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Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus
p. 525

Articulus II. De peccato primorum parentum in relatione ad ignorantiam ex parte intellectus.

Quaestio III. Utrum ignorantia sit culpae excusatio.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ignorantia sit culpae excusatio. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum primo1: Misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans hoc feci: si ergo ignorantia fuit ratio, quare pervenit ad misericordiam, videtur, quod ignorantia excusabilem fecerit eius culpam.

2. Item, scientia aggravat culpam, sicut dicitur Lucae duodecimo2: Servus sciens voluntatem Domini sui etc.: ergo per oppositum ignorantia alleviat, ergo excusat.

3. Item, omne peccatum est voluntarium: ergo quod diminuit de ratione voluntarii diminuit de ratione peccati; sed ignorantia diminuit de ratione voluntarii, quia «voluntarium est, ut dicit Philosophus3, cuius principium est in ipso cognoscente singularia»; ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut ad resistendum peccato requiritur fortitudo, sic etiam requiritur et cognitio; sed defectus fortitudinis, utpote infirmitas, excusat culpam4: ergo similiter videtur, quod et defectus cognitionis, scilicet ignorantia.

5. Item, quod in sua plenitudine omnino tollit culpam, citra plenitudinem aliquo modo diminuit; sed cum aliquis simpliciter est ignarus, «sicut parvulus et furiosus, nihil quod faciat, imputatur ei in peccatum», sicut dicit Bernardus5 et alii doctores: ergo videtur, quod omnis ignorantia, peccato perpetrato, aliquo modo praebeat excusationis patrocinium.

Contra: 1. Isidorus in libro de Ecclesiastica Institutione6: «Nullus in culpa maior est, quam qui Deum nescit»: ergo videtur, quod ignorantia non excuset, sed aggravet.

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2. Item super illud ad Romanos secundo7: An ignoras etc., Ambrosii Glossa: «Gravissime peccas, quia ignoras»: ergo videtur ignorantia gravare culpam.

3. Item, ignorantia de se malum est, sed malum additum malo facit maius malum: ergo videtur, quod ignorantia peccatum augeat, non excuset.

4. Item, scientia nec auget nec minuit meritum, sed sola gratia et caritas8: ergo pari ratione nec ignorantia auget nec diminuit demeritum, ergo non excusat peccatum.

5. Item, esto, quod unus sciens peccet ex aliquanta libidine, et alter ignorans ex tanta libidine; si aequalis est ibi libido, ergo aequalis debet esse punitio: ergo videtur, quod aequalis sit utrobique excusatio, vel accusatio: ergo non magis excusat, vel accusat ignorantia quam scientia.

Est igitur quaestio: propter quid magis excusat ignorantia quam scientia9? Et cum tam ignorantia quam infirmitas excuset, similiter est quaestio, quae istarum magis excuset.

Rursus, cum sint multae differentiae ignorantiae, cum hoc quaeritur, quae earum excusent et quae non, et quae magis et quae minus.

Conclusio

> Quaelibet ignorantia aliquo modo excusat peccatum vel a toto vel a tanto.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod omnis ignorantia aliquo modo excusat peccatum. — Et ratio huius est, quia minuit de ratione voluntarii, minuit etiam de ratione contemptus. Ceteris enim paribus, magis contemnit qui peccat ex industria, quam qui ignoranter peccat. Et iterum, cum voluntarium includat in se cognitionem, quod privat cognitionem privat de ratione voluntarii. — Quia ergo peccatum mensuratur secundum quantitatem10 libidinis et contemptus, et ignorantia diminuit de ratione horum; generaliter verum est, quod omnis ignorantia, in quantum huiusmodi, excusat peccatum; et si tanta sit, quod privet omnino rationem voluntarii et rationem contemptus, excusat a toto; si vero non omnino privet, excusat a tanto11. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod ignorantia excusat peccatum.

Ad argumenta in contrarium: Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de Isidoro: Gravissime peccat, qui Deum nescit; dicendum, quod Isidorus ibi comparat peccatum infidelitatis ad alia peccatorum genera; et ipsum in se valde grave est, quia non est sine magna animae deordinatione. Nihilominus tamen, cum quis ignorans aliquid facit et in incredulitate12, sicut dicit Apostolus de se, minus graviter peccat, quam ille qui facit ex certa scientia.

Ad 2. Ad illud Ambrosii, quod dicit, quod gravissime peccat qui ignorat; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur non ratione maioris culpae, sed ratione infirmitatis magis periculosae; quia cum non habeat scientiam de morbo sive culpa, non quaerit medicinam; et ita semper remanet morbus et corruptio. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro Confessionum13: «Eo insanabilius peccabam, quo me non peccare arbitrabar».

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum additum malo facit maius malum; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, cum malum malo conformatur14. Malum autem poenae cum sit involuntarium, non conformatur malo culpae, quod est voluntarium; et ideo non auget, sed potius diminuit. Et quoniam ignorantia in nobis non est sic culpa, quin etiam aliquo modo sit poena, ideo culpam perpetratam excusat.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod scientia non auget meritum; dicendum, quod illud non sequitur. Quantitas enim meriti non est a nobis, sed a gratia Dei; demeritum vero et eius quantitas ortum habet a voluntate liberi arbitrii: et ideo quod facit ad rationem voluntarii facit aliquo modo ad augmentum peccati, et similiter, quod diminuit facit ad alleviationem peccati. Talis autem est ignorantia, ut dictum fuit supra15.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccantes ex pari libidine aequaliter puniuntur; dicendum, quod hoc non cogit, quin ignorantia excuset; quia si ille qui ignorat, peccat ex tanta libidine, ex quanta ille qui cognoscit; in statu ignorantiae existens, si haberet scientiam, peccaret multo maiori; et ita gravius peccaret et gravius puniretur; et ideo ignorantia, quae in ipso est, excusat peccatum, excusat, inquam, et minuit quantitatem peccati, non quam habet, sed quam haberet, si ignorantia non esset.

p. 527

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae magis excuset, utrum ignorantia, vel infirmitas; responderi potest, quod duo sunt de ratione voluntarii, videlicet cognitio singularium sive circumstantiarum, et quod operationis principium sit intrinsecum. Ignorantia igitur excusat, quia privat de ratione cognoscendi; infirmitas excusat, quia privat de ratione perfecte principiandi; et quoniam privato priori, privatur posterius, et non convertitur, et cognoscere praeambulum est ad facere: plus tollit de ratione voluntarii ignorantia quam infirmitas vel impotentia: et ideo magis excusat, ceteris paribus16. Adeo tamen potest infirmitas praecellere et ignorantia parva esse, sive ex culpa nostra procedere, quod erit e converso. Unde etsi, in generalitate loquendo, verum est dicere, quod magis excuset ignorantia quam infirmitas; descendendo tamen ad specialia peccata, possunt se habere sicut excedentia et excessa.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quae ignorantia excuset et quantum; dicendum, quod est ignorantia facti et ignorantia iuris. — Ignorantia facti potest esse dupliciter: aut adhibita debita diligentia, aut non. Si adhibita debita diligentia, excusat a toto; si non adhibita, non excusat a toto, sed a tanto.

Si autem sit ignorantia iuris, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut est vincibilis, aut invincibilis. Si vincibilis, tunc est ignorantia, quae est culpa. Et haec aut est ex consensu vero, ut ignorantia affectata, et ista sic ex una parte excusat, quod ex alia parte magis aggravat; aut est ex negligentia et ignavia, sicut ignorantia crassa et supina, et ista, etsi aliquo modo excuset, non tamen «ita excusat, ut sempiterno igne non ardeat17», sicut dicit Augustinus, et Magister in littera.

Si autem sit ignorantia invincibilis, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ista ignorantia est in nobis introducta per culpam praeambulam, aut praeter omnem culpam. Si praeter omnem culpam, aut simpliciter privat cognitionem iuris, sicut in infantibus et furiosis, qui omnino carent usu rationis; et haec excusat a toto — unde dicit Bernardus, «quod pueris infantibus et dormientibus nihil quod faciunt, imputatur». — Aut non tollit omnino usum rationis, sed plenum18; et tunc non excusat a toto, sed a tanto, sicut est in his qui non sunt plene furiosi, sed habent aliquo modo lucida intervalla, et in pueris, qui aliquo modo sunt capaces praecepti, licet non plene. — Si autem ignorantia est introducta per culpam propriam, sicut est in ebrio et furioso, quorum uterque se praecipitavit in hoc per culpam suam; sic non excusat a toto, sed a tanto, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus19, «ebrius habebit duplices maledictiones, maledictionem scilicet pro culpa praecedenti et maledictionem pro culpa subsequenti».

Quantum autem et qualiter excuset sequentem culpam, diversimode quidam determinant. — Quidam enim dicunt, quod nec ebrius nec furiosus, qui usu rationis caret, committit20 novam culpam, sed ex inordinatione sequenti aggravatur culpa prima; potest enim culpa aggravari ex eventu sequenti. — Aliis autem videtur, quod nec sic excuset, quin novam culpam committat; non tamen est adeo gravis, sicut si illam21 faceret ex certa scientia. Primus tamen modus dicendi probabilior esse videtur. — Ex his patet, quod Loth non omnino excusatur a culpa incestus, cum cognovit filias suas22. Primum quidem, quia non fuit in eo plena ignorantia; licet enim dicatur in textu, quod non senserit, quando filiae accubuerunt, hoc dicitur, quia non discrevit. Secundo vero, quia in illam ignorantiam pervenit per ebrietatem, quam debuisset vitare; et ideo Sancti dicunt, eum fuisse culpabilem, licet ex alia parte dicant, eum fuisse aliquatenus excusabilem23.

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English Translation

Article II. On the sin of our first parents in relation to ignorance on the part of the intellect.

Question III. Whether ignorance is an excuse for fault.

Thirdly it is asked whether ignorance is an excuse for fault. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. First, to Timothy chapter one1: I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly: if therefore ignorance was the reason why he attained to mercy, it seems that ignorance made his fault excusable.

2. Likewise, knowledge aggravates fault, as is said in Luke chapter twelve2: The servant who knew the will of his Lord etc.: therefore, by the opposite, ignorance lightens [it], therefore it excuses.

3. Likewise, every sin is voluntary: therefore what diminishes from the character of the voluntary diminishes from the character of sin; but ignorance diminishes from the character of the voluntary, because «the voluntary, as the Philosopher says3, is that whose principle is in the very one who knows the singulars»; therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as fortitude is required for resisting sin, so too knowledge is required; but a defect of fortitude, namely weakness, excuses fault4: therefore it seems likewise that a defect of knowledge, namely ignorance, [excuses too].

5. Likewise, what in its fullness wholly removes fault, short of fullness diminishes it in some way; but when someone is simply ignorant, «as is an infant and a madman, nothing he does is imputed to him as sin», as Bernard5 and other doctors say: therefore it seems that all ignorance, once a sin has been perpetrated, in some way affords the protection of an excuse.

On the contrary: 1. Isidore, in the book On Ecclesiastical Institution6: «No one is greater in fault than he who does not know God»: therefore it seems that ignorance does not excuse, but aggravates.

2. Likewise, upon that passage to the Romans chapter two7: Or are you ignorant etc., the Gloss of Ambrose: «You sin most grievously, because you are ignorant»: therefore it seems that ignorance aggravates fault.

3. Likewise, ignorance is of itself an evil, but an evil added to an evil makes a greater evil: therefore it seems that ignorance increases sin, [and] does not excuse [it].

4. Likewise, knowledge neither increases nor diminishes merit, but grace and charity alone do8: therefore by parity of reasoning neither does ignorance increase nor diminish demerit, therefore it does not excuse sin.

5. Likewise, suppose that one who knows sins from a certain amount of lust, and another who is ignorant from as great a lust; if the lust there is equal, then the punishment ought to be equal: therefore it seems that the excuse, or the accusation, is equal on both sides: therefore ignorance does not excuse, or accuse, any more than knowledge does.

There is therefore a question: on account of what does ignorance excuse more than knowledge9? And since both ignorance and weakness excuse, there is likewise a question, which of these excuses more.

Again, since there are many differences of ignorance, along with this it is asked which of them excuse and which not, and which more and which less.

Conclusion

> Every ignorance in some way excuses sin, either wholly or to a degree.

I respond: For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that all ignorance in some way excuses sin. — And the reason for this is that it diminishes from the character of the voluntary, [and] diminishes also from the character of contempt. For, other things being equal, he who sins on purpose shows more contempt than he who sins ignorantly. And again, since the voluntary includes within itself knowledge, what removes knowledge removes from the character of the voluntary. — Since therefore sin is measured according to the quantity10 of lust and of contempt, and ignorance diminishes from the character of these; it is generally true that all ignorance, insofar as it is such, excuses sin; and if it be so great that it wholly removes the character of the voluntary and the character of contempt, it excuses wholly; but if it does not wholly remove [them], it excuses to a degree11. — The reasons showing that ignorance excuses sin are therefore to be granted.

To the arguments on the contrary: To 1. To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Isidore: He sins most grievously who does not know God; it must be said that Isidore there compares the sin of unbelief to the other kinds of sins; and it is in itself very grave, because it is not without a great disordering of the soul. Nevertheless, when someone does something ignorantly and in unbelief12, as the Apostle says of himself, he sins less grievously than he who does it from certain knowledge.

To 2. To that of Ambrose, who says that he who is ignorant sins most grievously; it must be said that this is said not by reason of greater fault, but by reason of a more dangerous weakness; for since he has no knowledge of the disease or fault, he does not seek the medicine; and so the disease and corruption always remain. And this is what Augustine says in the book of Confessions13: «I sinned the more incurably, the more I judged myself not to be sinning».

To 3. To that which is objected, that an evil added to an evil makes a greater evil; it must be said that this holds true when an evil conforms to an evil14. But the evil of punishment, since it is involuntary, does not conform to the evil of fault, which is voluntary; and therefore it does not increase but rather diminishes [it]. And since ignorance in us is not so much a fault but that it is also in some way a punishment, therefore it excuses the sin perpetrated.

To 4. To that which is objected, that knowledge does not increase merit; it must be said that this does not follow. For the quantity of merit is not from us, but from the grace of God; whereas demerit and its quantity have their origin from the will of free choice: and therefore what contributes to the character of the voluntary contributes in some way to the increase of sin, and likewise, what diminishes [it] contributes to the lightening of sin. But ignorance is such, as was said above15.

To 5. To that which is objected, that those who sin from equal lust are equally punished; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion] that ignorance does not excuse; because if he who is ignorant sins from as great a lust as he who knows; existing in the state of ignorance, if he had knowledge, he would sin with a much greater [lust]; and so he would sin more gravely and be punished more gravely; and therefore the ignorance which is in him excuses the sin — excuses, I say, and diminishes the quantity of the sin, not [the quantity] which it has, but [the quantity] which it would have if the ignorance were not present.

To that which is asked, which excuses more, ignorance or weakness; it can be answered that there are two things belonging to the character of the voluntary, namely the knowledge of singulars or of circumstances, and that the principle of the operation be intrinsic. Ignorance therefore excuses, because it deprives [it] of the character of knowing; weakness excuses, because it deprives [it] of the character of acting perfectly as a principle; and since, when the prior is taken away, the posterior is taken away, and not conversely, and to know is preliminary to acting: ignorance removes more from the character of the voluntary than does weakness or impotence: and therefore it excuses more, other things being equal16. Yet weakness can so far surpass and the ignorance be so slight, or proceed from our own fault, that it will be the reverse. Hence although, speaking in general, it is true to say that ignorance excuses more than weakness; yet descending to particular sins, they can stand as exceeding and exceeded.

To that which is asked, which ignorance excuses and how much; it must be said that there is ignorance of fact and ignorance of law. — Ignorance of fact can be twofold: either due diligence has been applied, or not. If due diligence has been applied, it excuses wholly; if it has not been applied, it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree.

But if it be ignorance of law, this can be twofold: either it is vincible, or invincible. If vincible, then it is the ignorance which is a fault. And this is either from true consent, as affected ignorance, and this so excuses on the one side that on the other side it aggravates the more; or it is from negligence and sloth, as crass and supine ignorance, and this, although it excuses in some way, yet does not «so excuse that one does not burn in everlasting fire17», as Augustine says, and the Master in the text.

But if it be invincible ignorance, this can be twofold: either this ignorance has been introduced in us through a preceding fault, or apart from all fault. If apart from all fault, either it simply deprives [one] of the knowledge of law, as in infants and madmen, who entirely lack the use of reason; and this excuses wholly — whence Bernard says «that to infant children and to the sleeping, nothing they do is imputed». — Or it does not wholly remove the use of reason, but [removes its] fullness18; and then it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree, as is the case in those who are not fully mad, but have in some way lucid intervals, and in children, who are in some way capable of a precept, though not fully. — But if the ignorance has been introduced through one's own fault, as is the case in the drunkard and the madman, each of whom has cast himself into this through his own fault; thus it does not excuse wholly, but to a degree, because, as the Philosopher says19, «the drunkard shall have a twofold malediction, namely a malediction for the preceding fault and a malediction for the subsequent [fault]».

But how much and in what manner it excuses the subsequent fault, certain men determine in various ways. — For some say that neither the drunkard nor the madman, who lacks the use of reason, commits20 a new fault, but the first fault is aggravated by the subsequent disorder; for a fault can be aggravated by the subsequent outcome. — But to others it seems that it does not so excuse but that he commits a new fault; yet it is not so grave as if he did that same thing21 from certain knowledge. The first manner of speaking, however, seems more probable. — From these things it is clear that Lot is not entirely excused from the fault of incest, when he knew his daughters22. First indeed, because there was not in him full ignorance; for although it is said in the text that he did not perceive when his daughters lay down, this is said because he did not discern. But secondly, because he came into that ignorance through the drunkenness which he ought to have avoided; and therefore the Saints say that he was culpable, although on the other side they say that he was to some extent excusable23.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 13. In textu a Vulg. exhibito post Misericordiam adiunctum vero, hoc est Dei, et suppressum post ignorans demonstrativum hoc.
    Verse 13. In the text given from the Vulgate, vero — that is, Dei — is added after Misericordiam, and the demonstrative hoc after ignorans is suppressed.
  2. Vers. 47: Servus, qui cognovit voluntatem Domini sui et non praeparavit, et non fecit secundum voluntatem eius, vapulabit multis.
    Verse 47: The servant who knew the will of his Lord and did not prepare, and did not act according to his will, shall be beaten with many [stripes].
  3. Lib. III. Ethic. c. 1. Averroes, ibid. ea quae Aristoteles docet de voluntario et involuntario, sic breviter complectitur: Cum igitur dicitur de eo quod fit coacte aut inscienter, quod fit inspontanee; palam est, quod hoc quod agitur sponte, est cuius agendi principium est in agente ipsum, et agens ipsum scit particularia, in quibus fit actio.
    Book III of the Ethics, ch. 1. Averroes, in the same place, briefly sums up what Aristotle teaches on the voluntary and involuntary thus: When therefore it is said of that which is done under compulsion or in ignorance that it is done involuntarily; it is plain that what is done voluntarily is that whose principle of acting is in the agent himself, and the agent himself knows the particulars in which the action takes place.
  4. Cod. a culpa.
    Codex [reads] a culpa (from fault).
  5. De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 2. n. 5: Hinc est, quod insanis, infantibus itemque dormientibus nihil quod faciant, vel bonum vel malum, imputatur, quia nimirum, sicut suae non sunt compotes rationis, sic nec usum retinent propriae voluntatis, ac per hoc nec iudicium libertatis. Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 24. et Nemes. episc. Emes., de Natura hominis, c. 31, quo loco Damasc. nititur.
    On Grace and Free Choice ch. 2, n. 5: Hence it is that to the insane, to infants, and likewise to the sleeping, nothing they do, whether good or evil, is imputed, because, no doubt, just as they are not possessed of their reason, so neither do they retain the use of their own will, and through this neither the judgment of freedom. Cf. Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, ch. 24, and Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, On the Nature of Man, ch. 31, on which passage Damascene relies.
  6. Libr. II. Sent. c. 1. n. 6.
    Sentences Book II, ch. 1, n. 6.
  7. Vers. 1. — Glossam Ambrosii Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 113. m. 6. citat sic: «Peccas, homo, dum impunitatem tibi promittis; gravius, cum Dei bonitatem contemnis; gravissime, cum ignoras». Haec sumta et contracta videntur ex Commentario super Epist. ad Rom. 2, 5. seq., olim Ambrosio tributo, ubi sic legitur: Impunitatem sperans peccatorum, non solum durat inconvertibilis et intractabilis manens; sed adhuc acerbius peccat securus, quod non sit ultio futura, cor habens impoenitens, ignorans, quia iram sibi congregat in die irae. Eadem verba habet Lyranus in hunc locum. — Mox cod. T aggravare pro gravare.
    Verse 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 113, m. 6, cites the Gloss of Ambrose thus: «You sin, O man, while you promise yourself impunity; more grievously, when you despise the goodness of God; most grievously, when you are ignorant». These [words] seem taken and abridged from the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 2, 5 ff., formerly attributed to Ambrose, where it reads thus: Hoping for impunity for his sins, he not only continues, remaining unconvertible and intractable; but he sins yet more bitterly, secure that there will be no future vengeance, having an impenitent heart, ignorant that he is heaping up wrath for himself in the day of wrath. Lyra has the same words on this passage. — Further on, codex T [reads] aggravare (aggravate) for gravare (weigh down).
  8. Cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 2.
    Cf. below, dist. 29, art. 1, q. 2.
  9. Haec propositio abest a pluribus codd., inter quos FH K T.
    This proposition is absent from several codices, among which FH, K, T.
  10. Vat. qualitatem.
    The Vatican [edition reads] qualitatem (quality).
  11. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 5.
  12. Vide hic, fundam. 1. — Pro in incredulitate Vat. et nonnulli codd. ex incredulitate, alii plures codd., ut K T W ee, incredulitate tantum.
    See here, fundamentum 1. — For in incredulitate (in unbelief) the Vatican [edition] and several codices [read] ex incredulitate (from unbelief), several other codices, such as K, T, W, ee, [read] incredulitate only.
  13. Libr. V. c. 10. n. 18: Id erat peccatum insanabilius, quo me peccatorem non esse arbitrabar. — In pluribus codd., ut FHIKTU ee, suppressa est vox morbus, quae paulo ante habetur, in non paucis aliis, ut BDEPQVWY aa, corruptio.
    Book V, ch. 10, n. 18: That was the more incurable sin, by which I judged myself not to be a sinner. — In several codices, such as FHIKTU, ee, the word morbus (disease), which occurs a little before, is suppressed; in not a few others, such as BDEPQVWY, aa, corruptio (corruption) [is suppressed].
  14. Cod. F hic et paulo inferius confortatur. Circa finem solut. Vat. sine culpa pro sic culpa.
    Codex F here and a little below [reads] confortatur (is strengthened). Near the end of the solution, the Vatican [edition reads] sine culpa (without fault) for sic culpa (so a fault).
  15. In corp. quaest. — Vat., omisso est, hic addit potest minuere peccatum.
    In the body of the question. — The Vatican [edition], omitting est, here adds potest minuere peccatum (it can diminish the sin).
  16. Simul audi quam infirmitas, quae verba cod. cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt.
    Hear at the same time quam infirmitas (than weakness), which words codex cc and edition 1 add.
  17. Hic c. 5.
    Here, ch. 5.
  18. Vat. semiplenum, quae et mox pro qui aliquo modo substituit qui aliquando.
    The Vatican [edition reads] semiplenum (half-full), which also, just after, substitutes qui aliquando for qui aliquo modo.
  19. Libr. III. Ethic. c. 5: His attestari et privatim singuli et ipsi legumlatores videntur, qui eos qui mala perpetrant, castigant ac puniunt... ob ignorantiam etiam puniunt, si sibi ipse ignorationis causa quispiam fuisse videatur. Unde ebriis duplices poenae institutae sunt; in ipso enim qui inebriatur, principium est, cum sui quisque in eo dominus sit, ut non inebrietur, id quod ignorationis est causa.
    Book III of the Ethics, ch. 5: Both individuals privately and the lawgivers themselves seem to attest to these things, who chastise and punish those who perpetrate evils... they also punish on account of ignorance, if someone seems himself to have been the cause of the ignorance. Hence twofold punishments have been instituted for the drunken; for in the very one who gets drunk the principle lies, since each is his own master not to get drunk — which is the cause of the ignorance.
  20. Vat. committere potest.
    The Vatican [edition reads] committere potest (is able to commit).
  21. Codd. H aa cc et ed. 1 illa.
    Codices H, aa, cc and edition 1 [read] illa.
  22. Gen. 19. 33. seqq.
    Genesis 19, 33 ff.
  23. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
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