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Dist. 22, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus
p. 527

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si vir non peccasset, humanum genus minime peccatis corruptum periret. Sed contra: ita contrahit homo massam carnis a muliere, sicut a viro, et magis: si ergo originale peccatum contrahimus ex corruptione massae damnatae, ergo ita contraheret originale peccatum ex corruptione mulieris, sicut ex corruptione viri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia principale principium propagationis residet penes virum, potestas servandi iustitiam maxime penes virum residebat, et Deus hanc viro servandam commiserat; et ideo, si vir non peccasset, posteri originali iustitia non carerent. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de muliere, respondetur dupliciter: vel quod homo p. 528 tunc ex parte mulieris contraheret corruptionem poenalitatis, non corruptionem foeditatis, quae principaliter habet ortum ex parte viri; vel certe, quod probabilius videtur, vir mulieri commixtus amplius non esset, sed ei Deus aliam novam formasset, hoc salvo, quod sententia damnationis et mortis et corruptionis permansisset in ea1.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Tribus modis, ut ait Isidorus, peccatum geritur etc.; quoniam Beda2 dicit, quod quatuor sunt nobis inflicta propter primum peccatum, videlicet « infirmitas, ignorantia, malitia et concupiscentia »: ergo cum omnia ista sint peccatorum principia, videtur divisio Isidori insufficiens esse, quae ponit tantum tria membra. — Item, sicut ignorantiae opponitur industria, ita infirmitati opponitur potentia: ergo sicut ponitur, aliud genus peccati esse ex ignorantia, et aliud esse ex industria, similiter deberet poni aliud ex infirmitate, aliud ex potentia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista divisio peccati accipitur penes corruptionem virium animae, ita quod ignorantia respicit rationalem, infirmitas irascibilem, et malitia respicit concupiscibilem; et vocatur hic idem peccatum ex industria et ex malitia. Ideo, cum omnes vires motivae sub his tribus comprehendi possint, omne peccatum, quod fit in statu naturae lapsae, ad ista tria genera habet reduci. — Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de concupiscentia, dicendum, quod illud membrum non distinguit contra alia, quia, sicut idem Beda dicit, concupiscentia ex omnibus his est conflata3; et ideo penes concupiscentiam non sumitur aliqua differentia, cum omnia peccata procedant ab ipsa. Sic enim dicit Augustinus4: « Dum lex prohibet concupiscentiam, prohibet omne malum ».

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia opponitur infirmitati, sicut industria ignorantiae; dicendum, quod industria non stat ibi principaliter pro scientia, quae est ignorantiae opposita, sed stat ibi pro malitia, quam concomitatur scientia. Quare autem peccatum ex malitia dicatur ex industria, infra5 patebit, cum agetur de peccato in Spiritum sanctum.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ignorantia eorum qui scire nolunt, dum possint, non excusat; quia, sicut dicit Philosophus6, « omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant »; sed quod naturale est nullo modo assuescit in contrarium: ergo videtur, quod nullus homo scientiam respuat. — Item, sic se habet scientia ad intellectum, sicut se habet pax ad affectum; sed quia pax est perfectio affectus, nullus est, qui non appetat pacem, sicut dicit Augustinus7: « Propter pacem enim bellant omnes quicumque bellant »: ergo videtur similiter, quod nullus scientiam respuat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut contingit aliquid nosse in universali et ignorare in particulari, sic contingit aliquid appetere in universali, et tamen contemnere in particulari. Et hoc patet: omnis enim homo appetit beatitudinem; illam tamen beatitudinem, quam Christiani exspectant, multi sunt, qui aspernantur et recusant; et primus quidem appetitus est a voluntate naturali, secundus est a voluntate electiva. Per hunc modum est in proposito. Etsi omnes homines natura scire desiderent et velint esse scientes, scientiam tamen mandatorum Dei plurimi aspernantur. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa duo obiecta; nam scientiam recusare, hoc non est naturae, sed voluntatis electivae. Etsi etiam pacem in universali nullus recuset, tamen hunc modum pacis, vel illum multi refugiunt, et ideo confugiunt ad bellum8.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non est confugiendum ad ignorantiae tenebras. Cum enim p. 529 ignorantia sit pura privatio, et nihil appetatur nisi sub ratione boni et utilis9, videtur, quod ignorantia non possit affectari, vel ad eam confugi. Praeterea, nihil amatur nisi cognitum10: sed ignorantiae tenebrae non cognoscuntur: ergo videtur, quod ad eas nullus confugiat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam appetuntur propter aliquid appetibile et delectabile, quod habent in se, sicut bona spiritualia et corporalia. Quaedam appetuntur propter bonum, quod ad ea consequitur et ex ipsis elicitur, sicut aliquis appetit angustias et tribulationes, ex quibus pervenit homo ad perfectionem in merito et praemio. Quaedam appetuntur propter comparationem maioris mali, sicut aliquis, ne capiatur, proiicit se de alto; et illud proprie non est appetere, sed ad ipsum confugere. Per hunc modum intelligendum est esse in proposito. Quia enim homo timet deprehendi in scelere, ideo fugit lucem; non enim venit ad lucem, ne arguantur opera eius11. Et quia non contingit fugere lucem nisi in tenebris et per tenebras, ideo oculus adulteri observat caliginem, et qui vult male facere divinorum mandatorum requirit ignorantiam: non quia illam propter se appetat, sed quia refugit sceleris deprehensionem et amat delectationem, quam amat12 in sceleris perpetratione.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In ipso homine et in alio causa exstitit, ut fieret deterior. Ex hoc enim videtur, quod homo non peccasset, nisi diabolus fuisset; et hoc videtur falsum, quia homo habebat liberum arbitrium vertibile: ergo circumscripta omni tentatione diaboli, in malum poterat consentire ac per hoc peccare. — Item Augustinus probat, quod « alio auctore nullus potest fieri deterior », in principio Octoginta trium Quaestionum13, quia nec a minori nec a pari nec a superiori. Minus enim non potest; par aequali non praevalet; superius non vult, quia nihil est superius bono nisi bonum, et bonum non vult bonum deteriorare.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio, nulla tentatione pellente, homo peccare poterat, sicut patet in lucifero, qui peccavit sine impulsu alieno, qui etiam excellentior erat homine primo. Magister autem loquitur supponendo modum peccandi, secundum quod14 homo lapsus est, videlicet ad suggestionem diaboli; et ideo dicit, quod in ipso homine et in diabolo erat, quod fieret homo deterior; sed aliter et aliter, quia diabolus solum erat causa inducens et quasi adminiculans, sed homo fuit causa perficiens et consummans. Et quia omne peccatum, quod facimus, quodam modo habet ortum a peccato primo propter corruptionem, quae inolevit per originalis transfusionem; hinc est, quod non solum primus parens deterioratus dicitur fuisse a diabolo, immo etiam omne peccatum dicitur esse ab ipso. Unde Hieronymus super Ieremiam15 in originali dicit: « Quidquid peccamus, quidquid nocte et die malorum operum perpetramus, imperium est daemonum »; quia vel omne peccatum procedit ex suggestione daemonum immediata, vel ex illa suggestione primaria. — Et sic patet illud quod dicit Magister in littera; nec obstat illud Augustini, qui intelligit de principali agente, volens ostendere, quod corruptionis primariae nullus potuit esse principalis auctor, nisi16 ipse homo.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: If man had not sinned, the human race would not have perished corrupted by sins. But on the contrary: man contracts the mass of flesh from the woman just as from the man, and more so: if therefore we contract original sin from the corruption of the condemned mass, then it would likewise contract original sin from the corruption of the woman just as from the corruption of the man.

I respond: It must be said that, because the principal source of propagation resides in the man, the power of preserving justice resided chiefly in the man, and God had committed this to the man to be preserved; and therefore, if the man had not sinned, his posterity would not be deprived of original justice. — To that, then, which is objected concerning the woman, the reply is twofold: either that man would then have contracted from the woman's side the corruption of penalty, not the corruption of foulness, which chiefly takes its origin from the man's side; or rather, what seems more probable, that the man would no longer have been joined to the woman, but God would have formed for him another, new woman, this being preserved, that the sentence of condemnation and of death and of corruption would have remained in her1.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: In three modes, as Isidore says, sin is carried on, etc.; for Bede2 says that four things were inflicted upon us on account of the first sin, namely « infirmity, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence »: therefore, since all these are sources of sins, Isidore's division seems to be insufficient, which posits only three members. — Likewise, just as industry is opposed to ignorance, so potency is opposed to infirmity: therefore, just as it is posited that one kind of sin is from ignorance, and another from industry, so likewise another ought to be posited from infirmity, another from potency.

I respond: It must be said that this division of sin is taken according to the corruption of the powers of the soul, so that ignorance regards the rational, infirmity the irascible, and malice regards the concupiscible; and the same sin is here called both sin from industry and from malice. Therefore, since all the motive powers can be comprehended under these three, every sin that occurs in the state of fallen nature must be reduced to these three kinds. — But to that which is objected concerning concupiscence, it must be said that that member is not distinguished against the others, because, as the same Bede says, concupiscence is compounded out of all these3; and therefore no difference is taken according to concupiscence, since all sins proceed from it. For thus Augustine says4: « When the law prohibits concupiscence, it prohibits every evil ».

To that which is objected, that potency is opposed to infirmity as industry to ignorance; it must be said that industry does not stand here principally for the knowledge that is opposed to ignorance, but stands there for the malice that knowledge accompanies. But why sin from malice is called sin from industry will appear below5, when treatment is made of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: The ignorance of those who refuse to know, when they are able, does not excuse; because, as the Philosopher says6, « all men naturally desire to know »; but what is natural is in no way habituated to its contrary: therefore it seems that no man rejects knowledge. — Likewise, knowledge is related to the intellect as peace is related to the affection; but since peace is the perfection of the affection, there is no one who does not desire peace, as Augustine says7: « For all who make war make war for the sake of peace »: therefore it likewise seems that no one rejects knowledge.

I respond: It must be said that, just as it happens that one knows something in the universal and is ignorant of it in the particular, so it happens that one desires something in the universal and yet despises it in the particular. And this is clear: for every man desires beatitude; yet that beatitude which Christians await, many there are who spurn and refuse; and the first desire is from the natural will, the second is from the elective will. In this manner it is in the matter at hand. Although all men by nature desire to know and wish to be knowing, yet very many spurn the knowledge of God's commandments. — And thus the reply to those two objections is clear; for to refuse knowledge, this belongs not to nature, but to the elective will. And although no one refuses peace in the universal, yet many shun this mode of peace, or that, and therefore flee to war8.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: One must not flee to the shadows of ignorance. For since ignorance is a pure privation, and nothing is desired except under the aspect of the good and the useful9, it seems that ignorance cannot be sought after, or fled to. Moreover, nothing is loved unless known10: but the shadows of ignorance are not known: therefore it seems that no one flees to them.

I respond: It must be said that some things are desired on account of something desirable and delightful which they have in themselves, like spiritual and corporeal goods. Some things are desired on account of a good which follows upon them and is drawn out of them, as one desires distresses and tribulations, through which a man comes to perfection in merit and reward. Some things are desired on account of the comparison of a greater evil, as one, lest he be captured, throws himself down from a height; and that is not properly to desire, but to flee to it. In this manner it is to be understood in the matter at hand. For because a man fears to be caught in a crime, therefore he flees the light; for he does not come to the light, lest his works be reproved11. And because one cannot flee the light except in darkness and through darkness, therefore the eye of the adulterer watches for the gloom, and he who wishes to do evil seeks the ignorance of the divine commandments: not because he desires it for its own sake, but because he shuns the detection of his crime and loves the delight which he loves12 in the perpetration of the crime.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: In man himself and in another the cause existed, that he should become worse. For from this it seems that man would not have sinned unless the devil had existed; and this seems false, because man had a changeable free will: therefore, every temptation of the devil being set aside, he was able to consent to evil and thereby to sin. — Likewise Augustine proves that « by another author no one can be made worse », at the beginning of the Eighty-three Questions13, because neither by a lesser nor by an equal nor by a superior. For the lesser cannot; the equal does not prevail over its equal; the superior does not will it, because nothing is superior to the good except the good, and the good does not will to make the good worse.

I respond: It must be said that, without doubt, with no temptation impelling, man was able to sin, as is clear in Lucifer, who sinned without an impulse from another, who also was more excellent than the first man. But the Master speaks by supposing the mode of sinning according to which14 man fell, namely at the suggestion of the devil; and therefore he says that in man himself and in the devil it lay, that man should become worse; but in different ways, because the devil was only the inducing cause and, as it were, an assisting one, but man was the perfecting and consummating cause. And because every sin which we commit in some way takes its origin from the first sin on account of the corruption which grew in through the transmission of the original [sin]; hence it is that not only is the first parent said to have been made worse by the devil, but rather every sin is also said to be from him. Whence Jerome on Jeremiah15 says in the original: « Whatever we sin, whatever evil works we perpetrate night and day, is the command of the demons »; because either every sin proceeds from the immediate suggestion of demons, or from that primary suggestion. — And thus is made clear that which the Master says in the text; nor does that of Augustine stand in the way, who understands it of the principal agent, wishing to show that of the primary corruption no one could be the principal author, except16 man himself.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Anselm., de Conceptu virg. et pecc. orig. c. 9. solvit quaestionem, cur peccatum, quo damnatur genus humanum, magis imputetur Adae, quam Evae, cum ille post et per illam peccaverit. Allegatis verbis Apostoli (Rom. 5, 14.): Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etc., tres adducit rationes: Quia illa duorum copula tota intelligitur in nomine principalis partis, sicut saepe per partem totum solet significari; aut quoniam Adam cum costa sua, quamvis in mulierem aedificata, dici poterat Adam... aut idcirco, quia si non Adam, sed sola Eva peccasset, non necesse erat, totum humanum genus perire. Poterat namque Deus de Adam, in quo semen omnium hominum creaverat, aliam facere mulierem, per quam de Adam propositum Dei perficeretur. Cfr. infra d. 31. dub. 3; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 3. a. 2; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit. Magistri.
    Anselm, On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin c. 9, resolves the question why the sin by which the human race is condemned is imputed more to Adam than to Eve, since he sinned after her and through her. Citing the Apostle's words (Rom. 5:14): But death reigned from Adam to Moses, etc., he adduces three reasons: Because that union of the two is wholly understood under the name of the principal part, as often the whole is wont to be signified by the part; or because Adam together with his rib, although built into a woman, could be called Adam... or for this reason, that if not Adam, but Eve alone had sinned, it would not have been necessary for the whole human race to perish. For God could have made from Adam, in whom He had created the seed of all men, another woman, through whom God's purpose concerning Adam would be accomplished. Cf. below, d. 31, dub. 3; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 106, m. 3, a. 2; B. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master.
  2. A Scholasticis communiter allegatur eius expositio (ab aliis homilia) in Luc. 10, 30., de quo vide supra pag. 306, nota 3. Cfr. August., Enchir. c. 24. n. 8; Hugo de S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 31.
    His exposition (by others called a homily) on Luke 10:30 is commonly cited by the Scholastics, concerning which see above p. 306, note 3. Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion c. 24, n. 8; Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments bk. I, p. VII, c. 31.
  3. Ita plures codd., inter quos T V cc cum ed. I; Vat. hic contracta, sed infra, d. 30. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 2. ipsa cum omnibus codd. et edd. conflata.
    Thus several codices, among them T V cc with ed. I; the Vatican edition here [reads] contracta (compounded together), but below, d. 30, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2, it [reads], with all the codices and editions, conflata (fused together).
  4. Libr. de Spiritu et lit. c. 4. n. 6: Nam hoc ideo elegit Apostolus generale quiddam, quo cuncta complexus est, tanquam haec esset vox legis ab omni peccato prohibentis, quod ait: Non concupisces; neque enim ullum peccatum nisi concupiscendo committitur; proinde quae hoc praecipit, bona et laudabilis lex est. Cfr. Glossa ordinaria Rom. 7, 7. apud Lyranum.
    On the Spirit and the Letter c. 4, n. 6: For the Apostle chose this for this reason, something general by which he embraced all things, as though this were the voice of the law prohibiting from every sin, in that it says: Thou shalt not covet; for no sin is committed except by coveting; consequently the law which commands this is a good and praiseworthy law. Cf. the Ordinary Gloss on Rom. 7:7 in Lyra.
  5. Dist. 43. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius Vat. omittit verba non stat ibi usque stat ibi. — Idem dubium solvit S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit. Magistri.
    Distinction 43, a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, the Vatican edition omits the words non stat ibi down to stat ibi. — St. Thomas resolves the same doubt, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master.
  6. Libr. I. Metaph. c. 1.
    Metaphysics bk. I, c. 1.
  7. Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. n. 1: Omnis enim homo etiam belligerando pacem requirit.
    City of God bk. XIX, c. 12, n. 1: For every man, even in waging war, seeks peace.
  8. August., I. de Lib. Arb. c. 14. n. 30. — Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit.
    Augustine, On Free Will bk. I, c. 14, n. 30. — Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 517, nota 1.
    Cf. above p. 517, note 1.
  10. Vide August., X. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2: Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest.
    See Augustine, On the Trinity bk. X, c. 1, n. 2: For certainly something cannot be loved unless it is known.
  11. Ioan. 3, 20: Et non venit ad lucem, ut non arguantur etc. — Seq. textus est Iob 24, 13.
    John 3:20: And he does not come to the light, that his works may not be reproved, etc. — The following text is Job 24:13.
  12. Vat. habet.
    The Vatican edition [reads] habet (he has).
  13. Quaest. 3. et 4. — Subinde Vat. substituit Minor pro Minus et superior pro superius.
    Questions 3 and 4. — Thereafter the Vatican edition substitutes Minor for Minus and superior for superius.
  14. Codd. Y cc (F T a secunda manu) et ed. 1 quem.
    Codices Y cc (F T by a second hand) and ed. 1 [read] quem.
  15. Cap. 16, 13.
    Chapter 16, 13.
  16. Vat. nec. — Vide Petr. a Tar., hic ad lit. Magistri.
    The Vatican edition [reads] nec. — See Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master. ---
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