Dist. 29, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 29
Articulus III. De quantitate gratiae in statu innocentiae.
Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur, quantam gratiam primus homo habuerit.
Et primo est quaestio de quantitate gratiae primi hominis quantum ad donorum multitudinem. Secundo vero, quantum ad donorum magnitudinem.
Quaestio I. Utrum homo habuerit tot virtutes ante lapsum, quot habuit post lapsum.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum homo habuerit tot virtutes ante lapsum, quot habuit post lapsum. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo per Damascenum1 dicentem, quod Deus fecit « hominem omni virtute circumdatum et omnibus bonis ornatum »: ergo non videtur, quod aliquis habitus virtutis, qui sit in nobis, deesset eidem.
2. Item, ex parte cognitionis2 non cognoscimus plura, quam Adam cognovit, nec plures habemus in nobis scientias: ergo pari ratione ex parte affectionis non videtur, quod plures in nobis habeamus habitus virtutum, quam habuit primus homo.
3. Item, connexio est in virtutibus, sicut Sancti dicunt, et suo loco ostendetur in tertio: ergo si Adam habuit aliquam virtutem, necesse fuit, quod omnes habuerit: ergo tot habuit, quot nos habemus.
4. Item, aut aliquam virtutem habemus, quam non habuit Adam, aut non. Si non: ergo tot virtutes habuit, quot nos habemus. Si sic: aut ergo illius virtutis fuit Adam capax, aut non. Si non: ergo videtur, quod per peccatum creverit in nobis boni capacitas; quod absurdum est dicere. Si sic: cum Deus daret gratiam Adae secundum capacitatem suam, videtur, quod omnem virtutem, quam nobis confert post lapsum, et ipsi Adae contulerit ante lapsum.
Sed contra: 1. Virtus fortitudinis consistit in perpessione terribilium4; sed in Adam in statu innocentiae non poterat esse talis perpessio: ergo nec fortitudo.
2. Item, temperantia consistit in coercendis pravis carnis passionibus5; sed tales non poterant reperiri in natura instituta: ergo nec temperantia.
3. Item, poenitentia consistit in detestatione malorum perpetratorum6; sed nullo modo contingebat in statu innocentiae de malis commissis dolere: ergo tunc non poterat esse in homine virtus poenitentiae.
4. Item, qui habet donum perseverantiae, non cadit a iustitia; sed Adam a iustitia cecidit: ergo perseverantiam non habuit. Hanc autem multi habent in statu naturae lapsae: ergo non omnis virtus, quae nunc est, fuit in statu innocentiae.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Dona gratiae gratis datae in homine ante et post lapsum se habent sicut excedentia et excessa; dona vero gratiae gratum facientis in aequali multitudine fuerunt in utroque statu.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum fit comparatio multitudinis donorum gratiae ad statum naturae lapsae et statum naturae institutae, hoc potest intelligi vel de donis gratiae gratis datae, vel de donis gratiae gratum facientis. — Si intelligatur de donis gratiae gratis datae, sic se habent sicut excedentia et excessa, pro eo quod aliqua dona gratiae gratis datae habuit Adam in statu illo, utpote immortalitatem et impassibilitatem, quae non habuit aliquis posterorum eius; et aliqua dona gratiae gratis datae habent posteri sui, quae ipse non habuit, sicut est7 gratia sanitatum et operatio virtutum et genera linguarum et consimilia. — Ratio autem huius diversitatis venit ex hoc, quod alia dona expediebant illi tempori, et alia competunt isti.
Si autem loquamur de donis gratiae gratum facientis, sic, quia illa dona connexionem habent quantum ad habitus et quantum ad actus, qui perfectionis sunt; sic concedendum est, quod in aequali multitudine fuerunt in primo homine, in qua reperiuntur in eius posteritate. Hoc dico quantum ad habitus et quantum ad actus, qui perfectionis sunt, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt. Quantum vero ad actus, qui habent imperfectionem annexam, non contingebat virtutes secundum statum illum in Adam ponere.
Ad 1, 2, 3. Et per hoc patet responsio ad tria obiecta, quorum unum est de fortitudine, alterum de temperantia et tertium de poenitentia; quae omnia procedunt secundum actus habentes imperfectionem aliquam annexam; quae quidem imperfectio non competit illis virtutibus secundum omnem statum, sed solum secundum statum praesentis miseriae8.
Ad 4. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de perseverantia, dicendum, quod perseverantia uno modo dicitur propositum perseverandi in bono: et hoc modo est virtus vel dispositio consequens virtutes inseparabiliter. Alio modo perseverantia est continuatio in bono usque in finem9; et sic non dicit habitum, sed potius dicit statum, et hunc primus homo non habuit. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod aliqua virtute caruerit pro eo tempore, quo in gratia permansit.
Si quis autem quaerat, cuiusmodi actus habuerunt virtutes in primo homine, quae imperfectionem habent annexam in actibus suis secundum statum naturae lapsae; dicendum, quod actus illi in statu innocentiae plurimum conformes erant actibus, quos in patria virtutes sunt habiturae; cuiusmodi autem sint illi, determinat Magister in tertio libro distinctione trigesima tertia, et ibi10 suo loco determinabitur, dante Deo.
I. In solutione 1. quaestionis huius articuli auctores antiqui satis conveniunt, si excipias Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 3.), qui aliter iudicat, quia opinatur, quod primi parentes ante lapsum non habuerint gratiam sanctificantem. — Circa 2. quaestionem est opinionum dissensio. S. Thom. (hic a. 1.) cum S. Bonav. docet quidem, meritum (quod non consistit in habitu, sed in actu) habere quodam modo triplicem radicem; tamen quoad primam conditionem (difficultatem operis) censet: « quod aliquod arduum augmentet rationem meriti, non habet ex difficultate laboris [nisi per accidens], sed ex bonitate », scilicet obiecti. Idem in Sum. (I. q. 95. a. 4.) cum nostro Doctore tantum docet, quod quantitas meriti, orta ex difficultate operis, respondet tantum praemio accidentali. Sed praedictus diversus modus loquendi componi posse videtur, adhibita distinctione illa difficultatis, quam Seraphicus habet infra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. — Quoad tertiam vero conditionem Angelicus simpliciter docet, quod comparando statum ad statum, in primordio copiosior fuerit gratia; id quod Seraphico et Alexandro non tam probabile esse videtur, quam quod nunc magis efficacia sint dona gratuita ad merendum. — Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) aequalem esse censet gratiam pro utroque statu; quod etiam Durando (hic q. 3.) probatur. — Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) primae et secundae opinionis argg. et solutiones affert, nihil determinans. — Sed B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 5.) consentit S. Bonaventurae et docet: « Si comparentur (virtutes) secundum actus, quos habent, tunc nullum dubium est, quin actus virtutum Sanctorum secundi status, adiuti per gratiam Salvatoris, multo fuerint perfectiores quam actus virtutum primorum parentum in primo statu ». — Idem placet Aegidio R. (hic q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lat. 1. 2.), qui fuse disputat de causis diversitatis meritorum, et relata sententia Angelici, putat, eam stare non posse, etiam in hypothesi, quod in primo statu gratia sanctificans data fuisset. Eadem sententia etiam Dionysio Carth. (hic q. 1.) « rationabilior videtur », respectu habito ad virtutem et meritum Ss. Incarnationis, nec non Scoto, qui comparando statum ad statum, vult, in primitivo statu opera meritoria tantum quoad extensionem efficaciora fuisse; quod patet ex locis eius collectis in Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 93. a. 4. Idem putat Biel (hic q. unica).
II. De 1. quaest. specialiter agunt praeter Alex. Hal., de quo vide supra a. 1. q. 2, schol., et Aegid. R. — Scot., hic in utroque Scripto, q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. loc. cit. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2.
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Article III. On the quantity of grace in the state of innocence.
Next, with respect to the third article, it is asked how much grace the first man had.
And first there is the question concerning the quantity of the first man's grace with respect to the multitude of the gifts. Second, with respect to the magnitude of the gifts.
Question I. Whether man had as many virtues before the fall as he had after the fall.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether man had as many virtues before the fall as he had after the fall. And that he did, it seems:
1. First, by Damascene1, who says that God made « man surrounded by every virtue and adorned with all goods »: therefore it does not seem that any habit of virtue which is in us was lacking to him.
2. Likewise, on the side of cognition2 we do not know more things than Adam knew, nor do we have more sciences in us: therefore by parity of reasoning, on the side of affection, it does not seem that we have more habits of virtues in us than the first man had.
3. Likewise, there is a connection among the virtues, as the Saints say, and as will be shown in its place in the third [book]: therefore if Adam had any virtue, it was necessary that he had them all: therefore he had as many as we have.
4. Likewise, either we have some virtue which Adam did not have, or not. If not: then he had as many virtues as we have. If so: then either Adam was capable of that virtue, or not. If not: then it seems that through sin the capacity for the good has grown in us; which is absurd to say. If so: since God gave grace to Adam according to his capacity, it seems that every virtue which he confers on us after the fall, he also conferred on Adam himself before the fall.
On the contrary: 1. The virtue of fortitude consists in the enduring of terrible things4; but in Adam, in the state of innocence, there could be no such enduring: therefore neither [could there be] fortitude.
2. Likewise, temperance consists in restraining the depraved passions of the flesh5; but such [passions] could not be found in established nature: therefore neither [could there be] temperance.
3. Likewise, penance consists in the detestation of evils committed6; but in the state of innocence it in no way happened that one should grieve over evils committed: therefore at that time the virtue of penance could not exist in man.
4. Likewise, whoever has the gift of perseverance does not fall from righteousness; but Adam fell from righteousness: therefore he did not have perseverance. But many have this in the state of fallen nature: therefore not every virtue which now exists existed in the state of innocence.
Conclusio
Conclusion. The gifts of grace freely given are related, in man before and after the fall, as exceeding and exceeded; but the gifts of sanctifying grace existed in equal multitude in both states.
I respond: It must be said that when a comparison is made of the multitude of the gifts of grace to the state of fallen nature and the state of established nature, this can be understood either of the gifts of grace freely given, or of the gifts of sanctifying grace. — If it be understood of the gifts of grace freely given, then they are related as exceeding and exceeded, for the reason that Adam had certain gifts of grace freely given in that state, such as immortality and impassibility, which none of his posterity had; and his posterity have certain gifts of grace freely given which he did not have, such as7 the grace of healings and the working of miracles and the kinds of tongues and the like. — Now the reason for this diversity arises from this, that some gifts were expedient for that time, and others belong to this one.
But if we speak of the gifts of sanctifying grace, then, since those gifts have a connection with respect to the habits and with respect to the acts which are of perfection, it must be granted that they existed in equal multitude in the first man, in which they are found in his posterity. This I say with respect to the habits and with respect to the acts which are of perfection, as the reasons brought forward for the first part show. But with respect to the acts which have an imperfection annexed, it did not happen that virtues, according to that state, were posited in Adam.
To 1, 2, 3. And through this the answer to the three objections is clear, of which one is about fortitude, another about temperance, and the third about penance; all of which proceed according to acts having some imperfection annexed; which imperfection indeed does not belong to those virtues according to every state, but only according to the state of present misery8.
To 4. But to that which is objected concerning perseverance, it must be said that perseverance in one sense means the resolve of persevering in the good: and in this sense it is a virtue or a disposition following the virtues inseparably. In another sense perseverance is the continuation in the good unto the end9; and thus it does not denote a habit, but rather denotes a state, and this the first man did not have. Yet from this it does not follow that he lacked any virtue during the time in which he remained in grace.
But if anyone should ask of what sort were the acts which the virtues had in the first man, [the virtues] which have an imperfection annexed in their acts according to the state of fallen nature; it must be said that those acts in the state of innocence were for the most part conformed to the acts which the virtues are to have in the homeland; but of what sort these are, the Master determines in the third book, distinction thirty-three, and there10, in its place, it will be determined, God granting.
I. In the solution of the first question of this article the ancient authors agree well enough, if one excepts Aegidius Romanus (here q. 1, a. 3), who judges otherwise, because he holds that the first parents did not have sanctifying grace before the fall. — Concerning the second question there is a disagreement of opinions. St. Thomas (here a. 1), together with St. Bonaventure, teaches indeed that merit (which consists not in a habit but in an act) has in a certain way a triple root; yet as to the first condition (the difficulty of the work) he holds: « that something arduous increases the account of merit, it has not from the difficulty of the labor [except accidentally], but from the goodness », namely of the object. The same [author] in the Summa (I, q. 95, a. 4), together with our Doctor, teaches only that the quantity of merit, arising from the difficulty of the work, corresponds only to an accidental reward. But the aforesaid different manner of speaking seems able to be reconciled, by applying that distinction of difficulty which the Seraphic [Doctor] has below in d. 30, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5. — As to the third condition, the Angelic [Doctor] teaches simply that, comparing state to state, the grace was more copious in the beginning; which does not seem so probable to the Seraphic [Doctor] and to Alexander as [it does] that the gratuitous gifts are now more efficacious for meriting. — Petrus a Tarantasia (here q. 1, a. 2) judges the grace to be equal for both states; which is also proved by Durandus (here q. 3). — Richardus a Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 2) brings forward the arguments and solutions of the first and second opinion, determining nothing. — But B. Albert (Summa, p. II, tr. 14, q. 91, m. 5) agrees with St. Bonaventure and teaches: « If [the virtues] be compared according to the acts which they have, then there is no doubt that the acts of the virtues of the Saints of the second state, aided by the grace of the Savior, were much more perfect than the acts of the virtues of the first parents in the first state ». — The same pleases Aegidius Romanus (here q. 2, a. 1, and lat. dub. 1, 2), who disputes at length about the causes of the diversity of merits, and, having reported the opinion of the Angelic [Doctor], thinks that it cannot stand, even on the hypothesis that in the first state sanctifying grace had been given. The same opinion « seems more reasonable » to Dionysius Carthusianus (here q. 1), having regard to the virtue and merit of the most holy Incarnation, and likewise to Scotus, who, comparing state to state, holds that in the primitive state the meritorious works were more efficacious only as to their extension; which is clear from the passages of his collected in the Summa of Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 93, a. 4. Biel thinks the same (here, the single question).
II. On the first question there treat specially, besides Alexander of Hales, concerning whom see above a. 1, q. 2, scholion, also Aegidius Romanus. — Scotus, here in both his writings, the single question. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; and at the place cited, a. 3. — B. Albert, at the place cited, m. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richardus a Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2.
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- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 12. Vide supra a. 1. q. 2. arg. 3. ad opposit. — Paulo superius pro habuit codd. C H R S bb ee et alii bene habet, et paulo inferius pro circumdatum cod. N decoratum.[John Damascene,] Book II, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 12. See above, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 3, to the contrary. — A little above, in place of habuit (he had) codices C H R S bb ee and others rightly read habet (he has), and a little below, in place of circumdatum (surrounded) codex N reads decoratum (adorned).
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem.See the scholion on the preceding question.
- Dist. 36. q. 1. Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 13.Distinction 36, q. 1. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics VI, c. 13.
- Ut exponit Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 6. seq. De hoc et de seqq. argg. cfr. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12.As Aristotle explains, Ethics III, c. 6 ff. On this and on the following arguments, cf. Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 9, n. 12.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 10. seq.Cf. Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 10 ff.
- Verbum est ex codd. E P Q cc et ed. 1 adiicimus. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 legit sic: sicut gratiam sanitatum et operationem virtutum. Exempla, quae hic afferuntur, sumta sunt ex I. Cor. 12, 9. seq.We add the word est (is) from codices E P Q cc and ed. 1. The Vatican edition, with edd. 3, 4, reads thus: sicut gratiam sanitatum et operationem virtutum (as the grace of healings and the working of miracles). The examples adduced here are taken from 1 Cor. 12:9 ff.
- Cfr. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12. — Paulo superius pro non competit illis, quod habent codd. F aa bb ee et alii, edd. et multi codd. non competit aliis; nostra lectio non modice commendatur tum illis quae proferuntur in corp. et fine huius quaest., tum etiam illis verbis Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 2. a. 2. § 2: « Dicendum, quod poenitentia reduci habet ad virtutem iustitiae; est enim de speciebus iustitiae, existente statu personae lapsae; non autem fuisset de speciebus illius, si permansisset status naturae conditae; tunc enim esset actus iustitiae, Deo regenti subiectum esse ». Ultima huius sententiae verba lectorem delegant ad August., XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12, ubi docetur, virtutes cardinales quoad suos actus perfectos in utroque statu manere.Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 9, n. 12. — A little above, in place of non competit illis (does not belong to those), which codices F aa bb ee and others have, the editions and many codices read non competit aliis (does not belong to others); our reading is not slightly commended both by what is brought forward in the body and at the end of this question, and also by those words of Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 91, m. 2, a. 2, § 2: « It must be said that penance is to be reduced to the virtue of justice; for it is among the species of justice, given that the state of the fallen person exists; but it would not have been among the species of that [justice], if the state of created nature had remained; for then it would be an act of justice, [namely] to be subject to God who rules ». The last words of this sentence refer the reader to Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 9, n. 12, where it is taught that the cardinal virtues remain, as to their perfect acts, in both states.
- Matth. 10, 22: Qui autem perseveraverit usque in finem etc. Cfr. August., de Corrept. et gratia, c. 10. n. 26. seqq. — Aliquanto inferius pro habuerunt cod. cc et ed. 1 habuerint.Matthew 10:22: But he who shall have persevered unto the end etc. Cf. Augustine, On Correction and Grace, c. 10, n. 26 ff. — Somewhat below, in place of habuerunt (they had) codex cc and ed. 1 read habuerint (they may have had).
- Quaest. 6. — Ab edd., excepta 1, absunt verba dante Deo.Question 6. — From the editions, except for ed. 1, the words dante Deo (God granting) are absent.