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Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. Utrum homo ante peccatum habuerit gratiam gratum facientem.

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum homo in statu innocentiae habuerit gratiam gratum facientem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum habuerit gratiam ante lapsum. Secundo quaeritur, utrum simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus.

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Quaestio I. Utrum homo ante lapsum habuerit gratiam.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum homo ante lapsum habuerit gratiam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Lucae decimo1: Qui etiam exspoliaverunt eum et plagis impositis etc.; et exponunt Sancti et Glossa, quod « exspoliaverunt eum gratuitis et vulneraverunt in naturalibus »: ergo si hoc intelligitur in primo homine, primus homo non tantum habuit naturalia, sed etiam gratuita ante peccatum.

2. Item, Bernardus2: « Cum videret patrem nostrum omnium hominum aemulus caritate circumdatum et omni virtute vestitum, et hoc accepisse terrenum hominem, quod ipse per superbiam amisit; invidit insatiabilis homicida ». Ex hoc igitur patet, quod primus homo et caritatem habebat et omnem virtutem.

3. Item, Adam post soporem prophetavit, sicut innuitur in textu Genesis3 et in Glossis; hoc autem non fuit, nisi quia introductus fuit in illo sopore in secretum caelestis curiae, sicut plures dicunt auctoritates; sed nullum decebat illuc introduci, qui non haberet gratiam gratum facientem: ergo etc.

4. Item, a Deo recepit mandatum disciplinae, sed si illud mandatum servasset absque gratia, nihil meruisset4. Si igitur illud mandatum datum est sibi in meritum obedientiae, videtur, quod Deus non dederit sibi in praeceptum praeter gratiae adiutorium, alioquin dedisset in malum; quod nullo modo decet facere Deum.

5. Item, peccatum Adae arguitur fuisse maximae ingratitudinis5; sed nullum donum in via est maius gratia gratum faciente: ergo si maior ingratitudo fuit in peccato Adae quam in peccato aliorum posterorum, et posteri eius post acceptum donum gratiae Deum offendunt; videtur, quod ipse ante peccatum habuerit donum gratiae gratum facientis.

Sed contra: 1. Deus sciebat, ipsum statim esse lapsurum: ergo sciebat, quod illud gratiae donum in nullo esset sibi utile, sed potius esset sibi in nocumentum. Si igitur sapiens artifex non debet aliquid frustra facere, vel etiam quod vertatur in operis sui damnum et nocumentum; videtur, quod non dederit illi gratiam.

2. Item, Adam, quia iustitiam originalem habuit, quando peccavit, et voluntarie perdidit, nunquam eam recuperavit: ergo pari ratione, si habuisset donum gratiae gratum facientis, nec ipse nec aliquis posterorum eius gratiam recuperasset. Si igitur ipse gratiam gratum facientem recuperavit6, videtur, quod ante lapsum eam non habuerit.

3. Item, Adam habebat optima naturalia et nullam habebat pronitatem ad malum nec difficultatem ad bonum7: ergo si caritatem et gratiam habuisset, totaliter Deo adhaesisset, ergo nunquam in peccatum cecidisset. Sed constat, quod cecidit: ergo gratiam ante lapsum non habuit.

4. Item, lucifer non habuit gratiam gratum facientem, sicut probatum fuit supra8. Si ergo Adam gratiam gratum facientem habuit et ab illa cecidit, ergo de altiori gradu cecidit quam Angelus: ergo videtur, quod peccatum eius fuit incurabilius quam peccatum angelicum. Si igitur hoc constat esse falsum, Adam ante peccatum non habuit gratiae donum.

5. Item, prius debet aliquis probari quam in amicum assumi; hoc non solum verum est in amicitia humana, verum etiam in amicitia divina. Unde

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dicitur Iudith octavo9: Abraham, pater noster, tentatus est, et per multas tribulationes probatus, Dei amicus effectus est. Si igitur nullus habet Dei gratiam, quin habeat Dei amicitiam; videtur, quod ante tentationem Adam non habuerit gratiam. Sed statim post tentationem peccavit: ergo non habuit gratiam ante lapsum.

Conclusio

Adam ante lapsum gratiam gratum facientem habuit.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex consuevit esse opinio. — Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod Adam non habuit gratiam gratum facientem, pro eo quod non videtur credibile, quod lapsus esset, si tale adiutorium habuisset. Ad auctoritates autem et rationes respondent dicentes, quod Adam habuit multas gratias gratis datas et naturam habuit valde bonam. Et propterea Sancti videntur aliquando dicere, ipsum habuisse gratuita ante lapsum, non quia habuit donum gratiae gratum facientis, sed donum gratiae gratis datae, et per illud poterat tentationi resistere et ad gratiam gratum facientem se ipsum disponere.

Sed quoniam auctoritates Sanctorum expresse videntur dicere de gratia gratum faciente, sicut patet in illis quas Magister adducit in littera10, et huic etiam consonare videtur Scripturae auctoritas et rationis probabilitas: ideo est alia opinio communior et verior et probabilior, quam etiam Magister sustinet in littera11, scilicet quod Adam ante lapsum gratiam gratum facientem habuit, per quam non solum malo resistere, sed etiam in bono proficere potuit; et illa gratia adiutus, ita bene meruisset mandatum Domini observando, sicut demeruit transgrediendo. — Hanc igitur opinionem sustinendo concedere possumus rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus sciebat, statim ipsum esse lapsurum; dicendum, quod propter hoc non debuit dimittere donum gratiae sibi dare, duplici ratione: primum quidem, quia simul cum hoc praesciebat, quod bonum debebat de lapsu eius elicere; secundo vero, quia Deus in conferendo gratiam non attendit futura peccata, sed idoneitatem praesentem ad gratiam; sicut patet, cum confert gratiam in tempore praescitis, et eis quos ab aeterno reprobavit; et in utroque eorum commendatur Dei largitas et sapientia; et arguitur hominis ingratitudo et iniustitia in hoc, quod a tam benefico et tam benigno se avertit sine causa12.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potuit recuperare originalem iustitiam, quam habuit, quando peccavit; dicendum, quod non est tota ratio, scilicet quod voluntarie amisit iustitiam illam, sed simul cum hoc facit, quia iustitia originalis non tantum respiciebat voluntatem deliberativam, sed etiam respiciebat ipsam naturam institutam; gratia autem respicit ipsam voluntatem liberam, ut est libera. Et quoniam voluntas de facili vertitur et revertitur, natura autem, cum corrupta est, non sic de facili relevatur; hinc est, quod magis potest recuperari gratia quam prima iustitia, quamvis utraque fuerit per peccatum amissa. — Est etiam alia ratio, quare non recuperatur originalis iustitia; sed haec manifestabitur infra13, cum agetur de originali peccato.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi Adam habuisset gratiam, quod inseparabiliter Deo adhaesisset; dicendum, quod hoc non oportet, quia liberum arbitrium, habens gratiam, moveri potest praeter gratiae inclinationem, et frequenter movetur, nihil considerans de eo, ad quod movet gratia. Unde frequenter contingit, quod homo magnae caritatis inordinate afficitur, pro eo quod non semper actualiter fertur in illud summum bonum, circa quod habet immensum desiderium; sic intelligendum est accidisse ipsi Adae. Quis enim est homo, habens caritatem, qui peccaret, si Deum prae oculis semper haberet et actu consideraret, quantum Deus amabilis est, et quantum nefas est ipsum offendere?

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lucifer non habuit gratiam gratum facientem; dicendum, quod verum est. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod homo peccaverit maiori ingratitudine, pro eo quod lucifer proximior erat statui gloriae; simul enim recepisset gratiam et gloriam. Homo vero sic conditus fuit, ut longe ante gloriam haberet gratiam14; et ideo positus est in terra quasi longe a caelo distans, ac per hoc in transgrediendo nec adeo cecidit de alto, ut lucifer, nec adeo fuit ingratus nec adeo per peccatum depravatus15.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius debet homo tentari quam in amicum assumi; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de illa amicitia, quae facit hominem Deo privatum et familiarem; per quem modum dicit ipse Dominus Apostolis Ioannis decimo quinto16: Vos autem dixi amicos etc. De amicitia

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autem large dicta hoc non potest intelligi apud Deum, licet posset intelligi de amicitia apud homines, pro eo quod, nisi Deus gratiam daret, in probando potius reprobaret quam approbaret. Non enim habemus, unde possimus approbari a Deo, nisi per eius donum; non sic autem est de homine respectu hominis; et sic patet illud.

Scholion

I. Utramque huius articuli quaest. alii magistri plerumque coniungunt. Prima est de facto, utrum protoparentes ante lapsum a Deo acceperint gratiam, scilicet sanctificantem; secunda est de tempore sive instante, quo eam acceperint. Circa utramque quaest. variae illa aetate opiniones fuerunt, quibus occasionem dedisse videntur verba Magistri (d. XXIV. c. I.), qui S. Augustinum asserit docere, homini in creatione collatam esse potentiam, per quam posset stare, id est non declinare ab eo quod acceperat, sed non posset proficere in tantum, ut per gratiam creationis sine alia mereri salutem valeret.

II. Quoad hanc (1.) quaest. a S. Thoma (hic q. 2.) et ab Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) refertur opinio quorundam, quod Adam creatus fuerit tantum cum virtutibus naturalibus, sine gratia sanctificante et virtutibus gratuitis. Secunda opinio recensetur a nostro Doctore (hic in corp.), quam etiam tuetur Aegid. R., qui vult, eam esse tutiorem et sententiam sinceram Magistri, scilicet « Adam non esse in puris naturalibus productum, nec gratiam habuisse ante peccatum; sed habuit quoddam donum gratuitum i. e. originalem iustitiam, per quam poterat stare, sed non proficere ». — Attamen prima illa opinio post Concilium Trid. (Sess. V. can. I, Sess. VI. cap. I. 7.) ut omnino falsa apparet, nec etiam opinio Aegidii amplius sustineri potest. Unde conclusio, quam S. Bonav. vocat communiorem, veriorem et probabiliorem, nunc inter catholicos certissima censetur.

III. In solvenda altera (2.) quaest. eadem dissensio magistrorum fuit, quam quoad Angelos (supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 1, in schol.) notavimus. Cum Hugone et Magistro tenent Alex. Hal., B. Albert. (saltem in Summa), Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et (suo modo) Aegid. R., quod Adam non in eodem primo instanti, quo creatus fuit, etiam gratia sanctificante ornatus fuerit, licet non caruerit donis supernaturalibus, scilicet iustitia originali, quatenus exprimit donum integritatis, purae naturae divinitus superadditum. Secundum hanc positionem iustitia originalis et gratia sanctificans ita distinguuntur, ut prima actu separata esset ab altera. Pro eadem sententia citatur etiam Scot. (hic q. unica n. 7; Report. hic q. 2.), sed ab Hier. a Montefortino, t. II. q. 95. a. I. ad alteram partem trahitur. — Praeter argg. in corp. allata, hanc opinionem suadere videbatur ratio in fundam. 4. exposita, quae etiam magis urget, si supponitur opinio nostri Doctoris de primo subiecto gratiae et intima eiusdem natura (cfr. supra a. I. q. I.). — Opposita autem sententia recepta est a S. Thoma, in Comment. (loc. cit.) quidem ut probabilior, in Sum. (I. q. 95. a. 1, II. II. q. 5. a. I.) magis absolute. Ad arg. (fundam. 4.), sumtum a necessitate consensus in adultis, Angelicus respondet (S. I. q. 93. a. I. ad 3.): « Cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet, etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse ». Haec autem assertio, ut iam observavimus (in schol. praedicto), aliena erat ab opinione eorum, qui primam sententiam sequebantur. Quamvis autem Concilium Trid. a definienda hac controversia consulto abstinuerit, et, ut dicit Estius (II. Sent. d. 25. § 1.), nihil sit temeritatis vel periculi in prima opinione; tamen sententia S. Thomae nostra aetate in scholis catholicis omnino praevaluit. — Haec controversia intime connectitur tum cum doctrina de relatione, quae est inter gratiam sanctificantem et donum integritatis, tum cum determinatione accuratiore peccati originalis.

IV. De utraque quaest. praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., vide schol. praeced. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. 2; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 90. m. I. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 24. q. I.

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English Translation

Article II. Whether man before sin had sanctifying grace.

Next it is asked whether man in the state of innocence had sanctifying grace. And concerning this two things are asked. First, it is asked whether he had grace before the fall. Second, it is asked whether at the same time as he was created he was constituted in things of grace and in natural things.

Question I. Whether man before the fall had grace.

Concerning the first the procedure is as follows, and it is asked whether man before the fall had grace. And that he did seems to be the case.

1. Luke chapter ten1: Who also stripped him and, having laid blows upon him, etc.; and the Saints and the Gloss expound this to mean that « they stripped him of his gratuitous gifts and wounded him in his natural endowments »: therefore if this is understood of the first man, the first man had not only natural endowments, but also gratuitous gifts before sin.

2. Likewise, Bernard2: « When the enemy of all men saw our father girded about with charity and clothed with every virtue, and that this earthly man had received what he himself had lost through pride; the insatiable murderer envied him ». From this, therefore, it is clear that the first man both had charity and had every virtue.

3. Likewise, Adam after his sleep prophesied, as is intimated in the text of Genesis3 and in the Glosses; but this happened only because he was introduced in that sleep into the secret of the heavenly court, as many authorities say; but it was fitting for no one to be introduced there who did not have sanctifying grace: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, he received from God a command of discipline, but if he had kept that command without grace, he would have merited nothing4. If, therefore, that command was given to him for the merit of obedience, it seems that God did not give it to him as a precept apart from the help of grace; otherwise He would have given it unto evil, which it in no way befits God to do.

5. Likewise, the sin of Adam is argued to have been of the greatest ingratitude5; but no gift in this life is greater than sanctifying grace: therefore if there was greater ingratitude in Adam's sin than in the sin of his other descendants, and his descendants offend God after they have received the gift of grace; it seems that he before sin had the gift of sanctifying grace.

On the contrary: 1. God knew that he was straightway about to fall: therefore He knew that that gift of grace would be in no way useful to him, but rather would be to his harm. If, therefore, a wise craftsman ought not to do anything in vain, or even anything that turns to the damage and harm of his work; it seems that He did not give him grace.

2. Likewise, Adam, because he had original justice, when he sinned and voluntarily lost it, never recovered it: therefore by parity of reasoning, if he had had the gift of sanctifying grace, neither he nor any of his descendants would have recovered grace. If, therefore, he did recover sanctifying grace6, it seems that before the fall he did not have it.

3. Likewise, Adam had the best natural endowments and had no proneness to evil nor difficulty toward the good7: therefore if he had had charity and grace, he would have clung wholly to God, therefore he would never have fallen into sin. But it is certain that he did fall: therefore he did not have grace before the fall.

4. Likewise, Lucifer did not have sanctifying grace, as was proved above8. If, then, Adam had sanctifying grace and fell from it, then he fell from a higher degree than the Angel: therefore it seems that his sin was more incurable than the angelic sin. If, therefore, this is established to be false, Adam before sin did not have the gift of grace.

5. Likewise, one ought first to be proved before he is taken up as a friend; this is true not only in human friendship, but also in divine friendship. Hence

it is said in Judith chapter eight9: Abraham, our father, was tempted, and through many tribulations being proved, was made the friend of God. If, therefore, no one has the grace of God without having the friendship of God; it seems that before the temptation Adam did not have grace. But straightway after the temptation he sinned: therefore he did not have grace before the fall.

Conclusion

Adam before the fall had sanctifying grace.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there were wont to be two opinions. — For some have wished to say that Adam did not have sanctifying grace, on the ground that it does not seem credible that he would have fallen, if he had had such help. And to the authorities and reasons they reply, saying that Adam had many gratuitously-given graces and had a very good nature. And therefore the Saints sometimes seem to say that he had gratuitous gifts before the fall, not because he had the gift of sanctifying grace, but the gift of gratuitously-given grace, and through it he was able to resist temptation and to dispose himself for sanctifying grace.

But since the authorities of the Saints seem expressly to speak of sanctifying grace, as is clear in those which the Master adduces in the text10, and to this also the authority of Scripture and the probability of reason seem to consonate: therefore there is another opinion, more common and truer and more probable, which the Master also maintains in the text11, namely that Adam before the fall had sanctifying grace, by which he was able not only to resist evil, but also to advance in good; and aided by that grace, he would have merited as well by observing the command of the Lord as he demerited by transgressing it. — Maintaining this opinion, therefore, we can grant the reasons which are adduced for the first part.

1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary, that God knew he was straightway about to fall; it must be said that on this account He ought not to have forborne to give him the gift of grace, for a twofold reason: first indeed, because together with this He foreknew the good that He was to draw out of his fall; but secondly, because God in conferring grace does not regard future sins, but present fitness for grace; as is clear, since He confers grace in time upon those foreknown, and upon those whom He has reprobated from eternity; and in each of these the largesse and wisdom of God is commended; and the ingratitude and injustice of man is arraigned in this, that he turns away without cause from one so beneficent and so kind12.

2. To that which is objected, that he could not recover the original justice which he had when he sinned; it must be said that this is not the whole reason, namely that he voluntarily lost that justice, but along with this there is the fact that original justice regarded not only the deliberative will, but also regarded the constituted nature itself; whereas grace regards the free will itself, insofar as it is free. And since the will is easily turned and turned back, but nature, when it is corrupted, is not so easily restored; hence it is that grace can be recovered more readily than the first justice, although both were lost through sin. — There is also another reason why original justice is not recovered; but this will be made manifest below13, when original sin is treated.

3. To that which is objected, that if Adam had had grace, he would have clung inseparably to God; it must be said that this does not follow, because free will, having grace, can be moved apart from the inclination of grace, and is frequently so moved, considering nothing of that toward which grace moves. Hence it frequently happens that a man of great charity is inordinately affected, on the ground that he is not always actually borne toward that highest good, concerning which he has an immense desire; thus it must be understood to have befallen Adam himself. For what man, having charity, would sin, if he always had God before his eyes and actually considered how lovable God is, and how great a wickedness it is to offend Him?

4. To that which is objected, that Lucifer did not have sanctifying grace; it must be said that it is true. Yet from this it does not follow that man sinned with greater ingratitude, on the ground that Lucifer was nearer to the state of glory; for he would have received grace and glory together. Man, however, was so constituted that he had grace long before glory14; and therefore he was placed on earth as though far distant from heaven, and through this in transgressing he neither fell from so high a place as Lucifer, nor was he so ungrateful nor so depraved by sin15.

5. To that which is objected, that a man ought first to be tempted before he is taken up as a friend; it must be said that this is understood of that friendship which makes a man intimate and familiar with God; in which way the Lord Himself says to the Apostles, John chapter fifteen16: But I have called you friends, etc. Of friendship

taken in a broad sense, however, this cannot be understood with regard to God, although it could be understood of friendship among men, on the ground that, unless God were to give grace, in proving He would rather reprove than approve. For we have nothing whereby we can be approved by God, except through His gift; but it is not so of man with respect to man; and thus that point is clear.

Scholion

I. Other masters for the most part join together both questions of this article. The first is of fact, whether the first parents before the fall received grace from God, namely sanctifying grace; the second is of the time or instant at which they received it. Concerning both questions there were various opinions in that age, occasion for which seems to have been given by the words of the Master (d. XXIV, c. I), who asserts that St. Augustine teaches that there was conferred upon man in his creation a power by which he could stand, that is, not decline from what he had received, but could not advance so far as to be able through the grace of creation, without another grace, to merit salvation.

II. Concerning this (first) question, by St. Thomas (here q. 2) and by Aegidius Romanus (here q. 1, a. 2) there is reported the opinion of certain men, that Adam was created only with natural virtues, without sanctifying grace and gratuitous virtues. The second opinion is set forth by our Doctor (here in the corpus), which Aegidius R. also upholds, who holds that it is the safer opinion and the genuine view of the Master, namely « that Adam was not produced in pure naturals, nor had grace before sin; but he had a certain gratuitous gift, i.e. original justice, through which he could stand, but not advance ». — Nevertheless that first opinion, after the Council of Trent (Sess. V, can. I; Sess. VI, cap. I, 7), appears wholly false, nor can even the opinion of Aegidius any longer be sustained. Hence the conclusion which St. Bonaventure calls more common, truer, and more probable, is now most certain among Catholics.

III. In solving the other (second) question there was the same dissension of the masters which we noted concerning the Angels (above, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1, in the scholion). With Hugh and the Master, Alexander of Hales, B. Albert (at least in the Summa), Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and (in his own way) Aegidius R. hold that Adam was not, in the same first instant in which he was created, also adorned with sanctifying grace, although he did not lack supernatural gifts, namely original justice, insofar as it expresses the gift of integrity, divinely superadded to pure nature. According to this position, original justice and sanctifying grace are so distinguished that the former would be actually separate from the latter. For the same opinion Scotus is also cited (here q. unica, n. 7; Report. here q. 2), but by Hieronymus a Montefortino (t. II, q. 95, a. I) he is drawn to the other side. — Besides the arguments adduced in the corpus, this opinion seemed to be supported by the reason set forth in fundamentum 4, which also presses the more strongly if one supposes our Doctor's opinion concerning the first subject of grace and its inmost nature (cf. above, a. I, q. I). — But the opposite opinion was received by St. Thomas, in his Commentary (loc. cit.) indeed as more probable, in the Summa (I, q. 95, a. 1; II-II, q. 5, a. I) more absolutely. To the argument (fundamentum 4), taken from the necessity of consent in adults, the Angelic Doctor replies (S. I, q. 93, a. I, ad 3): « Since the motion of the will is not continuous, nothing prevents the first man, even in the first instant of his creation, from having consented to grace ». But this assertion, as we have already observed (in the aforesaid scholion), was foreign to the opinion of those who followed the first view. But although the Council of Trent deliberately abstained from defining this controversy, and, as Estius says (II Sent., d. 25, § 1), there is nothing of rashness or danger in the first opinion; nevertheless the view of St. Thomas in our age has wholly prevailed in the Catholic schools. — This controversy is intimately connected both with the doctrine concerning the relation that exists between sanctifying grace and the gift of integrity, and with the more accurate determination of original sin.

IV. Concerning both questions, besides those already mentioned: Alexander of Hales, see the preceding scholion. — B. Albert, II Sent., d. 24, a. 1, 2; S. p. II, tr. 14, q. 90, m. I, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. I. — Dionysius Carthusianus, II Sent., d. 24, q. I.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 30. — Quoad Glossam cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. In libro: Instructio sacerdotis (inter opera Bernardi) p. I. c. 1. n. 2. de Adamo dicitur: Qui descendit de Ierusalem in Iericho et incidit in manus latronum, in arbitrium malignorum spirituum; qui vulneratum eum in naturalibus spoliaverunt in gratuitis etc. Quod in Glossa dicitur ad Adamum referendum est, ut in ipsa Glossa insinuatur et in cod. Q a manu posteriore explicite notatur.
    Verse 30 [of Luke 10]. — As to the Gloss, cf. above p. 506, note 3. In the book Instruction of the Priest (among the works of Bernard), p. I, c. 1, n. 2, it is said of Adam: Who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among robbers, into the arbitrament of malignant spirits; who, having wounded him in his naturals, despoiled him in his gratuitous gifts, etc. What is said in the Gloss must be referred to Adam, as is intimated in the Gloss itself and explicitly noted in codex Q by a later hand.
  2. Hic textus non in operibus Bernardi invenitur, sed in Sermone de Symbolo contra Iudaeos, paganos et Arianos (inter opera Augustini), c. 2. his verbis: Dum [diabolus] illum primum Adam scilicet, patrem omnium nostrum, intueretur videretque hominem ex limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia ornatum, temperantia compositum, caritate circumdatum, immortalitate vestitum, aemulus atque invidus, haec hominem terrenum accepisse, quod ipse, dum esset angelus, per superbiam cognoscitur amisisse, invidit statim insatiabilis homicida, eosque nostros primos parentes illis donis ac tantis bonis exspoliavit, insuper et peremit. Cfr. de Salutar. Document. c. 60. (August.) et hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Sententia Bernardi habetur in Serm. I. in Annuntiat. B. M. V. n. 6. seqq.; Serm. II. de Diversis, n. 2. seq. et Serm. de Excellentia ss. Sacramenti et dignitate sacerdotum (inter opera Bernardi), n. I. seq. — Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 insanabilis pro insatiabilis.
    This text is not found in the works of Bernard, but in the Sermon on the Creed against Jews, Pagans, and Arians (among the works of Augustine), c. 2, in these words: When [the devil] beheld that first Adam, namely the father of us all, and saw that the man made from the slime of the earth to the image of God was adorned with chastity, composed with temperance, girded with charity, clothed with immortality, the rival and envious one, [seeing] that this earthly man had received what he himself, while he was an angel, is known to have lost through pride, the insatiable murderer straightway envied him, and despoiled those our first parents of those gifts and so great goods, and moreover destroyed them. Cf. On the Salutary Document, c. 60 (Augustine), and here the text of the Master, c. 2. — The view of Bernard is found in Sermon I on the Annunciation of the B.V.M., n. 6 ff.; Sermon II on Various Matters, n. 2 f.; and the Sermon on the Excellence of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Dignity of Priests (among the works of Bernard), n. I ff. — Many codices with editions 1, 2 read insanabilis (incurable) for insatiabilis (insatiable).
  3. Cap. 2, 23. seq. Vide supra pag. 433, nota 10, ubi etiam ex Augustino ille locus affertur, quo docetur, quod mens Adami in illo somno ita elevatus sit, ut « per ecstasim particeps fieret tanquam angelicae curiae, et intrans in sanctuarium Dei, intelligeret in novissima. Denique evigilans tanquam prophetiae plenus » etc. Hoc dictum refert Glossa ordinaria. — Idem ac August. docet Bernardus, Serm. 2. in Septuag. n. I. Glossam interlinearem videsis apud Lyranum.
    Chapter 2, 23 ff. See above p. 433, note 10, where that passage is also adduced from Augustine, by which it is taught that the mind of Adam in that sleep was so elevated that « through ecstasy he became a partaker, as it were, of the angelic court, and entering into the sanctuary of God, he understood the last things. Finally, waking as though full of prophecy », etc. This saying is reported by the ordinary Gloss. — Bernard teaches the same as Augustine, Sermon 2 on Septuagesima, n. I. The interlinear Gloss you may see in Lyra.
  4. Cfr. art. praeced. q. 2. — De seq. propos. cfr. August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 12. et c. II. n. 24. seqq. — In maiori codd. B E F H K M aa Adam pro a Deo. Circa finem arg. post in malum codd. Y aa bb ee subiungunt suum.
    Cf. the preceding article, q. 2. — On the following proposition cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, bk. VIII, c. 6, n. 12, and c. II, n. 24 ff. — In the majority [of cases?] codices B E F H K M aa read Adam for a Deo (from God). Near the end of the argument, after in malum (unto evil), codices Y aa bb ee add suum (his own).
  5. Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 21, a. 3, q. 3.
  6. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIII. c. 4.
    See below, the text of the Master, d. XXXIII, c. 4.
  7. Sicut docet Magister in lit. supra d. XXIV. c. 2. et d. XXV. c. 6.
    As the Master teaches in the text above, d. XXIV, c. 2, and d. XXV, c. 6.
  8. Dist. 4. a. I. q. 2. — Quod Adae peccatum remissibile fuerit, supra ostensum est d. 21. a. 3. q. 2.
    Distinction 4, a. I, q. 2. — That Adam's sin was remissible was shown above, d. 21, a. 3, q. 2.
  9. Vers. 22. — Loco Iudith octavo, ubi verba citt. habentur, codd. et primae edd. perperam legunt ad Hebraeos 8. (11?), quo quidem loco etiam de Abrahae (in fide et obedientia) tentati constantia sermo est, sed aliis verbis.
    Verse 22. — In place of Judith chapter eight, where the cited words are found, the codices and the first editions wrongly read to the Hebrews 8 (11?), in which place too there is mention of the constancy of Abraham when tempted (in faith and obedience), but in other words.
  10. Hic c. 2, ubi inter virtutes, quibus Adam ornatus erat, ei caritas enumeratur.
    Here, c. 2, where among the virtues with which Adam was adorned, charity too is enumerated for him.
  11. Hic c. 2, supra d. XXIV. c. 1. et d. XXV. c. 6. seq.
    Here, c. 2; above, d. XXIV, c. 1, and d. XXV, c. 6 f.
  12. Cfr. supra d. XXIII. lit. Magistri, c. 1, et I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro in tempore praescitis, et eis cod. cc et ed. 1 in tempore praesenti etiam eis.
    Cf. above, d. XXIII, the text of the Master, c. 1, and I Sent., d. 47, q. 3. — A little earlier, for in time upon those foreknown, and upon those (in tempore praescitis, et eis), codex cc and edition 1 read in present time also upon those (in tempore praesenti etiam eis).
  13. Dist. 32. a. I. q. I. seq.
    Distinction 32, a. I, q. I f.
  14. In cod. aa, verbis transpositis, ita legitur: « longe ante haberet gratiam quam gloriam ».
    In codex aa, with the words transposed, it reads thus: « he had grace long before glory ».
  15. Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. 2. ad 1. et d. 4. a. I. q. I. seq.
    Cf. above, d. 21, a. 3, q. 2, ad 1, and d. 4, a. I, q. I f.
  16. Vers. 15. — Paulo superius pro privatum, quod, teste Du Cange, Glossar. mediae et infimae latinitatis, etiam vim habet familiaris vel amici, edd., excepta 1, probatum; codd. exhibent privatum. Mox pro licet posset plures codd., ut F K T Y aa etc., licet possit.
    Verse 15. — A little earlier, for privatum (intimate), which, according to Du Cange, Glossary of Middle and Low Latinity, also has the force of familiaris (familiar) or amicus (friend), the editions, except the first, read probatum (proved); the codices exhibit privatum. Shortly after, for licet posset several codices, such as F K T Y aa etc., read licet possit.
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