Bonaventure

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Articulus II. De mandatis Decalogi quoad distinctionem et ordinem.

Consequenter quaeritur de mandatis Decalogi quantum ad ordinem et distinctionem. Et circa hoc tria possunt quaeri. Primo quaeritur de ipsorum mandatorum numero et sufficientia, utrum sint decem. Secundo quaeritur de ordine ipsorum ad invicem. Tertio vero quaeritur de numero et ordine in comparatione ad tabularum distinctionem.

Quaestio I. Utrum mandata Decalogi debeant esse tantum decem, an plura, an pauciora.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum mandata Decalogi debeant esse tantum decem, an plura, an pauciora. Et quod debeant esse pauciora, videtur:

1. Quia ad Romanos decimo tertio¹ dicitur: Qui diligit proximum Legem implevit: ergo in mandato de dilectione proximi tota Lex potest includi: videtur ergo, quod mandata non debeant numero denario multiplicari, cum in paucioribus satis contineantur.

2. Item, super illud ad Romanos septimo²: Concupiscentiam nesciebam; Glossa: « Bona est Lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omnia mala prohibet »: si ergo in prohibitione concupiscentiae cetera mala prohibentur, videtur, quod alia mandata superfluunt.

3. Item, quicumque peccat mortaliter, se ipsum occidit³: ergo cum in occisione prohibeatur non tantum homicidium corporale, sed etiam spirituale, non tantum operis, sed etiam voluntatis; videtur, quod in illa prohibitione prohibeantur omnia peccata: ergo superfluunt omnia alia mandata.

4. Item, differentia Legis et Evangelii est, quod Lex prohibeat manum, non animum; Evangelium autem non solum manum, sed etiam animum prohibet⁴: ergo videtur, quod solummodo deberet prohiberi actus exterior, et non, quod spectaret ad actum interiorem: ergo superfluit mandatum de non concupiscendo. Si tu dicas, quod prohibetur concupiscentia, quae progreditur in opus; contra hoc est: quia illa non distinguitur a peccato operis: ergo praeceptum de prohibitione illius concupiscentiae non debet connumerari praecepto de prohibitione operis exterioris.

Sed contra: quod debeant esse plura quam decem, videtur.

5. Magis sumus debitores Deo quam proximo: ergo plura deberent esse mandata ordinantia ad Deum quam ordinantia ad proximum: ergo cum mandata ordinantia ad proximum sint septem, videtur, quod mandata ordinantia ad Deum sint plura, vel saltem totidem.

6. Item, tantum obligamur ad benefaciendum proximo, quantum obligamur, ut non male faciamus ei⁵: cum ergo sex sint mandata, secundum quae prohibemur, ne offendamus proximum; videtur, quod saltem sex deberent esse, secundum quae obligaremur et ordinaremur ad benefaciendum; et si hoc, omnia mandata essent saltem quindecim.

7. Item, septem sunt capitalia peccata ita magna, quantum est de natura sua, sicut peccatum avaritiae et luxuriae⁶: ergo sicut speciale mandatum est, in quo prohibetur avaritia, et in quo prohibetur luxuria; ita speciale mandatum deberet esse ad alia vitia prohibenda, ita quod aliquod esset praeceptum, in quo specialiter prohiberetur superbia, aliquod, in quo invidia, et sic de aliis. Si tu dicas, quod implicite prohibentur in prohibitione concupiscentiae; obiicitur contra hoc, quod tres sunt radices peccatorum, secundum quod dicitur primae Ioannis secundo⁷: Concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis et superbia vitae: si ergo concupiscentia carnis et oculorum prohibetur explicite, videtur, quod et superbia vitae deberet habere specialem prohibitionem.

8. Item, sicut contingit concupiscere uxorem alienam, et concupiscentiam consummari in opere; sic etiam est reperire circa homicidium et falsum testimonium et circa alia mandata: ergo sicut duo diversa sunt praecepta de concupiscentia uxoris alienae et rei alienae in opere et voluntate; sic deberent alia praecepta duplicari; quod si verum esset, tunc essent plura quam decem.

Est igitur quaestio, quare decem sint et non plura nec pauciora.

Conclusio.

Convenienter assignata sunt decem praecepta Decalogi.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod sufficientia et numerus mandatorum sumitur secundum rationem ordinis ipsius iustitiae generalis⁸, cuius est hominem ad Deum et ad proximum ordinare; unde quaedam sunt mandata ordinantia hominem ad Deum, quaedam vero ordinantia ad proximum. — Illa vero, quae ordinant hominem ad Deum, dicuntur esse praecepta primae tabulae; et ista sunt tria et non plura nec pauciora. Quorum numerus et sufficientia sumi potest tripliciter, videlicet ex parte obiecti et ex parte subiecti et ex parte actus medii.

Ex parte obiecti sic: nam cum in Deo sint tres personae et tria appropriata et triplex genus causae, secundum quod comparatur ad creaturam; triplex est praeceptum, secundum quod creatura rationalis ordinari habet ad Deum. Nam secundum rationem maiestatis, quae appropriatur Patri et convenit Deo, secundum quod est causa efficiens creaturae, ordinatur per illud praeceptum: Non habebis deos alienos. — Secundum rationem veritatis, quae appropriatur Filio et convenit Deo, secundum quod est causa formalis exemplaris creaturae, ordinatur per illud: Non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. — Secundum rationem bonitatis, quae appropriatur Spiritui sancto et convenit Deo, secundum quod est causa finalis, ordinatur per illud: Memento, ut diem Sabbati sanctifices; ita quod per illa tria sufficienter homo ordinetur ad Deum, videlicet ut subiaceat summae Maiestati, credat summae Veritati et adhaereat summae Bonitati. Et haec sufficientia sumta est ex parte obiecti⁹.

Secundo modo sumitur sufficientia ex parte subiecti ordinabilis, quod quidem est anima rationalis, in qua est triplex vis motiva, secundum quam habet in Deum ordinari, videlicet rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Mandatum de adoratione respicit ipsam irascibilem; mandatum vero secundum respicit ipsam rationalem; sed mandatum tertium de sanctificatione respicit ipsam concupiscibilem, sicut intuenti satis apparet¹⁰. Et haec sufficientia sumta est ex parte subiecti.

Tertio vero modo sumitur sufficientia ex parte actus medii. Triplex enim est actus, secundum quem habet homo in Deum ordinari, videlicet actus cordis, oris et operis¹¹. Penes actum operis attenditur mandatum adorationis. Penes actum oris attenditur secundum mandatum, quo prohibetur falsa invocatio nominis divini. Secundum actum cordis attenditur tertium mandatum, in quo praecipitur sanctificatio mentis. — Et sic patet sufficientia mandatorum ordinantium hominem ad Deum¹⁶, quoniam sunt tria tantum et non plura nec pauciora.

Sufficientia autem mandatorum secundae tabulae iuxta hunc modum tripliciter potest assignari, videlicet ex parte obiecti et subiecti et actus medii.

Ex parte namque conditionum ipsius obiecti sic potest sumi. In proximo enim, ad quem ordinant mandata secundae tabulae, relucet proprietas Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Secundum quod in proximo relucet proprietas Patris, sic debemus ei honorem et reverentiam; et penes hoc attenditur illud mandatum: Honora patrem tuum etc.; in quibus relucet proprietas summi Patris in hoc, quod habent rationem principii¹². — Secundum autem quod in proximo relucet proprietas Filii, sic debemus ei veritatem; et sic est illud mandatum: Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium. — Secundum autem quod relucet in proximo proprietas Spiritus sancti, sic debemus ei dilectionem et innocentiae puritatem. Et quoniam possumus nocere proximo sive damnificare eum multipliciter: in persona propria et in persona coniuncta et in rebus suis, et hoc dupliciter: vel actu interiori, vel exteriori; ideo sunt ulterius quinque mandata. Contra nocumentum enim, quod

habet fieri in persona proximi, est illud praeceptum: Non occides. — Contra nocumentum vero, quod habet fieri in persona coniuncta, est illud praeceptum: Non moechaberis, secundum quod exercetur in opere. — Contra nocumentum, quod fit in rebus, est illud: Non furtum facies. — Et quia nocumentum illud duplex, videlicet in persona coniuncta et in rebus, frequentius fit in voluntate per concupiscentiam, quam fiat in opere; ideo sunt alia duo mandata, in quorum uno prohibetur concupiscentia uxoris, in hoc quod dicitur: Non concupisces uxorem; in alio prohibetur concupiscentia rerum, in hoc quod dicitur: Non concupisces rem proximi tui etc. Sic igitur patet sufficientia ex parte conditionum obiecti.

Ex parte vero subiecti secundum triplicem potentiam animae contingit etiam sufficientiam assignare hoc modo. Triplex enim est potentia animae, secundum quam contingit ad proximum ordinari, videlicet rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Quantum autem ad potentiam irascibilem habet homo convenienter ordinari ad superiorem per reverentiam et honorem, et sic est illud: Honora patrem tuum etc.; ad proximum vero per pacem et odii declinationem, et sic est illud: Non occides. — Secundum autem rationalem virtutem ordinamur ad proximum per veritatis loquelam et testificationem; et sic est illud mandatum: Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium. — Secundum vero potentiam concupiscibilem habet homo ordinari ad proximum per ipsius refrenationem. Et quoniam illa est multipliciter corrupta per cupiditatem et concupiscentiam¹³; ideo prohibetur cupiditas et concupiscentia in actu exteriori per duo mandata, per hoc videlicet: Non moechaberis, et: Non furtum facies; prohibetur etiam in actu interiori per alia duo, per hoc videlicet: Non concupisces uxorem proximi tui; non agrum nec aliquam rem. Et sic potest sumi sufficientia ex parte virium animae in mandatis secundae tabulae.

Ex parte autem actus potest sumi sic. Ordinari enim habemus ad proximum secundum innocentiam et secundum beneficentiam. Si secundum beneficentiam, sic est illud mandatum: Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam. Si secundum innocentiam, hoc est tripliciter: aut secundum actum cordis, aut oris, aut operis. Si secundum actum operis, aut hoc est in prohibendo deordinationem¹⁴, quae est contra ipsius esse individui; et sic est illud: Non occides. Aut contra debitam conservationem speciei; et sic est illud: Non moechaberis. Aut contra possessionem temporalis subsidii¹⁵; et sic est illud: Non furtum facies. — Si autem ordinemur ad proximum secundum actum oris; sic est illud mandatum: Non falsum testimonium dices. — Si vero secundum actum cordis, qui quidem consistit in affectu, hoc contingit dupliciter: aut liberaliter contra cupiditatem, aut honeste contra voluptatem; et secundum hoc sunt duo mandata: unum contra voluptatis concupiscentiam, et sic est illud: Non concupisces uxorem; aliud vero contra cupiditatem et avaritiam, et sic est illud: Non concupisces rem.

Et sic per omnem modum patet numerus et sufficientia mandatorum Decalogi: quoniam tria sunt, quae ordinant hominem respectu summae Trinitatis; et septem sunt, quae ordinant hominem respectu totius inferioris universitatis; ut sic non tantum sit congruentia numeri ex parte rei, sed etiam ex parte ipsius numeralis proportionis; quam rectissime contingit in denario invenire, secundum quod docet Augustinus in libro Musicae¹⁷, ubi ostendit, in denario quandam excellentem esse perfectionem, ob quam status est in numero illo, et ultra in numerando non procedimus nova numeratione, sed redimus ad caput: et ideo in numero illo decebat terminari et comprehendi divina praecepta, quae sunt via deveniendi ad perfectionem summam. — Concedendum est igitur, quod decem sunt mandata Decalogi, secundum quod Lex dicit, nec plura nec pauciora.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod qui diligit proximum Legem implevit; dicendum, quod quamvis in dilectione proximi claudantur mandata ordinantia ad proximum in quadam generalitate, nihilominus propter obnubilationem peccati opportunum erat et congruum, mandata illa, per quae evitantur speciales deordinationes, explicari in speciali¹⁸. Unde sicut unitas generis non excludit multitudinem specierum, nec unitas finis excludit multitudinem eorum quae sunt ad finem; sic ex unitate mandati dilectionis in proximum non potest concludi, quod non sit pluralitas mandatorum ad proximum ordinantium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Lex prohibendo concupiscentiam prohibet omnia mala; dicendum, quod concupiscentia sumitur generaliter et specialiter. Generaliter concupiscentia dicitur quilibet appetitus libidinosus et immoderatus, specialiter vero dicitur esse appetitus delectabilis secundum gustum et tactum¹⁹. Et primo quidem modo in prohibitione concupiscentiae dicuntur omnia mala prohiberi; secundo autem modo tenet rationem specialis mandati et numeratur inter mandata Decalogi.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui peccat mortaliter se ipsum occidit; dicendum, quod in prohibitione homicidii non prohibetur deordinatio cuiuscumque vis, sed deordinatio potentiae irascibilis, quae est in actu exteriori, vel ad actum exteriorem aliquo modo habet ordinari²⁰. Unde quamvis prohibeatur ibi homicidium operis et voluntatis, non tamen prohibetur omne peccatum. Et propterea ex hoc non potest concludi superfluitas aliorum mandatorum Decalogi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Lex prohibet manum et non animum: dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur, quod Lex non prohibeat peccatum cordis, sed hoc dicitur, quia peccatum cordis non punit poena mortis, secundum quod peccatum operis, quod potest exterius probari; unde per prohibitionem intelligere possumus poenae inflictionem. Et ex hoc non potest haberi, quod peccatum cordis non debeat prohiberi in mandatis Decalogi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deberent esse plura, quia plura debemus Deo quam homini; dicendum, quod omnia quae debemus homini, quodam modo debemus et solvimus Deo; ideo plura sunt, quae debentur et redduntur Deo quam proximo. Quia tamen ad Deum ordinamur secundum vitam contemplativam, ad proximum secundum vitam activam; et in vita contemplativa quaeritur unitas, in activa vero versatur multiplex rerum varietas²¹: hinc est, quod plura sunt mandata, quae directe obligant ad proximum, quam quae directe obligant ad Deum. Hinc est etiam, quod plura sunt peccata, quibus directe peccatur in proximum, quam quibus directe peccatur in Deum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tot modis contingit alicui benefacere, quot etiam modis contingit male; dicendum, quod quia corruptio concupiscentiae in nobis, quantum est de se, ad malum inclinat; ideo sumus difficiles ad bonum faciendum, quia proni sumus ad malum perpetrandum²². Hinc est, quod plura sunt praecepta negativa ordinantia ad proximum quam affirmativa; plura sunt, in quibus prohibetur, ne fiat malum, quam in quibus praecipitur, ut fiat bonum.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ita debet prohiberi superbia et invidia, sicut avaritia et luxuria; dicendum, quod illa duo magis habent prohiberi explicite, quia propter improbitatem libidinis citius progrediuntur in actum exterioris operis²³; nihilominus tamen et alia peccata capitalia in mandatis Decalogi habent prohiberi. Nam superbia prohibetur in adoratione Dei et in honorificatione proximi; invidia vero et ira in fuga homicidii; accidia in sanctificatione Sabbati; avaritia vero in prohibitione furti; luxuria et gula sibi coniuncta in prohibitione moechiae et adulterii, ubi prohibetur omnis illicitus coitus et immoderata delectatio carnalis. — Et si obiiciat, quod ita debet prohiberi in speciali superbia vitae, sicut concupiscentia carnis et oculorum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quoniam, sicut iam patet, non ita radix illa est progressiva in actum exteriorem, secundum quod aliae.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ita contingit homicidium perpetrare corde et opere, sicut adulterium et furtum; dicendum, quod non est simile duplici ex causa: tum quia irascibilis non est adeo corrupta, secundum quod concupiscibilis, quae propter suam immoderatam corruptionem dicitur corrupta et infecta et magis ad malum prona; tum etiam, quia ira ortum habet ex concupiscentia, secundum quod dicit Damascenus, quia « ira est vindex laesae concupiscentiae ». Et ideo, dum prohibetur concupiscentia in sua origine, quodam modo prohibetur et ira; ideo non sic oportuit geminari mandatum, quod respicit actum irascibilis sive ipsam iram, sicut mandatum, quod respicit actum concupiscentiae sive ipsam concupiscentiam. Et ex hoc eodem potest haberi, quare non oportuit duplicari alia mandata.

Article II. On the commandments of the Decalogue with respect to their distinction and order.

Consequently it is asked concerning the commandments of the Decalogue with respect to order and distinction. And concerning this three things can be asked. First it is asked concerning the number and sufficiency of the commandments themselves, whether they are ten. Secondly it is asked concerning their order to one another. Thirdly it is asked concerning the number and order in comparison to the distinction of the tables.

Question I. Whether the commandments of the Decalogue ought to be only ten, or more, or fewer.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the commandments of the Decalogue ought to be only ten, or more, or fewer. And that they ought to be fewer, it seems:

1. Because in Romans 13¹ it is said: He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law: therefore in the commandment of the love of neighbor the whole Law can be included: it seems therefore that the commandments ought not to be multiplied to the number ten, since they are sufficiently contained in fewer.

2. Likewise, on that text of Romans 7²: I did not know concupiscence; the Gloss: « Good is the Law, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils »: if therefore in the prohibition of concupiscence the other evils are forbidden, it seems that the other commandments are superfluous.

3. Likewise, whoever sins mortally kills himself³: therefore since in killing there is forbidden not only bodily homicide, but also spiritual, not only of deed, but also of will; it seems that in that prohibition all sins are forbidden: therefore all the other commandments are superfluous.

4. Likewise, the difference between the Law and the Gospel is that the Law forbids the hand, not the mind; but the Gospel forbids not only the hand, but also the mind⁴: therefore it seems that only the exterior act ought to be forbidden, and not that which would regard the interior act: therefore the commandment about not coveting is superfluous. If you say that the concupiscence which proceeds into deed is forbidden; to the contrary is this: because that is not distinguished from the sin of deed: therefore the precept about the prohibition of that concupiscence ought not to be numbered along with the precept about the prohibition of the exterior deed.

But on the contrary: that they ought to be more than ten, it seems.

5. We are more debtors to God than to neighbor: therefore there ought to be more commandments ordering toward God than ordering toward neighbor: therefore since the commandments ordering toward neighbor are seven, it seems that the commandments ordering toward God are more, or at least as many.

6. Likewise, we are obligated to do good to neighbor just as much as we are obligated not to do him evil⁵: since therefore there are six commandments according to which we are forbidden to offend our neighbor; it seems that there ought to be at least six according to which we would be obligated and ordered to do good; and if this is so, all the commandments would be at least fifteen.

7. Likewise, there are seven capital sins so great, as far as their own nature is concerned, as the sin of avarice and lust⁶: therefore just as there is a special commandment in which avarice is forbidden, and in which lust is forbidden; so there ought to be a special commandment for prohibiting the other vices, such that there would be some precept in which pride would be specially forbidden, some in which envy, and so of the others. If you say that they are implicitly forbidden in the prohibition of concupiscence; it is objected against this, that there are three roots of sins, according as it is said in 1 John 2⁷: The concupiscence of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life: if therefore the concupiscence of the flesh and of the eyes is forbidden explicitly, it seems that the pride of life too ought to have a special prohibition.

8. Likewise, just as it happens to covet another's wife, and for the concupiscence to be consummated in deed; so too it is to be found with respect to homicide and false testimony and the other commandments: therefore just as there are two diverse precepts concerning the concupiscence of another's wife and of another's property in deed and in will; so the other precepts ought to be doubled; and if this were true, then there would be more than ten.

It is therefore a question why there are ten and not more nor fewer.

Conclusion.

The ten precepts of the Decalogue have been suitably assigned.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the sufficiency and number of the commandments is taken according to the account of the order of general justice itself⁸, whose office is to order man toward God and toward neighbor; whence some commandments order man toward God, and some order toward neighbor. — Now those which order man toward God are called the precepts of the first table; and these are three and not more nor fewer. Their number and sufficiency can be taken in three ways, namely from the side of the object and from the side of the subject and from the side of the middle act.

From the side of the object thus: for since in God there are three persons and three appropriated [attributes] and a threefold kind of cause, according as he is compared to the creature; there is a threefold precept, according as the rational creature has to be ordered toward God. For according to the account of majesty, which is appropriated to the Father and befits God, according as he is the efficient cause of the creature, [the creature] is ordered through that precept: Thou shalt not have strange gods. — According to the account of truth, which is appropriated to the Son and befits God, according as he is the formal exemplar cause of the creature, [the creature] is ordered through this: Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain. — According to the account of goodness, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit and befits God, according as he is the final cause, [the creature] is ordered through this: Remember to keep holy the Sabbath day; in such a way that through those three man is sufficiently ordered toward God, namely that he be subject to the supreme Majesty, believe the supreme Truth, and cleave to the supreme Goodness. And this sufficiency is taken from the side of the object⁹.

In a second way the sufficiency is taken from the side of the orderable subject, which indeed is the rational soul, in which there is a threefold motive power, according to which it has to be ordered toward God, namely the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. The commandment of adoration regards the irascible itself; but the second commandment regards the rational itself; but the third commandment, concerning sanctification, regards the concupiscible itself, as appears sufficiently to one who considers¹⁰. And this sufficiency is taken from the side of the subject.

But in a third way the sufficiency is taken from the side of the middle act. For there is a threefold act, according to which man has to be ordered toward God, namely the act of the heart, of the mouth, and of the deed¹¹. With respect to the act of deed the commandment of adoration is attended to. With respect to the act of the mouth the second commandment is attended to, by which the false invocation of the divine name is forbidden. According to the act of the heart the third commandment is attended to, in which the sanctification of the mind is enjoined. — And thus appears the sufficiency of the commandments ordering man toward God¹⁶, since they are only three and not more nor fewer.

Now the sufficiency of the commandments of the second table can be assigned according to this mode in three ways, namely from the side of the object and of the subject and of the middle act.

For from the side of the conditions of the object itself it can be taken thus. For in the neighbor, toward whom the commandments of the second table order, there shines forth the property of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. According as the property of the Father shines forth in the neighbor, so we owe him honor and reverence; and with respect to this that commandment is attended to: Honor thy father etc.; in which there shines forth the property of the supreme Father in this, that they have the account of a principle¹². — But according as the property of the Son shines forth in the neighbor, so we owe him truth; and so is that commandment: Thou shalt not speak against thy neighbor false testimony. — But according as the property of the Holy Spirit shines forth in the neighbor, so we owe him love and purity of innocence. And since we can harm our neighbor or damage him in many ways: in his own person and in a conjoined person and in his goods, and this in two ways: either by interior act, or by exterior; therefore there are further five commandments. For against the harm which

has to be done in the person of the neighbor, there is that precept: Thou shalt not kill. — But against the harm which has to be done in a conjoined person, there is that precept: Thou shalt not commit adultery, according as it is exercised in deed. — Against the harm which is done in goods, there is this: Thou shalt not steal. — And because that harm is twofold, namely in a conjoined person and in goods, [and] is more frequently done in the will through concupiscence than it is done in deed; therefore there are two other commandments, in one of which the concupiscence of the wife is forbidden, in what is said: Thou shalt not covet [thy neighbor's] wife; in the other the concupiscence of goods is forbidden, in what is said: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's property etc. Thus therefore appears the sufficiency from the side of the conditions of the object.

But from the side of the subject according to the threefold power [it] also happens to assign the sufficiency in this way. For there is a threefold power of the soul, according to which it happens to be ordered toward neighbor, namely the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. Now as regards the irascible power man has suitably to be ordered toward the superior through reverence and honor, and so is that: Honor thy father etc.; but toward neighbor through peace and the avoidance of hatred, and so is that: Thou shalt not kill. — But according to the rational virtue we are ordered toward neighbor through the speech and attestation of truth; and so is that commandment: Thou shalt not speak against thy neighbor false testimony. — But according to the concupiscible power man has to be ordered toward neighbor through its restraint. And since that [power] is in many ways corrupted through cupidity and concupiscence¹³; therefore cupidity and concupiscence are forbidden in the exterior act through two commandments, namely through this: Thou shalt not commit adultery, and: Thou shalt not steal; they are forbidden also in the interior act through two others, namely through this: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife; nor his field nor any property. And thus the sufficiency can be taken from the side of the powers of the soul in the commandments of the second table.

But from the side of the act it can be taken thus. For we have to be ordered toward neighbor according to innocence and according to beneficence. If according to beneficence, so is that commandment: Honor thy father and thy mother. If according to innocence, this is in three ways: either according to the act of the heart, or of the mouth, or of the deed. If according to the act of deed, either this is in prohibiting a disorder¹⁴ which is against the being of the individual himself; and so is that: Thou shalt not kill. Or against the due preservation of the species; and so is that: Thou shalt not commit adultery. Or against the possession of temporal sustenance¹⁵; and so is that: Thou shalt not steal. — But if we are ordered toward neighbor according to the act of the mouth; so is that commandment: Thou shalt not bear false testimony. — But if according to the act of the heart, which indeed consists in the affection, this happens in two ways: either liberally against cupidity, or honorably against pleasure; and according to this there are two commandments: one against the concupiscence of pleasure, and so is that: Thou shalt not covet the wife; but the other against cupidity and avarice, and so is that: Thou shalt not covet the property.

And thus in every way appears the number and sufficiency of the commandments of the Decalogue: since there are three which order man with respect to the supreme Trinity; and there are seven which order man with respect to the whole lower totality; so that thus there is not only a fittingness of number from the side of the thing, but also from the side of the numerical proportion itself; which it happens most rightly to find in the number ten, according as Augustine teaches in the book On Music¹⁷, where he shows that in the number ten there is a certain excellent perfection, on account of which there is a stop in that number, and beyond it in counting we do not proceed by a new numeration, but return to the head: and therefore it was fitting that the divine precepts, which are the way of arriving at the supreme perfection, be terminated and comprehended in that number. — It is to be granted therefore that there are ten commandments of the Decalogue, according as the Law says, neither more nor fewer.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law; it must be said that although in the love of neighbor the commandments ordering toward neighbor are enclosed in a certain generality, nevertheless on account of the obscuring of sin it was opportune and fitting that those commandments, through which special disorders are avoided, be explicated in particular¹⁸. Whence just as the unity of a genus does not exclude the multitude of species, nor the unity of an end exclude the multitude of those things which are toward the end; so from the unity of the commandment of love toward neighbor it cannot be concluded that there is no plurality of commandments ordering toward neighbor.

2. To that which is objected, that the Law by forbidding concupiscence forbids all evils; it must be said that concupiscence is taken generally and specially. Generally, concupiscence is called any libidinous and immoderate appetite, but specially it is said to be the delectable appetite according to taste and touch¹⁹. And in the first way indeed in the prohibition of concupiscence all evils are said to be forbidden; but in the second way it holds the account of a special commandment and is numbered among the commandments of the Decalogue.

3. To that which is objected, that he who sins mortally kills himself; it must be said that in the prohibition of homicide there is not forbidden the disorder of any power whatever, but the disorder of the irascible power, which is in the exterior act, or has in some way to be ordered toward the exterior act²⁰. Whence although homicide of deed and of will is forbidden there, nevertheless not every sin is forbidden. And therefore from this the superfluity of the other commandments of the Decalogue cannot be concluded.

4. To that which is objected, that the Law forbids the hand and not the mind: it must be said that this is not said, that the Law does not forbid the sin of the heart, but this is said, because the sin of the heart is not punished by the penalty of death, according as the sin of deed [is], which can be proved exteriorly; whence by the prohibition we can understand the infliction of penalty. And from this it cannot be had that the sin of the heart ought not to be forbidden in the commandments of the Decalogue.

5. To that which is objected, that there ought to be more, because we owe more to God than to man; it must be said that all the things which we owe to man, in a certain way we owe and pay also to God; therefore there are more things which are owed and rendered to God than to neighbor. Yet because we are ordered toward God according to the contemplative life, toward neighbor according to the active life; and in the contemplative life unity is sought, but in the active there is engaged a manifold variety of things²¹: hence it is that there are more commandments which directly obligate toward neighbor than those which directly obligate toward God. Hence it is also that there are more sins by which one directly sins against neighbor than those by which one directly sins against God.

6. To that which is objected, that in as many ways as it happens to do good to someone, in just as many ways it happens [to do] evil; it must be said that because the corruption of concupiscence in us, as far as it is in itself, inclines toward evil; therefore we are difficult toward doing good, because we are prone toward perpetrating evil²². Hence it is that there are more negative precepts ordering toward neighbor than affirmative; there are more in which it is forbidden that evil be done, than in which it is enjoined that good be done.

7. To that which is objected, that pride and envy ought so to be forbidden, as avarice and lust; it must be said that those two have rather to be forbidden explicitly, because on account of the wickedness of lust they more quickly proceed into the act of exterior deed²³; nevertheless the other capital sins too have to be forbidden in the commandments of the Decalogue. For pride is forbidden in the adoration of God and in the honoring of neighbor; but envy and anger in the avoidance of homicide; sloth in the sanctification of the Sabbath; but avarice in the prohibition of theft; lust and gluttony joined to it in the prohibition of adultery and fornication, where every illicit coitus and immoderate carnal pleasure is forbidden. — And if one should object that the pride of life ought so to be forbidden in particular, as the concupiscence of the flesh and of the eyes; it must be said that it is not similar: since, as is already plain, that root is not so progressive into the exterior act, according as the others.

8. To that which is objected, that homicide happens to be perpetrated in heart and in deed just as adultery and theft; it must be said that it is not similar, for a twofold cause: both because the irascible is not so corrupted as the concupiscible, which on account of its immoderate corruption is called corrupted and infected and more prone toward evil; and also because anger has its origin from concupiscence, according as Damascene says, since « anger is the avenger of injured concupiscence ». And therefore, when concupiscence is forbidden in its origin, in a certain way anger too is forbidden; therefore it was not so necessary to double the commandment which regards the act of the irascible or anger itself, as the commandment which regards the act of concupiscence or concupiscence itself. And from this same thing it can be had why it was not necessary to double the other commandments.