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Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
p. 702

Quaestio II. Utrum homo simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per textum Genesis primo1: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Sed sicut exponit Augustinus, et habitum est supra distinctione decima sexta, imago est in naturalibus et similitudo in gratuitis: ergo si homo factus est ad imaginem et similitudinem, videtur, quod conditus fuerit simul in naturalibus et gratuitis.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo2: Deus de terra creavit hominem; et post: Et secundum se vestivit illum virtute: ergo homo a sui conditione primaria virtute fuit vestitus; et si hoc, redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, Damascenus3: « Fecit Deus hominem innocentem, rectum, virtuosum, sine sollicitudine, sine tristitia, omni virtute decoratum, omnibus donis ornatum »; ergo videtur, quod homo in gratuitis fuerit conditus.

4. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Deus fecit hominem perfectum quantum ad aetatem et quantum ad cognitionem ab exordio suae conditionis4: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod fecerit eum perfectum quantum ad voluntatis rectitudinem; sed voluntatis rectitudo consistit in dono gratiae: ergo videtur, quod donum gratiae habuerit in initio conditionis suae.

5. Item, ad hoc, quod alicui detur gratia, requiritur divina liberalitas et recipientis idoneitas5; sed Deus in primordio, cum Adam condidit, liberalissimus erat, et Adam a suae conditionis primordio ad suscipiendam gratiam idoneitatem habebat: ergo ab ipso conditionis primordio Deus ei gratiam conferebat.

p. 703

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus6 dicit, quod « homo in suae conditionis primordio habuit, unde posset stare, sed non, unde posset proficere ».

2. Item, Magister supra distinctione vigesima quarta7: « Poterat homo per auxilium gratiae creationis resistere malo, sed non perficere bonum »; sed si habuisset gratiam gratum facientem ab exordio creationis, potuisset utrumque: ergo si non potuit perficere bonum, patet etc.

3. Item, magis convenit gratia cum gloria quam natura cum gratia8; sed in homine gratia praecedit gloriam: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortiori, natura praecessit tempore donum gratiae.

4. Item, per gratiam fit matrimonium inter Deum et animam9; sed lex matrimonii est, ut non fiat absque mutuo consensu: ergo videtur, quod nulli adulto gratia debeat dari, nisi praecedat consensus. Si ergo Adam prius fuit, quam consentire posset, ergo non habuit simul naturam et gratiam.

5. Item, donum gratiae infructuosum est, nisi recognoscatur esse a Deo; nemo enim in se gratiam reservare potest, nisi pro illa Deo gratus existat10: igitur si magis tenet rationem gratuiti, quod est naturalibus superadditum, quam quod est naturaliter inditum; et donum gratiae est mere gratuitum: ergo videtur, quod non ab ipsa creatione, sed post, donum gratiae fuerit homini collatum.

Conclusio

Probabilius est, quod Adam habuerit prius tempore naturalia quam gratuita.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod homo fuerit creatus non solum in naturalibus, verum etiam in gratuitis, tum propter Dei liberalitatem, tum etiam propter hominis idoneitatem.

Sed quoniam Sanctorum auctoritates videntur sonare contrarium, ideo est alia opinio communior et probabilior, quod homo prius tempore habuit11 naturalia, quam haberet gratuita. Unde secundum hanc opinionem in statu innocentiae distinguuntur duo tempora: quoddam enim fuit tempus, in quo habuit tantum naturalia; quoddam vero, in quo habuit et naturalia et gratuita. Et secundum diversitatem huius duplicis temporis dissolvitur apparens contrarietas in auctoritatibus Sanctorum. Nam quaedam videntur dicere, quod homo habuit gratiam, quaedam vero quod non, et utraeque verum dicunt pro diversis temporibus.

Ratio autem, quare Dominus voluit post naturam dare gratiam, cum posset dare simul, sumitur ex triplici ordine, videlicet ab ordine sapientiae, bonitatis et iustitiae. — Ordo sapientiae hoc requirebat, ut, sicut esse gratuitum est alterius generis quam esse naturale, sic in diversis temporibus homini conferretur; et sicut elementa mundi prius tempore sunt creata et distincta quam ornata, propter ordinem sapientiae commendandum12: sic etiam fieret circa hominem, qui est minor mundus. — Ordini etiam bonitatis hoc competebat; hoc enim ordine dicitur aliquid ordinari in suum finem. Tunc igitur gratia homini ordinate datur, quando datur ei, secundum quod est utilior et fructuosior. Tanto autem gratia Dei est nobis utilior et fructuosior, quanto pro ea Deo gratiosiores13 existimus; et ideo sic debuit dari, ut ex ipso ordine dandi cognosceretur, donum illud esse gratuitum; et propterea non fuit a creatione indita, sed naturae iam perfectae et constitutae fuit superinfusa. — Ordo etiam iustitiae hoc requirebat; Deus enim secundum legem communem requirit aliquam praeparationem et dispositionem a parte nostra ad hoc, quod infundat alicui gratiam, sive in eo cui infundit, ut in adulto, sive in alio adiuvante, secundum quod contingit in parvulo14. Et ideo gratia non fuit homini concreata, sed dilata fuit, quousque homo per actum et usum rationis quodam modo se disponeret ad illam suscipiendam, ut sic verificaretur illud Augustini15 in primo homine: « Qui creavit te sine te, non iustificat te sine te ».

p. 704

Patet igitur, quod multiplex ordo hoc exigebat, ut homo prius fieret in naturalibus, quam in donis gratuitis ornaretur; et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem etc.; dicendum, quod similitudo attenditur ibi in gratuitis gratis datis16. — Vel dicendum, quod Deus dicitur fecisse hominem ad suam imaginem et similitudinem, non quia statim, cum dedit imaginem, simul etiam dederit similitudinem, sed quia alterum dedit, scilicet imaginem, et ad alterum habilem fecit, videlicet ad similitudinem, quam postmodum pro loco et tempore ei dedit. Unde quantum est ex vi verbi, non potest concludi, quod simul et semel fuerit in homine imago Dei et similitudo.

Ad 2. 3. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duas auctoritates sequentes, Ecclesiastici videlicet et Damasceni, quia sic intelliguntur: non quia Deus statim, ut hominem condidit, virtute vestiverit et ornaverit, sed quia tunc dispositum fecerit, et non longo post tempore complevit.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de perfectione aetatis et cognitionis, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia perfectio aetatis et cognitionis non tantum elongatur a perfectione naturae, sicut perfectio gratiae. Unde homo per vim naturae sibi inditam potest pervenire ad perfectam aetatem et proficere ad cognitionem, sed nunquam potest per se homo in habitum gratiae, nisi Deus infundat mera sua benignitate.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo erat idoneus, et Deus erat liberalissimus; dicendum, quod Deus maiorem idoneitatem exspectabat, quae quidem competeret ordini sapientiae et bonitatis et iustitiae, sicut prius ostensum est; et ideo non statim gratiam dedit, sed distulit, pro eo quod Deus sic operatur liberaliter, ut tamen sua liberalitas non excludat sapientiam nec iustitiam.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether man was at the same moment of time created in things of grace and in things of nature.

Secondly it is asked whether man was at the same moment of time created in things of grace and in things of nature. And that he was, it seems:

1. By the text of Genesis 11: Let us make man to our image and likeness. But as Augustine expounds, and as was held above in the sixteenth distinction, the image is in things of nature and the likeness in things of grace: therefore if man was made to the image and likeness, it seems that he was created at the same time in things of nature and things of grace.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 172: God created man of the earth; and afterwards: And according to himself he clothed him with virtue: therefore man from his condition was clothed with virtue at the first; and if so, the same conclusion returns as before.

3. Likewise, the Damascene3: "God made man innocent, upright, virtuous, without anxiety, without sadness, adorned with every virtue, ornamented with all gifts"; therefore it seems that man was created in things of grace.

4. Likewise, this seems so by reason. God made man perfect as to age and as to knowledge from the very beginning of his condition4: therefore by like reasoning it seems that he made him perfect as to rectitude of will; but rectitude of will consists in the gift of grace: therefore it seems that he had the gift of grace at the beginning of his condition.

5. Likewise, for grace to be given to anyone, divine liberality and the fitness of the recipient are required5; but God in the beginning, when he created Adam, was most liberal, and Adam from the beginning of his condition had the fitness for receiving grace: therefore from the very beginning of his condition God conferred grace upon him.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine6 says that "man at the beginning of his condition had whereby he could stand, but not whereby he could advance."

2. Likewise, the Master above in the twenty-fourth distinction7: "Man could by the help of the grace of creation resist evil, but not perfect the good"; but if he had had grace making-gracious from the beginning of creation, he could have done both: therefore if he could not perfect the good, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, grace agrees more with glory than nature with grace8; but in man grace precedes glory: therefore by like reasoning, indeed by a much stronger one, nature preceded the gift of grace in time.

4. Likewise, by grace a marriage takes place between God and the soul9; but it is the law of marriage that it not take place without mutual consent: therefore it seems that grace ought to be given to no adult unless consent precedes. If therefore Adam existed before he could consent, then he did not have nature and grace at the same time.

5. Likewise, the gift of grace is fruitless unless it is recognized to be from God; for no one can keep grace within himself unless he is grateful to God for it10: therefore if that which is superadded to things of nature holds the account of the gratuitous more than that which is implanted by nature; and the gift of grace is purely gratuitous: therefore it seems that the gift of grace was conferred on man not from creation itself, but afterwards.

Conclusion

It is more probable that Adam had things of nature prior in time to things of grace.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there was a twofold opinion.

For some wished to say that man was created not only in things of nature, but also in things of grace, both on account of God's liberality and on account of man's fitness.

But since the authorities of the Saints seem to sound the contrary, therefore there is another, more common and more probable opinion, that man had things of nature prior in time11 to having things of grace. Hence according to this opinion in the state of innocence two times are distinguished: for there was a certain time in which he had only things of nature; and a certain other in which he had both things of nature and things of grace. And according to the diversity of this twofold time the apparent contrariety in the authorities of the Saints is resolved. For some seem to say that man had grace, others that he did not, and both speak truly for different times.

Now the reason why the Lord willed to give grace after nature, when he could have given them together, is taken from a threefold order, namely from the order of wisdom, of goodness, and of justice. — The order of wisdom required this, that, just as gratuitous being is of another genus than natural being, so it should be conferred upon man at different times; and just as the elements of the world were created and distinguished prior in time to being adorned, for the commending of the order of wisdom12: so likewise it should come to pass concerning man, who is a lesser world. — The order of goodness also befitted this; for by this order a thing is said to be ordered to its end. Therefore grace is then given to man in an orderly way, when it is given to him insofar as it is more useful and more fruitful. But the grace of God is the more useful and fruitful to us, the more gracious13 we are to God on account of it; and therefore it ought to be given in such a way that from the very order of giving it might be recognized that the gift is gratuitous; and therefore it was not implanted from creation, but was superinfused upon a nature already perfect and constituted. — The order of justice also required this; for God according to the common law requires some preparation and disposition on our part for his infusing grace into anyone, whether in the one into whom he infuses it, as in an adult, or in another helping, as happens in an infant14. And therefore grace was not created together with man, but was deferred, until man through the act and use of reason should in some way dispose himself to receive it, so that thus might be verified that saying of Augustine15 concerning the first man: "He who created you without you does not justify you without you."

It is clear, therefore, that a manifold order required this, that man should first be made in things of nature, before he should be adorned with the gifts of grace; and the reasons which show this are to be granted.

To the arguments for the affirmative side:

To 1. To that which is objected: Let us make man to the image and likeness, etc.; it must be said that the likeness is there understood in things of grace gratuitously given16. — Or it must be said that God is said to have made man to his image and likeness, not because as soon as he gave the image he also gave the likeness at the same time, but because he gave the one, namely the image, and made him fit for the other, namely for the likeness, which he afterwards gave him in due place and time. Hence as far as the force of the word goes, it cannot be concluded that the image of God and the likeness were in man at one and the same time.

To 2 and 3. And by this is clear the response to the two following authorities, namely of Ecclesiasticus and of the Damascene, for they are understood thus: not that God, as soon as he created man, clothed and adorned him with virtue, but that he then made him disposed, and not long after in time completed it.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the perfection of age and of knowledge, it must be said that the case is not similar, because the perfection of age and of knowledge is not so far removed from the perfection of nature as is the perfection of grace. Hence man by the power of nature implanted in him can attain to perfect age and advance to knowledge, but man can never by himself attain to the habit of grace, unless God infuses it of his pure goodness.

To 5. To that which is objected, that man was fit and God was most liberal; it must be said that God awaited a greater fitness, which indeed would befit the order of wisdom and of goodness and of justice, as was shown before; and therefore he did not give grace at once, but deferred it, because God so works liberally that nevertheless his liberality does not exclude wisdom nor justice.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 26. — De sententia mox Augustino attributa cfr. liber de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 10. et 39. nec non supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.
    Verse 26. — On the opinion presently attributed to Augustine, cf. the book On the Spirit and the Soul (among the works of Augustine), c. 10 and 39, and also above, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
  2. Vers. 1. — Seq. textus ibid. v. 2.
    Verse 1. — The following text [is] ibid., v. 2.
  3. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 12.
    Book II, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 12.
  4. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 3. et d. XXIII. c. 2. seq. — Pro cognitionem primae edd. cum multis codd. conditionem; falso.
    See above, the Master's text, d. XVII, c. 3, and d. XXIII, c. 2 ff. — For cognitionem ("knowledge") the first editions, with many codices, [read] conditionem ("condition"); wrongly.
  5. Cfr. Matth. 25, 15: Dedit... unicuique secundum propriam virtutem.
    Cf. Matthew 25:15: He gave... to every one according to his proper ability.
  6. Hoc dictum Augustini in eius operibus verbotenus non habetur, sed sententialiter in eius libro de Corrept. et gratia, c. 11. n. 32. (Cfr. supra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri, c. 1.). Ibid. c. 10. n. 27. S. Doctor dicit, Deum « sic ordinasse Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut in ea prius ostenderet, quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium; deinde, quid posset suae gratiae beneficium iustitiaeque iudicium ».
    This saying of Augustine is not found word-for-word in his works, but in sense in his book On Correction and Grace, c. 11, n. 32 (cf. above, d. XXIV, the Master's text, c. 1). Ibid., c. 10, n. 27, the holy Doctor says that God "so ordained the life of Angels and of men, that in it he might first show what their free choice could do; then, what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do."
  7. Cap. I. — Pro perficere bonum ed. I proficere in bono.
    Chapter I. — For perficere bonum ("perfect the good") ed. I [reads] proficere in bono ("advance in the good").
  8. Vide supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3.
    See above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3.
  9. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo inferius post quam Vat. cum ed. 1 valde inconvenienter interiicit natura eius.
    Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — A little further down, after quam ("than"), the Vatican edition with ed. 1 very unsuitably inserts natura eius ("its nature").
  10. August., Serm. 283. (alias 42. de Diversis) c. 2. n. 2: Si habes aliquid a Deo et nescis, a quo habeas, non eris muneratus, quia remanes ingratus. Si nescis, a quo habeas, non agis gratias; non agendo gratias, et quod habes perdis etc. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam omittunt esse.
    Augustine, Sermon 283 (otherwise 42, On Various Subjects), c. 2, n. 2: "If you have something from God and you do not know from whom you have it, you will not be rewarded, because you remain ungrateful. If you do not know from whom you have it, you give no thanks; by not giving thanks, you lose even what you have," etc. — A little above, very many codices with editions 1, 2, 3 wrongly omit esse.
  11. Codd. K Q X Z et alii habuerit.
    Codices K Q X Z and others [read] habuerit.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. — Similiter de homine ut minore mundo loquitur Aristot., de quo cfr. supra pag. 336, nota 6.
    Cf. above, d. 12, a. 1, q. 2. — Aristotle likewise speaks of man as a lesser world, on which cf. above, p. 336, note 6.
  13. Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 gratiores, in quo sensu etiam vox gratiosiores, quam textus exhibet, sumenda est. Cfr. Du Cange, Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, ubi voci gratiositatis non solum tribuitur vis amabilitatis sive comitatis, sed etiam vis grati animi.
    Codices aa cc and ed. 1 [read] gratiores, in which sense also the word gratiosiores, which the text exhibits, is to be taken. Cf. Du Cange, Glossary of Medieval and Late Latin, where to the word gratiositas is attributed not only the force of amiability or graciousness, but also the force of a grateful disposition.
  14. Cfr. supra d. 26. dub. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 26, dubium 3.
  15. Serm. 169. c. 11. n. 13. Vide supra pag. 671, nota 4. — Paulo inferius pro quam in donis Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et paucis tantum codd. quam donis; in ed. 1 legitur quam in gratuitis formaretur.
    Sermon 169, c. 11, n. 13. See above, p. 671, note 4. — A little further down, for quam in donis the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and only a few codices [read] quam donis; in ed. 1 is read quam in gratuitis formaretur.
  16. gratis datis. (Sc. similitudo attenditur in gratiis gratis datis.)
    "gratuitously given." (That is, the likeness is understood in graces gratuitously given.) ---
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