Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 42
Articulus II. De comparatione peccati venialis ad mortale.
Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum, scilicet de comparatione venialis ad mortale. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.
Primo quaeritur, utrum peccatum veniale et mortale conveniant in aversione.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum conveniant in reatu sive obligatione ad aeternitatem poenae.
Quaestio I. Utrum peccatum veniale et mortale conveniant in aversione.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum veniale et mortale conveniant in aversione. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Augustinus2 definiens peccatum dicit, quod « peccatum non est appetitus rerum malarum, sed desertio meliorum ». Si ergo veniale peccatum peccatum est, ergo in ipso est desertio summi boni; sed ubi est desertio summi boni, ibi est aversio: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod haec ratio conveniat mortali tantum; tunc ego quaero: in quo communicant3 veniale et mortale, ratione cuius utrumque dicatur peccatum? Si tu dicas, quod in conversione ad commutabile bonum; hoc non videtur, quia converti ad commutabile bonum non est peccatum, nisi per illud recedat homo a bono incommutabili; peccatum enim est privatio, non positio. Si ergo veniale peccatum, in quantum peccatum est, communicat cum mortali, et illud, in quo communicat, non est conversio: ergo est aversio.
2. Item, omne illud, quod est contra divinum praeceptum, avertit a Deo; sed veniale est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Maior per se manifesta est; minor probatur. Ad Romanos septimo4 super illud: Non concupisces; Glossa: « Bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omnia mala prohibet »: ergo si peccatum veniale est malum, ergo per illud praeceptum: Non concupisces, est prohibitum.
3. Item, omne illud, quod deformat imaginem, avertit a Deo; peccatum veniale est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Minor probatur per illud quod dicitur sexto Musicae5: « Amor inferioris pulcritudinis animam polluit »; sed peccatum veniale est amor inferioris pulcritudinis: ergo etc.
4. Item, simplex, ad quod se convertit, totaliter se convertit6; sed tam intellectus quam affectus est simplex: ergo cum se convertit ad aliquid, totaliter se convertit. Sed quod totaliter se convertit ad aliquid avertitur ab eius opposito vel disparato: ergo cum affectus noster se convertit ad creaturam sub ratione creaturae, necesse est, ipsum averti a Deo. Sed hoc est in veniali peccato: ergo etc.
5. Item, impossibile est, quod aliquid moveatur ad terminum ad quem, quin aliquo modo separetur a termino a quo; sed conversio dicit motum animi respectu termini ad quem, aversio autem respectu termini a quo: ergo si conversio est in veniali peccato, necesse est, quod similiter sit aversio.
6. Item, omnis amor creaturae vel est per modum usus, vel per modum fruitionis, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana7; sed in peccato veniali est amor creaturae: ergo vel per modum usus, vel fruitionis. Non per modum usus, quia iam non esset culpa; est ergo amor fruitionis. Sed frui creatura est ponere finem in creatura; et hoc non est aliud quam averti a Deo: ergo omnis amor venialis peccati facit a Deo averti.
Sed contra: 1. Nullus aversus a Deo est iustus; sed peccans venialiter remanet in iustitia: ergo peccans venialiter non avertitur a Deo. Maior manifesta est; minor probatur per illud Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto8: Septies in die cadit iustus et resurget.
2. Item, nullus separatur a Deo nisi volens; sed omnis qui avertitur, separatur a Deo: ergo nullus separatur a Deo nisi in actu, quem facit mera voluntate. Sed multa venialia peccata committimus quadam necessitate, sicut dicitur ad Romanos septimo9: Quod nolo malum, illud facio: ergo etc.
3. Item, nullus avertitur a Deo sine ipsius Dei contemptu et offensa10; sed nullus contemnit et offendit Deum sine gravi culpa; sed veniale inter levia peccata reponitur: ergo per veniale homo non avertitur a Deo.
4. Item, nihil, quod stat simul cum caritate, avertit a Deo; sed veniale stat simul cum caritate: ergo etc. Maior manifesta est; minor probatur: quia, si veniale expelleret caritatem, ergo auferret homini vitam gratiae. Sed peccatum, quod aufert homini vitam gratiae, ponit mortem et dicitur mortale: ergo peccatum veniale esset mortale.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Peccatum veniale non communicat cum mortali in aversione, secundum quod aversio dicitur proprie.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio peccatum veniale non communicat cum mortali in aversione, secundum quod aversio dicitur proprie. Importat enim Dei contemptum, et contemptus Dei iram meretur et mortem11; peccatum autem, quo quis meretur iram et mortem, non debet dici veniale, immo potius mortale. Et propterea communiter tenetur, quod aversio, proprie loquendo, reperitur in peccato mortali, non in veniali.
Et istud melius patet, si modum attendamus, per quem homo dicitur averti a Deo et contemnere Deum, committendo aliquod peccatum, in quo nihil cogitat de Deo. Aut enim avertitur homo a Deo, quia facit contra divinum mandatum; aut quia ponit sibi bonum creatum tanquam finem ultimum. In hoc namque, quod facit contra divinum mandatum, recte12 a Deo avertitur; quia mandatum est via recte perveniendi ad Deum et tendendi in Deum. Qui igitur facit contra mandatum incedit directe via contraria; ideo quasi faciem suam retrorsum convertens, tergum vertit ad illum, in quem debebat per mandatum tendere13. — Similiter, cum statuit sibi creaturam tanquam finem ultimum, recte dicitur a Deo averti. Anima enim media est inter creaturam et Deum, in quantum est imago Dei14. Dum ergo ad creaturam se tanquam ad finem convertit, faciem suam, quae debebat esse sursum versa, deorsum inclinat, et ideo se avertit a Deo. — Et utroque dictorum modorum non est aversio sine contemptu. Nam qui mandatum Dei transgreditur contemnit mandantem. Similiter, qui creaturam sibi finem statuit principalem magis appretiat creaturam15 quam Deum; et hoc non potest esse sine Dei contemptu.
Veniale autem peccatum nec est directe contra Dei mandatum, nec statuit creaturam tanquam finem ultimum; et ideo non est in eo nec aversio nec contemptus. Sed quia veniale fit praeter Dei mandatum, in veniali etiam peccato creatura non refertur in Deum; hinc est, quod per veniale quodam modo recedit homo a via mandati, quodam modo etiam morose adhaeret ei, per quod deberet transire. Unde et in veniali est quaedam elongatio et quaedam retardatio. — Unde conceditur, quod veniale a Deo non avertit, sed elongat, a Deo non separat, sed retardat. Et si large nomen aversionis acciperetur, ut se extenderet ad elongationem et retardationem, in veniali esset aversio quaedam. Quia tamen nomen aversionis sonat in contemptum: ideo tenendum est, quod avertere a Deo sit mortalis peccati proprie. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod peccatum est desertio; dicendum, quod si ista definitio detur pro peccato mortali, desertio stat ibi pro aversione. Si autem detur pro quolibet peccato, desertio dicit quandam elongationem et retardationem16. — Posset tamen dici, quod non dicitur ibi peccatum desertio Dei, sed desertio cuiuscumque boni, quod spectat ad rectitudinem. Quamvis ergo in veniali peccato non sit desertio Dei, est tamen desertio alicuius bonae circumstantiae circa actum, ex cuius defectu incidit veniale peccatum17. Et in hoc communicant tam veniale quam mortale peccatum, quia utrumque privat aliquod bonum. Sed in hoc differunt, quod mortale privat aliquem actum vel circumstantiam necessariam ad salutem, veniale vero non.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veniale est18 contra Dei prohibitionem; dicendum, quod illud proprie dicitur esse contra Dei prohibitionem, ad cuius oppositum obligat prohibitio; veniale autem non est huiusmodi, et ideo non est directe prohibitum. Est tamen ipsi prohibitioni annexum, et magis proprie debet dici cohibitum, quam prohibitum. Et hoc patet, quia, cum Deus prohibet concupiscentiam dicens1: Non concupisces; non prohibet primum motum concupiscentiae, sed concupiscentiae progressum, secundum illud Ecclesiastici decimo octavo: Fili, post concupiscentias tuas non eas; sed dum prohibet, hominem ire post motum concupiscentiae, hoc ipso manifestat, quod concupiscentiae motus non est bonus nec Deo placitus.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor inferioris pulcritudinis polluit animam; dicendum, quod anima dupliciter habet pollui: aut macula mortalis2 peccati, quae quidem expellit nitorem gratiae; aut macula venialis peccati, quae quodam modo retardat actum dilectionis gratuitae. Et prima pollutio est per mortale et facit ad deformationem imaginis, quia aufert ei formam, scilicet imaginem recreationis. Secunda vero est pollutio venialis, quae, etsi aliquo modo polluat, non tamen animam deformat, quia stat simul cum gratia, quae animam informat.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplex, ad quod se convertit, totaliter se convertit; dicendum, quod hoc tripliciter3 potest intelligi: quia totaliter potest dicere totalitatem quantum ad actum convertendi, vel quantum ad habitum, vel quantum ad potentiam convertendi. Si intelligatur quantum ad actum; sic verum est, ad minus secundum statum viae, quia non intelligimus simul et semel nisi unum solum; aut si multa simul intelligamus et velimus, hoc est, in quantum sunt unum4. — Si autem dicat totalitatem habitus, vel virtutis; sic falsus est sermo. Non enim oportet, quod quando anima vel aliquod simplex convertit se ad aliquid, convertat se secundum totum suum habitum et secundum totam suam potentiam, quia potest converti intensius et remissius. — Cum ergo dicitur, quod quando affectus se convertit ad unum totaliter, avertitur ab eius opposito sive disparato; si primo modo intelligatur, falsum est5, quia potest se convertere ad unum in actu, et ad aliud in habitu; si secundo modo, vel tertio intelligatur, sic habet veritatem. Sed maior propositio fuit falsa, et propter hoc, quia totaliter converti aliter accipitur in maiori propositione, et aliter in minori; ideo consequentia illa non tenet. Et si tu obiicias, quod non potest affici simul et semel erga Deum et erga creaturam, quam inordinate diligit, unde cum convertitur ad unum, avertitur ab altero; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia averti plus dicit quam non converti actualiter; importat enim contrarium conversionis, videlicet quandam aspernationem Dei sive contemptum.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus separat a termino a quo; dicendum, quod verum est de illo motu proprie dicto, qui concernit duos terminos, unum a quo incipit, et alterum in quem tendit. Non sic est in actu venialis peccati. Anima enim, cum peccat venialiter, non movetur a Deo in creaturam, sed magis afficitur circa ipsam creaturam. Unde et veniale peccatum potius est animi affectus sive actus quam motus.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor venialis peccati est amor fruitionis; dicendum, quod falsum est, secundum quod frui accipitur proprie,6 videlicet quiescere in aliquo tanquam ad finem ultimum; sic enim frui est per mortale, non per veniale. — Si ergo quaerat, utrum sit usus, vel fruitio; dicendum, quod nec est usus nec fruitio, sed abusus, nisi forte usus dicatur large omnis amor, quo quis amat aliquid, non quiescens in illo, sed refert7 ad aliud actu vel habitu, sive referat recte, sive minus recte. Et quod illud oporteat dicere, manifestum est. Cum enim aliquis diligit aliquam creaturam, referens ad aliud, non tamen ad illud ad quod debet, amore illo peccat; nec tamen illud est fruitio nec usus proprie dictus, sed magis proprie debet dici abusus. Unde Augustinus, cum dicit: Omnis qui amat aliquid, aut amat utens, aut fruens, accipit large usum et fruitionem: usum pro omni amore relato, sive directe8, sive indirecte; fruitionem pro omni amore non relato, sive statuat ibi finem principalem, sive non. Et sic in divisione illa comprehenditur amor venialis peccati, nisi forte quis velit dicere, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de amore ordinato. Et sic patent omnia.
I. Non omnia peccata ex natura sua esse mortalia, sed aliqua esse venialia, fide catholica constat (Concil. Trid. Sess. VI. c. 11.). Circa hunc articulum, praeter Wiclefum et novatores saeculi XVI, erravit etiam Baius, ut patet ex eius propositione 20. condemnata: « Nullum est peccatum ex natura sua veniale, sed omne peccatum meretur poenam aeternam ». — De divisionibus variis peccatorum cfr. hic dub. 2. — De triplici peccato veniali, et quomodo veniale fieri possit mortale, vide IV. Sent. d. 16. p. II. a. 3. q. 1, d. 17. p. II. dub. 7.
Variis loquendi modis utuntur antiqui magistri, ut distinguant veniale peccatum a mortali, qui tamen, secundum mentem auctorum explicati, idem dicunt. Quod igitur hic in corp. dicitur, scilicet, veniale peccatum non esse directe contra Dei mandatum, sed praeter illud, quod etiam a S. Thoma (S. 1. II. q. 88. a. 1. ad 1.) repetitur; hoc explicatur per contextum ac in solutionibus ad 1. 2. 5. 6; et eo sensu intelligitur, quod non sit ita contra legem, ut finis legis et plenitudo eius, quae est caritas, elidatur. — Observatione autem digna est explicatio in solut. ad 4, quomodo voluntas in actu se convertere possit ad unum, et ad aliud in habitu.
De hac quaestione auctores (plerumque sub aliis titulis): Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 2. 4. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 21. q. 1. et aliis locis collectis ab Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 88. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. 4; S. loc. et art. cit.; de Malo, q. 7. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4. a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tor., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., de hoc et seq. q. hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.
II. Quoad sequentem (2.) quaest., ut refert Richard. a Med. (loc. cit.), fuerunt qui assererent, omne peccatum deliberate commissum, etiam veniale, per se obligare ad poenam aeternam. Alii, ut Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. m. 9.), ob rationem in 2. arg. ad oppos. allegatam tantum putarunt, aeternitatem poenae non constituere differentiam essentialem inter peccatum mortale et veniale, quia in dicto casu veniale mereatur poenam aeternam. Ab aliis autem cum S. Bonav. respondetur, pro casu supposito veniale obligare ad aeternitatem poenae tantum per accidens. Scotus autem (IV. Sent. d. 21. q. 1. n. 3-6.) ne hoc quidem concedendum esse putat.
Praeter citatos auctores: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5; S. 1. II. q. 87. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Durand., hic q. 7.
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Article II. On the comparison of venial sin to mortal sin.
Consequently, inquiry is made concerning the second point, namely concerning the comparison of venial to mortal sin. And concerning this two questions are asked.
First it is asked whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion.
Second it is asked whether they agree in guilt, or in obligation to the eternity of punishment.
Question I. Whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion. And that they do seems to be the case.
1. Augustine2, in defining sin, says that « sin is not the appetite for evil things, but the desertion of better things ». If therefore venial sin is sin, then in it there is desertion of the highest good; but where there is desertion of the highest good, there is aversion: therefore, etc. If you should say that this argument applies to mortal sin only, then I ask: in what do venial and mortal sin agree3, by reason of which each is called sin? If you should say, in the conversion to a changeable good, this does not seem so, because to turn to a changeable good is not a sin, unless through it a man recedes from the unchangeable good; for sin is privation, not position. If therefore venial sin, insofar as it is sin, agrees with mortal, and that in which it agrees is not conversion, then it is aversion.
2. Likewise, everything that is contrary to a divine precept turns away from God; but venial sin is of this kind: therefore, etc. The major is manifest of itself; the minor is proved. To the Romans, chapter seven4, on that text: Thou shalt not covet; the Gloss: « Good is the law, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils »: therefore, if venial sin is an evil, then by that precept Thou shalt not covet it is forbidden.
3. Likewise, everything that deforms the image turns away from God; venial sin is of this kind: therefore, etc. The minor is proved by what is said in the sixth book of On Music5: « Love of an inferior beauty pollutes the soul »; but venial sin is the love of an inferior beauty: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, a simple thing, in respect to that to which it turns, turns wholly6; but both the intellect and the affection are simple: therefore, when it turns to something, it turns wholly. But what turns wholly to something is turned away from its opposite or its disparate: therefore, when our affection turns to a creature under the aspect of a creature, it is necessary that it be turned away from God. But this is the case in venial sin: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, it is impossible for anything to be moved to the term to which without being in some way separated from the term from which; but conversion bespeaks a motion of the mind in respect to the term to which, and aversion in respect to the term from which: therefore, if conversion is in venial sin, it is necessary that there likewise be aversion.
6. Likewise, all love of a creature is either by way of use or by way of enjoyment, as Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine7; but in venial sin there is love of a creature: therefore either by way of use or of enjoyment. Not by way of use, for then it would no longer be a fault; therefore it is the love of enjoyment. But to enjoy a creature is to place one's end in a creature; and this is nothing other than to be turned away from God: therefore all love of venial sin causes a turning away from God.
On the contrary: 1. No one turned away from God is just; but one who sins venially remains in justice: therefore one who sins venially is not turned away from God. The major is manifest; the minor is proved by that text of Proverbs, chapter twenty-four8: Seven times a day the just man falls and rises again.
2. Likewise, no one is separated from God except willingly; but everyone who is turned away is separated from God: therefore no one is separated from God except in an act which he does by sheer will. But we commit many venial sins by a certain necessity, as is said to the Romans, chapter seven9: The evil that I would not, that I do: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, no one is turned away from God without contempt of God himself and offense10; but no one contemns and offends God without grave fault; but venial sin is reckoned among the light sins: therefore by venial sin a man is not turned away from God.
4. Likewise, nothing that stands together with charity turns away from God; but venial sin stands together with charity: therefore, etc. The major is manifest; the minor is proved: because, if venial sin expelled charity, then it would take from a man the life of grace. But a sin that takes from a man the life of grace inflicts death and is called mortal: therefore venial sin would be mortal.
Conclusio
Conclusion. Venial sin does not agree with mortal sin in aversion, according as aversion is taken properly.
I respond: It must be said that, without doubt, venial sin does not agree with mortal sin in aversion, according as aversion is taken properly. For it implies contempt of God, and contempt of God merits wrath and death11; but a sin by which one merits wrath and death ought not to be called venial, but rather mortal. And therefore it is commonly held that aversion, properly speaking, is found in mortal sin, not in venial.
And this appears better if we attend to the manner by which a man is said to be turned away from God and to contemn God, by committing some sin in which he thinks nothing of God. For either a man is turned away from God because he acts against a divine command; or because he sets up a created good for himself as his ultimate end. For in this, that he acts against a divine command, he is rightly12 turned away from God; because the command is the way of rightly arriving at God and tending toward God. He therefore who acts against the command proceeds straight along the contrary way; and so, as it were turning his face backward, he turns his back upon him toward whom he ought to have tended by the command13. — Likewise, when he sets up a creature for himself as his ultimate end, he is rightly said to be turned away from God. For the soul is midway between the creature and God, inasmuch as it is the image of God14. When therefore it turns to a creature as to its end, it bends downward its face, which ought to have been turned upward, and therefore it turns itself away from God. — And in both of the said modes there is no aversion without contempt. For he who transgresses God's command contemns the commander. Likewise, he who sets up a creature for himself as his principal end values the creature15 more than God; and this cannot be without contempt of God.
Venial sin, however, is neither directly against God's command, nor does it set up a creature as its ultimate end; and therefore there is in it neither aversion nor contempt. But because venial sin is committed beside God's command, in venial sin too a creature is not referred to God; hence it is that through venial sin a man in some way recedes from the way of the command, and in some way also lingers slothfully upon that by which he ought to pass through. Hence in venial sin too there is a certain elongation and a certain retardation. — Hence it is conceded that venial sin does not turn away from God but elongates, does not separate from God but retards. And if the name aversion were taken broadly, so that it extended to elongation and retardation, in venial sin there would be a certain aversion. Yet because the name aversion sounds toward contempt, therefore it must be held that to turn away from God belongs properly to mortal sin. — Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded.
1. To that, then, which is objected first, that sin is a desertion; it must be said that, if this definition is given for mortal sin, desertion there stands for aversion. But if it is given for any sin whatever, desertion bespeaks a certain elongation and retardation16. — Yet it could be said that sin is not there called desertion of God, but desertion of any good whatsoever which pertains to rectitude. Therefore although in venial sin there is no desertion of God, there is nonetheless desertion of some good circumstance about the act, from the defect of which venial sin arises17. And in this both venial and mortal sin agree, because each deprives of some good. But in this they differ, that mortal sin deprives of some act or circumstance necessary for salvation, but venial does not.
2. To that which is objected, that venial sin is18 against God's prohibition; it must be said that that is properly said to be against God's prohibition to whose opposite the prohibition obliges; but venial sin is not of this kind, and therefore it is not directly prohibited. It is, however, attached to the prohibition itself, and more properly ought to be called restrained than prohibited. And this is plain, because, when God forbids concupiscence saying1: Thou shalt not covet; he does not forbid the first motion of concupiscence, but the progress of concupiscence, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter eighteen: Son, go not after thy lusts; but while he forbids a man to go after the motion of concupiscence, by this very fact he makes manifest that the motion of concupiscence is not good nor pleasing to God.
3. To that which is objected, that the love of an inferior beauty pollutes the soul; it must be said that the soul can be polluted in two ways: either by the stain of mortal2 sin, which indeed expels the splendor of grace; or by the stain of venial sin, which in some way retards the act of gratuitous love. And the first pollution is by mortal sin and tends toward the deformation of the image, because it takes from it its form, namely the image of re-creation. But the second is a venial pollution, which, although it pollutes in some way, nonetheless does not deform the soul, because it stands together with grace, which informs the soul.
4. To that which is objected, that a simple thing, in respect to that to which it turns, turns wholly; it must be said that this can be understood in three ways3: for "wholly" can bespeak totality with respect to the act of turning, or with respect to the habit, or with respect to the power of turning. If it is understood with respect to the act, then it is true, at least according to the state of the wayfarer, because we do not understand more than one thing at once; or if we understand and will many things at once, this is insofar as they are one4. — But if it bespeaks totality of habit or of virtue, then the statement is false. For it is not necessary that, when a soul or some simple thing turns to something, it turn according to its whole habit and according to its whole power, because it can turn more intensely and more remissly. — When therefore it is said that, when the affection turns to one thing wholly, it is turned away from its opposite or its disparate; if it is understood in the first way, it is false5, because it can turn to one thing in act and to another in habit; if it is understood in the second or third way, then it holds true. But the major proposition was false, and on this account, because to turn wholly is taken in one sense in the major proposition and in another in the minor; therefore that consequence does not hold. And if you object that one cannot be affected at one and the same time toward God and toward a creature which one inordinately loves, whence, when one turns to the one, one turns away from the other; it must be said that it does not follow, because to be turned away says more than not to turn actually; for it implies the contrary of conversion, namely a certain spurning of God or contempt.
5. To that which is objected, that motion separates from the term from which; it must be said that this is true of that motion properly so called, which involves two terms, one from which it begins and another to which it tends. It is not so in the act of venial sin. For the soul, when it sins venially, is not moved from God into the creature, but rather is affected about the creature itself. Hence venial sin is rather an affection of the mind, or act, than a motion.
6. To that which is objected, that the love of venial sin is the love of enjoyment; it must be said that this is false, according as to enjoy is taken properly,6 namely to rest in something as in an ultimate end; for thus to enjoy is by mortal sin, not by venial. — If therefore one should ask whether it be use or enjoyment; it must be said that it is neither use nor enjoyment, but abuse, unless perhaps "use" be taken broadly for all love by which one loves something, not resting in it but referring7 it to another in act or in habit, whether one refers it rightly or less rightly. And that one must say this is manifest. For when someone loves some creature, referring it to another, yet not to that to which he ought, by that love he sins; nor yet is that enjoyment or use properly so called, but more properly ought to be called abuse. Hence Augustine, when he says: Everyone who loves something either loves using or loves enjoying, takes use and enjoyment broadly: use for every referred love, whether directly8 or indirectly; enjoyment for every unreferred love, whether he sets his principal end there or not. And so in that division the love of venial sin is comprehended, unless perhaps one wishes to say that Augustine is there speaking of ordered love. And thus all things are clear.
I. That not all sins are by their nature mortal, but that some are venial, is established by the Catholic faith (Council of Trent, Session VI, c. 11). Concerning this article, besides Wyclif and the innovators of the sixteenth century, Baius also erred, as is plain from his condemned proposition 20: « No sin is by its nature venial, but every sin merits eternal punishment ». — On the various divisions of sins, cf. here dubium 2. — On the threefold venial sin, and how a venial sin can become mortal, see IV Sent., d. 16, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, and d. 17, p. II, dub. 7.
The ancient masters use various manners of speaking in order to distinguish venial sin from mortal, who nonetheless, when explained according to the mind of the authors, say the same thing. What therefore is said here in the body, namely that venial sin is not directly against God's command but beside it — which is also repeated by St. Thomas (S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1) — this is explained by the context and in the solutions to 1, 2, 5, 6; and it is understood in this sense, that it is not so against the law that the end of the law and its fullness, which is charity, is destroyed. — Worthy of note, moreover, is the explanation in the solution to 4, how the will in act can turn to one thing and to another in habit.
On this question, the authors (mostly under other titles): Alex. of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 108, m. 2, 4. — Scotus, in both Commentaries, II Sent., d. 21, q. 1, and in other places collected by Hier. of Montefortino, t. III, q. 88, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, 4; Summa, loc. and art. cit.; de Malo, q. 7, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; Summa, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4, a. 3, 4. — Petr. a Tor., here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following q. here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 6. — Dionysius Carthusian, on this and the following q. here q. 3.
II. As regards the following (2nd) question, as Richard of Mediavilla reports (loc. cit.), there were some who asserted that every sin deliberately committed, even venial, of itself obliges to eternal punishment. Others, such as Alex. of Hales (loc. cit. m. 9), on account of the argument alleged in the 2nd argument to the contrary, thought only that the eternity of punishment does not constitute an essential difference between mortal and venial sin, because in the said case venial sin would merit eternal punishment. By others, however, together with St. Bonaventure, it is answered that, in the supposed case, venial sin obliges to the eternity of punishment only per accidens. But Scotus (IV Sent., d. 21, q. 1, n. 3-6) thinks that not even this is to be conceded.
Besides the cited authors: St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5; Summa I-II, q. 87, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; Summa, p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4, a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, loc. cit. a. 4. — Durandus, here q. 7.
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- De Natura boni, c. 34. et 36. In definitione ex August. allata textus originalis pro appetitus rerum exhibet appetitio naturarum. Cfr. supra pag. 838, nota 8.Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, c. 34 and 36. In the definition cited from Augustine, the original text reads appetitio naturarum in place of appetitus rerum. Cf. above, p. 838, note 8.
- Plurima codd. et edd. 1, 2 communicat.Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read communicat (singular).
- Vers. 7. — Ipsa verba Glossae vide supra pag. 528, nota 4. et pag. 721, nota 2.Verse 7. — For the very words of the Gloss see above, p. 528, note 4, and p. 721, note 2.
- Cap. 14. n. 46. — Pro dicitur sexto Musicae in Vat. legitur dicit Augustinus, et ad marginem habetur lib. 6. Music.Chapter 14, n. 46. — In place of it is said in the sixth book of On Music, the Vatican edition reads Augustine says, and in the margin has bk. 6 of On Music.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 36. (c. 7.).Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 36 (c. 7).
- Libr. I. c. 3. n. 3. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 2.Book I, c. 3, n. 3. Cf. I Sent., the text of the Master, d. I, c. 2.
- Vers. 16. Vulgata: Septies enim cadit etc., omissis verbis in die. Altera autem lectio in antiquis auctoribus vulgo occurrit.Verse 16. The Vulgate: For seven times he falls etc., the words in die being omitted. But the other reading commonly occurs in the ancient authors.
- Vers. 15. 16. 19. De hac minori cfr. supra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro peccata committimus edd. praeter 1 exhibent peccata committuntur.Verses 15, 16, 19. On this minor cf. above, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — In place of we commit sins the editions besides 1 read sins are committed.
- Averti enim, ut Magister explicat supra d. V. c. 1, est odio habere vel invidere.For to be turned away, as the Master explains above, d. V, c. 1, is to hold in hatred or to be envious.
- Vat. iram incurrit et meretur mortem.The Vatican edition: incurs wrath and merits death.
- Id est directe, sive, si placet, vere.That is, directly, or, if you prefer, truly.
- Epist. II. Petr. 2, 21: Melius enim erat illis non cognoscere viam iustitiae, quam post agnitionem retrorsum converti ab eo quod traditum est illis sancto mandato.2 Peter 2:21: For it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than, after they had known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them.
- August., Epist. 140 (alias 120), sive Liber de gratia novi Testamenti ad Honoratum, c. 2. n. 3.Augustine, Letter 140 (formerly 120), or the Book on the Grace of the New Testament to Honoratus, c. 2, n. 3.
- Codd. et edd. 1, 2 appretiatur.The codices and editions 1, 2 read appretiatur.
- Cod. T sic: desertio stat ibi pro quadam elongatione et retardatione.Codex T thus: desertion there stands for a certain elongation and retardation.
- Respicitur illa peccati definitio, quae habetur supra d. 35. dub. 6. in fine: Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni. — Edd., excepta 1, perperam incidit in veniale peccatum.Reference is made to that definition of sin which is found above, d. 35, dub. 6, at the end: Sin is an act arising from a defect of good. — The editions, except 1, wrongly read incurs into venial sin.
- Non pauci codd., ut CFKLRS (T a prima manu) ee etc., cum edd. 2, 3, 4 falso non est.Not a few codices, such as CFKLRS (T by the first hand) ee etc., together with editions 2, 3, 4, wrongly read is not.
- Deut. 5, 21; Exod. 20, 17. Verba Eccli. habentur cap. cit. v. 30. Cfr. August., I. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 29. n. 32.Deuteronomy 5:21; Exodus 20:17. The words of Ecclesiasticus are found in the cited chapter, v. 30. Cf. Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence I, c. 29, n. 32.
- Dictio nitor gratiae lectorem revocat ad illam gratiae definitionem, quae supra pag. 648, nota 8. proposita est: Gratia est quidam nitor animae ad conciliandum sanctum amorem. — Aliquanto inferius pro quae, etsi codd. F K Y ee ee etc. atque ed. 1 substituunt quod, etsi.The expression splendor of grace recalls the reader to that definition of grace which was proposed above, p. 648, note 8: Grace is a certain splendor of the soul for procuring holy love. — A little further down, in place of quae, etsi, the codices F K Y ee ee etc. and edition 1 substitute quod, etsi.
- Codd. et primae edd. dupliciter, contra subnexa.The codices and the first editions read dupliciter (in two ways), against what follows.
- Cfr. verba Aristot. supra pag. 79, nota 2. in fine allata.Cf. the words of Aristotle cited above, p. 79, note 2, at the end.
- Cod. M sic falsum est.Codex M: thus it is false.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 in fine ultimo.The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4: in an ultimate end.
- Cod. T bene referens, multi alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2 referat.Codex T rightly referring; many other codices with editions 1, 2 read referat.
- Intellige cum codd. H K T V recte. Deinde pro indirecte cod. V non recte. Paulo inferius pro nisi forte Vat. sive forte.Understand with codices H K T V rightly. Then, in place of indirectly, codex V reads not rightly. A little further down, in place of nisi forte, the Vatican edition reads sive forte.