit modus dicendi.

p. 584Fuerunt namque aliqui, qui dixerunt, quod etiam in sensualitate ordinata ad rationem non omnino ponendum est esse peccatum, sed aliquo modo secundum quid. Peccatum enim duo dicit, videlicet actum et deordinationem circa actum. Et licet peccatum dicatur esse in sensualitate ratione actus substrati et ratione motus, tamen ipsa deordinatio est in ratione, quae minus cauta et sollicita fuit praevidere, ne talis motus inordinatus in sensualitate insurgeret, vel etiam minus diligens est reprimere. Ideo illa deordinatio peccatorum venialium ponitur in ipsa ratione, quae sensualitatem neglexit regere. Imputatur autem ei in veniale, non in mortale, propter hoc, quod non tenebatur ipsam compescere ex lege coniugii, sicut tenetur ratio superior respectu inferioris11. — Sed iste modus dicendi minus sufficiens esse videtur: primo, quia secundum hoc omnia peccata venialia potius essent ex omissione quam ex inordinata inclinatione. Secundo, quia quaedam sunt venialia, quae ratio vitare non potest, sicut dicit Augustinus, et ostenditur infra12. Tertio vero, quia ibi est deordinatio, ubi est et actus, qui deordinatur; et ita, si motus et actus peccati in sensualitate ponitur, in ea debet poni et inordinatio.

Propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod est loqui de peccato, in quantum habet rationem culpae, et in quantum habet rationem vitii. In quantum habet rationem culpae, sic opponitur gratiae et facit illum, in quo est13, esse dignum vituperio; et hoc modo omne peccatum est in libero arbitrio. Alio modo est considerare peccatum, in quantum tenet rationem vitii; et sic dicit inordinationem alicuius potentiae respectu actus sibi debiti secundum suam naturalem institutionem; et quia talis deordinatio habet esse in sensualitate, ita quod illa deordinatio est via ad opus vituperio dignum, sic ponitur, in sensualitate esse peccatum. — Per hanc autem distinctionem manifesta est quaestionis intentio et omnium obiectionum praecedentium dissolutio. Hoc autem melius denudabitur infra14, quando agetur de subiecto virtutis et gratiae, et de oppositione virtutis et culpae.

Scholion

I. Primam opinionem S. Thom. absolute approbat, quam tenet etiam S. Bonav., sed cum distinctione, quam saepius Magister (cfr. infra d. XXXI. c. 6.), secutus Augustinum, facit inter culpam et vitium. Hanc distinctionem ipse S. Bonav. etiam alibi adhibet et explicat his verbis: «Nam peccatum dicit culpam, vitium dicit culpae sequelam» (III. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. I. ad I, cfr. ibid. ad 3.). Et iterum (infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.): «Peccatum de sua ratione duo dicit: dicit enim deordinationem sive privationem ordinis circa actum alicuius potentiae; dicit nihilominus illam deordinationem ut dignam vituperatione et punitione. Et quantum ad primum peccatum tenet rationem vitii aliquo modo corrumpentis; quantum ad secundum tenet rationem culpae et demeriti». — Quibus modis peccatum referri possit ad voluntatem et esse voluntarium, explicatur infra d. 41. a. 2. q. I. — Satis ad mentem S. Doctoris, sed aliis verbis, Richard. a Med. (II. Sent. d. 21. a. 2. q. 3.) quatuor terminos, quorum frequenter unus accipitur pro alio, ita explicat: «Vitium est carentia habitualis dispositionis convenientis naturae rei... Peccatum vero est actus, vel carentia rectitudinis in actu, ex eo quod declinat a regula sua; unde in naturalibus monstra dicuntur peccata, eo quod declinant a recta regula naturae; similiter in artificialibus dicitur peccatum in effectu, cum declinat ab artis regula; in moralibus est peccatum in actu, cum declinat a regula rationis rectae. — Culpa autem est in actu non recto, in quantum est in voluntatis potestate. — Demeritum autem est culpa in comparatione ad retributionem. Et sic vides, quod omne demeritum est culpa, et omnis culpa est peccatum, et omne peccatum est vitium; sed non convertitur». — Idem (hic a. 4. q. I.) ad ipsam quaestionem respondet: «Ego autem dico, quod inordinatio sensualitatis potest esse sine omni culpa, si voluntas non est causa illius inordinationis nec omittendo nec committendo, nec antecedenter nec concomitanter. Quandoque autem est culpa venialis materialiter in sensualitate, formaliter autem nunquam, sed in voluntate, et hoc est, quando insurgit inordinatio in sensualitate per negligentiam voluntatis... Semper tamen inordinatio sensualitatis in nobis vitium est et peccatum, secundum quod peccatum distinguitur contra culpam et demeritum». — Fere in eodem sensu videtur intelligendus S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 74. a. 3. ad 3.), qui dicit: «Talis motus sensualitatis rationem praeveniens est peccatum veniale, quod est quiddam imperfectum in genere peccati». Aegid. etiam R. (hic p. II. q. I. a. 2.) vult, «quod primi motus, qui pertinent ad sensualitatem et oriuntur ex rebellione carnis, non solum sunt poenae peccati, sed etiam sunt peccatum». Uterque autem excipit motus pure naturales, qui sunt sine imaginatione.

II. De hac et seq. quaestione simul tractant praeter citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 68. m. 4. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 74. a. 3. 4. — S. Thom., praeter locum cit. hic q. 3. a. 2, et de seq. q.; S. loc. cit. a. 4. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 9; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 92. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. a. I.

---

English Translation

Article III.

How sin comes to be and exists in sensuality.

Next, concerning the third point — by which it is asked how sin comes to be and exists in sensuality — two questions are raised.

For first it is asked whether there can be venial sin in sensuality.

Secondly it is asked whether there can be mortal sin in sensuality.

Question I.

Whether there can be venial sin in sensuality.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that there can be venial sin in sensuality:

1. First, by that statement of Augustine, in the twelfth book On the Trinity, which the Master recites in the text1: «If the enticement of sin be held only in the sensual motion, it is venial».

2. Likewise, upon that text of Proverbs, chapter twenty-four2: Seven times a day etc., the Gloss says: «Through the necessity and frailty of the flesh we sin each day, whether unwilling or willing». If therefore we sin against our rational will, that sin is not in the will, but only in sensuality.

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason. A motion toward what is illicit is disordered, and so reprehensible and evil; but first motions are of this kind: therefore first motions are sins. But first motions are in sensuality: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is ordinable according to the rule of justice has fault in itself when it is disordered; but sensuality is ordinable according to the rule of justice, and it happens that it be disordered3 in its motions: it seems therefore that it becomes culpable.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, in the fifth book On the City of God4, distinguishes a threefold kind of cause: there is one that only makes, and this is God; one that is only made, as nature; one that both makes and is made, as the liberty of choice or the will. And in the first cause there cannot be sin on account of its dignity; in the second there cannot be sin on account of its constraint: since therefore it belongs to sensuality rather to be moved than to move, to be acted upon than to act, it seems that sin cannot be in it.

2. Likewise, in faults we differ from beasts: therefore it is impossible that there be sin in us according to that in which we have a common nature with beasts; but this is sensuality5: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the foolish and the frenzied have the use of sensuality, and yet in none of their acts do they sin: therefore sin is never in us from the disorder of sensuality: therefore no sin is to be placed in sensuality.

4. Likewise, fault is born to be only in that power6 according to which a man is capable of praise and blame; but as regards the sensible part a man is worthy neither of praise nor of blame: therefore according to it fault cannot be present.

Conclusion.

Venial sin, insofar as it has the character of fault, is in free choice; insofar as it has the character of vice, it is placed in sensuality.

I respond: For the understanding of this it must be noted that, when it is asked whether venial sin can be in sensuality, the common reply is that sensuality can be considered in two ways: either in itself, or as it is ordinable by reason and under reason. If it be considered in itself, in this mode it has its use in the frenzied, and in this mode Augustine says7 that in it we have a common nature with beasts. And so there cannot be sin in it, as the reasons for the second part show. — In another way one speaks of sensuality according as it is ordinable to reason and under reason; and in this mode it can be regulated according to the law8 of justice. And so, when it is moved toward what is illicit, its very disorder comes to be a sin; and so it is commonly held that, although in sensuality considered in itself sin cannot be, nevertheless sin can be in it as it is ordered to reason. And by this the arguments adduced for either part can be made clear9.

Nevertheless there still remains the question how there can be sin and fault in sensuality, since in no way is virtue or grace placed in it; and therefore, to those willing to examine this question more inwardly10, a twofold mode of speaking will appear.

p. 584For there were some who said that even in sensuality ordered to reason sin is not altogether to be placed, but in some way according to something. For sin states two things, namely the act and the disorder concerning the act. And although sin is said to be in sensuality by reason of the underlying act and by reason of the motion, nevertheless the disorder itself is in reason, which was less cautious and careful to foresee, lest such a disordered motion should arise in sensuality, or which is also less diligent in repressing it. Therefore that disorder of venial sins is placed in reason itself, which neglected to govern sensuality. But it is imputed to it as venial, not as mortal, on this account: that it was not bound to restrain it by the law of marriage, as the superior reason is bound with respect to the inferior11. — But this mode of speaking seems to be less sufficient: first, because according to it all venial sins would be rather from omission than from disordered inclination. Secondly, because there are certain venial sins which reason cannot avoid, as Augustine says, and as is shown below12. And thirdly, because disorder is there where there is also an act that is disordered; and so, if the motion and act of sin be placed in sensuality, the disorder too ought to be placed in it.

Therefore there is another mode of speaking, namely to speak of sin insofar as it has the character of fault, and insofar as it has the character of vice. Insofar as it has the character of fault, it is thus opposed to grace and makes the one in whom it is13 worthy of blame; and in this mode every sin is in free choice. In another way sin is to be considered insofar as it holds the character of vice; and thus it states the disorder of some power with respect to the act due to it according to its natural institution; and because such a disorder has its being in sensuality, so that that disorder is the way to a work worthy of blame, so it is placed that sin is in sensuality. — And by this distinction the intention of the question and the resolution of all the preceding objections is made manifest. But this will be better laid bare below14, when treatment is made of the subject of virtue and grace, and of the opposition of virtue and fault.

Scholion

I. S. Thomas absolutely approves the first opinion, which S. Bonaventure also holds, but with the distinction that the Master often (cf. below, d. XXXI, c. 6) makes, following Augustine, between fault and vice. S. Bonaventure himself also employs and explains this distinction elsewhere in these words: «For sin states fault, vice states the sequel of fault» (III. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. I. ad 1, cf. ibid. ad 3). And again (below, d. 41. a. 2. q. 2): «Sin of its very nature states two things: for it states the disorder or privation of order concerning the act of some power; it states nonetheless that disorder as worthy of blame and punishment. And as to the first, sin holds the character of a vice in some way corrupting; as to the second, it holds the character of fault and demerit». — In what modes sin can be referred to the will and be voluntary is explained below, d. 41. a. 2. q. I. — Quite in accord with the mind of the holy Doctor, but in other words, Richard of Mediavilla (II. Sent. d. 21. a. 2. q. 3) explains four terms, of which frequently one is taken for another, thus: «Vice is the lack of a habitual disposition befitting the nature of the thing... But sin is an act, or a lack of rectitude in an act, from the fact that it deviates from its rule; whence in natural things monsters are called sins, because they deviate from the right rule of nature; likewise in artificial things a sin is said to be in the effect, when it deviates from the rule of art; in moral matters there is sin in the act, when it deviates from the rule of right reason. — But fault is in an act not right, insofar as it is in the power of the will. — And demerit is fault in comparison to retribution. And thus you see that every demerit is fault, and every fault is sin, and every sin is vice; but it does not convert». — The same author (here, a. 4. q. I) replies to the question itself: «But I say that the disorder of sensuality can be without any fault, if the will is not the cause of that disorder either by omitting or by committing, neither antecedently nor concomitantly. But sometimes there is venial fault materially in sensuality, formally however never, but in the will, and this is when disorder arises in sensuality through the negligence of the will... Yet always the disorder of sensuality in us is vice and sin, according as sin is distinguished against fault and demerit». — In nearly the same sense S. Thomas seems to be understood (S. I. II. q. 74. a. 3. ad 3), who says: «Such a motion of sensuality preceding reason is venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin». Giles of Rome also (here, p. II. q. I. a. 2) holds «that first motions, which pertain to sensuality and arise from the rebellion of the flesh, are not only penalties of sin, but are also sin». But each excepts the purely natural motions, which are without imagination.

II. On this and the following question there treat together, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 68. m. 4. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III. q. 74. a. 3. 4. — S. Thomas, besides the place cited, here q. 3. a. 2, and on the following q.; S. loc. cit. a. 4. — B. Albert, on this and the following q. here a. 9; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 92. m. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following q. here q. 4. a. I.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 9. Verba August. exstant XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17.
    Chapter 9. The words of Augustine occur in On the Trinity XII, c. 12, n. 17.
  2. Vers. 16: Septies enim cadet iustus et resurget. Glossam vide apud Lyranum; convenit cum verbis Rabani in hunc locum. Apud Lyranum in Glossa post volentes adiectum est frequenter. — Dein in conclus. edd., excepta I, post secundum voluntate repetunt rationali.
    Verse 16: For seven times shall the just man fall and rise again. See the Gloss in Lyra; it agrees with the words of Rabanus on this passage. In Lyra's Gloss, after willing the word frequently is added. — Then in the conclusion the editions, except I, after according to the will repeat rational.
  3. Plures codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 ordinari, lectio aperte incongrua.
    Several codices with the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 read ordinari ("to be ordered"), a reading plainly incongruous.
  4. Cap. 9. n. 4; Causa itaque rerum, quae facit nec fit, Deus est. Aliae vero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales. Corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam faciunt etc.
    Chapter 9, n. 4; The cause of things, therefore, which makes and is not made, is God. But the other causes both make and are made, as are all created spirits, especially the rational ones. But corporeal causes, which are made rather than make etc.
  5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. 8. et 13. — Paulo superius codd. DHT aa omittunt secundum id; in Vat. et edd. 2, 3 propositio legitur sic: esse peccatum secundum illud quod communicamus etc.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, 8 and 13. — A little above, codices DHT aa omit according to that; in the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3 the proposition reads thus: that there is sin according to that in which we have a common nature etc.
  6. Cod. X hic non bene addit in qua potest esse eius oppositum, scilicet gratia. Deinde pro capax est laudis et vituperii codd. cum primis edd. capax est laude et vituperio. Demum in fine arg. pro inesse culpa nonnulli codd. cum edd. esse culpa.
    Codex X here not well adds in which its opposite can be, namely grace. Then for capable of praise and blame the codices with the first editions read capable of praise and blame (in the ablative). Finally at the end of the argument, for fault be present some codices with the editions read be fault.
  7. Libr. XII. de Trin. c. 1. 3. et 12. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. 8. et 13. — Paulo inferius pro ad secundam partem codd. cum edd. I, 2 ad primam partem; perperam.
    Book XII On the Trinity c. 1, 3 and 12. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, 8 and 13. — A little below, for for the second part the codices with editions I, 2 read for the first part; wrongly.
  8. Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. et edd. 3, 4 regulam. Subinde pro ad illicitum cod. T ad aliquem illicitum actum, et immediate post pro ipsa eius deordinatio codd. A M in ipsa eius deordinatione, et pro habet Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 potest.
    The Vatican edition with one codex or another and editions 3, 4 read the rule. Thereupon for toward what is illicit codex T reads toward some illicit act, and immediately after, for its very disorder codices A M read in its very disorder, and for has the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads can.
  9. Multi codd. declinari, plures alii cum edd. 2, 3 determinari, cod. aa sic: et per hoc responderi potest ad argumenta etc.
    Many codices read declinari, several others with editions 2, 3 determinari, codex aa thus: and through this a reply can be made to the arguments etc.
  10. Edd. 2, 3 et Vat. ulterius.
    Editions 2, 3 and the Vatican edition read further.
  11. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. seqq. — Vat., in principio huius propos. pro autem substituto enim, mox ante tenebatur cum nonnullis codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittit non, qua vocula omissa, vis argumenti frangitur. Deinde eadem Vat. loco respectu inferioris ponit inferiorem.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7 ff. — The Vatican edition, at the beginning of this proposition substituting enim ("for") for autem ("but"), then before was bound with some codices and editions 2, 3, 4 omits not; with this little word omitted, the force of the argument is broken. Then the same Vatican edition, in place of with respect to the inferior, puts the inferior.
  12. Dist. 41. a. 2. q. I, ubi etiam, et quidem in corp. quaest. nec non in argg. ad opp., dictum Augustini, quod hic respicitur, et habetur III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51. seqq., affertur et explicatur.
    Distinction 41, a. 2, q. I, where also — and indeed in the body of the question as well as in the arguments to the contrary — the saying of Augustine, which is referred to here, and is found in On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 51 ff., is adduced and explained.
  13. Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 supprimunt in quo est.
    Not a few codices with editions 1, 2, 3 suppress in whom it is.
  14. Dist. 26. q. 3, d. 31. a. I. q. 2, d. 32. a. 2. q. I, d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. — Denudabitur idem est ac manifestabitur; cfr. de hoc Forcellini, Lexicon etc. Pro denudabitur edd. determinabitur.
    Distinction 26, q. 3; d. 31, a. I, q. 2; d. 32, a. 2, q. I; d. 41, a. 2, q. 2. — Denudabitur ("will be laid bare") is the same as manifestabitur ("will be made manifest"); cf. on this Forcellini, Lexicon etc. For denudabitur the editions read determinabitur ("will be determined").
← Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2→