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Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.
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Quaestio III. Utrum obligatio mandatorum Decalogi attendatur secundum legem naturae, an secundum legem scriptam.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum obligatio mandatorum Decalogi attendatur secundum legem naturae, an secundum legem scriptam. Et quod secundum legem naturae, videtur.

1. Illud enim est naturale, quod est commune apud omnes1; sed ad mandata Decalogi obligantur omnes: ergo obligatio illa est secundum legem naturae.

2. Item, obligatio, quae se extendit ad omne tempus, attenditur secundum illam legem, cuius dictamen currit in omni tempore; sed obligatio mandatorum Decalogi manet in statu legis naturae et legis scriptae et legis gratiae: ergo obligatio illorum mandatorum attenditur secundum legem naturae2.

3. Item, mandata, quae obligant hominem, circumscripta Scriptura et gratia, habent obligare secundum legem naturae; sed talia sunt mandata Decalogi — sunt enim de dictamine rationis rectae, circumscripta lege Moysi et lege Evangelii3 — ergo etc.

4. Item, quaedam sunt prohibita, quia mala; quaedam mala, quia prohibita4; similiter quaedam sunt bona, quia sunt in praecepto; quaedam vero ideo sunt in praecepto, quia bona sunt; ea autem, quae in Decalogo prohibentur vel praecipiuntur, de se sunt mala vel bona, secundum quod dictat ratio recta — sicut Deum esse colendum, et parentes honorandos, hoc utique bonum est de se; falsum testimonium et homicidium, hoc utique de se malum est — sed talia spectant ad legem inditam: igitur obligatio mandatorum Decalogi attenditur secundum vinculum legis naturalis.

Sed contra: 1. Exodi vigesimo5 legitur, quod primo mandata ista fuerunt de caelo audita; et postea subiungitur, quomodo fuerunt in tabulis scripta: si ergo ibi tradebatur lex scripta, videtur, quod obligatio mandatorum Decalogi secundum legem scriptam principaliter habeat attendi.

2. Item, ad Romanos septimo6: Concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi Lex diceret: Non concupisces;

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Glossa: « Concupiscentiam nesciebam esse peccatum »; sed mandatum, quod obligat secundum legem naturae, manifestum est homini etiam sine lege scripta: ergo mandatum illud: Non concupisces etc.; non spectat ad legem naturae, sed potius ad legem scriptam.

3. Item, quod est de dictamine legis naturae spectat ad statum innocentiae; sed distinctio mandatorum Decalogi ad statum innocentiae non spectat, quia in statu illo locum non habebat homicidium nec furtum nec adulterium7: ergo videtur, quod obligatio mandatorum Decalogi non sequatur instinctum legis naturalis.

4. Item, quae sunt secundum dictamen legis naturae non solummodo se extendunt ad statum viae, verum etiam ad statum patriae; sed obligatio ista mandatorum Decalogi ad statum patriae non se extendit, quia ibi nec furtum potest esse, ubi nihil est proprium, nec concupiscentia, ubi nullum potest esse vitium8: ergo videtur, quod obligatio huiusmodi mandatorum non sequatur legis naturalis instinctum.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: si obligatio mandatorum Decalogi sequitur legem naturae, unde hoc est, quod magis fuerunt mandata illa scripta in tabulis lapideis quam alia mandata Legis?

Item, quaeritur: propter quid Dominus immediate ipsi populo decem verba Legis proposuit, sicut legitur Exodi vigesimo9, magis quam alia mandata, iudicialia scilicet et caerimonialia, quae mediante Moyse pervenerunt ad populi notitiam?

Conclusio.

Obligatio mandatorum Decalogi radicaliter sequitur legem naturae, sed quantum ad explicationem et distinctionem sequitur legem scriptam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod est loqui de obligatione mandatorum Decalogi tripliciter, secundum quod et de ipsa sufficientia fidei. Secundum enim quod articulos fidei contingit credere tripliciter, videlicet implicite, et explicite, et quosdam implicite et quosdam explicite10; sic et de praeceptis Decalogi intelligendum est.

Et secundum istum triplicem modum obligatio mandatorum Decalogi respicit triplicem statum, videlicet statum naturae institutae et statum naturae lapsae et statum legis scriptae, ita quod statum legis scriptae respicit simpliciter explicite, ubi lucide vel distincte illa decem mandata a Deo fuerunt pronuntiata et scripta11. — Statum vero naturae lapsae respicit obligatio mandatorum Decalogi implicite secundum duo praecepta iuris naturalis, quae natura semper dictabat, videlicet quod faceret alii quod sibi vellet fieri, et non faceret alii quod sibi nollet fieri12. — Statum autem naturae institutae respiciebat quodam modo implicite, quodam modo explicite. Quaedam enim sunt praecepta ordinantia ad Deum, quaedam vero ordinantia ad proximum. Ad praecepta namque illa quae ordinant ad Deum, explicite obligabatur13 homo in statu naturae institutae, ubi idoneus erat et dispositus ad colendum Deum integre et perfecte. Ad mandata vero, quae ordinant ad proximum, obligabatur implicite, pro eo quod necessitas explicandi mandata illa ortum habet ex multiplici deordinatione, quae subsecuta est ex prima transgressione. Et illud colligi potest ex eo quod dicitur Ecclesiastici decimo septimo14, loquens de hominis conditione: Sensu implevit cor illorum et mala et bona ostendit illis, posuit oculos ipsorum super corda ipsorum etc., usque ibi: Attendite ab omni iniquo, et mandavit illis unicuique de proximo suo; ubi colligitur explicita obligatio hominis respectu cultus divini, et implicita respectu vitandae laesionis ipsius proximi.

Secundum hoc igitur patet, quod obligatio mandatorum Decalogi radicaliter sequitur legem naturae, sed quantum ad explicationem sequitur legem Scripturae. — Explicatio enim plenaria mandatorum Decalogi opportuna fuit secundum statum peccati propter obscurationem luminis rationis et propter obli-

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gationem voluntatis. Quia enim voluntas corrupta prompta erat ad multiplicem deordinationem, oportebat, eam religari15 per multiplicia mandata. Rursus, quoniam scriptura cordis interior propter peccatum erat obnubilata, et homo, qui fuerat spirituali mente praeditus, effectus erat sensibilis et carnalis; opportunum erat, ut exterius legeret et audiret per sensus corporis ea, per quae posset in rectitudinem iustitiae regulari16. Et ideo explicatio et distinctio mandatorum Decalogi spectabat ad legem scriptam, quamvis obligatio spectaret ad legem inditam, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, quae concedi possunt, quoniam verum concludunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod verba Decalogi audita fuerunt in datione Legis; iam patet responsio: quia hoc non erat propter introducendam novam obligationem, sed potius propter ipsius obligationis explicationem, quae quidem necessaria erat propter peccati obnubilationem17.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Apostoli, quod concupiscentiam nesciebat esse peccatum; potest dici, quod loquitur in persona hominis carnalis; aut certe hoc dicit, quia, etsi aliquo modo nosset per legem naturae in generali, non tamen in speciali cognoscebat nisi per legem scriptam; unde ipsemet ibidem18 dicit, quod per Legem est cognitio peccati. Propterea ex verbo illo non habetur, quod obligatio huiusmodi mandatorum ortum habeat a lege scripta, sed solum quod ipsius obligationis explicatio in lege illa sit facta.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ea quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae, conveniunt statui innocentiae; dicendum, quod verum non19 est de his quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae in speciali; quae autem sunt de dictamine legis naturae in generali et implicite illi statui habent convenire; et hoc modo ad illum statum spectabant mandata secundae tabulae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ea quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae, manent in statu gloriae; responderi potest dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia, sicut dicitur de virtutibus, quod manent in patria secundum excellentiores et nobiliores usus et actus20; sic concedi potest, quod adimpletio mandatorum Decalogi salva erit in patria, multo tamen nobiliori et excellentiori modo, quam sit in via, secundum quod ibi excellentiori modo ordinabitur et ad Deum et ad proximum, et secundum quod voluntas excellentiori modo erit ad bonum ordinata et a malo remota. — Aliter etiam posset dici, sicut tactum est prius, ut fiat generaliter, et in his cum multiplicatione, et in his quae natura dictat specialiter, sive implicite et explicite; et rursus, in his quae natura dictat explicite, vel dictat secundum omnem statum naturae, vel secundum statum naturae lapsae; et quod est de dictamine legis naturae simpliciter et explicite, illud manebit21 in statu gloriae. Explicatio autem et distinctio mandatorum Decalogi respicit statum naturae lapsae et instructionem legis scriptae.

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, quare magis ista decem verba scripta fuerint in tabulis lapideis quam alia, cum minus spectarent ad legem scriptam; dicendum, quod hoc fuit, quoniam in ipsis maxime consistebat22 regula iustitiae, et alia habebant reduci ad haec; et ipsa quidem stabilia erant nec evacuari habebant per legem supervenientem: ideo in tabulis lapideis scripta fuerunt, ut ostenderetur eorum praerogativa quantum ad dignitatem et quantum ad stabilitatem23.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare magis data sunt ipsi populo a Deo immediate mandata Decalogi quam iudicialia et24 caerimonialia; dicendum, quod hoc

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fuit, quia, cum mandata Decalogi essent de dictamine legis naturae, modica indigebant expositione, unde simplices statim potuerunt illa capere. Caerimonialia vero et iudicialia indigebant maiori instructione; unde illorum cognitio principalius spectabat ad iudices et sacerdotes; ideo non sic fuerunt data populo immediate, sed mediante legislatore25.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether the obligation of the Decalogue's commandments is attended to according to the law of nature or the written law.

Thirdly it is asked whether the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue is attended to according to the law of nature, or according to the written law. And that it is according to the law of nature, it seems.

1. For that is natural which is common among all1; but all are obligated to the commandments of the Decalogue: therefore that obligation is according to the law of nature.

2. Likewise, an obligation that extends to every time is attended to according to that law whose dictate runs in every time; but the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue remains in the state of the law of nature and of the written law and of the law of grace: therefore the obligation of those commandments is attended to according to the law of nature2.

3. Likewise, the commandments that obligate man, with Scripture and grace set aside, must obligate according to the law of nature; but such are the commandments of the Decalogue — for they are from the dictate of right reason, with the law of Moses and the law of the Gospel set aside3 — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, certain things are prohibited because evil; certain are evil because prohibited4; likewise certain things are good because they are in a precept; but certain are in a precept for this reason, that they are good; but those things which are prohibited or commanded in the Decalogue are of themselves evil or good, according as right reason dictates — as that God is to be worshiped, and parents to be honored, this surely is good of itself; false testimony and homicide, this surely is of itself evil — but such things pertain to the implanted law: therefore the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue is attended to according to the bond of the natural law.

On the contrary: 1. In Exodus 205 it is read that first those commandments were heard from heaven; and afterward it is added how they were written on tablets: if therefore there the written law was being handed down, it seems that the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue must principally be attended to according to the written law.

2. Likewise, to the Romans 76: I had not known concupiscence, unless the Law had said: Thou shalt not covet;

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Gloss: « I knew not concupiscence to be sin »; but a commandment that obligates according to the law of nature is manifest to man even without the written law: therefore that commandment: Thou shalt not covet, etc.; does not pertain to the law of nature, but rather to the written law.

3. Likewise, what is from the dictate of the law of nature pertains to the state of innocence; but the distinction of the commandments of the Decalogue does not pertain to the state of innocence, because in that state homicide had no place, nor theft, nor adultery7: therefore it seems that the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue does not follow the instinct of the natural law.

4. Likewise, those things that are according to the dictate of the law of nature extend not only to the state of the wayfarer, but also to the state of the fatherland; but this obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue does not extend to the state of the fatherland, because there theft cannot exist, where nothing is one's own, nor concupiscence, where there can be no vice8: therefore it seems that the obligation of commandments of this kind does not follow the instinct of the natural law.

Alongside this it is asked: if the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue follows the law of nature, whence is it that those commandments were rather written on tablets of stone than the other commandments of the Law?

Likewise, it is asked: for what reason did the Lord propose the ten words of the Law immediately to the people itself, as is read in Exodus 209, rather than the other commandments, namely the judicial and ceremonial ones, which came to the knowledge of the people by the mediation of Moses?

Conclusion.

The obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue radically follows the law of nature, but as to its explication and distinction it follows the written law.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a threefold way of speaking of the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue, according as there is also of the sufficiency of faith itself. For according as it happens to believe the articles of faith in three ways, namely implicitly, and explicitly, and some implicitly and some explicitly10; so too it must be understood of the precepts of the Decalogue.

And according to this threefold mode, the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue regards a threefold state, namely the state of nature-as-instituted and the state of nature-as-fallen and the state of the written law, so that it regards the state of the written law simply explicitly, where lucidly or distinctly those ten commandments were pronounced and written by God11. — But the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue regards the state of fallen nature implicitly, according to the two precepts of natural right which nature always dictated, namely that one should do to another what he would wish to be done to himself, and should not do to another what he would not wish to be done to himself12. — But it regarded the state of instituted nature in one way implicitly, in another way explicitly. For certain precepts order toward God, but certain order toward neighbor. For to those precepts which order toward God, man was explicitly obligated13 in the state of instituted nature, where he was fit and disposed to worship God wholly and perfectly. But to the commandments which order toward neighbor, he was obligated implicitly, for the reason that the necessity of explicating those commandments arose from the manifold disorder which followed upon the first transgression. And this can be gathered from what is said in Ecclesiasticus 1714, speaking of the condition of man: He filled their heart with sense, and showed them both good and evil, he set his eyes upon their hearts etc., up to where: Beware of all iniquity, and he gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor; where there is gathered the explicit obligation of man with respect to divine worship, and the implicit with respect to avoiding the harm of one's neighbor.

According to this, therefore, it is plain that the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue radically follows the law of nature, but as to its explication follows the law of Scripture. — For the full explication of the commandments of the Decalogue was opportune according to the state of sin, on account of the obscuration of the light of reason and on account of the obli-

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gation of the will. For since the corrupt will was prompt to manifold disorder, it was fitting that it be bound15 by manifold commandments. Again, since the interior writing of the heart was overshadowed on account of sin, and man, who had been endowed with a spiritual mind, was made sensual and carnal; it was opportune that he should read and hear exteriorly through the senses of the body those things by which he could be regulated unto the rectitude of justice16. And therefore the explication and distinction of the commandments of the Decalogue pertained to the written law, although the obligation pertained to the implanted law, as the reasons brought forward for the first part show, which can be granted, since they conclude what is true.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that the words of the Decalogue were heard in the giving of the Law; the response is already plain: because this was not for the sake of introducing a new obligation, but rather for the sake of the explication of the obligation itself, which indeed was necessary on account of the overshadowing caused by sin17.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Apostle, that he knew not concupiscence to be sin; it can be said that he speaks in the person of the carnal man; or certainly he says this, because, although he might in some way have known it through the law of nature in general, nevertheless he did not know it in particular except through the written law; whence he himself in the same place18 says that through the Law there is the knowledge of sin. Therefore from that word it is not had that the obligation of commandments of this kind arises from the written law, but only that the explication of the obligation itself was made in that law.

3. To that which is objected, that the things which are from the dictate of the law of nature befit the state of innocence; it must be said that this is not true19 of those things which are from the dictate of the law of nature in particular; but the things which are from the dictate of the law of nature in general and implicitly do befit that state; and in this way the commandments of the second table pertained to that state.

4. To that which is objected, that the things which are from the dictate of the law of nature remain in the state of glory; it can be answered in two ways. First indeed, because, as is said of the virtues, that they remain in the fatherland according to more excellent and nobler uses and acts20; so it can be granted that the fulfillment of the commandments of the Decalogue will be preserved in the fatherland, yet in a far nobler and more excellent manner than it is in the way, according as there it will be ordered in a more excellent manner both to God and to neighbor, and according as the will will be in a more excellent manner ordered to the good and removed from evil. — It could also be said otherwise, as was touched upon before, that it [the dictate of the law of nature] is taken generally, and in some things with multiplication, and in those things which nature dictates specially, whether implicitly or explicitly; and again, among those things which nature dictates explicitly, it either dictates according to every state of nature, or according to the state of fallen nature; and what is from the dictate of the law of nature simply and explicitly, that will remain21 in the state of glory. But the explication and distinction of the commandments of the Decalogue regards the state of fallen nature and the instruction of the written law.

To that which is asked, why these ten words were written on tablets of stone rather than the others, since they pertained less to the written law; it must be said that this was because in them especially consisted22 the rule of justice, and the others had to be reduced to these; and these indeed were stable and were not to be made void by a supervening law: therefore they were written on tablets of stone, so that their prerogative might be shown as to dignity and as to stability23.

To that which is asked, why the commandments of the Decalogue were given to the people itself immediately by God rather than the judicial and24 ceremonial ones; it must be said that this

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was because, since the commandments of the Decalogue were from the dictate of the law of nature, they needed little exposition, whence the simple could grasp them at once. But the ceremonial and judicial ones needed greater instruction; whence the knowledge of them pertained more principally to judges and priests; therefore they were not so given to the people immediately, but by the mediation of the lawgiver25.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Boeth., de Divisione: Nam quod apud omnes idem est naturae est; consuetudinis vero est quod apud aliquos permutatur. Cfr. supra pag. 114, nota 3. — Superius pro attendatur plures codd. intendatur.
    Boethius, On Division: For what is the same among all belongs to nature; but it belongs to custom that which is changed among some. Cf. above p. 114, note 3. — Above, for attendatur several codices read intendatur.
  2. Naturale enim secundum Aristot., Problem. sect. 15. n. 3, est quod semper atque ubique effici solet. — In maiori pro currit cod. K est.
    For the natural, according to Aristotle, Problems, section 15, n. 3, is that which is wont to be brought about always and everywhere. — In the major premise, for currit codex K reads est.
  3. Hilar., Tract. in Ps. 118. lit. 15. n. 11, exponens illud, Praevaricantes deputavi [sic] omnes peccatores terrae etc. ait: Sed hic praevaricatores esse existimantur omnes peccatores terrae; nullus excipitur, generaliter ad omnes praevaricationis nomen refertur. Lex enim veluti naturalis est iniuriam nemini inferre, nil alienum praeripere, fraude ac periurio abstinere etc. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 57. n. 1: Quia homines appetentes ea quae foris sunt, etiam a se ipsis exsules facti sunt, data est etiam conscripta lex, non quia in cordibus scripta non erat, sed quia tu fugitivus eras cordis tui, ab illo qui ubique est comprehenderis et ad te ipsum intro revocaris. Propterea scripta lex quid clamat eis qui deseruerunt legem scriptam in cordibus suis? Redite praevaricatores ad cor (Isai. 46, 8.). Quis enim te docuit... nolle, tibi furtum fieri? quis te docuit nolle iniuriam pati etc. Cfr. II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 9. n. 32, et Glossam ordinariam in Rom. 2, 14, et II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo ante pro rationis rectae, quod exhibent codd. A PQUVbb, alii cum edd. legis rectae.
    Hilary, Tract on Ps. 118, letter 15, n. 11, expounding the text I have accounted all the sinners of the earth prevaricators etc., says: But here all the sinners of the earth are reckoned to be prevaricators; no one is excepted, the name of prevarication is referred generally to all. For it is, as it were, a natural law to do injury to no one, to seize nothing of another's, to abstain from fraud and perjury etc. Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 57, n. 1: Because men, desiring the things that are without, have been made exiles even from themselves, a written law was also given, not because it was not written in their hearts, but because thou wast a fugitive from thy heart, thou art apprehended by him who is everywhere and recalled within to thyself. Therefore what does the written law cry out to those who have forsaken the law written in their hearts? Return, prevaricators, to the heart (Isaiah 46:8). For who taught thee... to be unwilling that theft be done to thee? who taught thee to be unwilling to suffer injury etc. Cf. On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount II, c. 9, n. 32, and the ordinary Gloss on Romans 2:14, and II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — A little before, for rationis rectae (of right reason), which codices A PQUVbb exhibit, others with the editions read legis rectae (of the right law).
  4. August., I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 6: Non sane ideo malum est [adulterium], quia vetatur Lege, sed ideo vetatur Lege, quia malum est.
    Augustine, On Free Choice I, c. 3, n. 6: Indeed [adultery] is not evil because it is forbidden by the Law, but it is forbidden by the Law because it is evil.
  5. Vers. 18: Cunctus autem populus videbat voces et lampades etc.; et v. 22: Vos vidistis, quod de caelo locutus sim vobis. Ibid. 31, 18: Deditque Dominus Moysi... duas tabulas testimonii lapideas, scriptas digito Dei. Cfr. 34, 1. et Deut. 9, 10. — In fine arg. pro principaliter cod. Z potius.
    Verse 18: And all the people saw the voices and the flames etc.; and v. 22: You have seen that I have spoken to you from heaven. Ibid. 31:18: And the Lord gave to Moses... two stone tables of testimony, written with the finger of God. Cf. 34:1 and Deuteronomy 9:10. — At the end of the argument, for principaliter codex Z reads potius.
  6. Vers. 7. — Glossam exhibet Petr. Lombard. et Lyranus ut interlinearem. Haymo, in hunc locum, ait: Nam concupiscentiam libidinis aliarumque malarum rerum nesciebam, subaudis: peccatum esse, nisi Lex diceret: Non concupisces. — In conclusione arg. post Non concupisces Vat. addit domum proximi tui, nec desiderabis uxorem eius nec servum etc.
    Verse 7. — The Gloss is exhibited by Peter Lombard and Lyra as interlinear. Haymo, on this passage, says: For I knew not the concupiscence of lust and of other evil things, understanding: to be sin, unless the Law had said: Thou shalt not covet. — At the conclusion of the argument, after Non concupisces the Vatican edition adds thy neighbor's house, neither shalt thou desire his wife nor servant etc.
  7. Cfr. Gen. 4, 7, ubi, peccato primorum parentum iam perpetrato, dicitur ad Cain: Sub te erit appetitus eius etc. — Inferius pro sequatur permulti codd. sequitur.
    Cf. Genesis 4:7, where, the sin of the first parents now perpetrated, it is said to Cain: Its appetite shall be under thee etc. — Below, for sequatur very many codices read sequitur.
  8. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118, ii. serm. 13. n. 1, exponens illa verba: Et custodiam Legem tuam semper, dicit: Neque enim praecepta Legis, sicut hic, etiam ibi [in caelo] accepturi sumus, quae custodiamus. — Cod. A pro ubi nihil substituit ubi nullum, et in initio arg. de dictamine cod. K ex dictamine pro secundum dictamen.
    Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 118, sermon 13, n. 1, expounding those words: And I will keep thy Law always, says: For we are not, as here, going to receive the precepts of the Law there too [in heaven], which we are to keep. — Codex A for ubi nihil substitutes ubi nullum, and at the beginning of the argument, for secundum dictamen codex K reads de dictamine (ex dictamine).
  9. Vers. 1. seqq., edd. allegant Exod. 34, sed codd. Levit. 20. — Pro ipsi populo cod. Z illi populo.
    Verse 1ff.; the editions cite Exodus 34, but the codices Leviticus 20. — For ipsi populo codex Z reads illi populo (to that people).
  10. Cfr. supra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. — Codd. Z aa pro quosdam bis quodam modo. — Ad duo prima membra subaudi: simpliciter.
    Cf. above, d. 25, a. 1, q. 2. — Codices Z aa for quosdam (twice) read quodam modo (in a certain way). — To the first two members understand: simply.
  11. Vat., paulo superius post ita omisso quod, cum edd. 1, 2 prosequitur statum legis scriptae respicit simpliciter et explicite vel lucide et distincte, secundum quod illa decem etc.
    The Vatican edition, a little above, having omitted quod after ita, continues with editions 1, 2: it regards the state of the written law simply and explicitly or lucidly and distinctly, according as those ten etc.
  12. Hugo de S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. XI. c. 7: Sola illa igitur, quae sic se habent, ut nunquam licite fieri possint, lex naturalis prohibuit; illa vero, quae nunquam licite possunt praetermitti, sola praecepit, media omnia ad utrumtibet relinquens. De prohibendis unum praeceptum in corde hominis scripsit: Quod tibi non vis fieri alii ne feceris (Tob. 4, 16.). De praecipiendis similiter unum: Quaecumque vultis, ut vobis faciant homines, et vos similiter facite illis (Matth. 7, 12.); ut videlicet homo ex sui consideratione disceret, qualem se erga proximum exhibere deberet. Cfr. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 57. n. 1, in Ps. 118. serm. 25. n. 4, et de Spiritu et littera (quasi per totum), ubi relationem legis naturalis, scriptae et evangelicae fusius exponit ac docet, gentes naturaliter quae Legis sunt fecisse, « quia non usque adeo in anima humana imago Dei terrenorum affectuum labe detrita est, ut nulla in ea velut lineamenta extrema remanserint » (c. 28. n. 48.).
    Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments I, p. XI, c. 7: Therefore the natural law prohibited only those things which are so constituted that they can never licitly be done; but it commanded only those which can never licitly be omitted, leaving all intermediate things to either side. Concerning things to be prohibited it wrote one precept in the heart of man: What thou wilt not have done to thee, do not to another (Tobit 4:16). Concerning things to be commanded likewise one: All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them (Matt. 7:12); namely so that man might learn from consideration of himself how he ought to show himself toward his neighbor. Cf. Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 57, n. 1, on Ps. 118, sermon 25, n. 4, and On the Spirit and the Letter (almost throughout), where he more fully expounds the relation of the natural, written, and evangelical law and teaches that the gentiles did by nature the things that are of the Law, « because the image of God in the human soul has not been so worn away by the stain of earthly affections that no traces of it, as it were, remain » (c. 28, n. 48).
  13. Non pauci codd. incongrue obligatur.
    Not a few codices incongruously read obligatur (is obligated).
  14. Vers. 6–13. — Paulo superius pro ortum habet edd. ortum habuit.
    Verses 6–13. — A little above, for ortum habet (arises) the editions read ortum habuit (arose).
  15. Cod. A regulari.
    Codex A reads regulari (to be regulated).
  16. De his rationibus cfr. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. 5, 20. (inter opera Ambros.); I. Quaest. ex vet. Testam. q. 4. (inter opera August.); et Cassiodor. in Ps. 77, 5, ubi exponens illud: Et suscitavit testimonium in Iacob etc., ait: Suscitatum autem dixit, quasi in lucem redditum, quod somno ignorantiae videbatur oppressum. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.
    Concerning these reasons cf. the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 5:20 (among the works of Ambrose); Questions on the Old Testament I, q. 4 (among the works of Augustine); and Cassiodorus on Ps. 77:5, where, expounding the text And he raised up a testimony in Jacob etc., he says: But he said "raised up," as if "brought back to light," that which seemed oppressed by the sleep of ignorance. See also here the Master's text, c. 5.
  17. Alcuin., Interrogat. et respons. in Gen. interrog. 14, in qua ad quaestionem: quare Deus in principio Legem non dedit, quam postea per Moysen tradidit? respondet: Quia in hominibus primis diu lex bonae naturae servabatur; at ubi naturalis lex evanuit, oblata consuetudine peccandi, data est lex litterae per Moysen, ut bona quae sciebantur, auctoritatem haberent, et quae latere coeperant manifestarentur; et ut terror disciplinae corrigeret delinquentes et fidem reformaret in Deum. — Paulo superius pro introducendam edd. cum aliquot codd. inducendam.
    Alcuin, Questions and Answers on Genesis, question 14, in which to the question: why did God not give in the beginning the Law which he afterward handed down through Moses? he answers: Because among the first men the law of good nature was long kept; but when the natural law vanished, the custom of sinning having come in, the law of the letter was given through Moses, so that the good things which were known might have authority, and the things which had begun to lie hidden might be made manifest; and so that the terror of discipline might correct the offenders and reform faith in God. — A little above, for introducendam the editions with some codices read inducendam.
  18. Rom. 7, 7: Sed peccatum non cognovi nisi per Legem. — Mox pro est, quod in codd. desideratur, cod. Z habetur.
    Romans 7:7: But I did not know sin except through the Law. — Presently, for est, which is wanting in the codices, codex Z reads habetur.
  19. Contextu exigente, supplevimus hoc loco non, quod solus cod. K hic habet; eadem particula a cod. bb et edd. 1, 2 perperam inferius verbis illi statui subiungitur. Vat. ibi legit illi statui non habent convenire nisi implicite, et hoc modo etc. Cod. A brevius, sed sufficienter: dicendum, quod verum est de his quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae in generali etc.
    The context requiring it, we have here supplied non, which codex K alone here has; the same particle is by codex bb and editions 1, 2 wrongly subjoined below to the words illi statui. The Vatican edition there reads they do not befit that state except implicitly, and in this way etc. Codex A more briefly, but sufficiently: it must be said that it is true of those things which are from the dictate of the law of nature in general etc.
  20. Cfr. supra d. 33. q. 6. et d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. — August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 13. n. 4: Neque enim praecepta Legis, sicut hic, etiam ibi accepturi sumus, quae custodiamus, sed ipsam Legis, ut dixi, plenitudinem sine ullo peccandi timore servabimus; quia et Deum plenius, cum viderimus, amabimus, et proximum, quia Deus erit omnia in omnibus (I. Cor. 15, 28.), nec falsae cuiquam de proximo suspicioni erit locus, ubi nullus ulli erit occultus. — Superius pro gloriae non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 gratiae; perperam.
    Cf. above, d. 33, q. 6, and d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. — Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 118, sermon 13, n. 4: For we are not, as here, going to receive the precepts of the Law there too, which we are to keep, but we shall keep, as I said, the very fullness of the Law without any fear of sinning; because we shall both love God more fully, when we shall have seen him, and our neighbor, because God will be all in all (1 Cor. 15:28), nor will there be place for any false suspicion concerning one's neighbor, where no one will be hidden from anyone. — Above, for gloriae not a few codices and editions 1, 2 read gratiae (of grace); wrongly.
  21. Ita edd. cum aliquibus codd., codd. K X manifestabitur, alii manifestabit, codd. A I L manifestabat. Pro simpliciter et explicite cod. A simpliciter et implicite. Aliquanto superius pro natura dictat cod. K bis ratio dictat. In fine solut. pro instructionem codd. A Z et edd. 1, 2 institutionem.
    Thus the editions with some codices; codices K X read manifestabitur (will be made manifest), others manifestabit, codices A I L manifestabat. For simpliciter et explicite codex A reads simpliciter et implicite. Somewhat above, for natura dictat codex K twice reads ratio dictat (reason dictates). At the end of the solution, for instructionem codices A Z and editions 1, 2 read institutionem.
  22. In cod. K additur natura.
    In codex K natura is added.
  23. Isidor., Comment. in Exod. c. 29: Quare in tabulis lapideis? Signat, Iudaeos dura cervice fuisse. Cfr. August., XV. contra Faustum, c. 4.
    Isidore, Commentary on Exodus, c. 29: Why on tablets of stone? It signifies that the Jews were of a stiff neck. Cf. Augustine, Against Faustus XV, c. 4.
  24. Multi codd. vel, cod. A quam.
    Many codices read vel (or), codex A quam (than).
  25. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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