Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 43
Quaestio II. Utrum peccatum in Spiritum sanctum semper habeat aliud peccatum praeambulum.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum in Spiritum sanctum semper habeat aliud peccatum praeambulum. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Magister in littera1 dicit, quod « peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est peccatum desperationis, vel obstinationis »; sed nullus desperat nec obstinatur nisi propter aliquod praecedens peccatum: ergo videtur, quod semper aliquod peccatum sit praeambulum ad peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.
2. Item, peccatum in Spiritum sanctum vel est finalis impoenitentia, vel habet semper annexam finalem impoenitentiam, quantum est de se; sed impoenitentia non est nisi respectu peccati praecedentis, sicut nec poenitentia: ergo nunquam est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quin habeat aliud peccatum praeambulum.
3. Item, peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est peccatum procedens ex certa malitia: ergo necesse est, quod antequam homo peccet peccato in Spiritum sanctum2 sit malitiosus; sed non est malitiosus nisi per culpam: ergo ante peccatum in Spiritum sanctum necesse est esse aliam culpam praeambulam.
4. Item, in bonis nemo repente fit summus3: ergo videtur, quod et in malis nemo statim labatur in profundum; sed per istud peccati genus labitur homo in profundum vitiorum: videtur ergo, quod istud peccati genus habeat aliud praeambulum, quod disponat ad ipsum.
Sed contra: 1. Quatuor sunt nobis inflicta, sicut dicit Beda4 propter peccatum primi parentis, videlicet « infirmitas, ignorantia, malitia et concupiscentia »; sed possibile est, quod homo primo peccato peccet peccato ex ignorantia et ex infirmitate: igitur similiter possibile est, quod primo peccet peccato, quod ex malitia procedit.
2. Item, quotiescumque peccatorum genera sunt diversa, possibile est peccare peccato uno absque alio: si ergo peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est peccatum
distinctum ab aliis generibus peccatorum5, possibile est, aliquem peccare illo genere peccati, etiam si non praecesserit aliud peccatum.
3. Item, impugnatio veritatis agnitae est huius peccati species6; sed ita bene potest quis impugnare veritatem agnitam, sicut etiam veritatem ignoratam: ergo videtur saltem, quod quantum ad illam speciem absque alio peccati genere committi possit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.
4. Item, peccatum in Spiritum sanctum consistit circa actum spiritus7; sed magis pendet actus carnis ex actu spiritus quam e converso: ergo si homo potest peccare peccato carnis, nullo alio peccato praecedente, pari ratione, immo multo fortiori, videtur hoc esse verum de peccato in Spiritum sanctum.
Conclusio
Quaedam sunt species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quae nullo modo possunt esse absque peccato praeambulo; quaedam vero possunt esse absque peccato praeambulo, quod tamen vix aut nunquam accidit.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de peccato in Spiritum sanctum differenter est loqui secundum eius species differentes. Quaedam enim sunt species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quae nullo modo possunt esse absque peccato praeambulo, sicut sunt obstinatio, desperatio et finalis impoenitentia. Talia enim respiciunt peccatum praeambulum quasi materiam circa quam, et etiam sicut causam; nemo enim desperat de venia, nisi qui commisit culpam; nemo obstinatur in malo, nisi qui fecit malum; nemo impoenitens est, nisi qui habet unde poeniteat.
Sunt et aliae species peccati in Spiritum sanctum, quae quidem possunt esse absque peccato praeambulo, pro eo quod actus ipsarum non respicit determinate peccatum8, sicut est invidentia fraternae gratiae et impugnatio veritatis agnitae, sicut etiam est praesumtio de impunitate. Potest enim quis fraternae gratiae invidere et veritatem agnitam impugnare et de impunitate praesumere, etiam si nulla actualis culpa praecesserit; et hoc propter libertatem voluntatis, quae in quodlibet9 horum peccatorum propria deordinatione potest se praecipitare. — Attamen, quia ista sunt peccata valde gravia, vix aut nunquam contingit, quod aliquis in haec cadat, nisi mens eius fuerit per alia peccata depravata.
Concedendum est igitur, quod peccatum in Spiritum sanctum non solum est genus peccati distinctum ab aliis peccatorum generibus10 secundum formam, sed etiam separari potest secundum existentiam, ita quod committatur sine culpa praeambula, quamvis rarissime contingat. — Unde et rationes, quae ad illam partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.
Ad argumenta in contrarium:
Illa tamen ratio, quam facit de eo, quod minus dependet actus spiritus ab actu carnis etc.; dicendum, quod illa ratio non cogit, quin peccatum in Spiritum sanctum possit esse sine aliis peccatis, pro eo quod actus spirituales sive ad animam pertinentes non solum transeunt super materiam debitam, sed etiam super alios actus; unde substernunt sibi alios actus quasi pro materia11. Sic et peccata, quae habent circa actus illos consistere, ut plurimum alia peccata praesupponunt tanquam materialia, sicut desperatio et obstinatio. Non sic autem est de actibus corporalibus, qui quidem non transeunt in alios actus, sed in materiam extrinsecam; et ideo illa peccata circa illos actus existentia non habent alia peccata tanquam materialia. Et huic consonat illud quod dicit grammaticus12, quod verba prohaeretica sive ad animam pertinentia requirunt determinari per infinitivum sequentem. Non sic est de actibus pertinentibus ad corpus; et ideo ratio illa non cogit. — Nec etiam alia, quae dicit, quod est genus peccati distinctum; esto enim, quod non esset sine aliis, nihilominus posset distingui ab aliis, quia multa sunt inseparabilia secundum esse, quae tamen distinguuntur formaliter13.
1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur in contrarium de obstinatione et desperatione, dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ab insufficienti; quamvis enim illud sit verum in istis duobus generibus peccatorum, non tamen sequitur, quod sit verum in aliis generibus peccati in Spiritum sanctum.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finalis impoenitentia est annexa omnibus speciebus illius peccati; dicendum similiter, quod nec illud cogit, pro eo quod peccando in Spiritum sanctum committit homo aliquod peccatum, respectu cuius potest habere propositum non poenitendi, sicut ille qui impugnat veritatem agnitam, vel invidet fraternae gratiae; vel etiam sicut est de eo qui adeo praesumit de
benignitate misericordiae, quod nullum relinquit effectum iustitiae, et ex hoc proponit mala facere et nunquam de eis poenitere. Et hoc totum potest esse sine alterius peccati genere.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud peccatum est ex malitia; dicendum, quod malitia, secundum quod est huius peccati14 radix, potest dicere malitiam contractam ex peccato originali, vel potest dicere malitiam actam, scilicet actualem perversitatem voluntatis. Et primo modo praecedit natura et tempore, secundo modo concomitatur. Non enim oportet, quod ante fuerit malitiosus, sed volendo malignari, potest in Spiritum sanctum peccare; et ita non oportet, quod praecedat aliqua malitia actualis peccati, depravans voluntatem, sed sufficit, quod praecedat tempore malitia, quae est poena originalis.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nemo repente fit summus; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia, quamvis non possit aliquis nisi ordinate ascendere, potest tamen inordinate descendere sive subito se praecipitare. Praeterea, non efficitur homo ita perfecte malus, committendo semel peccatum15 in Spiritum sanctum, immo quanto pluries peccat, tanto magis labitur in profundum16.
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Question II. Whether the sin against the Holy Spirit always has another sin as its antecedent.
Secondly it is asked whether the sin against the Holy Spirit always has another sin as its antecedent. And that it does, seems [to be the case]:
1. The Master in the text1 says that « the sin against the Holy Spirit is the sin of despair or of obstinacy »; but no one despairs nor becomes obstinate except on account of some preceding sin: therefore it seems that some sin is always antecedent to the sin against the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, the sin against the Holy Spirit either is final impenitence, or always has final impenitence annexed to it, so far as it is of itself; but impenitence exists only with respect to a preceding sin, just as neither does penitence [exist otherwise]: therefore the sin against the Holy Spirit never exists without having another sin as its antecedent.
3. Likewise, the sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin proceeding from settled malice: therefore it is necessary that, before a man sins by a sin against the Holy Spirit2, he be malicious; but he is not malicious except through fault: therefore before the sin against the Holy Spirit there must be another fault as antecedent.
4. Likewise, among goods no one becomes great suddenly3: therefore it seems that among evils too no one falls into the depths at once; but through this kind of sin a man falls into the depths of vices: therefore it seems that this kind of sin has another [sin] as antecedent, which disposes toward it.
On the contrary: 1. Four things were inflicted upon us, as Bede4 says, on account of the sin of the first parent, namely « infirmity, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence »; but it is possible that a man, by a first sin, sin by a sin [arising] from ignorance and from infirmity: therefore likewise it is possible that he first sin by a sin which proceeds from malice.
2. Likewise, whenever the kinds of sins are diverse, it is possible to sin by one sin without the other: if therefore the sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin
distinct from the other kinds of sins5, it is possible for someone to sin by that kind of sin, even if no other sin has preceded.
3. Likewise, the impugning of acknowledged truth is a species of this sin6; but one can impugn an acknowledged truth just as well as also a truth not known: therefore it seems at least that, as regards that species, the sin against the Holy Spirit can be committed without another kind of sin.
4. Likewise, the sin against the Holy Spirit consists about an act of the spirit7; but the act of the flesh depends more on the act of the spirit than conversely: therefore if a man can sin by a sin of the flesh with no other sin preceding, by like reasoning, indeed by a much stronger one, this seems to be true of the sin against the Holy Spirit.
Conclusion
There are some species of the sin against the Holy Spirit which can in no way exist without an antecedent sin; but there are others which can exist without an antecedent sin, though this scarcely ever or never happens.
I respond: It must be said that one must speak differently of the sin against the Holy Spirit according to its differing species. For there are some species of the sin against the Holy Spirit which can in no way exist without an antecedent sin, such as are obstinacy, despair, and final impenitence. For such regard an antecedent sin as the matter about which, and also as a cause; for no one despairs of pardon except one who has committed a fault; no one is obstinate in evil except one who has done evil; no one is impenitent except one who has something to repent of.
There are also other species of the sin against the Holy Spirit which can indeed exist without an antecedent sin, because their act does not regard a sin determinately8, such as is envy of fraternal grace and impugning of acknowledged truth, as also is presumption of impunity. For one can envy fraternal grace, and impugn an acknowledged truth, and presume upon impunity, even if no actual fault has preceded; and this on account of the freedom of the will, which by its own disordering can hurl itself into any9 of these sins. — Nevertheless, because these are very grave sins, it scarcely ever or never happens that anyone falls into them, unless his mind has been depraved by other sins.
It must therefore be granted that the sin against the Holy Spirit is not only a kind of sin distinct from the other kinds of sins10 according to form, but can also be separated according to existence, so that it is committed without an antecedent fault, although this happens very rarely. — Hence the reasons too, which are adduced for that side, are to be granted.
To the arguments to the contrary:
As for that reason which it makes from the fact that the act of the spirit depends less on the act of the flesh, etc.; it must be said that that reason does not compel [the conclusion] that the sin against the Holy Spirit cannot exist without other sins, because spiritual acts, that is, those pertaining to the soul, not only pass over upon their due matter, but also upon other acts; whence they lay other acts under themselves as it were for matter11. So too the sins which are to consist about those acts for the most part presuppose other sins as material, such as despair and obstinacy. But it is not so with bodily acts, which indeed do not pass over into other acts, but into an extrinsic matter; and therefore those sins existing about those acts do not have other sins as material. And to this is consonant that which the grammarian says12, that prohairetic verbs, that is, those pertaining to the soul, require to be determined by a following infinitive. It is not so with acts pertaining to the body; and therefore that reason does not compel. — Nor again the other [reason] which it states, that it is a distinct kind of sin; for granted that it would not exist without others, nonetheless it could be distinguished from others, because there are many things inseparable according to being which are nevertheless distinguished formally13.
1. As for that which is objected to the contrary concerning obstinacy and despair, it must be said that that reason proceeds from an insufficient [ground]; for although that be true in these two kinds of sins, it does not however follow that it be true in the other kinds of the sin against the Holy Spirit.
2. As for that which is objected, that final impenitence is annexed to all the species of that sin; it must be said likewise that neither does that compel [the conclusion], because in sinning against the Holy Spirit a man commits some sin, with respect to which he can have the resolve not to repent, like the one who impugns an acknowledged truth, or envies fraternal grace; or even as is the case with the one who so presumes upon
the kindness of mercy, that he leaves no effect for justice, and from this resolves to do evils and never to repent of them. And all this can exist without another kind of sin.
3. As for that which is objected, that that sin is from malice; it must be said that malice, inasmuch as it is the root of this sin14, can mean malice contracted from original sin, or it can mean malice enacted, namely the actual perversity of the will. And in the first way it precedes in nature and in time, in the second way it accompanies. For it is not necessary that he was malicious beforehand, but by willing to act maliciously he can sin against the Holy Spirit; and so it is not necessary that some actual malice of sin, depraving the will, should precede, but it suffices that there precede in time the malice which is the penalty of original [sin].
4. As for that which is objected, that no one becomes great suddenly; it must be said that the case is not the same; because, although one cannot but ascend in order, one can nevertheless descend in disorder, that is, suddenly hurl oneself down. Moreover, a man is not made so perfectly evil by committing the sin against the Holy Spirit once15, rather the more times he sins, the more he falls into the depths16.
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- Hic circa initium.Here, near the beginning [of the distinction].
- Vat. hic repetit quod eique annectit ipse. A primis edd. abest hoc arg.The Vatican edition here repeats quod and annexes to it ipse. This argument is absent from the first editions.
- Bernard., in Cant. serm. 3. n. 4: Nolo repente fieri summus, paulatim proficere volo. Cfr. eiusdem opuscul. de Gradibus humilit. c. 9. n. 27. — In minori respicitur illud Prov. 18, 3: Impius cum in profundum venerit peccatorum, contemnit.Bernard, On the Canticle, sermon 3, n. 4: "I do not wish to become great suddenly; I wish to advance little by little." Compare the same author's treatise On the Degrees of Humility, c. 9, n. 27. — In the minor [premise] there is a reference to that [text of] Proverbs 18:3: "The wicked, when he has come into the depth of sins, contemns."
- Vide supra pag. 528, nota 2.See above, page 528, note 2.
- Quod probatum est quaest. praeced.Which was proved in the preceding question.
- Ostendetur infra a. 3. q. 1. seq.It will be shown below in article 3, question 1 following.
- Vide quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro multo fortiori cod. T substituit multo fortius.See the preceding question. — A little below, for multo fortiori codex T substitutes multo fortius.
- Edd. adiiciunt praeambulum.The editions add praeambulum ["antecedent"].
- Edd. cum pluribus codd. quolibet.The editions, with several codices, read quolibet.
- Pro ab aliis... generibus cod. T contra alia... genera.For ab aliis... generibus codex T reads contra alia... genera.
- Cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. et d. 25. p. II. q. 6. — Mox pro circa actus Vat. contra actus. Paulo inferius iterum pro circa illos actus Vat. nec non edd. 2, 3, 4 contra illos actus.Compare above, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4, and d. 25, p. II, q. 6. — Soon, for circa actus the Vatican edition reads contra actus. A little below again, for circa illos actus the Vatican edition, as also editions 2, 3, 4, [read] contra illos actus.
- Priscian., XVIII. Grammat. c. 19, postquam distinctionem verborum exposuit docens, quod « verborum alia ad corpus, alia ad animam, alia ad utrumque, alia ad extrinsecus accidentia pertinent », inter alia haec quoque profert: Voluntatem quoque significantia [verba] accusativo coniunguntur cum infinito alterius verbi: volo te currere... nisi infinitum a verbo alii sit casui iungendum... ut misereor tui, misereri tui volo etc. De vocabulo prohaeretica vide tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3. Graece προαιρετικός significat eum qui facultatem habet unum prae alio eligendi.Priscian, Grammar XVIII, c. 19, after he has set forth the distinction of verbs, teaching that « some verbs pertain to the body, others to the soul, others to both, others to things accidentally extrinsic », among other things adduces also this: "Verbs signifying also the will are joined in the accusative with the infinitive of another verb: volo te currere [I wish you to run]... unless the infinitive is to be joined by the verb to another case... as misereor tui, misereri tui volo [I have pity on you, I wish to have pity on you]," etc. On the word prohairetic see tome I, page 714, note 3. In Greek prohairetikos signifies one who has the faculty of choosing one thing before another.
- Cfr. supra pag. 939, nota 2.Compare above, page 939, note 2.
- Codd. et primae edd. omittunt peccati. — De malitia contracta et acta vide supra pag. 826, nota 4. — Mox pro scilicet cod. T secundum.The codices and the first editions omit peccati. — On malice contracted and enacted see above, page 826, note 4. — Soon, for scilicet codex T [reads] secundum.
- Verba semel peccatum desunt in Vat. Pro peccatum cod. T substituit malum.The words semel peccatum are absent in the Vatican edition. For peccatum codex T substitutes malum.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.