Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24
Quaestio II. Utrum in sensualitate possit esse mortale peccatum.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum mortale. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Sicut primus motus habet esse in parte sensibili, ita etiam et actus, in quo est consummatio peccati: ergo sicut ponitur in sensualitate esse peccatum veniale propter primum motum, ita ponendum est esse mortale propter actum consummatum.
2. Item, in eodem, in quo est dispositio, natus est esse habitus; sed veniale disponit ad mortale: ergo cum veniale possit esse in sensualitate, ut ostensum est1, videtur etc.
3. Item, iustitiae originali opponitur culpa mortalis; sed illa originalis iustitia non tantum fuit in Adam secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum partem sensibilem, quia totus ordinatus erat: ergo videtur, quod mortalis culpa in sensualitate esse possit, cum opposita nata sint fieri circa idem2.
4. Item, sicut superior portio rationis se habet ad bonum, ita sensualitas declinat ad malum; sed in superiori portione rationis potest esse veniale peccatum ex surreptione, sicut supra3 ostensum est: ergo econtra ex pleno consensu et peccati perpetratione mortale peccatum descendere poterit usque ad sensualitatem, ut, sicut sensualitas communicat veniale peccatum superiori, ita superior pars communicet mortale peccatum sensualitati.
Sed contra: 1. Completivum mortalis peccati in quantum huiusmodi est aversio a Deo; sed solius rationis est a Deo averti, cum eius solius sit ad Deum converti: ergo ex sola ratione potest peccatum4 esse peccatum mortale.
2. Item, solus consensus facit mortale peccatum; sed consensus est solius partis rationalis: ergo etc.
3. Item, culpa mortalis et gratia mutuo se expellunt, ergo habent esse circa idem5; sed gratia gratum faciens, cum in ea attendatur imago similitudinis, non habet esse nisi in ratione: ergo nec culpa mortalis.
4. Item, si culpa mortalis esset in sensualitate, hoc non esset, nisi quia per ipsam perpetratur: ergo quando aliquis perpetrat homicidium per gladium et manum, peccatum homicidii erit in gladio6 et manu; quod si falsum est dicere, absurdum est etiam dicere, peccatum mortale esse in sensualitate.
Conclusio. Peccatum mortale, nec quatenus dicit culpam, nec quatenus dicit vitium, ponendum est in sensualitate.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mortale peccatum, nec in quantum culpa nec in quantum vitium, ponendum est esse in sensualitate. — Et ratio huius est, quia aliter vitiat peccatum mortale quam peccatum veniale. Peccatum enim mortale vitiat et deordinat deordinatione perfecta, ut ita dicam, quae quidem consistit in aversione a Deo et eius contemptu et deliberationis consensu. Haec autem solius rationis sunt; et ideo mortale peccatum in sola ratione consistit. Deordinatio autem venialis non est deordinatio consummata, sed inchoata; et quia deordinatio inchoari habet in potentia inferiori et consummari in superiori: hinc est, quod veniale peccatum, in quantum vitium est, in sensualitate reperitur. Non enim directe opponitur habitui virtutis, sicut vitium mortalis peccati, sed solum ex quadam inclinatione et comparatione ad terminum, ad quem disponit. Vitiositas autem et deordinatio mortalis simpliciter excludit habitum virtutis; et propterea omne peccatum mortale in ratione ponitur, et nullum in sensualitate. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo, quod actus peccati est in sensualitate, sicut primus motus7; dicendum, quod etsi contingat utrumque in sensualitate reperiri, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam primus motus in sensualitate reperitur, ita quod ibi sumit originem, et potius est sensualitatis rationem excitantis quam a ratione excitatae et motae. Actus autem mortalis peccati sic reperitur in sensualitate, quod originem sumit ab imperio rationis, et est sensualitatis potius motae quam moventis. Et quoniam deordinatio et vitiositas ibi ponitur esse peccatum, ubi sumunt originem et ubi est in ratione actionis, non in ratione passionis8; hinc est, quod ex primo motu existente in sensualitate ponitur ibi esse peccatum veniale; ex actu vero peccati per sensualitatem perpetrato non ponitur in ea esse peccatum mortale.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dispositio et habitus in eadem potentia habent fieri; dicendum est, quod verum est de illa dispositione, quae est eiusdem naturae cum habitu, et de qua transitur9 in habitum, sicut scientia-dispositio fit scientia-habitus. De illa autem dispositione, quae est alterius generis et disponit solum per quandam ordinationem, veritatem non habet. Actus enim unius potentiae potest esse dispositio ad eliciendum actum alterius potentiae, sicut cognitio ad affectionem. Et sic in proposito habet esse; ideo non valet.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de iustitia originali, dicendum, quod de originali iustitia dupliciter contingit loqui: aut in quantum dicit habitum quendam regulantem naturam in statu innocentiae, aut in quantum dicit omnium virium rectificationem plenariam. Primo modo originalis iustitia habet esse in sola ratione; et sic opponitur ei culpa. Secundo modo non solum habet esse in ratione, sed etiam in viribus inferioribus; et sic non solum habet auferri per culpam, sed etiam per poenam, sive per aliquid, quod aliquo modo habet rationem poenae, aliquo modo rationem culpae; et tale est veniale peccatum10.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet sensualitas ad illicitum, sic se habet ratio ad bonum; dicendum, quod illa comparatio non valet, propterea quod plus potest virtus superior quam inferior; ideo, etsi superior potentia possit induere11 actum et dispositionem inferioris et negotiari circa eius obiectum, non tamen sequitur, quod possit esse e converso12.
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Question II. Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality.
Secondly it is asked whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality. And that it can, seems [to follow].
1. Just as the first movement has being in the sensible part, so too the act in which the consummation of the sin consists: therefore, just as venial sin is held to be in the sensuality on account of the first movement, so mortal [sin] must be held to be [there] on account of the consummated act.
2. Likewise, in that in which there is a disposition, there is apt to be a habit; but the venial disposes toward the mortal: therefore, since the venial can be in the sensuality, as has been shown1, it seems so, etc.
3. Likewise, mortal fault is opposed to original justice; but that original justice was in Adam not only according to reason, but also according to the sensible part, since the whole [man] was ordered: therefore it seems that mortal fault can be in the sensuality, since opposites are apt to come to be about the same thing2.
4. Likewise, just as the higher portion of reason is related to the good, so the sensuality declines toward evil; but in the higher portion of reason there can be venial sin by surreptition, as was shown above3: therefore, conversely, from full consent and the perpetration of the sin, mortal sin will be able to descend even to the sensuality, so that, just as the sensuality communicates venial sin to the higher [part], so the higher part may communicate mortal sin to the sensuality.
On the contrary: 1. What completes mortal sin as such is aversion from God; but it belongs to reason alone to be turned away from God, since to it alone belongs being turned to God: therefore from reason alone can a sin4 be a mortal sin.
2. Likewise, consent alone makes mortal sin; but consent belongs to the rational part alone: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, mortal fault and grace mutually expel each other, therefore they have being about the same thing5; but sanctifying grace, since in it is regarded the image of likeness, has being only in reason: therefore neither [does] mortal fault.
4. Likewise, if mortal fault were in the sensuality, this would not be except because it is perpetrated through it: therefore when someone perpetrates a homicide through the sword and the hand, the sin of homicide will be in the sword6 and the hand; and if it is false to say this, it is also absurd to say that mortal sin is in the sensuality.
Conclusion. Mortal sin, neither inasmuch as it names a fault, nor inasmuch as it names a vice, is to be placed in the sensuality.
I respond: It must be said that mortal sin, neither inasmuch as it is a fault nor inasmuch as it is a vice, is to be placed in the sensuality. — And the reason for this is that mortal sin vitiates otherwise than venial sin does. For mortal sin vitiates and disorders with a perfect disorder, so to speak, which indeed consists in aversion from God and contempt of him and the consent of deliberation. But these belong to reason alone; and therefore mortal sin consists in reason alone. But the venial disorder is not a consummated disorder, but an inchoate one; and because disorder is apt to be begun in the lower power and consummated in the higher: hence it is that venial sin, inasmuch as it is a vice, is found in the sensuality. For it is not directly opposed to the habit of virtue, as is the vice of mortal sin, but only by a certain inclination and relation to the term toward which it disposes. But the viciousness and disorder of the mortal [sin] simply excludes the habit of virtue; and therefore every mortal sin is placed in reason, and none in the sensuality. — And the reasons showing this are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected first, that the act of sin is in the sensuality, just as the first movement7; it must be said that, although it happens that both are found in the sensuality, yet [it is] in one way and another. For the first movement is found in the sensuality in such a way that it takes its origin there, and it is rather of the sensuality as exciting reason than as excited and moved by reason. But the act of mortal sin is found in the sensuality in such a way that it takes its origin from the command of reason, and is of the sensuality rather as moved than as moving. And since disorder and viciousness is held to be a sin there where they take their origin and where it is in the account of action, not in the account of passion8; hence it is that from the first movement existing in the sensuality, venial sin is held to be there; but from the act of sin perpetrated through the sensuality, mortal sin is not held to be in it.
2. To that which is objected, that disposition and habit are apt to come to be in the same power; it must be said that this is true of that disposition which is of the same nature as the habit, and from which there is a passing over9 into the habit, just as the disposition-of-knowledge becomes the habit-of-knowledge. But of that disposition which is of another genus and disposes only by a certain ordering, it does not hold true. For the act of one power can be a disposition for eliciting the act of another power, just as cognition [is a disposition] for affection. And so it holds in the proposed [case]; therefore it is not valid.
3. To that which is objected concerning original justice, it must be said that of original justice it happens that one speaks in two ways: either inasmuch as it names a certain habit regulating nature in the state of innocence, or inasmuch as it names a full rectification of all the powers. In the first way original justice has being in reason alone; and thus fault is opposed to it. In the second way it has being not only in reason, but also in the lower powers; and thus it is taken away not only by fault, but also by punishment, or by something which in some way has the character of punishment, in some way the character of fault; and such is venial sin10.
4. To that which is objected, that as the sensuality is related to the illicit, so reason is related to the good; it must be said that that comparison is not valid, because the higher power can do more than the lower; therefore, although the higher power can put on11 the act and disposition of the lower and busy itself about its object, it does not, however, follow that it can [be so] conversely12.
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- Quaest. praeced. — De dispositione et habitu cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate.The preceding question. — On disposition and habit cf. Aristotle, On the Categories, the chapter on Quality.
- Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 181, nota 3.According to Aristotle, on whom see above, p. 181, note 3.
- Hic a. 1. q. 2.Here, article 1, question 2.
- In pluribus codd., ut F R aa, et in edd. deest peccatum.In several codices, such as F R aa, and in the editions, peccatum ["sin"] is lacking.
- Vide hic arg. 3. ad opp. — Post se expellunt Vat. adiungit ut opposita.See here argument 3 to the contrary. — After se expellunt ["expel each other"] the Vatican edition adds ut opposita ["as opposites"].
- Codd. F K X Y Z bb ee etc. cum ed. 1 cultello.Codices F K X Y Z bb ee etc., with edition 1, [read] cultello ["with the knife"].
- Cod. F hic addit in sensualitate reperitur.Codex F here adds in sensualitate reperitur ["is found in the sensuality"].
- Cfr. infra d. 35. a. 1. q. 2, et d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.Cf. below, distinction 35, article 1, question 2, and distinction 41, article 2, question 2.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 transit. Paulo ante pro eiusdem … luae cod. aa eiusdem generis.The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] transit ["passes over"]. A little before, in place of eiusdem … luae, codex aa [reads] eiusdem generis ["of the same genus"].
- De quo plura invenies infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.Concerning which you will find more below, distinction 41, article 2, question 1, in the body [of the response].
- Cod. aa inducere.Codex aa [reads] inducere ["to bring in"].
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question. ---