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Dist. 29, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
p. 706

Quaestio II. Utrum dona gratuita aeque efficaciter ad merendum in homine fuerint ante et post lapsum.

Utrum dona gratuita fuerint aeque magnae efficaciae ad merendum ante lapsum, sicut sunt post lapsum. Et quod fuerint maioris efficaciae tunc quam nunc, videtur.

1. Quanto perfectior est cognitio, tanto perfectior est dilectio; et quanto maior est dilectio, tanto opus nostrum est Deo acceptabilius. Prima propositio patet per illud, quod quantum cognoscis, tantum diligis1. Si ergo in Adam secundum statum innocentiae clarior fuit cognitio, videtur, quod caritas ad merendum fuerit efficacior.

2. Item, «albius est quod est nigro impermixtius2»: ergo magis est meritorium quod minus habet in se de demerito; sed omnia merita nostra quodam modo permixta sunt culpae, secundum illud Isaiae sexagesimo quarto: Omnes iustitiae vestrae sicut pannus menstruatae. Si ergo in Adam secundum statum innocentiae merita omnino fuissent impermixta culpae, videtur, quod secundum statum illum dona gratuita erant multo maioris efficaciae.

3. Item, meritum est a gratia simul et libero arbitrio: quanto igitur liberum arbitrium magis gratiae obedit, tanto gratia efficacius in actum suum exit; sed tunc natura magis erat obediens gratiae quam nunc, cum est corrupta: ergo tunc dona gratuita erant ad merendum efficaciora.

4. Item, amor visibilium et sollicitatio3 circa terrena impedit hominem, ne iungatur Deo perfecte: si igitur in statu primo nulla vigebat in homine concupiscentia, videtur, quod Deo perfectius et diuturnius adhaerebat, et ita magis ad merendum dispositus erat.

Sed contra:

1. Secundae ad Timotheum secundo4: Non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit; sed magis impugnatur homo secundum statum naturae lapsae quam secundum statum naturae institutae: ergo si has pugnas vincit, gloriosius triumphat; et si gloriosius triumphat, maiorem meretur coronam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Philosophus5 dicit, quod «ars et virtus est circa difficilia»: ergo si hoc per se verum est, quanto actus virtutis est difficilior, tanto virtuosior; et quanto virtuosior, tanto ad merendum efficacior: si ergo maior est difficultas in perficiendis divinis mandatis nunc, quam esset in statu naturae institutae; videtur, quod maior sit merendi efficacia.

3. Item, si homo stetisset, aut Christus non esset incarnatus, aut si esset incarnatus, nunquam esset passus; sed Christus sua passione non sibi meruit, sed nobis, et tam merita nostra quam Sacramenta efficaciam habent a passione et eius fide. Si igitur inter omnia, quaecumque Deo placere possunt, hoc fuit Deo acceptissimum, quod Christus se obtulit hostiam Deo et Patri6, et inde sumunt efficaciam merita nostra, et illam efficaciam non habuissent merita in statu naturae institutae: ergo videtur, quod non essent efficaciora.

4. Item, «natura non deficit in necessariis», ut dicit Philosophus7; si hoc est verum in natura creata, multo magis verum est in natura increata; et si divina providentia non deficit bobus, de quibus minus cura est ei, multo minus nec deficit hominibus. Sed natura humana magis indiget adiuvari, quam indigeret ante lapsum: ergo videtur, quod nunc Deus det homini fortius et efficacius adiutorium. Si ergo efficacia meritorum attenditur secundum magnitudinem caritatis et gratiae, videtur, quod nunc dona gratuita in merendo sint maioris efficaciae.

p. 707

Conclusio

Rationabiliter colligitur, quod nunc ratione maioris difficultatis et ratione gratiae sint efficaciora dona gratuita ad merendum, quam in statu innocentiae, non autem ratione promptitudinis voluntatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod efficacia meriti principaliter ex tribus venit, videlicet ex difficultate operis, ex promptitudine voluntatis et ex magnitudine caritatis. — Difficultas operis multum facit ad meritum, et adeo facit, ut homo, qui est multo minoris caritatis quam Angelus, possit mereri, ut perveniat ad sublimitatem angelicam, secundum quod colligitur ex illo quod dicitur Matthaei undecimo8 de Ioanne Baptista: Qui minor est in regno caelorum maior est eo. Non enim est dubitandum, quin Ioannes sit exaltatus ad ordines excellentium Angelorum; et tamen secundum statum viae minoris caritatis erat quam aliquis eorum. — Promptitudo etiam voluntatis plurimum facit9; si voluntas prompta est secundum id quod habet, accepta est ad meritum. Quantacumque enim sit in homine gratia, nisi sit voluntas gratiae consentanea, nunquam eliciet opera meritoria; et quanto magis voluntas gratiae subiacet et conformatur, tanto magis homo in operibus meritoriis exercetur. — Magnitudo caritatis principaliter10 inter omnia est, quae facit ad meritum, quia secundum illius quantitatem attenditur remuneratio praemii substantialis. Pondus enim amoris est quod dat valorem operibus meritoriis.

Si igitur fiat comparatio efficaciae merendi in donis gratuitis secundum statum post lapsum et secundum statum ante lapsum; responderi potest, quod quantum ad primam conditionem, videlicet quantum ad difficultatem, efficaciores sunt virtutes nunc, quam tunc fuerunt. Nunc enim magis impugnatur et impugnando probatur et examinatur virtus quam tunc, sicut patet in sanctis Martyribus. — Et sic11 procedunt rationes ostendentes, dona gratuita ad merendum esse nunc efficaciora.

Quantum autem ad secundam conditionem, scilicet quantum ad promptitudinem voluntatis, efficaciores fuissent virtutes in merendo tunc quam nunc, pro eo quod voluntas tunc quasi continue fuisset in bonis operibus Deo placentibus sine retardatione; nunc autem sive ex lassitudine sive ex surreptione frequenter cessat a bonis operibus et intendit aliquando rebus nocivis, aliquando inutilibus, tum propter difficultatem ad bonum, tum propter pronitatem ad malum. Et quantum ad hanc conditionem procedunt rationes probantes, quod dona gratuita in statu naturae institutae fuissent ad merendum efficaciora. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad utramque partem; procedunt enim secundum diversas vias, secundum quas se habent dona gratuita in merendo sicut excedentia et excessa; et reperitur in eis secundum diversas conditiones maior et minor efficacia. Et sic nulla est inter rationes illas repugnantia; utraeque enim verum concludunt secundum diversam viam.

Si autem quaeratur ulterius de maioritate efficaciae quantum ad tertiam conditionem, tunc respondendum est, quod aut fit comparatio particularis personae ad particularem personam, aut status ad statum. Si primo modo; dicendum est, quod se haberent sicut excedentia et excessa. Satis enim probabiliter credi potest, quod aliqui sunt, qui habent maiorem gratiam aliquibus, qui fuissent in statu innocentiae, si Adam stetisset; alii vero minorem aliquibus, sicut dici consuevit, cum comparatur status Legis scriptae ad statum Legis evangelicae. — Si autem comparetur generaliter status ad statum, tunc non videtur usquequaque certum, in quo statu Dominus homini maius12 munus caritatis et gratiae tribuisset, pro eo quod secundum diversas conditiones reperitur maior et minor idoneitas in homine suscipiente; et quod plus est, magnitudo gratiae distributae plus attenditur secundum discretionem13 distribuentis, quae cognitionem nostram latet. Haec autem pars probabilior videtur et magis auctoritatibus14 consona, ut dicamus, quod Deus maiora munera gratiae elargitus est homini lapso, quam dedisset homini, si in statu innocentiae permansisset: tum quia homo maiori adiutorio gratiae indiget; tum etiam quia decet Deum, de malo maius bonum elicere, quam sit illud bonum, quod adimendo malum nocet; tum etiam quia Mediator et Intercessor pro nobis interpellat, quem decet exaudiri in omnibus pro sua reverentia15. Unde cum appareat vultui Dei semper ad interpellandum pro nobis, et pro nobis in cruce oblatus fuerit et quotidie offeratur; valde probabile videtur, quod maius munus gratiae tribuatur nobis, quam si ipse non fuisset incarnatus vel pro nobis oblatus. Et hoc expresse videtur innui Ioannis septimo16, cum dicitur, quod Spiritus nondum erat datus, quia Iesus nondum erat glorificatus. Unde cum ascendit in altum, tunc dedit dona hominibus. Ex hac igitur triplici ratione, quarum una est in commendatione misericordiae, et secunda in commendatione sapientiae, et tertia in commendatione divinae iustitiae; satis rationabiliter colligitur, quod nunc magis sint efficacia dona gratuita ad merendum, quam in statu innocentiae, non solum ratione difficultatis, verum etiam ratione gratiae et caritatis; quamvis non absurde dici possit, quod maior efficacia in merendo erat tunc quam nunc, ratione promptitudinis voluntatis. — Et hac via procedunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, sicut patet intuenti; aliter enim non cogunt.

p. 708

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Nam ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod maior erat tunc dilectio, quia maior cognitio; dicendum, quod verum est de dilectione, secundum quod se tenet ex parte potentiae concupiscibilis; sed non est verum de dilectione, secundum quod se tenet ex parte gratiae animam elevantis17. Et si obiiciat, quod utraque commensuratur cognitioni; dicendum, quod illud non est verum de omni cognitione, sed de cognitione experimentali; haec autem non magis viguit in primo parente quam in viris sanctis, qui fuerunt et sunt in statu naturae lapsae.

Ad 2, 3, 4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod meritum magis erat impermixtum demerito in statu innocentiae: dicendum, quod hoc venit ex hoc, quod voluntas non est ita prompta propter gravitatem carnis coniunctae et pronitatem concupiscentiae contractae; et ratio illa procedit ex parte promptitudinis voluntatis; similiter et duae rationes sequentes18.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the gratuitous gifts were equally efficacious for meriting in man before and after the fall.

Whether the gratuitous gifts were of equally great efficacy for meriting before the fall, as they are after the fall. And that they were of greater efficacy then than now, it seems.

1. The more perfect the knowledge, the more perfect the love; and the greater the love, the more acceptable our work is to God. The first proposition is plain from this, that you love as much as you know1. If, then, in Adam according to the state of innocence the knowledge was clearer, it seems that charity was more efficacious for meriting.

2. Likewise, «that is whiter which is more unmixed with black2»: therefore that is more meritorious which has less of demerit in itself; but all our merits are in some way mixed with fault, according to that of Isaiah sixty-four: All your righteous deeds are like a menstruous cloth. If, then, in Adam according to the state of innocence the merits had been wholly unmixed with fault, it seems that according to that state the gratuitous gifts were of much greater efficacy.

3. Likewise, merit is from grace together with free choice: the more, therefore, that free choice obeys grace, the more efficaciously grace goes forth into its act; but then nature was more obedient to grace than now, when it is corrupted: therefore then the gratuitous gifts were more efficacious for meriting.

4. Likewise, the love of visible things and solicitude3 about earthly things impede a man from being joined to God perfectly: if, then, in the first state no concupiscence flourished in man, it seems that he adhered to God more perfectly and more continuously, and so was more disposed for meriting.

On the contrary:

1. Second to Timothy, chapter two4: He is not crowned unless he has striven lawfully; but a man is more assailed according to the state of fallen nature than according to the state of instituted nature: therefore if he conquers these struggles, he triumphs more gloriously; and if he triumphs more gloriously, he merits a greater crown: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher5 says that «art and virtue are concerned with difficult things»: therefore if this is true of itself, the more difficult the act of virtue, the more virtuous; and the more virtuous, the more efficacious for meriting: if, then, there is greater difficulty in fulfilling the divine commandments now, than there would be in the state of instituted nature; it seems that the efficacy for meriting is greater.

3. Likewise, if man had stood, either Christ would not have been incarnate, or, if he had been incarnate, he would never have suffered; but Christ by his passion did not merit for himself, but for us, and both our merits and the Sacraments have their efficacy from the passion and faith in it. If, then, among all things whatsoever that can please God, this was most acceptable to God, that Christ offered himself a victim to God and the Father6, and from this our merits take their efficacy, and the merits in the state of instituted nature would not have had that efficacy: therefore it seems that they would not be more efficacious.

4. Likewise, «nature does not fail in necessary things», as the Philosopher says7; if this is true in created nature, much more is it true in uncreated nature; and if divine providence does not fail the oxen, of which it has less care, much less does it fail men. But human nature stands more in need of being helped than it would need before the fall: therefore it seems that now God gives to man a stronger and more efficacious help. If, then, the efficacy of merits is reckoned according to the magnitude of charity and grace, it seems that now the gratuitous gifts are of greater efficacy in meriting.

Conclusion

It is reasonably gathered that now, by reason of greater difficulty and by reason of grace, the gratuitous gifts are more efficacious for meriting than in the state of innocence, but not by reason of the promptitude of the will.

I respond: It must be said that the efficacy of merit comes principally from three things, namely from the difficulty of the work, from the promptitude of the will, and from the magnitude of charity. — The difficulty of the work contributes much to merit, and contributes so much that a man who is of much less charity than an Angel can merit so as to attain to angelic sublimity, according to what is gathered from that which is said in Matthew eleven8 concerning John the Baptist: He who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he. For it is not to be doubted that John was exalted to the orders of the excellent Angels; and yet according to the state of the wayfarer he was of less charity than some of them. — The promptitude of the will also does very much9; if the will is prompt according to what it has, it is acceptable for merit. For however great the grace in a man, unless there be a will agreeable to grace, it will never elicit meritorious works; and the more the will is subject to grace and conformed to it, the more a man is exercised in meritorious works. — The magnitude of charity is principally10 among all things that contribute to merit, because according to its quantity is reckoned the recompense of the substantial reward. For the weight of love is what gives worth to meritorious works.

If, then, a comparison be made of the efficacy of meriting in the gratuitous gifts according to the state after the fall and according to the state before the fall, it can be answered that as to the first condition, namely as to difficulty, the virtues are more efficacious now than they were then. For now virtue is more assailed and by being assailed is more proved and tested than then, as is plain in the holy Martyrs. — And thus11 proceed the reasons showing that the gratuitous gifts are now more efficacious for meriting.

But as to the second condition, namely as to the promptitude of the will, the virtues would have been more efficacious in meriting then than now, because the will then would have been as it were continually in good works pleasing to God without delay; but now, whether from weariness or from surprise, it frequently ceases from good works and is intent sometimes on harmful things, sometimes on useless things, both on account of the difficulty toward good, and on account of the proneness toward evil. And as to this condition there proceed the reasons proving that the gratuitous gifts in the state of instituted nature would have been more efficacious for meriting. — And by this the response to both parts is plain; for they proceed according to diverse ways, according to which the gratuitous gifts stand in meriting as exceeding and exceeded; and there is found in them, according to diverse conditions, a greater and a lesser efficacy. And thus there is no contradiction among those reasons; for both conclude what is true according to a diverse way.

But if it be asked further about the greater efficacy as to the third condition, then it must be answered that either a comparison is made of a particular person to a particular person, or of a state to a state. If in the first way; it must be said that they would stand as exceeding and exceeded. For it can be believed quite probably that there are some who have greater grace than some who would have been in the state of innocence, if Adam had stood; but others a lesser grace than some, as it is wont to be said, when the state of the written Law is compared to the state of the evangelical Law. — But if a state be compared generally to a state, then it does not seem altogether certain in which state the Lord would have bestowed on man the greater12 gift of charity and grace, because according to diverse conditions there is found a greater and a lesser fitness in the man receiving; and what is more, the magnitude of the grace distributed is reckoned rather according to the discretion13 of the distributor, which lies hidden from our knowledge. This part, however, seems more probable and more consonant with the authorities14, so that we say that God has bestowed greater gifts of grace on fallen man than he would have given to man, if he had remained in the state of innocence: both because man stands in need of greater help of grace; and also because it befits God to draw a greater good out of evil than is the good that is harmed by taking away the evil; and also because the Mediator and Intercessor intercedes for us, whom it befits to be heard in all things for his reverence15. Hence, since he appears before the face of God always to intercede for us, and was offered for us on the cross and is daily offered; it seems quite probable that a greater gift of grace is bestowed on us than if he had not been incarnate or offered for us. And this seems expressly to be intimated in John seven16, when it is said that the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. Hence when he ascended on high, then he gave gifts to men. From this threefold reason, therefore, of which one is in the commendation of mercy, and the second in the commendation of wisdom, and the third in the commendation of divine justice; it is gathered quite reasonably that now the gratuitous gifts are more efficacious for meriting than in the state of innocence, not only by reason of difficulty, but also by reason of grace and charity; although it can be said not absurdly that there was greater efficacy in meriting then than now, by reason of the promptitude of the will. — And by this way proceed the reasons which are adduced for the first part, as is plain to one who attends; for otherwise they do not compel.

To the arguments:

To 1. For to that which is objected first, that the love was then greater because the knowledge was greater; it must be said that this is true of the love insofar as it stands on the part of the concupiscible power; but it is not true of the love insofar as it stands on the part of the grace elevating the soul17. And if one object that both are commensurate with knowledge; it must be said that this is not true of every knowledge, but of experiential knowledge; and this did not flourish more in the first parent than in holy men, who were and are in the state of fallen nature.

To 2, 3, 4. But to that which is objected, that merit was more unmixed with demerit in the state of innocence: it must be said that this comes from this, that the will is not so prompt on account of the heaviness of the conjoined flesh and the proneness of the contracted concupiscence; and that reason proceeds on the part of the promptitude of the will; and likewise the two following reasons18.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. August., de Spir. et lit. c. 36. n. 64: Quanto maior notitia, tanto erit maior dilectio. Gregor., II. in Ezech. homil. 9. n. 10: Mensura amoris minor est, ubi adhuc mensura minor est cognitionis.
    Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter c. 36, n. 64: The greater the knowledge, the greater will be the love. Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel II, homily 9, n. 10: The measure of love is less where as yet the measure of knowledge is less.
  2. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.). — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 6: Quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae.
    Aristotle, Topics III, c. 4 (c. 5). — The following text is from the place cited, v. 6 (Isaiah 64): All our righteousness is as a menstruous cloth.
  3. Codd. H T sollicitudo; alii codd. sunt dubiae lectionis.
    Codices H T read sollicitudo (anxiety); the other codices are of doubtful reading.
  4. Vers. 5 (II. Tim. 2, 5).
    Verse 5 (2 Timothy 2:5).
  5. Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3; Vide supra pag. 572, nota 2.
    Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 3; see above, p. 572, note 2.
  6. Cfr. Hebr. 9, 14: Quanto magis sanguis Christi etc.
    Cf. Hebrews 9:14: How much more the blood of Christ etc.
  7. Libr. III. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 9.). — In seqq. alluditur ad 1. Cor. 9, 9: Nunquid de bobus cura est Deo? — Paulo inferius post Sed natura humana supple cum codd. A L V nunc.
    On the Soul III, text 45 (c. 9). — In what follows there is an allusion to 1 Corinthians 9:9: Is it for the oxen that God is concerned? — A little below, after But human nature, supply with codices A L V the word now.
  8. Vers. 11 (Matth. 11, 11).
    Verse 11 (Matthew 11:11).
  9. Epist. II. Cor. 9, 7: Hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus. — Mox post si codd. M Q Y aa subiiciunt enim. Pro si edd., excepta 1, substituunt sed et deinde omittunt est.
    2 Corinthians 9:7: For God loves a cheerful giver. — Presently, after si, codices M Q Y aa add enim. For si the editions, except the first, substitute sed and then omit est.
  10. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 principalior et dein faciunt pro facit.
    The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads principalior (more principal) and then faciunt for facit.
  11. Cod. aa bene addit rationes ad, et paulo inferius substituit Et similiter pro Et sic.
    Codex aa rightly adds rationes ad (the reasons for), and a little below substitutes Et similiter (And likewise) for Et sic (And thus).
  12. Cod. A addit vel minus.
    Codex A adds or a lesser.
  13. Edd. cum pluribus codd. distinctionem.
    The editions with several codices read distinctionem (distinction).
  14. Cod. aa adiicit Sanctorum. — De seqq. rationibus cfr. I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.
    Codex aa adds of the Saints. — On the following reasons cf. I Sent., d. 47, q. 3.
  15. Hebr. 5, 7. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 7, 25: Semper vivens ad interpellandum pro nobis.
    Hebrews 5:7. — The following text is from the same, c. 7, 25: Always living to make intercession for us.
  16. Vers. 39 (Ioan. 7, 39). — Seq. textus est Eph. 4, 8: Ascendens in altum, captivam duxit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus. Cfr. Ps. 67, 19.
    Verse 39 (John 7:39). — The following text is from Ephesians 4:8: Ascending on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men. Cf. Psalm 67(68):19.
  17. Cfr. supra dist. 23. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4.
    Cf. above, dist. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4.
  18. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question (i.e. the joint commentator-roll at a3-q1's SCHOLION I–II). ---
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