Dist. 24, Part 1, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister in littera, quod resistere malo non fecisset illi meritum, quia nihil erat in eo, quod ad malum impelleret. Si enim hoc verum est, tunc, cum nullum fuisset in Adam impellens, nunquam meruisset in aliquo opere suo. — Item, Christus nullum habuit interius impellens ad malum, cum diabolo in tentatione restitit1, et in operibus suis nullum habuit retrahens a bono: ergo nihil meruit in sua tentatione nec in aliqua operatione; quod omnino nefarium est dicere. — Item, exemplum eius2 videtur esse malum, cum subiungit: Sicut Angelis non fuit meritorium, quod steterunt; hoc enim est
contra veritatem et contra Augustinum, qui dicit in libro de Correptione et gratia3, quod « Angeli, qui, aliis cadentibus, remanserunt, huius mansionis debitam mercedem receperunt »: ergo videtur, quod stando meruerunt.
Ad hoc dici posset, quod est meritum dimissionis poenae sive satisfactorium, et est meritum vitae aeternae sive substantialis praemii. Ad primum requiritur poenalitas et difficultas, ad secundum vero sufficit sola caritas. Magister autem intelligit de merito secundum primam differentiam, non secundum aliam. — Sed quia illud meritum satisfactionis nunquam fuisset in Adam nec profectus in eo, si in statu innocentiae permansisset; praedicta responsio non videtur pertinere ad propositum.
Et propterea aliter videtur esse dicendum, quod est meritorium, quantum est de genere operis, et est meritorium ex radice caritatis. Meritorium ex genere operis dicitur, quod est opus virtutis de se; hoc autem est arduum et difficile4. Alio modo dicitur meritorium omne opus, quodcumque sit, dum tamen ex radice caritatis procedat. Vult igitur Magister dicere, quod in resistendo tentationi Adae non fuisset meritum, si non habuisset gratiam, nec primo modo nec secundo. Si vero restitisset ex caritate, meritorium fuisset secundo modo, non primo. In nobis autem semper est meritorium, vel utroque modo, vel altero, propter difficultatem ad bonum et pronitatem ad malum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, quia procedunt de merito secundum differentiam secundam, videlicet de eo quod est meritorium ratione radicis5.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod declinare a malo semper vitat poenam, sed non semper meretur palmam. Aut enim declinat quis a malo ex caritate, aut non. Si non; similiter nec facere bonum extra caritatem meretur palmam, ergo non est differentia inter declinare a malo et facere bonum. Si sic; cum omne illud quod fit ex caritate, sit meritorium, patet etc. Si tu dicas, quod non meretur palmam ex genere operis, quia non est difficile; hoc non solvit, quia, licet non sit difficile homini in statu innocentiae, est tamen difficile in statu naturae lapsae: ergo semper meretur palmam. — Item declinare a malo est una pars6 iustitiae, sicut facere bonum: ergo sicut unum est meritorium, ita et reliquum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod declinare a malo dupliciter dicitur, sicut non velle malum: uno modo privative — sicut dicitur dormiens non velle malum, quia non habet aliquam affectionem ad malum — alio modo contrarie, ut dicatur non velle malum, quia respuit et contraria affectione afficitur contra malum; sic etiam declinare a malo dupliciter dicitur. Et si dicatur contrarie, tunc est meritorium; si vero privative, vitat poenam, quia qui non peccat non punitur, non tamen meretur palmam, quia non est ibi aliquod opus meritorium; et primo modo est pars iustitiae, secundo modo non, quia non est opus.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas, qua malum eligitur, gratia desistente. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia, si hoc verum esset, tunc liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, semper consentiret peccato; quod plane falsum est. — Item, videtur, quod hoc non deberet poni in definitione liberi arbitrii, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus7, « peccat qui definit aliquid per peiora, et per ea ad quae non habet principaliter ordinari ». Si ergo liberum arbitrium de se, quantum est de prima conditione sua, non ordinatur ad malum, non debet definiri per electionem mali.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister definit hic liberum arbitrium non simpliciter, sed secundum statum naturae lapsae; et quia in statu naturae lapsae defectum habet et inclinationem ad malum: ideo non tantummodo definit per electionem boni, ad quam ordinatur mediante gratia, sed etiam per electionem mali, in quam cadit ex defectibilitate propria. Nec ponitur ibi electio mali tanquam finis, ad quem ordinatur, sed ut per hoc magis innotescat, qualiter ad finem proprium ordinatur; non enim ad illud pervenit nisi per gratiae adiutorium8. — Et sic patet responsio ad utrumque obiectum.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what the Master says in the text, that to resist evil would not have made it meritorious for him, because there was nothing in him which might impel toward evil. For if this is true, then, since there would have been nothing impelling in Adam, he would never have merited in any work of his. — Likewise, Christ had nothing interiorly impelling toward evil, when he withstood the devil in the temptation1, and in his works he had nothing drawing back from the good: therefore he merited nothing in his temptation nor in any operation; which is altogether wicked to say. — Likewise, his example2 seems to be bad, when he adds: As it was not meritorious for the Angels that they stood firm; for this is
against the truth and against Augustine, who says in the book On Rebuke and Grace3, that « the Angels who, when the others fell, remained, received the due reward of this remaining »: therefore it seems that they merited by standing firm.
To this it could be said that there is a merit of the remission of punishment, that is, a satisfactory merit, and there is a merit of eternal life, that is, of the substantial reward. For the first, penalty and difficulty are required, but for the second charity alone suffices. The Master, however, understands of merit according to the first difference, not according to the other. — But since that merit of satisfaction would never have been in Adam, nor any advancement in him, if he had remained in the state of innocence; the aforesaid response does not seem to pertain to the matter at hand.
And therefore it seems it must be said otherwise, that a thing is meritorious as regards the kind of work, and a thing is meritorious from the root of charity. That is called meritorious from the kind of work which is in itself a work of virtue; and this is arduous and difficult4. In another way every work is called meritorious, whatever it be, provided it proceeds from the root of charity. The Master therefore means to say that in resisting the temptation of Adam there would have been no merit, if he had not had grace, neither in the first way nor in the second. But if he had withstood it out of charity, it would have been meritorious in the second way, not in the first. In us, however, it is always meritorious, either in both ways or in one of them, on account of the difficulty toward the good and the proneness toward evil. — And by this the response to the objections is clear, since they proceed concerning merit according to the second difference, namely concerning that which is meritorious by reason of the root5.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that to turn away from evil always avoids punishment, but does not always merit the palm. For either one turns away from evil out of charity, or not. If not; likewise neither does doing good apart from charity merit the palm, therefore there is no difference between turning away from evil and doing good. If so; since everything that is done out of charity is meritorious, it is clear, etc. If you say that it does not merit the palm from the kind of work, because it is not difficult; this does not resolve it, because, although it is not difficult for man in the state of innocence, it is nevertheless difficult in the state of fallen nature: therefore it always merits the palm. — Likewise, to turn away from evil is one part6 of justice, just as to do good: therefore, just as the one is meritorious, so also is the other.
I respond: It must be said that to turn away from evil is said in two ways, just as not to will evil: in one way privatively — as a sleeper is said not to will evil, because he has no affection toward evil — in another way contrarily, so that one is said not to will evil because he rejects it and is affected with a contrary affection against evil; thus also to turn away from evil is said in two ways. And if it be taken contrarily, then it is meritorious; but if privatively, it avoids punishment, because he who does not sin is not punished, yet he does not merit the palm, because there is no meritorious work there; and in the first way it is a part of justice, in the second way not, because it is not a work.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: But free choice is the faculty by which evil is chosen, when grace withdraws. For it seems false to say so, because, if this were true, then free choice, deprived of grace, would always consent to sin; which is plainly false. — Likewise, it seems that this ought not to be placed in the definition of free choice, because, as the Philosopher says7, « he errs who defines something by worse things, and by those to which it is not principally ordered ». If therefore free choice of itself, as regards its first condition, is not ordered toward evil, it ought not to be defined by the choice of evil.
I respond: It must be said that the Master here defines free choice not simply, but according to the state of fallen nature; and because in the state of fallen nature it has a defect and an inclination toward evil: therefore he defines it not only by the choice of the good, to which it is ordered by the mediation of grace, but also by the choice of evil, into which it falls by its own defectibility. Nor is the choice of evil placed there as the end to which it is ordered, but so that through this it may be made more known how it is ordered to its proper end; for it does not attain to that except through the help of grace8. — And thus the response to both objections is clear.
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- Matth. 4, 1. seqq.; Luc. 4, 1. seqq. — Mox post nullum cod. aa subiicit malum.Matthew 4:1ff.; Luke 4:1ff. — Just after nullum codex aa adds malum.
- Scilicet Magistri, hic in lit. c. 1. circa finem.Namely, [the example] of the Master, here in the text, chapter 1, near the end.
- Cap. 11. n. 32: Angeli sancti, qui, cadentibus aliis per liberum arbitrium, per idem liberum arbitrium steterunt ipsi, et huius permansionis debitam mercedem recipere meruerunt.Chapter 11, n. 32: The holy Angels, who, when the others fell through free choice, by that same free choice themselves stood firm, and merited to receive the due reward of this remaining.
- Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3: Circa id quod difficilius est, semper et ars et virtus versatur; quod enim bene fit, melius in eo est. — Aliquanto superius edd., exc. 1, sicut et nonnulli codd., inter quos O aa, omittunt quantum est.Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 3: Both art and virtue are always concerned with what is more difficult; for what is done well is better therein. — Somewhat above, the editions, except the 1st, as also several codices, among which O aa, omit quantum est.
- Eodem modo hoc dubium solvunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 2. a. 2. § 3. ad 4; B. Albert., hic a. 4. et S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 90. m. 3; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. 3. lit.In the same way this doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 91, m. 2, a. 2, § 3, ad 4; Bl. Albert, here a. 4, and Summa p. II, tr. 14, q. 90, m. 3; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, here near the text; Giles of Rome, here dub. 3, in the text.
- Scilicet pars integralis; nam cum iustitiae sit, unicuique ius suum tribuere, ut hoc integre praestetur, requiritur, quod et debitum tribuatur et nocivum arceatur ab altero. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 perperam: ergo non semper meretur palmam.Namely, an integral part; for since it belongs to justice to render to each his own, in order that this may be rendered integrally, it is required that both what is owed be rendered and what is harmful be warded off from another. — Slightly above, very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4 wrongly read: therefore it does not always merit the palm.
- Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Amplius [peccat], si non ad melius, sed ad peius assignavit, cum sint plura, ad quae dicitur quod definitur. Nam omnis disciplina et potestas optimi videtur esse.Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 4): Moreover [he errs], if he has assigned [the definition] not to the better but to the worse, since there are several things to which that which is defined is referred. For every discipline and power seems to be of the best.
- Cfr. infra d. 25. p. II. q. 3. et d. 28, a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius sola Vat. omittit sed.Cf. below, d. 25, p. II, q. 3, and d. 28, a. 2, q. 3. — Slightly above, the Vatican edition alone omits sed. ---