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Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De necessitate gratiae ante peccatum primorum hominum.

Quaestio II. Utrum homo in statu naturae institutae potuerit mereri absque dono gratiae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo in statu naturae institutae posset in opus meritorium exire absque dono gratiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus in libro de Natura et gratia1: « Quis nesciat, ita factum hominem, ut in eo liberum arbitrium ad iuste vivendum pro possibilitate et capacitate sua constitueretur »? Ergo videtur, quod ex libertate arbitrii naturali posset iuste vivere, ergo et opera meritoria facere.

2. Item, Damascenus2: « Manentes in eo quod est secundum naturam, in virtute sumus »; sed opera virtuosa sunt meritoria: ergo liberum arbitrium in integritate suae naturae manens, absque omni gratia poterat facere opera meritoria.

3. Item, Dei perfecta sunt opera3, et « perfectum est aliquid, ut vult Philosophus, cum attingit propriae virtuti »: ergo si homo perfectus conditus est, poterat exire in operationem, propter quam factus est; haec autem est operatio, per quam pervenitur ad gloriam: ergo etc.

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4. Item, in omnibus creaturis, si distant a suo termino, ad quem ordinantur, data est virtus, per quam possint ad illum finem pervenire, sicut patet in igne, qui cum deorsum est, sua levitate potest sursum ferri: ergo aut liberum arbitrium miserabilius fuit inter ceteras creaturas, aut si aliae creaturae per naturam habent potentiam perveniendi ad suum finem, videtur multo fortius, quod et hoc homo posset per virtutem naturae ante statum miseriae.

5. Item, « natura nihil facit frustra nec deficit in necessariis4 »; sed nihil est magis necessarium homini quam illud, sine quo non potest beatificari: ergo cum potestas merendi huiusmodi sit, videtur, quod haec inesset ei per naturam, omni gratia circumscripta.

6. Item, circumscripta gratia, intelligamus, hominem in statu naturae servare divina mandata; aut igitur meretur aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil, ergo frustra operatur; sed frustra operari non potest esse sine aliqua poena; hoc autem non poterat esse in natura instituta5. Si aliquid meretur, cum opus rectum sit ad beatitudinem ordinatum, videtur, quod ex puris naturalibus mereri possit praemium aeternum.

Contra: 1. Ad Romanos sexto6: Gratia Dei vita aeterna; et Glossa: « Nihil aliud in nobis Deus coronat quam munera sua ». Tam ex textu quam ex Glossa colligitur, quod vitam aeternam non contingit mereri absque gratia.

2. Item, Deus nullo modo indiget bonis nostris7: ergo si acceptat bona nostra, hoc non est propter aliquam suam utilitatem, sed si est, hoc est per meram benignitatem: igitur nisi divina iustitia condescendat per gratiam, impossibile videtur, quod reputet aliquem dignum gloria propter aliqua opera, quae faciat.

3. Item, meritum et praemium debent esse proportionabilia; sed natura, quantumcumque eminens, improportionabilis est et alterius generis est, quam sit beatitudo gloriae: igitur impossibile est mereri gloriam per pura naturalia.

4. Item, nobilior est substantia quam operatio8; sed Deus nunquam acceptat hominem absque munere gratiae: ergo nec operationem hominis reputat meritoriam, nisi procedat a libero arbitrio et a gratia.

Conclusio

Homo in statu naturae institutae sine gratia non poterat facere opus meritorium, propter conditionem tum retribuentis, tum retributionis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non solummodo gratia necessaria est ad merendum secundum statum naturae lapsae, sed etiam secundum statum naturae institutae, licet secundum statum naturae lapsae magis indigeat liberum arbitrium dono gratiae. — In statu namque naturae institutae necessaria erat gratia, tum propter conditionem retribuentis, tum etiam propter conditionem retributionis. Propter conditionem retribuentis: quoniam ipse Deus bonorum nostrorum non indiget9; ideo nec acceptat hominem propter opera, nec aliquod meritum obligare potest ipsum secundum rationem dati et accepti; ideo ad hoc, quod aliquod bonum opus creaturae suae ad remunerandum Deo complaceat, necesse est, quod ipsius gratuitae bonitatis influentia in operante praecedat10, per quam creatura ipsi Creatori grata existat. — Similiter propter conditionem retributionis impossibile erat, liberum arbitrium mereri sine auxilio gratiae gratum facientis, pro eo quod illud praemium, quod meremur, est beatitudo aeterna. Beatitudo autem aeterna consistit in habendo eum qui est omne et summum bonum, et qui est super omnem naturam exaltatus et lucem habitat inaccessibilem11; et ideo impossibile est, quod homo merendo ad illud summum bonum ascendat et perveniat, nisi per aliquod adiutorium, quod sit ultra naturam. — Sic igitur homo in statu naturae institutae absque dono gratiae mereri non poterat, tum propter conditionem retribuentis, tum propter conditionem retributionis.

In statu vero naturae lapsae non solummodo indiget gratia ad merendum propter has conditiones, sed etiam propter conditionem operantis et operationis meritoriae. — Operans enim in statu naturae lapsae semper est in peccato et Dei adversarius et inimicus, nisi a peccato relevetur per gratiae donum; et ideo, quidquid faciat, nisi voluntas eius praeveniatur a gratia, quae Deo reconciliet, nihil meretur merito condigni, pro eo quod Dei est adversarius et inimicus. Deus autem opera non acceptat, nisi prius acceptet personam, sicut innuitur Genesis quarto12:

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Respexit Dominus ad Abel et ad munera eius; prius dicit ad Abel, et postea dicit ad munera. — Propter conditionem etiam operationis necessaria est gratia, quia nulla est operatio meritoria nisi recta; et nulla est13 recta, nisi fiat ex recta intentione; et nulla potest esse recta intentio, nisi quae bonum summum omni bono praeponit. Nulla autem intentio potest hoc facere in statu naturae lapsae sine dono gratiae. Et propterea, qualemcumque vel quantamcumque faciat homo operationem absque gratia, non meretur, quia non pensat Deus quantum, sed ex quanto hoc faciat.

Patet igitur, quod multiplex est necessitas gratiae ad merendum, scilicet propter conditiones retribuentis et retributionis, operantis et bonae operationis, ita quod haec quadruplex necessitas concurrit ad statum naturae lapsae, et duplex ad statum institutae. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera14, quod homo indigebat gratia operante et cooperante secundum statum naturae institutae, licet non secundum omnem modum gratiae operantis.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Augustini et Damasceni, dicendum, quod illud dictum est, non quia potestas liberi arbitrii et naturae sit sufficiens in opus meritorium, sed quia natura bene ordinata concordat cum gratia et discordat a culpa.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Dei perfecta sunt opera; dicendum, quod est perfectio quantum ad esse primum, et est perfectio quantum ad esse secundum. Et perfectio quantum ad esse secundum duplex est. Quaedam enim est, quae habet ortum a perfectione secundum esse primum, sicut illa perfectio, quae attenditur in accidentibus, quae oriuntur ex principiis subiecti. Est alia perfectio quantum ad esse secundum, quae non causatur a perfectione secundum esse primum, sed potius est supra illud, sicut est perfectio in esse gratuito vel glorioso, quae quidem est in nobis, non ex nobis, sed ex Deo15. Cum ergo dicitur, quod Dei perfecta sunt opera, hoc intelligitur quantum ad esse primum et quantum ad esse secundum, quod causatur ab illo. Quantum autem ad illud esse secundum, quod non causatur a perfectione secundum esse primum, veritatem non habet. Non enim fecit Deus omnes beatos et gloriosos, sed illos solos beatificavit, quos praedestinavit, conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui16; hoc enim disponit dare per merita tanquam bonum laudabile. Et ratio huius assignata fuit supra distinctione vigesima septima17.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliae creaturae possunt pervenire in finem, ad quem sunt, per virtutem naturae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia finis creaturae rationalis est summum bonum, quod est supra omnem naturam. Finis vero aliarum creaturarum est bonum creatum, quod est infra terminos naturae: ideo creatura rationalis magis indiget dono gratiae, ut possit pervenire in18 suum finem, quam aliae creaturae.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura non deficit in necessariis; iam patet responsio ex praedictis. Hoc enim intelligitur de necessariis, quae quidem attenduntur quantum ad esse primum, vel quantum ad esse secundum, quod causatur ex principiis naturae. Quantum vero ad illud esse secundum, quod est supra naturam, necesse est, naturam deficere, et tale est esse gratuitum et gloriosum. Nullum tamen ex hoc fit naturae praeiudicium, quia Deus defectum naturae supplet et semper praesto est, cum se offert tempus et locus, complere et dare quod natura non poterat.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, utrum homo mereretur aliquid vel nihil, si faceret opera; dicendum, quod non mereretur aliquid de condigno, sed de congruo; et sic merendo disponeret se ad gratiam, et ideo non operaretur frustra19. — Ex praedictis patet, quantum humana natura in statu innocentiae eguerit gratia20.

(Scholion: vide a1-q1. SCHOLION III et IV illius articuli sunt de his duabus quaestionibus communiter: « Pauci antiqui de his duabus quaest. explicite tractant ».)

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English Translation

Article I. On the necessity of grace before the sin of the first human beings.

Question II. Whether man in the state of instituted nature could merit without the gift of grace.

Secondly it is asked, whether man in the state of instituted nature could go forth into a meritorious work without the gift of grace. And that he could, it seems.

1. Augustine in the book On Nature and Grace1: « Who does not know that man was so made that in him free choice was established for living righteously according to its possibility and capacity »? Therefore it seems that by the natural freedom of choice he could live righteously, and therefore also do meritorious works.

2. Likewise, Damascene2: « Remaining in that which is according to nature, we are in virtue »; but virtuous works are meritorious: therefore free choice, remaining in the integrity of its nature, could without any grace do meritorious works.

3. Likewise, the works of God are perfect3, and « a thing is perfect, as the Philosopher holds, when it attains its proper virtue »: therefore if man was created perfect, he could go forth into the operation for which he was made; but this is the operation by which one arrives at glory: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in all creatures, if they are distant from their term, to which they are ordered, a power has been given by which they may be able to arrive at that end, just as is evident in fire, which, when it is below, can by its lightness be borne upward: therefore either free choice was more wretched than the other creatures, or, if the other creatures by nature have the power of arriving at their end, it seems much more strongly that man too could have this by the virtue of nature before the state of misery.

5. Likewise, « nature does nothing in vain nor falls short in necessary things4 »; but nothing is more necessary to man than that without which he cannot be made blessed: therefore, since the power of meriting is of this kind, it seems that this belonged to him by nature, every grace set aside.

6. Likewise, grace being set aside, let us understand that man in the state of nature keeps the divine commandments; either therefore he merits something, or nothing. If nothing, then he works in vain; but to work in vain cannot be without some penalty; but this could not be in instituted nature5. If he merits something, since a right work is ordered to beatitude, it seems that from pure natural endowments he can merit the eternal reward.

On the contrary: 1. To the Romans, chapter six6: The grace of God is eternal life; and the Gloss: « God crowns nothing else in us than his own gifts ». Both from the text and from the Gloss it is gathered that one does not happen to merit eternal life without grace.

2. Likewise, God in no way needs our goods7: therefore if he accepts our goods, this is not on account of any usefulness to himself, but if it is, this is through mere benignity: therefore unless the divine justice condescends through grace, it seems impossible that it should reckon anyone worthy of glory on account of any works that he does.

3. Likewise, merit and reward ought to be proportionate; but nature, however eminent, is disproportionate and of another genus than is the beatitude of glory: therefore it is impossible to merit glory through pure natural endowments.

4. Likewise, substance is nobler than operation8; but God never accepts a man without the gift of grace: therefore neither does he reckon a man's operation meritorious, unless it proceeds from free choice and from grace.

Conclusion

Man in the state of instituted nature could not without grace do a meritorious work, on account of the condition both of the one who rewards and of the reward.

I respond: It must be said that grace is necessary for meriting not only according to the state of fallen nature, but also according to the state of instituted nature, although according to the state of fallen nature free choice has greater need of the gift of grace. — For in the state of instituted nature grace was necessary, both on account of the condition of the one who rewards, and also on account of the condition of the reward. On account of the condition of the one who rewards: because God himself does not need our goods9; therefore he neither accepts man on account of his works, nor can any merit bind him according to the account of what is given and received; therefore, in order that some good work of his creature may be pleasing to God for rewarding, it is necessary that the influence of his gratuitous goodness precede in the one working10, through which the creature may exist as pleasing to its Creator. — Likewise, on account of the condition of the reward, it was impossible for free choice to merit without the help of grace that makes pleasing, for the reason that that reward which we merit is eternal beatitude. But eternal beatitude consists in having him who is the whole and supreme good, and who is exalted above every nature and dwells in inaccessible light11; and therefore it is impossible that man should by meriting ascend and arrive at that supreme good, except through some help which is beyond nature. — Thus therefore man in the state of instituted nature could not merit without the gift of grace, both on account of the condition of the one who rewards, and on account of the condition of the reward.

But in the state of fallen nature he needs grace for meriting not only on account of these conditions, but also on account of the condition of the one working and of the meritorious operation. — For the one working in the state of fallen nature is always in sin and an adversary and enemy of God, unless he be relieved from sin through the gift of grace; and therefore, whatever he does, unless his will be anticipated by grace which reconciles him to God, he merits nothing by the merit of condignity, for the reason that he is an adversary and enemy of God. But God does not accept works, unless he first accept the person, as is intimated in Genesis the fourth12:

The Lord looked upon Abel and upon his gifts; he says first upon Abel, and afterwards he says upon his gifts. — Also on account of the condition of the operation grace is necessary, because no operation is meritorious unless it is right; and none is13 right, unless it be done from a right intention; and no intention can be right except that which prefers the supreme good above every good. But no intention can do this in the state of fallen nature without the gift of grace. And therefore, of whatever kind or however great an operation a man does without grace, he does not merit, because God does not weigh how much, but out of how much he does this.

It is evident, therefore, that the necessity of grace for meriting is manifold, namely on account of the conditions of the one who rewards and of the reward, of the one working and of the good operation, so that this fourfold necessity concurs for the state of fallen nature, and a twofold for the state of instituted nature. And this is what the Master says in the text14, that man needed operating and cooperating grace according to the state of instituted nature, although not according to every mode of operating grace.

To the arguments:

To 1, 2. To that which is objected on the contrary from the authority of Augustine and Damascene, it must be said that this was said, not because the power of free choice and of nature is sufficient for a meritorious work, but because nature well-ordered agrees with grace and disagrees with fault.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the works of God are perfect; it must be said that there is a perfection with respect to first being, and there is a perfection with respect to second being. And the perfection with respect to second being is twofold. For there is a certain one which has its origin from the perfection according to first being, just as that perfection which is observed in accidents, which arise from the principles of the subject. There is another perfection with respect to second being, which is not caused by the perfection according to first being, but rather is above it, just as is the perfection in gratuitous or glorious being, which indeed is in us, not from us, but from God15. When therefore it is said that the works of God are perfect, this is understood with respect to first being and with respect to second being, which is caused by him. But with respect to that second being, which is not caused by the perfection according to first being, it is not true. For God did not make all blessed and glorious, but he beatified those alone whom he predestinated to be made conformed to the image of his Son16; for this he disposes to give through merits as a laudable good. And the reason for this was assigned above, in the twenty-seventh distinction17.

To 4. To that which is objected, that other creatures can arrive at the end for which they are, through the virtue of nature; it must be said that it is not alike, because the end of the rational creature is the supreme good, which is above every nature. But the end of other creatures is a created good, which is below the bounds of nature: therefore the rational creature has greater need of the gift of grace, that it may be able to arrive at18 its end, than the other creatures.

To 5. To that which is objected, that nature does not fall short in necessary things; the response is already evident from what has been said. For this is understood of necessary things which indeed are observed with respect to first being, or with respect to second being which is caused from the principles of nature. But with respect to that second being which is above nature, it is necessary that nature fall short, and such is gratuitous and glorious being. Yet from this no prejudice arises to nature, because God supplies the defect of nature and is always at hand, when time and place present themselves, to complete and to give what nature could not.

To 6. To that which is objected last, whether man would merit something or nothing, if he did works; it must be said that he would not merit something of condignity, but of congruity; and thus by meriting he would dispose himself to grace, and therefore he would not work in vain19. — From what has been said it is evident how much human nature in the state of innocence needed grace20.

(Scholion: see a1-q1. SCHOLION III and IV of that article concern these two questions jointly: « Few of the ancients treat these two questions explicitly ».)

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 43. n. 50: Quis enim eum [hominem] nescit sanum et inculpabilem factum, et libero arbitrio atque ad iuste vivendum potestate libera constitutum?
    Ch. 43, n. 50: For who does not know that he [man] was made sound and blameless, and constituted with free choice and with free power for living righteously?
  2. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 30.
    Book II, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 30.
  3. Deut. 32, 4. — Dictum Aristotelis, quod hic secundum antiquam translationem affertur, habetur VII. Phys. text. 18. (c. 3.), et explicatur illis verbis eiusdem auctoris, V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.): Virtus quoque quaedam perfectio est; unumquodque namque tunc perfectum est cunctaque substantia tunc perfecta, cum secundum speciem propriae virtutis nulla desit particula magnitudinis naturalis. — Vat. cum ed. 4 post attingit addit proprio fini seu.
    Deut. 32:4. — The saying of Aristotle, which is here adduced according to the old translation, is found in Physics VII, text 18 (c. 3), and is explained by these words of the same author, Metaphysics V, text 21 (IV, c. 16): Virtue too is a certain perfection; for each thing is then perfect, and every substance then perfect, when, according to the species of its proper virtue, no particle of natural magnitude is lacking. — The Vatican edition with ed. 4, after attains, adds to its proper end, or.
  4. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 43. (c. 9.).
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 43 (c. 9).
  5. Vide dictum Augustini, supra pag. 432, nota 4. allatum.
    See the saying of Augustine, adduced above, p. 432, note 4.
  6. Vers. 23. — Glossa hic allata apud Lyranum habetur non ad loc. cit., sed ad Eph. 1, 4, et est Augustini, in cuius operibus pluries occurrit, ut e. g. Enarrat. in Ps. 70. serm. 2. n. 5; in Ps. 102. n. 7; Epist. 194. (alias 105.) c. 5. n. 19; Serm. 170. (alias 49. de Tempore) c. 10. n. 10; de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 6. n. 15.
    Verse 23. — The Gloss here adduced is found in Lyra not at the place cited, but at Eph. 1:4, and is Augustine's, in whose works it occurs several times, as e.g. Enarration on Ps. 70, sermon 2, n. 5; on Ps. 102, n. 7; Letter 194 (alias 105), c. 5, n. 19; Sermon 170 (alias 49, On the Season), c. 10, n. 10; On Grace and Free Choice, c. 6, n. 15.
  7. Psalm. 15, 2: Bonorum meorum non eges. — In fine arg. post propter aliqua cod. aa subiungit bona.
    Psalm 15:2: You have no need of my goods. — At the end of the argument, after on account of any, codex aa adds goods.
  8. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 5. (c. 12.): Nam unicuique optimum, in substantia maxime.
    Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 5 (c. 12): For what is best for each thing is most of all in substance.
  9. Psalm. 15, 2. — Mox post propter opera codd. Y aa bb ee addunt sed opera propter hominem. Subinde pro meritum cod. T meritorum.
    Psalm 15:2. — Soon after on account of works, codices Y aa bb ee add but works on account of man. Thereupon, for merit, codex T reads of merits.
  10. Cod. O in operantem descendat.
    Codex O reads may descend into the one working.
  11. Epist. I. Tim. 6, 16, ubi Vulgata inhabitat pro habitat, ut iam saepius notatum est.
    First Letter to Timothy 6:16, where the Vulgate reads inhabits for dwells, as has now been frequently noted.
  12. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  13. Cod. S potest esse. — De hac ratione cfr. Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 3. seq.
    Codex S reads can be. — On this reasoning cf. Anselm, On the Concord of the Foreknowledge of God with Free Choice, q. 3, c. 3 ff.
  14. Hic c. 1, ubi etiam pro sua sententia adducit Augustinum.
    Here, c. 1, where he also adduces Augustine in support of his opinion.
  15. Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 26, q. 3.
  16. Rom. 8, 29.
    Rom. 8:29.
  17. Art. 2. q. 3. — Codd. et edd. perperam delegant ad d. 24.
    Article 2, q. 3. — The codices and editions wrongly refer to d. 24.
  18. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 ad.
    The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads to [ad for in].
  19. Cfr. supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro opera Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 mandata Dei.
    Cf. above, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1. — A little earlier, for works, the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads the commandments of God.
  20. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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